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ABSTRACT 
The Shari‘a Courts of Mogadishu: Beyond “African Islam” and “Islamic Law” 
By  
Ahmed Ibrahim 
Advisor: Vincent Crapanzano 
This dissertation, based on a year and eight months of fieldwork, is a historical ethnography 
of a Shari‘a-based movement which appeared in Mogadishu, Somalia within a year after the 
complete disintegration of the central government in 1991. The movement originated when 
religious authorities and “traditional” elders established centers in various neighborhoods in 
Mogadishu to deal with the vacuum of power after the fall of the state. Since Shari‘a 
structures of authority and discourse were integral to the formation and functioning of the 
centers, they became known as Shari‘a courts. My work on the Shari‘a courts intervenes in 
the literature on contemporary Islamic movements in two ways: a) I argue that the practices, 
norms, and discourses referred to as Shari‘a which informed the Shari‘a court movement in 
Mogadishu cannot simply be equated with the concept of “law.” Rather, Shari‘a was an 
overarching ethical framework that set the standards of right and wrong in the conduct of life, 
including the legal; b) Contrary to much of the literature on “African Islam,” which holds that 
political Islamic movements in sub-Saharan Africa are inspired by ideologies that are foreign 
to the countries and regions of the continent, I argue that such movements should be 
understood within the deeply rooted historical legacies and traditions of Islam in sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
Key words: Religion, Islam, Shari‘a, Africa, Horn of Africa, Somalia, and political Islam.    
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Introduction 
I receive a call in the middle of the day from a friend, Awiye, who has been helping me with 
the research. He informs me that he located a man, Mooge1, whom I have been trying to talk 
to regarding his involvement in the establishment of one of the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu. 
Mooge not only lived in the neighborhood where the Shari‘a Court of Sissi2 was formed but 
was himself intimately involved in the events that led to the formation of the court. His name 
frequently came up in conversations about this court. Luckily for me, Awiye knew Mooge 
because they were distant relatives. Awiye told me that Mooge was going to wait for us after 
midday prayer (duhur) at his local mosque. Awiye and I were to meet at a well-known 
intersection near the mosque from where we would together go to the mosque where Mooge 
awaited us. I hurriedly dressed and rushed to the nearest street to hail a rickshaw. As with 
many of Mogadishu’s residents, I relied on rickshaws to get around the city. In the pot-hole 
ridden, wreckage strewn, meandering streets and alleys that make-up the city’s 
transportation network, the rickshaw, commonly known as bajaj, is the most efficient means 
of transportation, much to the discontent of taxi drivers. For $2 and a ten minute ride later 
the rickshaw dropped me off at the intersection where Awiye was waiting for me with his 
car.  
Slightly built and smartly dressed, Awiye is in his early 30s and is doing alright for 
himself given the dire economic conditions in Mogadishu. He juggles three different jobs to 
make ends meet: he is a government employee, works for a local NGO, and has his own 
business. Because of his connection to the government Awiye is very careful about his 
                                                          
1 Most of the names I use are not real so as to protect the identity of the interviewees. 
2 The courts of Sissii was established in 2003 in one of the most insecure areas of Mogadishu 
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movements in the city. Anyone who works for the UN-sponsored and supported government 
is considered by al-Shabaab, the Islamist militant group, to be an apostate and, therefore, a 
legitimate target. I asked Awiye, why we couldn’t meet Mooge at one of the local 
restaurants? That way I could at least buy him lunch. Awiye replied that Mooge insisted on 
meeting in the mosque, and he suspected that Mooge was doing that as a security precaution. 
He most likely didn’t want to be seen in the company of a stranger in the eyes of the locals. 
Such is the pervasiveness of suspicion and fear in Mogadishu where al-Shabaab is waging a 
deadly campaign of bombings and assassinations against the weak government and anyone 
associated with it or with the international effort at state-building.  
On our way to the mosque, Awiye and I stopped at various locations that were places 
of significance in the emergence of the Shari‘a Court of Sissi, such as the garage where 
hostages3 were kept and the tree under which Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed4 and other 
religious figures used to give speeches. After about half an hour of driving with my curious 
eyes wandering, careful not to provoke the suspicion of neighborhood residents, we drove 
towards the mosque where Mooge awaited us. After driving through winding streets which 
snaked through and around small stone houses we finally came to a stop at the end of a road. 
Awiye pointed to a small structure distinguishable from the others only by its minaret. We 
walked into Mosque Rahiim’s first and only floor. Three men slept on a green rug in the far 
left corner, while an older man and a teenage boy sat on the opposite side. The old man 
waved his hand and Awiye and I walked up and greeted him. He stood up and warmly 
                                                          
3 Beginning in the early 2000s, kidnapping for ransom became widespread throughout Mogadishu.   
4 Sh. Sharif Sh. Ahmed was at that time a well-respected local teacher who was chosen to lead the newly established 
Shari‘a court of Sissi. Later, after the various courts of Mogadishu unified, he became the chairman of the Union of 
Islamic Courts (UICs). After the UICs was overrun by an Ethiopian invasion, he reconciled with “the international 
community,” after a brief exile, and became the president of the UN-backed government in Mogadishu. 
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greeted us. Mooge is a heavyset man, probably in his 60s, with a henna-dyed beard and small 
but lively eyes. After brief introductions, I asked Mooge to tell me about the day when he 
led a congregation from this very mosque to a garage a few blocks away that served as the 
center for a city-wide criminal network. The event that took place at this mosque that day 
was part of a general uprising throughout Mogadishu against petty thieves, militias, and 
warlords. An uprising which took the form of and led to the formation of Shari‘a courts 
throughout the city. Mooge described what happened on that Friday at Mosque Rahiim as 
follows:  
It was sometime in 2003 maybe 2002, I am not sure. You know Mogadishu was 
divided between the Abgal and Habar Gidir.5 Each area had its own terrible 
place where there was a lot of crime, but the worst was here in Sissii. I used to 
live in Madina (a district on the other side of the city) but I fled here after two 
militias began to fight over Madina. Sissi wasn’t so bad then, but it became really 
bad later on. For example, there was a girl who came back from Sweden. She 
came to visit her family but soon as she came back her father was kidnapped. 
                                                          
5 The two dominant lineage groups in Mogadishu. They are both members of the larger lineage known as Hawiya. 
Scholars, following the example of British social anthropologist I. M. Lewis (1961) divide the “Somali nation” into 
four large lineage groups: Darood, Dir, Hawiya, and Digil-Mirifle. Lewis referred to the large genealogical 
groupings as “clan-families.” There are also innumerable small “clans” that do not belong to any of these. In this 
dissertation I prefer to use the terms lineage, descent, or genealogical unit/group rather than “clan” to refer to 
kinship-based identities or political alliances because I find these terms to be less saddled by controversy. Within the 
small field of Somali studies debates about the nature of kinship identity is a constant feature. I. M. Lewis (1961) 
first proposed that kinship relations were the organizing principle in the social and political identities of the Somali 
people. “Clan,” according to him, was a key social unit expressing the importance of kinship relations. Lewis 
maintained that position throughout his career. Others, Abdi I. Samatar (1992) and Catherine Besteman (1996, 
1998), have disagreed with Lewis and argued that whatever the category of clan might have signified in precolonial 
Somalia, it has been transformed through its deployment as an administrative category by colonial powers. 
Moreover, important identities such as class and race have been just as important in shaping economic and political 
cleavages in postcolonial Somalia. For more on this see the exchange between Besteman (1996, 1998) and Lewis 
(1998) in the journal Cultural Anthropology. As will be clear from the dissertation, the Somalia conflict played 
along and exasperated lineage politics. As a result, most of my interlocutors’ descriptions and understanding of the 
conflict is through lineage politics. See chapters 4 & 5 for more on how kinship identities influenced the conflict and 
how the Shari‘a courts simultaneously reflected and opposed kinship and lineage politics.  
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Hostages were burnt with plastic. This woman was pregnant. Her father died 
while they were torturing him. This incident really bothered me. There were 
traditional elders but some of them were bad. They are ‘pirates of tradition’ 
(bur‘ad dhaqameed). They worked with the criminals. When a person was 
kidnapped or property taken, they would broker a deal (dilal) between the 
criminals and the victim. For example, if your relative was kidnapped, they would 
come to you and tell you, ‘this is how much the kidnappers are asking for,’ and 
you would tell them, ‘this is how much I can pay,’ and so forth. I know some of 
these elders, but I don’t want to name names. In Islam when you see evil being 
done you must do something. So one day, it was Friday, after Friday prayers I 
stood up and said ‘I have something to say. Anyone who leaves now is a thief.’ I 
told them that ‘the people who are doing all these reprehensible things (munkar) 
are our boys. In fact, some of them may be praying here with us. How can we be 
in the mosque everyday praying when Muslims are being burnt and killed in front 
of us? What happened to us? Our family (reer) used to be known all over Somalia 
for its goodness, for its religiosity.’ I told them in Islam when there is evil taking 
place where you live you have two options: either you move away and go live 
elsewhere (hajir) or you must do something about it. I said these are the only 
options, so what are we going to do? I didn’t plan to give a speech. I was just 
moved, my body was shaking. I couldn’t stop my tears from flowing. I saw other 
people were also crying. There was a sheikh there and he stood up and said I was 
right. I am not a sheikh, I am Tabliqh.6 I joined the Tabliqh in 1995. But I know 
                                                          
6 Jama’at al-Tabliqh is a transnational Islamic piety (da‘wa) movement, which originates from India. For more on 
this movement see Barbara D. Metcalf “’Remaking Ourselves:’ Islamic Self-Fashioning in a Global Movement of 
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the religion and I always worked so that people would understand the religion. I 
have always worked to protect those who were suffering injustice and tell people 
they are equal in religion. Also, my family is respected, we are listened to. After I 
finished my talk a young boy stood up and said, has anyone gone to the garage 
where the criminals keep their stolen property and hostages and told them how 
evil and un-Islam their actions are? After the young boy said that, I said let’s go 
to the garage now and tell them. So we all left and went to the garage. We were 
about 100. When we got closer to the garage they started shooting at us. 
Everyone ran away except three of us. We kept going straight. They yelled at us 
‘we will kill you.’ We said ‘only Allah can kill, and we will tell you what we need 
to tell you.’ They stopped shooting at us. We told them what they were doing was 
wrong and all the people wanted them to stop. We asked them ‘will you stop what 
you are doing or not?’ They told us ‘we won’t stop, do whatever it is you think 
you can do.’ We left and we stopped on the road and we prayed. A few days later 
we heard what the madani7 did. Then Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed joined the 
madani and a Shari‘a court was declared. I think Allah answered our prayer. I, of 
course, joined the people who were working with the court. After the court was 
established, the bad guys came to us and said they wanted to join the court. They 
heard the court was giving food and some money to its security force. We allowed 
them to join. We didn’t say you were a thief, so you can’t join. We allowed them 
                                                          
Spiritual Renewal.” In Accounting for Fundamentalism, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994).   
7 A self-organized and all voluntary neighborhood watch group, which directly confronted the militias in the 
neighborhood. Chapter four will describe in more detail the events leading to the formation of this court, as well as 
som of the other courts. 
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to join, but we opened a madrassa where they learned religion, and a center 
where they trained on how to use weapons. I worked in both places.8 
The vignette above is one man’s memory of an event that took place days before the 
formation of one of the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu, the Court of Sissii. The history of the Shariʻa 
courts occurred between 1992, when the first Shariʻa court appeared, and 2006, when the 
previously independent and communal Shariʻa courts unified and metamorphed into a political 
formation with the name the Union of Islamic Courts (UICs).9 In that decade and half, following 
the disintegration of the regime of longtime dictator Mohamed Siyad Barre in 1991, Somalia had 
become known throughout the world for conflict, famine, and piracy. Beginning in the early 1990s 
economic and political reform and liberalization led to the disengagement of the postcolonial 
developmentalist state in many sub-Saharan African societies resulting in social and political-
economic upheavals. Somalia was effected by the same economic and political developments, but 
it stood out for the magnitude and duration of its crises as the organs of the central government 
completely disintegrated and have remained so to this date. Since then the name Somalia has 
become synonymous with “state failure” or “collapsed state.” The absence of the organs of the 
central government, however, hasn’t meant lack of governance in general. Contrary to the “state 
failure” narrative (Bates 2008; Herbst 1997; Miliken 2003; Zartman 1995),10 which equates the 
absence of the state with anarchy, the disintegration of the Somali Republic has led to the 
emergence of varied forms of local governance (Doornbos 2002; Menkhaus 2006/2007; 
                                                          
8 Interview in Mogadishu, July 2015. 
9 The UICs is also referred to as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). In this dissertation I prefer the UICs because I 
think this rendering is a better translation of the Somali name, Midowga Mahmakadaha Islaamka. 
10 The critiques of the “state failure” narrative (Bellagamba and Klute 2008; Call 2011; Hagmann and Hoehne 2009; 
Hagmann and Peclard 2010) argue that this narrative takes for granted the universality of the ideal model of the 
rational-legal state. The narrative assumes that societal problems are rooted in the “absence” of properly functioning 
state institutions. The remedy to the problems is therefore to establish the state, with international intervention if 
necessary. 
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Verhoeven 2009). Rather than viewing the prolonged absence of the state as a political vacuum, 
the nonexistence of state institutions created conditions for experimenting with various types of 
governing arrangements leading to the emergence of political complexes that are relatively novel 
in today’s world. Communities, from neighborhood to regional levels, have organized to defend 
themselves and to govern their internal affairs.11 These “governances without government” 
(Menkhaus 2006/2007) provide a unique opportunity to understand the kind of socio-political 
formation and governance arrangements that are possible in a world where the postcolonial nation-
state is increasingly being questioned. To be sure the literature has taken stock of the emergence 
of new regimes and centers of authority (Ferguson 2006; Roitman 2005) as African societies have 
creatively responded to the weakening of state institutions (Raeymaekers et al., 2008; Bellagamba 
and Klute 2008). There have been very few works, however, that attempt to link the formation of 
new authorities and governing arrangements in the wake of state withdrawal to contemporary 
Islamic movements in sub-Saharan Africa. This dissertation does this through a historical 
ethnography of one of the most important of the self-governance initiatives that appeared 
throughout Somalia, the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu.   
The origin, development, and ultimate demise of the Shariʻa courts of Mogadishu is the 
subject of this dissertation. The history of the courts demonstrate how and why social and political 
crises in Muslim societies generate a renewed engagement with centuries-old traditions of Islamic 
jurisprudence, the historically rooted practices and concepts through which this engagement is 
                                                          
11 Many scholars who comment on the new governing arrangements and political complexes that have emerged in 
Somalia since the dissolution of the state (Bradbury 2008; Jhazbhay 2009; Richards 2014; Sandstrom 2013; Walls 
2014) view the secessionist region in the north, Somaliland, as the most significant of the new political complexes in 
Somalia. Utilizing a neat distinction between the international and the indigenous, this literature views Somaliland 
as an example of a successful “grassroots” state-building. I contend that the experience of the Shari‘a courts of 
Mogadishu in the south of the country is historically much more significant, particularly because the history of the 
courts provides a unique perspective into contemporary Islamic movements.    
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expressed, the images of society and notions of leadership that are generated through the renewed 
engagement, and what the trajectory and fate of movements brought into existence by such an 
engagement say about the Shari‘a in the contemporary world and its relations to the organizing 
structures of the modern world. Many commentators (Hagman and Hoehne 2009; Le Sage 2004; 
Menkhaus 2005, 2006/2007; Rotberg 2005; Waal 2004) contend that the Shari‘a courts in Somalia 
emerged when fundamentalist clerics, influenced by “foreign” networks, took advantage of the 
vacuum of power and a vulnerable population to impose their harsh and literal interpretation of 
the Shari‘a. On the contrary, I argue that the prolonged absence of the state and with that its 
modernizing project of cultural and religious reform meant that the attempt to separate Shari‘a-
informed communal ethics and morality from politics came to an end. The Shari‘a courts were an 
expression of organic forms of governance that were grounded in the practices, concepts, and 
discourses of the historically-rooted Islamic tradition of the community from which the courts 
emerged. Rather than assuming the courts were a vehicle for the spread of and a local manifestation 
of a global “radical” militant Islam, and therefore essentially foreign to Somali society, this 
dissertation provides a social and historical contextualization of the courts through an in-depth 
historical ethnography. Because of Somalia’s exceptional circumstance of prolonged statelessness, 
the history of the Shari‘a courts provides a fresh perspective into some of the most fascinating 
aspects of contemporary Islamic movements. 
After decades, and in some cases centuries, of the adoption of secular and Western legal 
codes throughout the Muslim world, Muslim activists are today calling for the implementation of 
the Shari‘a as the “law” of the state (Hefner 2011). This demand is made because the enactment 
of the Shari‘a as the law of the state is seen as crucial to reforming society in the image of what 
Muslim activists consider a proper Muslim society. The call to implement the Shari‘a is the central 
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demand animating the diverse phenomenon collectively referred to as the Islamic Awakening, 
which has taken the Muslim world by storm over the past few decades. In making this demand, 
Muslim activists conceptualize the Shari‘a as the “religious law” of Islam. Scholars (Hallaq 2005, 
2009; Messick 1993; Vikor 2005; Zubaida 2003) have analyzed the historical developments that 
have shifted the conceptualization of the Shari‘a from an overarching ethical framework to 
something resembling state law. Some scholars (Asad 2003; Hallaq 2004, 2013) assert that it’s 
impossible to take a centuries-old jurisprudential tradition, developed outside the sphere of 
political power to regulate relations between the individual and God (‘ibadat) as well as human 
interactions (mu‘amalat) articulating a comprehensive ethical framework, and turn it into codes in 
state courts. The fact that the demand to implement the Shari‘a as the “law” of the state is integral 
to contemporary Islamic movements, the argument continues, illustrates the dominance of the 
logic of the state. Additionally, it shows that these movements are products of modernity, caught 
in its predicaments (Hallaq 2004, 2013).  In studying the Shari‘a court movement of Mogadishu, 
I take up the question of what animates the call for the Shari‘a. Unlike the predominant majority 
of contemporary Islamic movements, whose demand to implement the Shari‘a is aimed at 
supplanting secular state, the Shari‘a of the Shari‘a court movement, had nothing to do with an 
already present state. Rather, the Shari‘a of the Shari‘a courts provided the language and rationale 
for establishing and governing a community in the complete absence of state institutions.  
For a period of 15 years the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu governed communal relations in 
a social milieu where state authorities and institutions no longer existed. The Shari‘a politics 
(Hussin 2016) of the Shari‘a courts was therefore not over-determined by the structures and logic 
of the state, rendering the experience of the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu a unique case in the 
contemporary world. Because of the complete absence of the state, Shari‘a practice and 
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conceptualization within the Shari‘a courts was concerned with and articulated through communal 
organization and governance. The individuals and communities that established the Shari‘a courts 
did so as members of neighborhoods attempting to resolve neighborhood problems. The history of 
the Shari‘a courts therefore provides a unique example of local and ground-up governance based 
on the ethical framework, practices, and concepts from the Shari‘a tradition, within the material 
context of Somali history. However, their eventual transformation into a political formation in the 
form of the UICs entailed the introduction of organizational and structural principles that 
undermined local control over Shari‘a authority and practice in favor of centralized and codified 
practices of governance.  
One of the funadamental arguments in this dissertation is that the Shari‘a courts, which 
existed, in one form or another, for over a decade and half before the formation of the UICs in 
2006, were qualitatively different than the UICs. The nature of authority, politico-religious 
leadership, Shari‘a practice, and governance marked this difference between the independent local 
Shari‘a courts and the UIC. Thus the courts’ metamorphosis into the UICs entailed a dramatic 
transformation. The differences between the Shari‘a courts and the UICs has been unappreciated 
because the history of the courts has been subsumed into that of the UICs, which itself has received 
very little academic analysis.12 Appreciating and analyzing the differences between the Shari‘a 
courts and the UICs is one of the assumptions and goals of this dissertation. I argue that the 
                                                          
12 One of the few academics to attempt an analysis of the UICs is political scientist Aisha Ahmad (2012; 2015). She 
posits a rational economic explanation of the rise of the UICs. She argues that behind the rise of the UICs were the 
economic interests of a local business class who supported the UICs to provide the security which no-one else could. 
She asserts that the UICs, unlike the warlords, could appeal to a cross section of society and was therefore unfettered 
by lineage politics. For sure, the role of a local business class was significant in the rise of the UICs, but the idea that 
the economic interests of a business class is solely responsible for the emergence of the UICs is very simplistic. 
Furthermore, it ignores the history of the Shari‘a courts that preceded the UICs and which made the formation of the 
UICs possible. In this sense, Ahmad’s work on the UICs is a good illustration of my argument that the UICs has 
overshadowed the history of the Shari‘a courts, and thereby concealed what’s most important about of them. 
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emergence of the Shari‘a courts out of the ashes of state collapse and the subsequent social 
upheavals allows for a unique opportunity to understand how discourses, concepts, and practices 
from the Islamic tradition enabled communal organizing and governance. The metamorphosis of 
the Shari‘a courts into the UICs entailed the implementation of organizational principles, such as 
bureaucratization, that are integral to the modern state. A study of the Shari‘a courts’ 
transformation into the UICs and those leading that process allows one to understand the impact 
bureaucratization has on Shari‘a practice as well as the contestation over religious authority 
between differently schooled politico-religious authorities. A brief history of the Shari‘a courts 
followed by the UICs is in order to better appreciate the differences between the two.  
The Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu  
The Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu caught the attention of the media and the concerns of policy 
makers in July 2006, when, seemingly out of no-where, the unified courts defeated a U.S.-backed 
coalition of warlords. After defeating the warlords, the Shari‘a courts and allied groups created the 
Union of Islamic Courts (UICs). The emergence of the UICs effectively turned Somalia into a 
front in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and dramatically altered the dynamics of the country’s 
history since. The emergence of the UICs and the subsequent developments have overshadowed 
the history of the Shari‘a courts which preceded the UICs.  
After about a decade of armed insurgency throughout the 1980s, the regime of longtime 
dictator Mohamed Siyad Barre disintegrated in early 1991. Barre fled Mogadishu in January of 
1991 as the forces of one of the rebel groups, the United Somali Congress (USC) made-up of 
members of the large lineage group Hawiya, entered the city.13 Following the collapse of Barre’s 
                                                          
13 For more on the armed rebellion against the Siyad Barre regime and the dynamics of the subsequent civil war see 
Daniel Compagnon, “Somali Armed Movements: The Interplay of Political Entrepreneurship & Clan-Based 
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regime, Somalia was thrown into a prolonged period of conflict marked by the complete absence 
of a central government. To this date, Somalia remains without a functioning central government, 
making Somalia the longest instance of state collapse and statelessness in the modern world. 
Mogadishu was one of the worst effected areas by the violence that followed the disintegration of 
the Barre regime. The USC rebel group, whose forces took control of Mogadishu and most of 
southern Somalia, split up into two and an intense fighting within the USC ensued. The viciousness 
of the civil war was made worse by the famine of 1991-1992, leading to a staggering loss of life 
and large population displacement. An international mission led by the U.S., through the offices 
of the U.N., intervened in 1992 to help with the delivery of aid to famine afflicted populations. 
The international intervention eventually ended in 1995 after failing to find a political solution to 
the conflict. From then on, as far as the “international community” and the world was concerned, 
Somalia became a dark corner of the world. Mogadishu, the epicenter of the conflict, became 
known as the most dangerous city in the world. The USC continued to fragment such that by the 
mid-90s Mogadishu was divided into countless fiefdoms controlled by various militias and 
warlords. At the same time, large scale conflict ended because the capture of the state, which 
defined the conflict early on, was no longer an important goal. The militias, common criminals, 
and warlords of Mogadishu fought a continuous turf war just to maintain their daily upkeep. A war 
economy materialized as a result. Moreover, because of the way lineage and descent was 
politicized to mobilize the population by the warring parties, the residents of Mogadishu separated 
roughly along the lines of kinship and lineage identities. The different neighborhoods and districts 
                                                          
Factions,” in African Guerrillas, edited by Christopher Clapham (Oxford: James Currey, 1998); Africa Watch, 
Somalia, a Government at War with Its Own People (New York: Africa Watch, 1990); William Reno, “Somalia and 
Survival: In The Shadow Of The Global Economy,” QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS100 (Northwestern 
University, 2003); Hussein Adam, From Tyranny to Anarchy: The Somali Experience (NJ: The Red Sea Press, Inc., 
2008); Catherine Besteman and Lee V. Cassanelli, The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia: The War Behind the 
War (UK: Westview Press, 1996). 
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of Mogadishu were thus predominated by a specific lineage group and often controlled by a militia 
and a strongman that identified with that lineage group. The militias, however, weren’t concerned 
with the protection of the people, often their fellow kinsmen, who lived in the areas they controlled. 
Rather, they viewed the areas they controlled and the people residing in it as their racketeering 
fiefdoms from which income was to be generated. For the population of Mogadishu, life became 
increasingly difficult. They were prisoners of gun-toting and unruly young men who arbitrarily 
subjected the population to daily robbery, kidnapping, rape, and murder.14 It was in this context 
and in response to these problems that the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu began to appear.  
The first Shari‘a court was founded in 1992, about a year after the disintegration of the 
Barre regime. As mentioned above, the politicization of kinship identities in the post-state collapse 
conflict resulted in the division of Mogadishu into lineage or “clan” and “sub-clan” enclaves 
controlled by competing militias. Thus the communities that established and run the Shari‘a courts 
were close kinsmen, which explains why the Shari‘a courts were known as “clan courts.”15 The 
processes of a Shari‘a court’s formation generally followed similar steps. When the level of 
insecurity of a specific area, such as a neighborhood or a district, rose to intolerable levels, the 
residents of the area convened a meeting. The meetings were led and organized by recognized 
lineage elders and religious authorities. The religious authorities were in the majority products of 
“traditional” religious institutions of learning. In other words, they did not belong to reformist 
movements whose adherents are distinguished by their educational background and worldview.16 
A crucial fact in distinguishing the independent communal Shari‘a courts from the UICs, as chapter 
six will explore in length. At the meeting residents lamented the level of insecurity and the lack of 
                                                          
14 A term, mooryan, was coined to describe these young men. For more on the mooryan see chapter four. 
15 A label that is sometimes used by more reformist-oriented Islamists to describe the courts. In calling them “clan 
courts” the implication is that their practice of Shari‘a was diluted.  
16 See chapter six 
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justice in their lives. Led by the sheikhs and lineage heads a consensus would be reached that the 
only way out of the misery is to establish a just mechanism for resolving disputes and conflicts. 
Inevitably, finding a just mechanism for conflict resolution meant following the processes and 
norms of the Shari‘a as understood by reliable local religious authorities. Before establishing a 
community center for the just resolution of conflicts, i.e. a Shari‘a court, it was critical to get the 
consent of the people that lived in the area. Such consent was obtained through the lineage 
representatives – the lineage heads of each lineage that lived in the area. The unanimous consent 
of the people in the area was necessary for a number of reasons.  
Foremost, the culprits of crime and insecurity and the victims of it were frequently fellow 
kinsmen because of the division of the city into lineage enclaves. Because of the breakdown of 
“traditional” and kin-based norms of criminal accountability,17 isolated lineage heads and close 
relatives were no longer in positions to prevent their young men from committing crimes. By 
agreeing to the establishment of a Shari‘a court each lineage representative was giving the court 
the authority to apprehend, prosecute, and punish, if necessary, any of their members. Obtaining 
the unanimous agreement of the various lineage representatives was also necessary because it was 
only after such an agreement that residents of the area provided the finances and security forces of 
the court. Once the consensus of the community was obtained, through lineage representatives, a 
Shari‘a court was declared. A location, often a previously government-owned building, was chosen 
as the site of the court. The various Shari‘a courts were almost always named after the site of their 
establishment. Once a court was declared and a location picked out, judges were selected by the 
lineage heads and religious authorities. In the selection of judges, their reputation for knowledge 
                                                          
17 For more on this breakdown and how the founding of a Shari‘a court individualized criminal responsibility see 
chapter four.  
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of jurisprudence (fiqh)18 and lineage affiliation were considered. The lineage consideration was 
important to avoid accusations of bias by litigants. The number of judges at a Shari‘a court varied 
but nine was the most common. Once judges were selected, a chairman of the Shari‘a court was 
chosen. A chairman was chosen for his overall reputation for religious knowledge, enthusiasm for 
the establishment of the court, and lineage affiliation. The security forces of a Shari‘a court were 
made up of lineage members from the area. Whether the forces were compensated depended on 
the financial condition of the court. They often began work voluntarily, but got small stipends as 
the finances of the courts improved.  
As regards the procedures and judicial reasoning of the Shari‘a courts, they varied both 
within a specific court in the span of its life and across the different Shari‘a courts. It’s worth 
pointing out that the independent communal Shari‘a courts that existed between 1992 and 2006 
did not leave behind any records, and what little records they produced were destroyed in 
subsequent conflicts.19 What I have to say about the judicial process of the communal Shari‘a 
courts is based on what interlocutors remembered. Cases came to a court in one of three ways. 
Sometimes the litigants voluntarily presented their case to the courts to resolve a dispute between 
them. In such cases the litigants had already agreed between themselves to abide by the court’s 
ruling. Cases of this nature predominated a court’s docket when a court’s ability to apprehend 
criminals and the accused were limited. Another way a case came to a court was when someone 
came to the court and complained about being wronged by another party that was absent. If the 
defendant was from the same area as the plaintiff, which often meant that the defendant belonged 
to a lineage that had consented to the founding of the court, the defendant would be apprehended 
                                                          
18 In Somalia an authoritative religious figure is frequently referred to as a faqih. See chapter two for more 
19 This is in contrast to the UICs which produced significant documents in the six months the UICs controlled 
Mogadishu. I was able to gain access to some of the documents left behind the UICs. See chapter six for more on the 
impact that writing, as the central feature of bureaucracy-making, had on Shari‘a practice and authority.  
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either by her/his close relatives or by the court’s security forces and brought to the court. If, 
however, the accused was from another part of Mogadishu and belonged to a lineage that wasn’t 
party to the founding of the court to which the plaintiff complained to, then the court’s ability to 
adjudicate the case was limited. If the accused was from an area that was under the jurisdiction of 
another court, the authorities at the court where the plaintiff opened the case would ask their 
counterparts at the court whose jurisdiction the accused resided under to apprehend the accused. 
Once the accused was apprehended, the two respective Shari‘a courts would decide where and 
under what judges the case would be heard. This created a relationship between the various Shari‘a 
courts of Mogadishu well before they unified under the UICs. The third way that a case came to a 
court was when the security forces of the court captured someone in the act of committing a crime. 
The most common of such arrests occurred at checkpoints or when drug dealers or users were 
caught in the act. These were the most common ways that cases came to the Shari‘a courts.   
Once a case came to a court the chairman of the court decided how many judges heard the 
case.  Depending on the complexity and sensitivity of the case the chairman assigned one to five 
judges. Only judgments that were unanimous were considered valid. The overwhelming majority 
of Somalis and Somali sheikhs follow the shafi‘i legal school of thought (maddhab). The Shari‘a 
manuals that were used by the courts were therefore shafi‘i manuals that contained the collected 
authoritative Shari‘a opinions of well-known scholars of this maddhab. The manuals used by the 
courts included Minhaj al-Talibin, Kitab al-Anwar, and Mughni al-Mukhtaj. That only the shafi‘i 
maddhab was to be used was often implicit, but some courts had it explicitly stated. In making 
their case in front of the judges both the plaintiff and the defendant could avail themselves of the 
services of a third party (wakiil da‘wa) to make their case. The wakiil da‘wa didn’t need to have 
any special expertise in the Shari‘a. They were chosen primarily for their eloquence and powers 
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of persuasion. Upon the start of the hearing, the plaintiff was asked to make his/her case and to 
introduce whatever evidence they had. The most important part of one’s argument was whether 
one had witnesses to corporate one’s case. The witness had to be a person of good moral character 
for the testimony to be accepted. This meant they had to be Muslim, perform daily prayers (salad), 
fast during Ramadan, a just person, mature, of sane mind,  and must not be someone who is known 
to be a liar or drinks alcohol or commits other transgressions. The more the number of witnesses 
and the higher their reliability the more convincing one’s case. After the plaintiff made her case, 
the defendant was asked for a rebuttal. The most crucial aspect of the defendant’s case was also 
the production of witnesses. The defendant also had the right of oath (al-Aqsaam). That is to say, 
if the defendant swore on a copy of the Qur’an that he/she was innocent of the accusation, then the 
judges and the plaintiff were expected to accept the claim of innocence. The acceptance of the 
oath, despite its obvious susceptibility to abuse, underlines that the Shari‘a courts existed in a 
socio-cultural context where the prevailing assumption was that there could be no finality to the 
justice of this world. The Shari‘a is, after all, nothing but the human approximation of divine 
justice, and not divine justice itself. In the 14 years between 1992 and 2006 there were different 
waves of Shari‘a courts which appeared and then vanished in different parts of Mogadishu. In what 
follows I sketch out a rough chronological narrative of several of the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu 
that have been more strongly etched into the historical memory. 
I. The Shari‘a court of Madina 
The first Shari‘a court appeared in the district of Madina in 1992. A number of factors converged 
to make Madina the first instance of the establishment of a Shari‘a court in Mogadishu. First, 
Madina lacked a strongman, in the form of a warlord, who could maintain a monopoly of violence. 
There is a definite negative correlation between the presence of strong faction leader or warlord 
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and the existence of a Shari‘a court. Militias in Mogadishu, and elsewhere in Somalia, were led by 
elites from the previous military regime. These elites were vehemently opposed to the creation of 
a Shari‘a court because they saw it as a base for an independent source of power and authority 
which would eventually challenge them. Additionally, the work of a Shari‘a court, such as the 
apprehension of militia men and the removal of checkpoints, was a direct threat to the manpower 
and economy of faction leaders. The existence of a powerful strongman also worked against the 
establishment of a Shari‘ court by controlling the undisciplined and armed youth that were initially 
recruited and armed through kinship networks, but who later on became common criminals locally 
known as mooryan. Powerful faction leaders maintained a modicum of discipline over the armed 
youth that made-up the militias, thereby preventing the proliferation of crime, which frequently 
led to the mobilization of the community in the form of a Shari‘a court. The presence of a powerful 
faction leaders or warlords, therefore, often prevented the formation of an independent Shari‘a 
court. The absence of such a figure in Madina resulted in the formation of the first Shari‘a court 
there.  
Second, there was a well-respected and active sheikh, Sheikh Haamud Sheikh Hassan 
Ziyar,20 in Madina. Sheikh Haamud’s father, Sheikh Hassan, was also a well-known and respected 
religious figure in southern Somali. He established and led a religious center that attracted 
followers from throughout the Somali-speaking territories in the Horn in early and middle 20th 
century. Sheikh Haamud was an established religious authority in his own right. Like the majority 
of reformist activists, he was educated outside of Somalia, in Egypt. But he was, unlike many 
reformists, respectful and had cordial relations with Sufi ‘Ulama in Mogadishu. His actions in 
                                                          
20 Sheikh Haamud wrote a religious tract titled, The Signs of the Wholesome Society, where he explains that it was a 
religious duty on everyone, particularly on Islamic scholars (‘ulama) to establish a Shari‘a cour as a way of saving 
society from complete annihilation. I came to the possession of this tract through the trust of the family of Sheikh 
Hamued. I am grateful for their trust. For more on Sheikh Haamud and the document see chapter 4.  
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leading the establishment of the first Shari‘a court in Mogadishu are recorded in a local Sufi praise 
poetry. However, Sheikh Haamud only stayed with the court for six months because a local 
strongman emerged and brought the court under his authority. Sheikh Haamud ended up moving 
to another district for fear of his life. Despite this eventuality Sheikh Haamud began a discourse 
that would create the intellectual and social parameters and set an example for the Shari‘a courts 
that followed it. The court of Madina is significant because it was the first instance in Mogadishu 
where a communal self-defense initiative led to the formation of a Shari‘a court which managed 
to significantly reduce the level of crime in the neighborhood.  
II. The Shari‘a courts of northern Mogadishu 
Following the Shari‘a Court of Madina, the next Shari‘a court experiment emerged in northern 
Mogadishu. This court was established by the members of a large genealogical unit known as the 
Abgal. This genealogical unit predominated in northern Mogadishu. Thus the jurisdiction of these 
courts, which are sometimes referred to as the Abgal courts, was limited to where the Abgal lived. 
This court was established at the end of 1994. It was established with the blessing and indeed under 
the nominal authority of Ali Mahdi, the leading strongman of the Abgal. Though he was the 
recognized political leader of the Abgal, Ali Mahdi did not exercise any control over the vast 
majority of the armed youth and militia men that terrorized the population in northern Mogadishu. 
As a result, traditional elders and religious authorities from the communities in the area urged him 
to agree to the establishment of a Shari‘a court that represented the Abgal. With his agreement a 
Shari‘a court was declared and one Sheikh Ali Dheere was elected the chairman. This Shari‘a court 
was first established in a district in northern Mogadishu, but it spread to all areas where the Abgal 
lived, including central Somalia. The way the court spread was any community, which shared the 
Abgal genealogical identity or political alliance, would, through its traditional elders and religious 
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authorities, establish a Shari‘a court and pledge allegiance to the mother court in northern 
Mogadishu. All the various Shari‘a courts were thus autonomous branches of the mother court. 
The mother court approved the judges of the branch courts and heard cases that proved too difficult 
for the branch courts to resolve. An independent oversight committee headed by three well-known 
Sufi Sheikhs was created. The finances of the court were collected from businesses as well as a 
collectively managed port, Eel Ma‘aan. As the power of the court grew, the leader of the mother 
court, Sheikh Ali Dheere, who was also the overall chairman of the Abgal courts became 
prominent.  
The secular politicians of the Abgal, led by Ali Mahdi, began to fear that the rise of the 
courts and the growing prominence of Ali Dheere was becoming a direct threat to them. They 
accused Sheik Ali Dheere of having “political” ambitions and wanting to undermine the interests 
of the Abgal. They used traditional elders and other religious figures to disband the court. Since 
the court’s authority derived from a voluntary association of the various Abgal sub-lineages, the 
secular politicians used the representatives of the lineages to undermine the courts. Through 
traditional elders and religious authorities each lineage of the Abgal agreed to abide by the courts’ 
rulings. Once these lineage representatives, under pressure from the secular politicians, sided with 
Ali Mahdi and refused to back the court, the court quickly ceased to operate. Sometime in late 
1996 the Sharia court of northern Mogadishu was disbanded. The social memory of the court, 
however, and what it has accomplished in terms of security remained.   
III. The Shari‘a courts of southern Mogadishu 
The next batch of experimentation with Shari‘a courts took place in the south of Mogadishu. The 
Shari‘a courts began to emerge after the death of the powerful warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed in 
1996. The various militias, which were precariously held together by the ambition of Aideed, 
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disintegrated as former subordinates of Aideed began to vie for power. This led to an internal 
struggle and the creation of small fiefdoms in southern Mogadishu dominated by different warlords 
belonging to different lineage groups. Predictably, this led to an increase in the number of armed 
men manning checkpoints and protecting their enclaves from opposing militias. Checkpoints 
began to appear all over. Insecurity and violence generally increased and movement of people and 
goods became very restricted within the southern part of the city. As the security situation 
deteriorated, neighborhood communities began to organize to protect themselves. Shari‘a courts 
appeared as an expression of these communal organizing. Each Shari‘a court represented a specific 
lineage. The earliest and most important of these Shari’a courts were the court of Ifka Halane 
representing the Ayr lineage, and the court of Shirkole representing the Saleban lineage group. 
They both emerged towards the end of 1996. Shortly thereafter, a few other courts were established 
representing other lineage groups. By the mid- and late-90s, the establishment of a Shari‘a as an 
expression of communal self-defense and self-governance was popular throughout Mogadishu. 
Numerous Shari‘a courts representing different lineages and extended families began to appear 
throughout the city. The formation of Shari‘a courts throughout Mogadishu led to a change in the 
dynamics of the conflict in Mogadishu, and ultimately of all of Somalia.  
Each Shari‘a court’s jurisdiction was limited to the area and the community that established 
it. This led to the problem of what to do when a suspect wanted by a particular court escaped to an 
area that was under the jurisdiction of another court. Or when one of the litigants in a case happened 
to reside in an area outside a court’s jurisdiction. To resolve this the courts worked out an 
understanding among themselves based on the extradition and exchange of suspects as well as 
allowing their judges to sit together to hear a case when the litigants were from different areas. 
This led to the emergence of a networked court system and the beginning of a working relationship 
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between the various Shari‘a courts. The courts also began to work together because they had a 
common enemy. Each Shari‘a court’s primary opponent and enemy were the militia and warlord 
that viewed the area under a Shari‘a court’s jurisdiction their own turf. As mentioned above, the 
warlords and militia groups viewed the courts as a threat to their economic and security interests. 
Whenever it was possible warlords attempted to completely dissolve or at least bring the courts 
under their sway. To meet the challenges posed by warlords and militia groups, the Shari‘a courts 
in the late 90s and early 2000s reached an understanding where they would come to each other’s 
aid when engaged in a conflict with a warlord. The courts also began to exchange judges, share 
experiences, and train each other’s staff. To coordinate the relations, the courts created a standing 
committee made up of the chairmen of the then existing Shari‘a courts in 2003. By removing 
checkpoints, doing nightly patrols, and arresting common criminals the courts began to dismantle 
the racketeeriing fiefdoms into which Mogadishu was divided. They made movement of people 
and goods easier and safer, winning for themselves the support of the majority of Mogadishu’s 
residents, including the support of the local business class. Around 2003 and 2004 it was clear that 
a new power was in the ascendency in Mogadishu. It was at this point that the courts became 
entangled in the Global War on Terror (GWOT).  
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in the U.S., Somalia, a territory without a functioning 
central government, was viewed by Western security analysts as an ideal place for wanted 
international militant Islamists to hide, plan attacks, and spread their ideology. These concerns 
were first voiced after the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa. The U.S. government 
suspected that some of the suspects from the bombings were hiding in Mogadishu, possibly with 
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the help of sympathetic individuals and groups in Mogadishu.21 This suspicion, as well as a general 
fear that the Shari‘a courts were a vehicle for the spread of anti-Western sentiments, led to a 
clandestine CIA support for Mogadishu’s hated warlords to capture wanted individuals and to 
check the growing power of the courts.22 Taking advantage of the CIA support, the warlords 
targeted not only the few CIA-wanted suspects, but also their own internal enemies, primarily 
members of the Shari‘a courts. To further legitimize themselves in the language of the GWOTthe 
warlords announced the creation of a new group called the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace 
and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) in February 2006. The U.S. support for the warlords 
spectacularly backfired when it led to a popular uprising led by the leadership of the  Shari‘a courts 
against the warlords. Unexpectedly, and in a matter of months, the courts evicted the warlords out 
of Mogadishu, bringing the city under a single power for the first time since the collapse of the 
Barre regime. By July 2006 the forces of the courts were in complete control of Mogadishu. After 
defeating the warlords the courts and their allied groups created the Union of Islamic Courts 
(UICs).   
The Union of Islamic Courts (UICs) 
After their takeover of Mogadishu and unification under the UICs, the UICs began to spread. First, 
to towns and cities in the vicinity of Mogadishu, and then through most of south and central 
Somalia. The way the courts spread was very simple. Residents in villages and towns led by their 
lineage elders and religious authorities organized themselves and declared allegiance to the 
courts.23 This all happened within a matter of months from early- to mid-2006, catapulting the 
                                                          
21 ‘Somalia: Eliminating the Terrorist Threat’ Fact Sheet, African Affairs, US Department of State, 25 January 
2007, www.state.gov/p/af/rls/fs/2007/79383.htm 
22 International Crisis Group, “Can the Somali Crisis be Contained?” Africa Report No 116, 10 August 2006, 
www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/116_can_the_somali_crisis_be_contained.pdf. 
23 There were also instances where the over-enthusiastic militia members of the UICs took over an area by force.  
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UICs into international headlines and policy circles. Western diplomats began to call the UICs the 
“African Taliban.”24 Regional states, particularly Ethiopia, a regional ally of the U.S which had a 
history of intervening in Somalia and conflict with Islamist groups there, also began to sound 
alarms about the danger the UICs posed to their own security and to regional stability. These fears 
and concerns of the UICs culminated in a U.S.-backed Ethiopian invasion of Mogadishu in 
December 2006.25 The Ethiopian forces quickly overpowered the militias of the UICs and the 
UICs’ ‘administration’ in Mogadishu crumbled with most of its leadership going underground or 
fleeing the country. Within months of the disbanding of the UICs and the Ethiopian occupation of 
Mogadishu, an underground insurgency, coalescing around a small group of militants known as 
Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (The Youth Movement of Holy Warriors) or simply al-
Shabaab (the Youth) emerged. After getting bogged down in Somalia by al-Shabaab, Ethiopian 
forces left in early 2009. By then there was significant international intervention in Somalia, which 
followed up on the heels of the Ethiopian invasion. Through the offices of the UN, an African 
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) force, paid and armed primarily by the U.S. and E.U., was 
created to take over from the Ethiopian forces and protect the weak federal government in 
Mogadishu. The main objective of the international intervention revolved around the creation and 
protection of the institutions of the state. Counter-terrorism in Somalia, as in other places, was and 
is a nation-state building project. A new government, which included many members of the so-
called ‘moderate’ wing of the UICs, was created in 2009 to try to undercut the opposition to the 
government. Al-Shabaab, however, continued its opposition to the government. When I started my 
                                                          
24 Jeffrey Gettleman, “Drinking Fanta with Islamists,” New York Times, May 13, 2017 
(https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/13/sunday-review/drinking-fanta-with-islamist-militants.html?smid=pl-
share&ct=t(May_19_20175_19_2017)&mc_cid=8608f4495d&mc_eid=83bedeb97f&_r=0, (accessed July 20, 
2017).  
25 For more on the Ethiopian invasion and US support for it, see Abdi I. Samatar “Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia, 
US Warlordism & AU Shame,” Review of African Political Economy, 34 no. 11 (Mar. 2007): 155-165.  
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fieldwork in Mogadishu in early 2014 the situation remained more or less the same, as it does at 
the time of writing these lines.26 Al-Shabaab, though significantly weakened as a military forces, 
continues to occupy large rural areas in southern Somalia and constantly carries out bombings and 
assassinations in Mogadishu and other urban areas. The UN continues to financially and militarily 
support the government in Mogadishu.  
The rise of the UICs was as sudden as it was short; it lasted a mere six months. Yet despite 
the brevity of its duration, the emergence of the UICs is regarded as a watershed moment in recent 
Somali history (Barnes and Hassan 2007). The rise of the UICs dramatically altered the dynamics 
of the Somali conflict, changed the calculus of all the actors and brought new actors into the 
conflict, and effectively turned Somalia into a new front in the GWOT. The story of the rise of the 
UICs and what came after it has all the elements of what has become a common enough occurrence 
in Muslim world: an economic and political crises in a Muslim society, a local response framed in 
Islamic symbols and discourse, an ill-informed Western intervention that leads to a more radical 
and militant “Islamist” response on the ground. The focus on the UICs by the media, policy 
makers, and academics, I suggest, is misplaced and contributes to conceal what I consider the 
much more important phenomenon that preceded the UICs: the independent and communal Shari‘a 
courts that existed in Mogadishu, in one form or another, since the disintegration of the Barre 
regime in 1991. It was these courts that came together in 2006 to form the UICs. The history of 
these communal Shari‘a courts – the socio-historical roots of their formation, the practices, 
concepts, and discourses that informed the work of the courts, and the metamorphosis of the courts 
into the UICs – provide an opportunity to study the social forces, historical traditions, and cultural 
and religious practices and concepts that inform and undergird Islamic movements, not only in 
                                                          
26 June 21, 2017.   
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Somalia but in other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. This dissertation is thus a historical ethnography 
of the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu.  
Organization of the chapters  
In chapter one I argue that the Shari‘a courts should be seen as a movement of communal self-
governance rooted in the historical experience and traditions of the communities that established 
the courts. Most commentators (Hagman and Hoehne 2009; Le Sage 2004; Menkhaus 2005, 
2006/2007; Rotberg 2005; Waal 2004) on the Shari‘a courts hold that the disintegration of the 
central state in 1991 led to a vacuum, which created the conditions for conservative clerics to 
impose Shari‘a “law” on society. I, on the contrary, contend that the prolonged absence of the state 
and with that its modernizing project of cultural and religious reform since its disintegration meant 
that the attempt to separate communal practices, concepts, ethics, and norms informed by the 
Islamic tradition from politics came to an end. The Shari‘a courts were an expression of organic 
forms of governance that were grounded in the practices, concepts, and norms of the historically-
rooted Islamic tradition of the community from which the courts emerged. Furthermore, I assert 
that it’s necessary to question two dominant presuppositions in order to clear the ground for a 
socially and historically rooted analysis of the Shari‘a courts. First, it’s essential to move away 
from a dichotomous approach to the study of Islam in Africa, which distinguishes between “Islam 
in Africa” and “African Islam” (Ware III 2014: 19). The former is considered as the proper form 
of Islam, a more austere and orthodox version of Islam viewed as an authentic expression of its 
Arabian roots, and therefore foreign to Sub-Saharan African societies and their cultures. African 
Islam or Islam Noir, on the other hand, is seen in both academic and nonacademic discourse as an 
Africanized version of Islam, which is essentially syncretistic and superstitious (Seesemann 2011: 
11). Another problematic approach which needs to be questioned is the conceptualization of the 
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Shari‘a as “Islamic law.” Most scholars (Asad 2003; Hallaq 2009a, 2009b, 2013; Messick 1993; 
Pierce 2003; Weiss 1992) contend that the Shari‘a as a historical phenomenon and lived tradition 
(Rosen 1989, 2000) is very distinct from “law” in the modern understanding of this term. Central 
to the modern understanding and practice of law is its separation from morality, a distinction that 
is wholly foreign and inconceivable in the Shari‘a tradition. Chapter one lays out the argument for 
why the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu should be contextualized within the history and religio-
cultural traditions of Somalia in order to appreciate the significance of this movement.  
 In chapters two and three, I provide a historical and religio-cultural context to the rise of 
the Shari‘a courts by examining the relationship between authority i.e. religious authority, and 
power i.e. political power, in pre-colonial Somalia. In chapter two I look at the role of religious 
authorities in relation to social organization and leadership. I argue that religious authorities, 
through their role of mediating and settling disputes, were integral to the activity of governing a 
society that in general lacked a centralized and a hierarchical political offices. In chapter three, I 
continue this line of analysis by demonstrating that on the few occasions when political power 
emerged in pre-colonial Somalia, it was founded upon and led by religious authorities. Together, 
the two chapters demonstrate the argument that religious authority has been integral to political 
power in precolonial Somalia. In making this argument these chapters accomplish two things. 
First, by providing a view of the longue durée in which the centrality of religious authority to 
political formations and political experience becomes evident, I show that the rise of the Shari‘a 
courts should not be viewed as a rupture with the region’s religious and political traditions, but as 
an event with a more complex relationship to the past and the present. Second, by showing the 
close association between religious authority and political power in precolonial Somalia, I counter 
a general tendency in the literature on authority and power in pre-modern Muslim societies, which 
A h m e d  I b r a h i m  
 
Page | 28  
 
contends that there has been a separation between authority and power in Muslims societies until 
the rise of the modern state brought the two together (Asad 2015; Hallaq 2003, 2009, 2013; 
Lapidus 2002; Messick 1993; Weiss 1992; Zubaida 2005). 
Chapters four, five and six are all more ethnographic than the first two chapters. Chapter 
four describes the initial events that led to the formation of four of the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu 
based on the personal accounts of individuals who were deeply involved in the events and actions 
that culminated in the founding of the courts. The descriptions are drawn from interviews with key 
members of the Shari‘a courts, biographical and historical manuscripts, as well as religious 
documents, all written in either Arabic or Somali by important players in the history of the Shari‘a 
courts and/or the subsequent UICs.27 A key theme that emerges out of the accounts of the four 
courts is the rise of religious authorities as politico-religious leaders was accompanied by the 
simultaneous decline of the political role of lineage- or “clan”-based faction leaders or warlords. I 
contend that the demise of the political role of lineage-based faction leaders was an expression of 
the fact that the “clan” as a political category was losing its coherence as the memory and 
experience of the postcolonial state faded. In other words, the “clan” as a political category only 
made sense in a world where the “clan” was depicted as a unit with authentic interests needing 
political representation at the level of the state vis-à-vis other clans. With the prolonged absence 
of the postcolonial state from the scene, the “clan” was no longer politically relevant. As both the 
“clan” and the political representative of the “clan,” the faction leader or warlord, lost their political 
significance, the general attitude, remnants of the centralized state institutions, that the political 
role of religious authorities should be delimited no longer reflected people’s lived reality. 
                                                          
27 This written material was collected and translated from Somali and Arabic by the author. 
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Consequently, religious authorities rose to political prominence. What we see here is essentially 
the de-privatization of religion as the experience of the postcolonial state faded from memory. 
Chapter five examines a few of the concepts and ideas from the Islamic tradition that 
informed the reasoning, actions, and practices that undergirded the rise of religious authorities to 
politico-religious leadership. More specifically, I analyze how the practices, discourses, and modes 
of reasoning associated with the concepts of “collective duty” (fard kifaya), “the people of 
resolution and contract” (Ahl al-Hal wa’l-‘Aqd), and “commanding right and forbidding wrong” 
(wa-ya’muruna bi’l-ma‘rufi wa-yanhawna ‘ani ’l-munkar) have informed the practices and 
reasoning of the actors whose actions culminated in the formation of communal Shari‘a courts. 
These concepts informed the practices and modes of reasoning of not only religious scholars 
(‘ulama), but also ordinary people whose actions were crucial to the formation of the courts. This 
shows that these Islamic traditional concepts formed part of the larger cultural background of the 
people. The rise of the Shari‘a courts was, therefore, not a result of an imposition of the Shari‘a, 
understood as “Islamic law,” on the population by conservative clerics. Rather, the courts built on 
older ideas, concepts, and practices that were embedded in the culture of the people and formative 
of their orientation to the world. 
Chapter six looks at the transition from independent communally established and run 
Shari‘a courts to the unified and semi-bureaucratized structure of the UICs. Specifically, I analyze 
in this chapter the transformation of Shari‘a practice and authority as part of the process of 
establishing a unified court system under the UICs. This process was led by a group of men 
educated in modern Islamic universities outside of Somalia who rose to power with the formation 
of the UICs. In their rise to power these new intellectuals displaced the authority of the local and 
“traditionally” educated religious authorities who founded the initial communal Shari‘a courts. 
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The bureaucratization of Shari‘a practice, which accompanied the rise of the UICs, changed 
Shari‘a practice and shifted authority away from neighborhood sheikhs. This chapter examines the 
educational background of these new elites, the organizational structures they introduced, and their 
impact on Shari‘a practice and authority. 
 Concepts, practices, and modes of reasoning from the Islamic “tradition”28 informed efforts 
and projects of communal and subject formation that eventually culminated in the rise of 
neighborhood/lineage Shari‘a courts. Before their unification into the UICs, the courts were 
independent from each other, non-hierarchical with no centralized authority. Consequently, they 
were much more open to pressures and influences by ordinary people. They were accountable to 
the neighborhood and district residents under their jurisdiction. The history of the Shari‘a courts 
of Mogadishu, therefore, give us a window into a type of governance informed by the Islamic 
tradition but not centered on the model of the modern territorial state, as many contemporary 
Islamic movements are. This is what is unique about the Shari‘a courts. The prolonged and 
complete absence of the state from the scene led people to engage in organic experiments of self-
governance without such process being influenced by the demands and engagement with state 
institutions. It was an experiment that grounded the governance of social affairs, i.e. politics, in 
historically embedded religio-cultural notions of authority, of justice, and responsibility. The non-
state centric concepts and practices of the communal Shari‘a courts ended with the formation of 
the UICs. The rise of the UICs, I submit, was a step in the direction of the logic and form of 
governance of the modern state.  
 
                                                          
28 For more on my use of the concept of “tradition” see chapters one and two 
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CHAPTER I 
The Shari‘a Courts of Mogadishu: Beyond “African Islam” and “Islamic law” 
As the introduction chapter demonstrated, the social upheavals, particularly the proliferation of 
crime and insecurity, following the disintegration of the postcolonial Somali state in 1991 created 
the conditions for the emergence of the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu. It was, however, practices 
and concepts informed by a historically-grounded and culturally-embedded Islamic tradition that 
led to the actions and modes of reasoning that culminated in the formation of the courts, as chapters 
four and five will demonstrate. In this sense, the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu were products of 
their users. They reflected the Shari‘a-informed ethical and moral outlook of the community, and 
weren’t courts in the sense that courts are understood as an arena where “law” is executed by an 
authority that is distinct and above society. The Shari‘a courts were, therefore, an organic 
movement rather than a court in the normal sense. This understanding of the Shari‘a courts of 
Mogadishu as grounded in the Islamic tradition as a lived reality reflective of Somalia’s history 
and culture is opposite to how many commentators have depicted the courts. For many 
commentators the Shari‘a courts were a local locomotive for the larger global phenomenon of 
“political Islam.” In such a reading, the absence of the state from the Somali scene since its collapse 
in 1991 is viewed as significant not because it allowed organic and more communally controlled 
forms of governance arrangements to emerge, but because the “vacuum” that the absence of the 
state created is said to have allowed “conservative” and “radical” clerics to spread their agenda in 
Somalia. On the contrary, I argue that the prolonged absence of the state and with that its 
modernizing project of cultural and religious reform since its disintegration in 1991 meant that the 
attempt to separate Shari‘a-informed communal ethics and morality from politics came to an end. 
The Shari‘a courts were an expression of organic forms of governance that were grounded in the 
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practices, concepts, and norms of the historically-rooted Islamic tradition of the community from 
which the courts emerged.  
As such, the notion of tradition will partly inform my approach. The notion of tradition as 
it was first conceptualized in the work of Alasdair MacIntyre29 and further developed by Talal 
Asad.30 In their formulation, tradition is no longer conceptualized as dichotomous to rational 
modernity and characterized by repetition of the same. Rather, tradition is an embodied and 
discursive formation that has its unique concepts, practices, and normative modes of reasoning and 
argumentation. Tradition understood as such can experience ruptures, recuperation, as well as 
continuities. In any living tradition, authority and what constitutes authoritative arguments or 
practices is constantly debated. In the case of the Islamic tradition, the foundational texts (Qur’an 
and hadith) constitute founding moments in an enduring conversation and argumentation. There 
is of course a separation between an authoritative tradition and its bearers. That separation is 
important for it’s in that moment of separation when relations of power is afforded influence in 
the enactment of the tradition. Tradition in this sense can be seen as a series of potentialities that 
are actualized in the performance of authorized procedures. In this dissertation, I approach the 
Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu as a historically and socially grounded movement that responded to 
the demands of the present through an engagement with the Islamic traditions as it has come to be 
articulated throughout the centuries in Somalia. I argue that concepts and practices from the 
Islamic tradition, in particular the Shari‘a, which are deeply embedded in the cultural and history 
of the Somali people, were integral to informing the actions and modes of reasoning that led to the 
                                                          
29 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2007); idem, A Short History of Ethics (London: Routledge, 1998). 
30 Talal Asad, The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam (Washington, D.C,: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 
Georgetown University, 1986); idem, “Thinking About Tradition, Religion, and Politics in Egypt Today,” Critical 
Inquiry 42 (Autumn 2015): 166-2014. 
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formation of the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu. In this chapter, I argue against reducing Shari’a to 
"law," in the narrow sense of that term – and differentiating it from Western epistemologies that 
draw a sharp distinction, at least in principle if not always in practice, between legality and morality 
– and for seeing its localized development as emergent from sociocultural contexts of practice. 
To view the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu as a movement whose development was informed by 
the Islamic tradition as it has been historically articulated in Somalia, and provide a historically 
and socially grounded account of it, it’s necessary to move away from a dichotomous approach 
that has become common in the study of Islam in Africa as well as the conventional 
conceptualization of the Shari‘a as “Islamic law.” The study of Sub-Saharan African Muslims has 
been framed by a narrative that distinguishes between “Islam in Africa” and “African Islam” (Ware 
III 2014: 19). The former is considered as the proper form of Islam, a more austere and orthodox 
version of Islam viewed as an authentic expression of its Arabian roots, and therefore foreign to 
Sub-Saharan African societies and their cultures. African Islam or Islam Noir, on the other hand, 
is seen in both academic and nonacademic discourse as an Africanized version of Islam, which is 
essentially syncretistic and superstitious (Seesemann 2011: 11). While there has been many 
academic critiques of this approach (Robinson 2004; Seesemann 2011; Ware III 2014), it continues 
to widely influence the study of African Muslim societies. In fact, this dichotomous approach has 
become even more influential in the current global fascination with security under “the war on 
terror” (Soares and Otayek 2007). Another problematic conventional approach is the 
conceptualization of the Shari‘a as “Islamic law.” Most scholars (Asad 2003; Hallaq 2009a, 2009b, 
2013; Messick 1993; Pierce 2003;; Weiss 1992) contend that the Shari‘a as a historical and lived 
culture (Rosen 1989, 2000) and legal tradition is very distinct from “law” in the modern 
understanding of this term. Central to the modern understanding and practice of law is its 
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separation from morality, a distinction that is wholly foreign and inconceivable in the Shari‘a 
tradition. In this chapter I demonstrate how the dichotomous approach to the study of Islam in Sub-
Saharan Africa and the conceptualization of the Shari‘a as “Islamic law” has influenced the 
commentary on the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu, and the shortcomings of these approaches. My 
overall argument in this chapter is that to appreciate the historicity and the religio-cultural roots of 
the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu, one must go beyond the conventional distinction between “Islam 
in Africa” and “African Islam,” as the common conceptualization of the Shari‘a as “Islamic law.”     
I. Islam in Africa 
The history of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa is long and complex going as far back as a millennium. 
For some countries, like Somalia and Mauritania, Islam is indistinguishable from the people’s 
identity, their norms and practices, their history, and their understanding of their place and 
orientation to the world. Our understanding, however, of the sociology and history of Islam in Sub-
Saharan Africa is limited. Research into Islam in Africa has often taken place within frameworks 
generated and informed by Western desires to cultivate malleable constituents, and to identify 
potential adversaries within Muslim societies. One consequence of that has been the conventional 
separation of Islam in Africa into two dichotomous entities: traditional “African Islam” and 
reformist Islam (Soares and Otayek 2007). “African Islam” is associated with Sufi orders (tariqa, 
plural turuq). The presence of Sufi orders in Africa goes back to the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. They have played important roles in trade, scholarship, and resisted or collaborated with 
European colonial powers (Babou 2002; Robinson 2000). Intricate Sufi rituals, including saint 
veneration and tomb visitation, are approached by most commentators as organically related to 
African cultures. As such, Sufi orders and their associated practices are viewed in conventional 
wisdom as the epitome of “traditional” or “African Islam.”  Additionally, and importantly, this so 
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called “African Islam” is portrayed positively because it’s assumed to be syncretic and thus 
tolerant of different practices in contrast to reformist Islam (Rosander 1997).  
Reformist Islam, on the other hand, has been associated with pan-Islamic movements or 
influences from the Middle East and North Africa, and has often been portrayed as posing a threat 
and a challenge to “African Islam” and Western interests. Reformist Islam is associated with 
“Wahhabism,” or interpretations and practices of Islam inspired by the eighteenth-century Arabian 
reformer Muhammad Abdul-Wahhab (d. 1792). Reformist Islam is also closely linked with 
salafism, a twentieth-century reform movement which invokes the practices of “the pious 
ancestors” as a model which today’s Muslims should aspire to. Commentators often employ 
interchangeably the categories of Wahhabi, Salafi, and fundamentalist, and reduce African 
Muslims’ efforts to change their own societies as emulation of Islam as practiced in the Arab 
world. African Muslim reform efforts are thus seen as anti “African Islam” (Cruise O’Brien 2003).  
This is of course a simplification of the complex and changing practices of Islam and Islamic 
reform movements in Africa.  
North Africa and the Arab Middle East, as one of the centers of new developments in 
Islamic intellectual discourse and practice, has always influenced how Muslims in Sub-Saharan 
Africa understood and practiced Islam. The articulation of the local and the global in how Muslims 
societies understand and practice Islam is more complex and perhaps deeper today than in the past 
(Coulon 2002; Soares 2005; Loimeier and Seesemann 2006), but it was in no way absent in the 
past and cannot be captured by the distinction of Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa into “African Islam” 
and reformist Islam. For example, it’s common knowledge among historians that Sufi orders have 
taken root and spread throughout Africa in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Martin 1977; 
Vikor 2000). However, Islam has been present in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa well before 
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that. Moreover, Sufi orders provided some of the fiercest resistance to European colonization in 
Africa (Levtzion and Pouwels 2000). So the conventional wisdom that Sufi orders are the epitome 
of “African Islam” and are, furthermore, characterized by tolerance and political quietism is 
historically inaccurate. Lastly, the practices associated with Sufi orders and are said to be 
organically connected to African cultures such as tomb visitation and saint veneration are practices 
that are common to Sufi orders throughout the Muslim world (Soares and Otayek 2007).  
This dichotomous approach to Islam has become even more conventional and widespread 
since Islam emerged as the new “menace” of Western security concerns after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Beginning with the 1998 attacks on U.S. embassies in East Africa and then with the 
September 11, 2001 attacks in the U.S., many scholars and policy makers began to focus on Islam 
in Africa. Countless studies warned that the weaknesses of African states, and their non-existence 
in places like Somalia, would provide ideal spaces for the spread of radical Islam. The post-9/11 
security concerns of the West has thus given a new impetus to the old and dichotomous approach 
to the study of Islam in Africa. This security oriented and dichotomous framing of Islam and 
Muslim societies in Africa has negatively impacted research on Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa, as 
Soares and Otayek point out: 
Much of the commentary on Islam and Islamism in Africa produced since the late 
1990s has been both superficial and alarmist, focusing almost exclusively on 
issues of international security. Many are now pointing to possible links between 
Islam/Islamism and terrorism in Africa, and commentators are looking 
everywhere in Africa for links to Muslim radicals, as well as for presumably 
nefarious Saudi and South Asian connections. (2007: 6) 
A h m e d  I b r a h i m  
 
Page | 37  
 
Such a dichotomous approach to the study of Islam is misleading for many reasons (Rosander 
1997; Soares and Otayek 2007). It assumes that all Muslims in Africa can neatly be placed in these 
categories and that their ideas, motivations, and practices can be explained in reference to these 
two categories and their supposedly antagonistic relationship. This approach, therefore, overlooks 
the consequences of dynamics internal to African societies. These include economic and political 
transformation of the colonial and post-colonial periods, including the crisis of the state, failures 
of economic and political developments, massive urbanization, and collapse of revolutionary post-
colonial ideals. These factors are the primary drivers of contemporary Islamic movements in 
Africa. In responding to these problems and attempting to reform their societies, African Muslim 
societies have engaged with and built on their historical experiences and religio-cultural practices. 
Foremost among the resources sub-Saharan Africa Muslim societies possess are the concepts, 
practices, modes of reasoning, notions of justice, and ethical responsibility that has been 
bequeathed to them by their heritage in the Islamic tradition. Rather than situating Islamic-oriented 
African social and political movements and organizations in the histories and religio-cultural 
norms and ideas of African societies, most commentators view them as “foreign” inspired and 
influenced. Once they are viewed as foreign-inspired it follows that there is little need to 
understand the specific history, culture, and religious traditions of the African societies from which 
they emerge. The analysis and commentary on the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu is no exception in 
this regard.   
Commentary on the Shari‘a Courts 
In line with the general depiction of Islam in Africa, the Shari‘a courts have been analyzed in terms 
of where they fit in the categories of “African Islam” and reformist or radical Islam. The courts 
are frequently depicted as a vehicle for the spread of reformist or radical Islam (Hagman and 
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Hoehne 2009; Le Sage 2004; Menkhaus 2005, 2006/2007; Rotberg 2005; Waal 2004). Reformist 
Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa, as mentioned above, is conventionally understood as representing a 
form of Islam that is foreign to African societies. The appeal of this supposedly foreign Islam is 
explained away through the utilization of such tropes as the post state collapse vacuum and the 
vulnerable society. The argument is that the Shari‘a courts took root and emerged because 
fundamentalist clerics, influenced by foreign religious networks, took advantage of a vulnerable 
population that was willing to accept anything and anyone that promised relief from the terrible 
conditions into which Somalia, particularly Mogadishu, had fallen into after the collapse of the 
state. In this framing, every act the Shari‘a courts or people associated with the courts took is seen 
as some type of conspiracy meant to win over the population and conscript them for a cause that 
is essentially alien to their daily concerns. A political scientist explains matters in the following: 
The complete collapse of government social services, for instance, has provided 
Islamic charities with the opportunity to become the primary provider of 
education and health care services. The absence of a formal judiciary has 
enabled shari‘a courts to step into the vacuum; they are now one of the most 
important forms of local rule of law. For hard-line Islamists, the continued 
collapse of the central government has provided a useful political environment – 
an opportunity to call for Islamic government as the cure for Somalia’s crisis, an 
easily exploited cauldron of social frustration and resentment with which to rally 
radical anti-Western sentiment, and a safe haven from a state that, if revived, 
might be tempted to crack down on hard-line Islamist groups. (Menkhaus 2005: 
29) 
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My argument isn’t that the formation of Islamic charities and “Islamic schools” weren’t 
critical to the formation of the Shariʻa courts, but I question why such charities and schools are 
portrayed as motivated by ulterior motives or serving as a conveyer belt for a religio-political 
ideology from the outside. The same author writes, “the rapid expansion of Islamic charities and 
schools, mostly funded from the Gulf, wins over hearts and minds and provides a convenient 
structure for recruitment of young Somali to the cause” (Menkhaus 2005: 23). Another 
commentator puts the relationship between the deteriorating security situation and the appeal of 
Islamic reform movements thus, “for instance, many young urban people took refuge in the 
mosques to avoid the fighting and thereby came into contact with more militant figures who were 
not part of what they describe as a clan-war among Muslims” (Marchal 2004: 123). One wonders, 
why is it so difficult for commentators to surmise that perhaps communities organized themselves, 
often in mosques, to rescue their communities from becoming victims or perpetrators of crime? 
Another writer says more or less the same thing, “the population – including wealthy and 
influential businessmen – was willing to accept shari’a rule in exchange for basic security 
administered by the courts” (Hagmann & Hoehne 2009: 50). This way of depicting the Shari‘a 
courts is popular with many analysts because it’s a direct consequence of that old and dichotomous 
approach to Islam in Africa, which has been rejuvenated by the “war on terror,” as Soares and 
Otayek highlight, “these new attempts to identify good and bad Muslims are strikingly similar to 
colonial efforts to determine whether Muslims in Africa were loyal or potentially seditious” (2007: 
7).  
It’s not that there are no partial truths in this narrative, but the problem is once this framing 
is used to explain the efforts of Muslims in Africa to change the conditions of their life, once they 
are depicted as simply taking advantage of a societal crisis and frustration, a number of more 
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complex considerations about the history and motivations of such efforts is rendered unnecessary. 
There is no attempt to understand the social practices and relations, experiences, motivations, and 
views of the people involved in the establishment of the courts, other than to point a finger at a 
“Wahhabi” influence achieved through foreign-funded Islamic charities and schools. Much is 
erased from consideration through the labeling of an individual or a movement as Wahhabi. Didn’t 
these actors emerge from within the environment which they are said to be taking advantage of? 
Couldn’t they be motivated by an earnest desire to ease their own suffering and that of the 
population in founding schools and charities? Why is their agency viewed only in terms of creating 
a warped anti-Western mentality and a mindless militant? How are the activities of this activists 
informed by a moral vision of the good life and an ethical duty to struggle towards its realization? 
How does the Islamic tradition inform their social vision and their activism? By assuming that 
“Islamists”31 are only taking advantage of the situation, one avoids having to analyze a series of 
very compelling themes. Relatedly, this way of framing lends itself and is part of the counter-
terrorism project. It argues that by alleviating the terrible conditions through the establishment of 
a security state one drains the swamp in the midst of which Islamic “radicalism” flourishes, thereby 
justifying the strengthening, and in the case of Somalia, the establishment of a neoliberal security 
state. It completely ignores the large historical complexities of which the active militant is only a 
minor expression.  
A key concept in this portrayal of the relationship between the Shari‘a courts and the 
society from which the courts emerged is the understanding of the Shari‘a as “Islamic law.” Such 
                                                          
31 For a critique of this concept see Hrischkind (1997).  
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understanding enables commentators to portray the Shari‘a court as an expression of an agenda by 
conservative clerics to impose Shari‘a or “Islamic law” on society: 
Since the outbreak of the civil war and again with the withdrawal of UNOSOM32 
forces, a new system of policing and judging crime –the Islamic Courts – is 
emerging in Madina33 and elsewhere. Empowered by well-armed and well-
disciplined young men, fundamentalist34 mosques have effectively maintained 
peace in some neighborhoods by imposing sharia law on offenders. (Menkhaus & 
Prendergas 1995: 54). 
These fundamentalist clerics are said to impose Shari‘a law on a vulnerable population, broken by 
years of pervasive violence and desperately desirous of law and order. Therefore, what the Shari‘a 
courts represent more than anything else is “law” which is being imposed on society. In being 
imposed on society, this “Shari‘a law” is serving as a Trojan horse for the advancement of political 
Islam, as this author makes clear, “Since the early 1990s, political Islam has been propagated in 
Somalia through the establishment of Shari‘a courts in a number of different cities and towns, but 
particularly in Mogadishu and Shabelle river valley” (Menkhaus 2006: 36). By equating the 
Shari‘a with “law,” the Shari‘a courts inevitably become something foreign and imposed from 
above on society. In other words, the courts are not a manifestation of the self-defense and self-
governance initiatives of the communities, and the people’s response to the challenges of the 
present through an engagement with their historical experiences and the cultural and religious 
legacies of their history.  
                                                          
32 United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) began in April 1992 and ended March 1995.  
33 Madina is a district in Mogadishu where the first Shari‘a court emerged in 1992 after the collapse of the state the 
year before (see chapter four).  
34 For a critique of the notion of Islamic fundamentalism see Euben (1999).   
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Unsurprisingly, and in line with the conventional distinction between “African Islam” and 
reformist Islam, it becomes necessary to differentiate between the Shari‘a or “Islamic law” and 
local “customs” in order to view the Shari‘a courts as an imposition. A report by a United Nations 
field mission describes the difference between custom and Shari‘a law in how the Shari‘a courts 
in Hiran region in southern Somalia functioned: 
They (the courts) are multi-clan in composition and have had considerable 
popular support; they have exercised the right to collect taxes, allocating 
revenues to pay for the running of the courts, provide small stipends to  
manage disputes, operate the prison, and maintain and control a shariʻa 
militia estimated at 500 men. The courts in Hiran base their deliberations on  
the Quran, but do not impose shariʻa law – parties to a dispute are entitled to 
opt for traditional (blood money) compensation or shariʻa.35 
A distinction is made between local, tradition-friendly, Shari‘a and a more puritanical “Shari‘a 
law.” One is an expression of local i.e. authentic African culture, while the other is an imposition 
on the local population. Interestingly, if one were to ask local Shariʻa scholars or sheikhs about the 
difference between Shari‘a and traditional Somali custom (heer), they would deny that a difference 
exists between the two, as this researcher found out, “Shari‘a judges assert that there is no conflict 
between Islamic law and traditional Somali clan law (known in Somalia as heer). They state that 
Somali culture was fully integrated into Islam and thus no conflict was possible” (Le sage 2004: 
136). The symbiosis between the Shari‘a and local customs throughout Islamic history is well 
known, “Islamic law depended, in both theory and practice, on the cooperation of customary (ada, 
                                                          
35 UNDOS, ‘Hiran Regional LAS Study: Executive Summary,’ Nairobi: UNDP-Somalia (January 1999). Quoted in 
Le Sage 135. 
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urf) and royal law (siyasa shar‘iyya). Nowhere did Islamic law operate exclusively, and 
everywhere customary law was entwined with it in the realm of practice” (Hallaq 2009: 368). This 
is not a surprise given that the Shari‘a throughout its history had to function in communities with 
extremely different customary practices, and did so without being backed by the legislative 
authority of a state. The Shari‘a, therefore, incorporated urf or ‘custom’ as one of its sources, “the 
idea that customary practice was a necessary if not theoretically authorized source of law was an 
old notion in Islamic legal thinking” (Peirce 2003: 119). However, despite this Shari‘a history and 
the assertions of his informants, the above commentator suggests the Somali sheikhs are lying 
because none of them were members of Sufi brotherhoods. Given the popular assumption that Sufi 
brotherhoods are the pre-eminent expression of Islam in Africa, the author concludes that since 
none of the judges at the Shari‘a courts identified themselves as members of Sufi brotherhoods, it 
must mean the Shari‘a they practice is non-traditional.36  
II. Law, Morality, and the State 
A key notion in this way of explaining the formation of the Shari‘a courts is the conceptualization 
of the Shari‘a as “law” in the modern understanding of that term. This conceptualization of the 
Shari‘a as “law,” as mentioned above, allows for the Shari‘a courts to be viewed as an imposition 
from without and not something that emerges from and is an expression of the practices, concepts, 
and discourses of the society in question as these have been bequeathed to them by the Islamic 
                                                          
36 It might be worth awhile to consider how colonizing European powers made a distinction between the Shari‘a or 
“Islamic law” and the traditional customs of the colonized. Once this distinction was made Shari‘a came to be 
viewed as more threatening by colonial officials. Speaking of Dutch colonization of South-East Asia, Hallaq 
addresses how Dutch legal experts and colonial officials viewed adat (what the Dutch considered local custom) in 
relation to Shariʻa.  It is very similar to how heer is viewed in relation to Shari‘a. Speaking of one of these legal 
experts, Hallaq writes, “he also espoused the view that any attempt weakening adat was nothing less than an 
invitation to open the floodgates to Islam, a religion seen by van Vollenhoven and many of his compatriots not only 
as a native political tool of unification, but as the very religion that had threatened Christendom for centuries. 
Furthermore, to side with adat was to promote secularism, the new religion of Eruope” (Hallaq 2009: 393). For a 
discussion of how French colonial officials viewed Islam and the Shari‘a in West Africa see Harrison (1988).  
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tradition.37 This way of understanding the Shari‘a, and by extension the Shari‘a courts, forecloses 
our ability to ask certain questions about Somali society and Islamic-oriented socio-political 
movements within it. A central feature of the modern understanding of law, one that underlines 
the difference between “law” and Shari‘a, is in relation to the concept of “morality,” a concept 
whose historical emergence partly lies in its separation from law in the modern West. Concomitant 
with the separation of law and morality, and perhaps a precondition for this separation, was the 
emergence of the autonomous self-legislating individual as well as the modern state for whom law 
is one of its sovereign characteristics. In the rest of this section I provide a brief account of the 
history of these concepts and their relations before moving on to a discussion of the Shariʻa as a 
historical phenomenon.38  
As with all concepts, the modern concept of morality has a specific history that conditioned 
its formation and subsequent use, a history that is specific both temporally and spatially. The moral 
Philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre writes, “in Latin, as in ancient Greek, there is no word correctly 
translated by our word ‘moral’; or rather there is no such word until our word ‘moral’ is translated 
back into Latin” (1984: 38). Most scholars trace the emergency of the modern notion of morality 
to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in northern Europe. Its emergence was a consequence 
                                                          
37 For the concept of tradition I employ here, see Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1984); idem, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1988); Talal Asad, The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam (Washington, D.C,: Center for Contemporary Arab 
Studies, Georgetown University, 1986); idem, “Thinking About Tradition, Religion, and Politics in Egypt Today,” 
Critical Inquiry 42 (Autumn 2015): 166-2014. In After Virtue MacIntyre writes, “We are apt to be misled here by 
the ideological uses to which the concept of a tradition has been put by conservative political theorists. 
Characteristically such theorists have followed Burke in contrasting tradition with reason and the stability of 
tradition with conflict. Both contrasts obfuscate. For all reasoning takes place within the context of some traditional 
mode of thought, transcending through criticism and invention the limitation of what had hitherto been reasoned in 
that tradition; this is as true of modern physics as of medieval logic. Moreover when a tradition is in good order it is 
always partially constituted by an argument about the goods the pursuit of which gives to that tradition its particular 
point of purpose. . . . Indeed when a tradition becomes Burkean it is always dying or dead” 221-22. 
38 My brief account of “Western law” is a broad ideal type. For the purposes of analysis I ignore the complexity of 
that genus.  
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and an expression of the dramatic transformations taking place in Europe at that time. This is not 
to say that there didn’t exist prior to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries a concept of the good 
and the bad or right or wrong, but the emergent idea of morality operated in a new semantic field 
and was built on a new conception of the self. MacIntyre (1966, 1984) attributes the emergence of 
this modern notion of morality to the breakdown of traditional forms of life where the good and 
the bad were a function of specific forms of life and inseparable from the evaluative judgments 
specific to the carrying out of the various roles inherent in that social life. He contends that the 
appearance of the distinctive moral ought was conditioned by the disappearance of shared ideals 
and functions within a shared form of life. In these traditional forms of life you ought to statement 
was inseparable from the relevant reasons for the injunction in the form of ‘you ought to do x or y 
if you want to be a knight or a saint.’ MacIntyre writes:   
But as shared ideals and accepted functions drop away in the age of 
individualism, the injunctions have less and less backing. The end of the process 
is the appearance of a ‘you ought . . .’ unbacked by reason, announcing 
traditional moral rules in a vacuum so far as ends are concerned, and addressed 
to an unlimited class of persons. For this ought the title of the moral ought is 
claimed, and it has two properties. It tells us what to do as an imperative does, 
and it is addressed to anyone who happens to be in the relevant circumstances. 
When to this use of ‘you ought’ the response is, But why ought I? The only 
ultimate answer is ‘you just ought’ (1966: 172-173). 
The new world brought into being by the Reformation and Counter-reformation conditioned the 
emergence of the impersonal and unconditional moral ought thereby necessitating the search for 
its rational justification which became the project of moral philosophy. One of the central and 
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defining features of this new morality is how it’s centered on and presupposes the autonomous and 
self-legislating individual.  
The modern notion of morality is inescapably centered on the autonomous individual and 
as such presupposes such an individual. That the autonomous self-legislating individual is a 
necessary presupposition of modern morality is underlined by the fact that moral philosophers 
presume the autonomous individual in their philosophical musings about morality. Moral 
philosophy takes it for granted that as rational, autonomous, and self-legislating individuals we 
should be able to find convincing reasons for doing what is moral, whether the arguments are based 
on appeal to enlightened interest or some basic psychological motivation. For moral philosophy, 
moral duties can have no authority than the individual: 
their authority, it is supposed, comes from us alone, since there can be no reasons 
to do one thing rather than another except insofar as we take them to be reasons: 
it is up to us to decide what import, if any, the facts as they are will have for our 
conducts. That the world itself is normatively mute except for the principles we 
impose upon it – this is the idea of autonomy, running through so much of the 
moral, political, and even scientific thought of modernity. (Larmore 2008: 7) 
It’s thus not surprising that the philosopher most identified with modern moral philosophy, 
Immanuel Kant, has offered a robust and far reaching formulation of morality as autonomy “he 
alone was proposing a truly revolutionary rethinking of morality. He held that we are self-
governing because we are autonomous. By this he meant that we ourselves legislate the moral law. 
It is only because of the legislative action of our own will that we are under moral law” 
(Schneewind 1998: 6). Hence the emergence of liberal individualism and the transformation of 
society into an aggregate of individuals each with her/his unique internal conscience and in pursuit 
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of personal interests is simultaneous with the emergence of the modern notion of morality as 
autonomy. This notion of morality is inseparable from the development of social life as an arena 
in which autonomous individuals each pursue their self-chosen conception of the good life. In such 
social life, government and its laws, in the form of the state, is viewed as normatively neutral in 
regards to rival individual-based conceptions of the good life. We thus see that another defining 
feature of modern morality is its distinction from “law,” where law now becomes an instrument in 
the imposition of a bureaucratized unity on a society made up of individuals.   
The modern notion of morality, which is centered on and presupposes the self-legislating 
autonomous moral agent, was being formulated as part of a conceptually meaningful discourse at 
a time when the modern state was emerging as the dominant entity in configuring the spaces and 
forms of social life. In such an environment morality is inevitably personal morality for its 
authority emanates from the autonomous individual. Conversely law becomes the domain of the 
state. With that a distinction emerges between law and morality in the West with the formation of 
the modern state, “the distinction between law and ethics is itself made in jurisprudential terms 
that are traceable in European thought at least as far back as Grotius, a distinction expressing the 
idea that law is the domain of the obedience to a civil sovereign and morality the domain of 
individual sovereignty in accordance with inner freedoms (conscience)” (Asad 2003: 238-39). The 
emergence of this distinction between law and morality informed various debates on what the 
relationship between law and morality is and should be. The most forceful, perhaps because it 
pointed to something fundamental about the nature of law under the state, was the legal positivism 
of John Austin who asserted that “a law in the most general and comprehensive acceptation in 
which the term, in its literal meaning, is employed, may be said to be a rule laid down for the 
guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having power over him” (Austin 1961:401). 
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In this Austinian/positivist39 formulation, law is simply understood as an order backed by threats, 
and as Hallaq points out, such an understanding is based on “a denial of a logical entailment or 
any necessary connection between law as it is and law as it ought to be” (Hallaq 2009b: 252).   
Hence the essential element in law is the relationship between a law giving sovereign, regardless 
of the form of the sovereign – democracy or absolute monarchy – and subjects who must render 
obedience to the law.  
When law is understood as such, that is, as an essential feature of the modern state’s claim 
to sovereignty, morality emerges as its counterpart, that is, as a claim to an independent personal 
space of the sovereign moral agent. It is understandable then that the emergence of the sovereign 
moral agent is frequently celebrated as the rejection of authority – traditional, religious or political 
– and an affirmation of the capacity of the individual for self-regulation,  “the conception of 
morality as self-governance provides a conceptual framework for a social space in which we may 
each rightly claim to direct our own actions without interference from the state, the church, the 
neighbors, or those claiming to be better or wiser than we” (Schneewind 1998: 4). However, a 
more nuanced take on this history might suggest that the rejection of authority that is inherent to 
the concept of the autonomous self-regulating moral subject isn’t a rejection of all authority. The 
impersonal authority of the modern state isn’t rejected or contradicted by the self-legislating 
autonomous subject. Rather, one might argue, such a subject is a necessary constituent for the 
functioning of the modern state. In fact, such an autonomous self-regulating citizen-subject 
emerges as a consequence of the new relations of power and authority that the modern state 
embodies. So it’s not simply that the autonomous self-legislating moral agent emerges as a result 
                                                          
39 For more on legal positivism, see Justin Austin; Nicholas Unwin, “Morality, Law, and the Evaluation of Values,” 
Mind, Vol.94. No.376 (Oct 1985); Harold J. Spaeth, ed., The Predicament of Modern Politics (Detriot: University of 
Detroit Press, 1969); Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press, 1986). 
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of the progressive unfolding of freedom. Rather, this new subject emerges in new relations of 
power and the distinction between personal morality and state law is crucial in the cultivation of 
such a subject.  
A good illustration of this relationship might be found in a colonial context, where, as part 
of the imposition of the colonial state and its forms of authority and relations of power, the state 
seeks to create spaces – legal, economic or otherwise – where a self-regulating autonomous subject 
might emerge in the form of the citizen. In an absorbing commentary of the transformation of the 
Shari‘a in Egypt under European colonization, Asad writes “I argue that it is the power to make a 
strategic separation between law and morality that defines the colonial situation, because it is this 
separation that enables the legal work of educating subjects into a new public morality” (2003: 
240). In this complicated argument, Asad contends that the separation of law and morality is 
necessary to the project of secularization, a process that entails the dismantling of the Shari‘a 
tradition. The separation of law and morality, he argues, was necessary to create spaces for the law 
of the sovereign state and the moral autonomy of the sovereign subject. This separation of law and 
morality is strategically necessary since colonized subjects had to be trained to become and assume 
the responsibilities of sovereign moral subjects. Significantly, the law of the sovereign state could 
then be invested with this civilizing mission, “the distinction between law (which the state 
embodied, produced, and administered) and morality (which is the concern ideally of the 
responsible person generated and sustained by the family) were essential for creating the social 
spaces wherein secular modernity could take shape” (2003: 238). Particular kinds of law require 
corresponding subjects of that law, and the modern and state-centered notion of law entails the 
self-legislating sovereign subject and the idea of morality as autonomous.  
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My goal in this section was to highlight that the contemporary understandings of “law” is 
unique and part of that uniqueness lies in its separation from “morality.” The historical formation 
of both terms is part of the emergence of the modern liberal secular Western state and the relations 
of power it expresses and the forms of life and subjectivities it made possible. My intention in 
drawing attention to the spatio-temporal historicity of these concepts is to point out that to equate 
the Shari‘a with “law,” understood in this modern sense, is to misunderstand the Shari‘a and by 
extension the Shari‘a court movement. If not as “Islamic law,” how then should the Shari‘a be 
understood? The answer to this question is the subject of the next section.   
III. Shariʻa, the Modern State, Da‘wa or Piety Movements 
It is now a common position among scholars of Islam that the Shari‘a can’t be equated with “law” 
in the modern understanding of this term (Asad 2003; Hallaq 2009a, 2009b, 2013; Messick 1993; 
Pierce 2003; Rosen 1989, 2000; Weiss 1992). The recent discussion of the distinction of the 
Shari‘a from law is different from an earlier discussion of the Shari‘a’s incapacity to separate law 
from morality. Surprised by the relative paucity of legal commands in the Qur’an and the 
predominance of what they considered ethical prescriptions in Islam’s Holy Scripture, early 
scholarship40 on the Shari‘a concluded that both the Qur’an and the Shari‘a, in general, suffer from 
an inability to distinguish between law and morality. This, in their view, explained the 
“inefficiency” and “ineffectiveness” of the Shari‘a as a “legal” system. For these scholars “the 
moral dimension of Islamic law, in language and in its conceptual derivation, is thus dismissed as 
one of the causes which rendered that law inefficient and paralyzed” (Hallaq 2009: 2). The obvious 
limitation of this approach is that it treats a phenomenon that is relatively recent in human history 
                                                          
40 See, Joseph Schacht, The Origin of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1950); N. J. 
Coulson, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1964). 
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and specific to the modern history of the West, the distinction between law and morality, as a 
standard by which the practices and experiences of other cultures and societies ought to be judged. 
Under such an approach, the Shari‘a inevitably appears as lacking in not making a distinction 
between law and morality. It’s telling that these earlier scholars would attribute ineffectiveness to 
the Shari‘a on account of the absence of a clear separation of law and morality.  
The more recent discussions of the Shari‘a have also underlined the absence of our modern 
notions of law and morality from the Shari‘a as a tradition of jurisprudence, “it is not, strictly 
speaking, possible to speak in this manner in the classical Arabic of traditional Islam, for that 
language does not possess true equivalents of the words ‘law’ and ‘morality’” (Weiss 1992: 6). 
However, unlike the previous orientalist generation, recent scholars haven’t treated this as a sign 
of an incomplete process of evolution. Rather, they view it as an invitation to understand the 
uniqueness of the Shari‘a in its historical formation and the forms of life and ways of reasoning its 
practices reflected and produced, as well as its difference from modern state law. In this section I 
intent to do three things. First, I highlight a couple of the more significant features of the Shari‘a 
in its development and as it was practiced before the onset of the European colonialism. Second, I 
briefly touch on how the features described were transformed under colonialism and the 
modernizing state. And finally, I end with a description of how da‘wa or ‘piety’ movements as an 
aspect of the so-called Islamic Revival, are building on some of the practices and discourses of the 
Shari‘a described above.    
Linguistically, Shari‘a means “way” or “path,” and more specifically in early Arabic, 
Shari‘a meant “a path leading to a source of water” (Izutsu 1966; Rosen 2000). Hence, Shari‘a can 
be understood as a path laid down by God for the guidance of humanity, “a path that claimed to 
guarantee well-being in this world and in the hereafter” (Hallaq 2013: 85). This guidance for 
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humanity is provided in the revelations, the Qur’an and hadiths (Prophet’s traditions). However, 
the number of legal commands in the Qur’an and hadiths are quite insignificant as to provide a 
guidance to a whole way of life. This led to the formation of Shari‘a specialists, who in their 
readings and commentary of revealed texts, tried to approximate God’s will. There is, therefore, a 
distinction between God’s will in the revelations and the approximations of it by Shari‘a 
specialists. The former is called Shari‘a and the latter fiqh (understanding or jurisprudence). One 
scholar describes the distinction between the Shari‘a and fiqh as follows, “Shari‘a law is a sort of 
Platonic ideal that scholars try to realize, however imperfectly and fallibly, in their fiqh. Fiqh law 
accordingly derives its validity from its character as the closest appropriation of Shari‘a law that 
scholars are capable of achieving” (Weiss 1992: 16). The person who possess the requisite 
scholarly qualifications required to undertake the task of elaborating the meaning of divine 
revelation is known as mujtahid or ‘toiler’ and the scholarly work the mujtahid undertakes is called 
ijtihad or ‘toil.’ The mujtahid is different from the faqih, that is, the person who simply bears or 
transmits fiqh.  The body of carefully worked out methodological principles which must be 
followed in the search for divine law by a mujtahid is elaborated in a special science known as 
usul al-fiqh or ‘the science of the principles underlying fiqh.’ The authoritative Shari‘a opinions 
of mujtahids have been collected throughout Islamic history into manuals that constitute fiqh or 
jurisprudence. We thus see that what has come to be referred to as Shari‘a is the work of Shari‘a 
specialists trying to tease out the will of God based on their hermeneutics of revealed texts and 
other scholarly opinion. The fact that the Shari‘a was the product of the efforts of independent 
legal specialists gave the Shari‘a it’s unique and defining characteristics.  
Among the most important consequences of the individual derivation of the Shari‘a are the 
independence of the Shari‘a from political power, and the staggering variety of different legal 
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opinions in fiqh texts called ijtihad. These two features are connected because the origin of the 
Shari‘a in the effort of independent scholars insulated it from being coopted by political leaders, 
while at the same time this led to the proliferation of the incredible variety of legal opinions.41 
Speaking of ijtihad, Hallaq writes, “one of the most salient elements and defining features of 
Islamic law, is just that, an opinion. It does not claim monopoly on jural truth, nor does it instigate 
any powers of enforcement. It is precisely here where the ‘law’ of the Shari‘a, the ijtihadic opinion, 
differs fundamentally from the law of the modern state. Islamic law, from at least this perspective, 
is not law, in the modern sense, at all” (2009a: 110). Ijtihad differs from hakm or legal judgment 
rendered by the qadi or judge. Though the qadi could and was often in the employ of political 
powers, he relied on the opinions of more specialized and authoritative legal scholars such as 
mujtahids or muftis, whose scholarly work were, for the most part, independent from political 
power.42 The substance of the Shari‘a, therefore, remained independent of political power, “the 
legal specialists and the popular religious movement that had emerged by the 130s/750s were too 
well entrenched for any political power to expunge or even replace them. Indeed, it was precisely 
this movement and its representatives that drove the wedge between religious authority and 
political power” (2009a: 131-32).43 In fact, it was due to the moral authority and religious/legal 
                                                          
41 Explaining the staggering variety of opinion in the Shari‘a, Hallaq writes “It is root cause was perhaps the absence 
of a central legislative agency – a role that could have been served by the state or the office of the caliphate but was 
not. The power to determine what the law was had lain instead, from the very beginning, in the hands of legal 
specialists, the proto-fuqaha’ and later the fuqaha’ themselves. It was these men who undertook the task of 
elaborating on the legal significance of the revealed texts, and it was they who finally established a legal 
epistemology that depended in its entirety on the premise of an individualistic interpretation of the law. This feature 
was to win for Islamic law, in modern scholarship, the epithet ‘jurist’s law’” (2009a: 27).   
42 My arguments in chapters two and three is that this wasn’t always the case. I content that in most of the “Islamic 
periphery,” places like Somalia where precolonial centralized political powers were rare, it’s hard to argue that there 
was a separation of politics and Shari’a there.  
43 The separation of religious authority and political power in pre-colonial Muslim societies isn’t true for all Muslim 
societies. I will argue in chapters two and three that in pre-colonial Somalia religious authority was not only not 
separate from political power, it was foundational to the formation of political power.  
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knowledge of these Shari‘a specialists that the rulers of Muslim dynasties were compelled to 
accept the ethico-religious norms which emerged from the hermeneutics of Shari‘a specialists. 
Another consequence of the fact that the Shari‘a was developed by independent Shari‘a 
specialists was that the Shari‘a had a different relationship to the Muslim communities than the 
idea of law captures.44 The absence of an overarching legislative power meant that the court had 
to rely on the community both in the formulation of the law and its enforcement, as Leslie Peirce 
describes in her excellent study of a sixteenth century Ottoman provincial capital. Members of the 
community played a variety of significant roles such as participating in the interpretation of divine 
law, serving as sources of customary practices, functioning as court observers, mediating conflicts 
before the litigants appear before the formal courts, and taking responsibility for monitoring 
individual conduct and morality at the neighborhood level. Furthermore, the Shari‘a was an 
essential element in the fabric of social life and wasn’t just limited to the court: 
For the inhabitants of Aintab, sharia was more than a legal discourse confined to 
the court. For one thing, it was a scholarly tradition taught and studies by local 
citizens. . . . Sharia was also a living tradition, ‘the right path,’ an ethical code as 
well as a body of law. Ordinary people did not have to apply to the court or the 
local colleges to obtain guidance along this path. Instruction was available at the 
neighborhood level from local muftis and imams. (Peirce 2003: 114)45 
                                                          
44 This point is crucial for my argument about how the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu emerged and their relationship 
to the community. A relationship that can’t be captured by the conventional understanding of a court and relatedly 
the modern notion of law.  
45 For more on the relationship between an Islamic court and the community in Muslim societies see, Leslie Peirce, 
2003, Morality Tales: Law and Gender in the Ottoman Court of Aintab (Berkeley: University of California Press); 
Ronald Jennings, “limitations of the Judicial Powers of the Kadi in Seventeenth Century Ottoman Kaseri,” Studio 
Islamica 50 (1979); Nelly Hanna, ed., The State and is Servants: Administration in Egypt from Ottoman Times to the 
Present (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1995); Hirsch, F. Susan. 1994. “Kadhi’s courts as complex sites 
of Resistance: The State, Islam, and Gender in Postcolonial Kenya.” In Contested States: Law, Hegemony, and 
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The communal embeddedness of the Shari‘a explains why the distinction between “law” 
and “morality” was never conceptualized within Muslim societies and why such a distinction was 
incomprehensible. The Shari‘a, as Messick explains, was a ‘total’ discourse46 that included what 
we might today refer to as legal, moral, religious, economic and the political.47 It pervaded every 
aspect of life since the modern distinction between public and private didn’t exist in the world of 
the Shariʻa. The Shari‘a does distinguish between mu‘amalat (rules governing the proper behavior 
between the faithful such as those dealing with commercial transactions) and ‘ibadat (rules 
governing relations between God and the faithful such as those detailing the form and content of 
salat or ‘canonical prayer’), but it would be wrong to equate ‘ibadat with the modern idea of 
private religion, and make a clear separation between the rules of ‘ibadat and rules of mu‘amalat. 
As many scholars have pointed out, the relationship between the two is different than the secular 
idea of privatized religion would suggest (Asad 1993; Hallaq 2009a, 2013; Hirschkind 2006; 
Izutsu 1966; Lapidus 1984; Mahmood 2005). For many of these scholars ‘ibadat (ritual worship) 
are not only significant to mu‘amalat (social behavior) because some ‘ibadat injunctions such as 
the duty to pay a certain percentage of one’s property known as zakat or ‘almsgiving’ have a direct 
bearing on social conduct. But even more importantly, the rituals48 of worship labelled ‘ibadat are 
crucial in the cultivation of a Shari‘a-minded subject and that is how  these rituals are seen in the 
Shari‘a discourse and by average Muslims, “in this view, the performance of the Shari‘a – spiritual 
cultivation of the self through ‘ibadat, the entire range of embodiments that define worship, 
                                                          
Resistance, edited by Mindie Lazarus-Black and Susan F. Hirsch (London: Routledge; Chapter 8 in Messick (1993); 
Chapter 4 in  Hallaq (2009a);    
46 This is adopted from Marcel Mauss (1967: 1).  
47 Messick, the calligraphic state, 3.  
48 There is a difference between the anthropological literature on ritual and the way these scholars approach the 
significance of ‘ibadat for Muslims and, one should add, the way Muslims see ‘ibadat in relations to their general 
lives. For a discussion on the genealogy of the concept of ritual see Ch. 2 in Asad (1993). For a discussion of Islamic 
disciplinary practices including rituals of worship and the anthropological literature on ritual see Ch. 4 in Mahmood 
(2005).  
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together with supererogatory exercises as well as the norms of social behavior (called muʻamalat) 
– are all interdependent” (Asad 2003: 250-251). Consequently, the Shari‘a is not only understood 
by its practitioners as a totalizing discourse that guides one on to the “right path,” but it is also 
seen as providing the practices, or ‘technologies of the self’, in the form of ‘ibadat, which are 
viewed by ordinary Muslims as critical in the cultivation of a subject who embodies a “willing 
submission to the authority of the ‘law’” (Hallaq 2013: 118). In this sense the Shari‘a can be 
understood as a ‘total discourse’ as well as a process that teaches individuals and helps them teach 
themselves to become moral subjects “in a scheme that connects the obligation to act morally with 
the obligation to act legally in complicated ways” (Asad 2003: 241).   
Given that the Shari‘a was so intricately woven into the fabric of social life in Muslim 
communities it was bound to be altered by the imposition of a distinctly modern political and 
economic processes and an alien culture under European colonization. The colonial period entailed 
for many Muslim societies “a profound alteration in, and reorganization of, people’s ethical and 
aesthetic sensibilities, life choices, and manner of public and personal conduct – not to mention a 
complete transformation of legal, educational, and political institutions” (Mahmood 2005: 74). Of 
the immense and various transformations that came with the process of colonialism I am interested 
in what became of the Shari‘a or how the Shari‘a was transformed under European colonialism. 
Speaking of what became of the Shari‘a under colonialism in the Muslim world49 Messick writes, 
“this total discourse was first modified and displaced, creating something approximating the form 
and separate status of Western law, as part of the larger process that brought about the rise of 
nationalism” (1993: 3). I have described above how “Western law” emerged in the same historical 
                                                          
49 Though much of the literature which I am relying on here is based on observations from few key countries, I agree 
with Hallaq that developments during the colonial and postcolonial periods have “deeply affected most other regions 
in the Muslim world” (Hallaq 2004: 22).  
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process that also produced the modern Western state, as well as the modern notion of morality and 
the sovereign moral subject. It is no surprise then that the Shari‘a was “modified and displaced, 
creating something approximating the form and separate status of Western law” under European 
colonization, since colonialism was a project that imposed the form of the modern state. As such, 
the process of colonization had to create a space for state law and it was in the process of doing 
that that the Shari‘a came to be redefined as something appropriate to, and exercising limited 
sovereignty over the realm of the family. Some have argued that the delimitation of the Shari‘a to 
the family was concomitant with the reform and redefinition of the family itself (Asad 2003; 
Agrama 2012; Hallaq 2013). This was also a process of secularization in that the redefinition of 
the Shari‘a as something appropriate to the sphere of the family entailed an introduction of the 
secular understanding of the religious as the private (Asad 2003). In the process of being limited 
to the private sphere the Shari‘a was also codified, among other transformations, so that it could 
be deployed in a rational and efficient way as state law.  
Essentially, European colonialism entailed the transformation of the form of life and the 
institutions that enabled the flourishing of the Shari‘a. Among the institutions that were 
transformed under colonialism were the large inalienable religious endowments (waqf) that 
supported the independent Shari‘a specialists and their discourse of ijtihadic hermeneutics that 
was “the very feature that distinguished Islamic law from modern codified legal system” (Hallaq 
2009a: 381). By supporting madrasas or law colleges these institutions helped to shield Shari‘a 
scholars from political pressures and thus maintain the independence of the substance of the 
Shari‘a. However, with the onset of colonialism and the formation of modern states in the Muslim 
world, waqf institutions came under the political powers of the centralizing and modernizing state 
thereby putting an end to the tradition of independent Shari‘a legal specialists and replacing them 
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with the agency of state law.50 Colonialism so transformed the Shari‘a that in time both those 
arguing that it should be limited to the private sphere (secularists) and those arguing that it should 
become the law of the state, creating an Islamic state (Islamists), were in agreement that the Shari‘a 
was something resembling state law and that it could be legislated on society as the law of the state 
or put aside.  
In a stimulating and timely recent book51 Hallaq argues that the primary demand of 
contemporary Islamists that the state in the Muslim world should be made into an Islamic state by 
making the Shari‘a the law of the state are involved in an impossible contradiction. In this book 
Hallaq contends that the Shari‘a cannot be restored as it has been traditionally practiced in Muslim 
societies for centuries. Through such processes as codification, centralization and new hierarchical 
law schools and lawyers the modern state has irredeemably altered the world of the Shari‘a and its 
restoration is impossible in this new landscape dominated by the sovereignty of the state. The 
primary shortcoming of this desire and attempt to transform the modern state into an Islamic state 
is that the Islamists “assume the modern state to be a neutral form of governance, one that can be 
harnessed to perform functions according to the choices and dictates of its leaders” (Hallaq 2013: 
155). They overlook that the imposition of the modern state is part of a processes that entailed 
unique consequences that are economic, political and psychological, among other things. Under 
the modern state not only must the Shari‘a resemble “Western law” so that it can be applied as 
state law and thus subject to state sovereignty but life under the modern state also involves the 
cultivation of individual and collective subjectivities such as the citizen subject and nationalist 
                                                          
50 In some parts of the Muslim world the translated and codified Shari‘a was applied by European judges. A good 
example of this is India under British colonialism, see Cohn (1989); Strawson (1995); Chapt. 14 in Hallaq (2009a).   
51 Hallaq, The Impossible State. For a shorter version of the same argument see Hallaq, “Can the Shari‘a be 
restored?” In Islamic Law and the Challenge of Modernity, edited by Yvonne Y. Haddad and Barbara F. Stowasser 
(Walnut, CA: Altamira Press, 2004), 21-53.  
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sentiments. The incompatibility between the Shari‘a and the modern state is, therefore, an 
incommensurability between the different forms of life and forms of governance and subjectivities 
inherent to them. This is a formidable critique of the discourse and political project of the 
movements that have taken much of the Muslim world by storm that refer to themselves as the 
Islamic Awakening or Islamic Revival (al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya).  
However, not all the movements that fall under that label are the same. They differ in their 
tactics and orientation. They are frequently differentiated into three groupings: Islamic political 
parties, militant Islamists, and socio-religious organizations that provide social services and work 
on proselytizing. The first two groups are involved primarily in state-oriented politics whereas the 
third group, often called ‘da‘wa movements’ or ‘piety movements’, focus on providing charitable 
services through a network of non-profit and for-profit businesses.52 More significantly, as part of 
their call to Islam, such movements are engaged in creating faithful Muslims by cultivating pious 
subjectivities that embody the religious ethos and sensibility that are considered appropriate to a 
Muslim life. As such, these movements are, on the one hand, apolitical, by our state-centered 
definition of the political, and on the other, they are building on an old Islamic tradition of 
cultivating the virtuous person through pious conduct both in public and in private. These 
movements have received considerable attention from scholars (Asad 1993; Mahmood 2005; 
Marsden 2005; Masquelier 2007; Schielke 2010; Soares 2006; Wickham 2013). Da‘wa or piety 
movements connect in complicated ways piety and ethical cultivation and consequently their 
projects often translate into ethico-political projects, as these scholars have demonstrated 
(Hirschkind 2006; Lambek 2000; Mahmood 2005). These scholars build on Foucault’s work on 
                                                          
52 Wickham (2013) refers to these networks as a “parallel Islamic sector,” often working in middle and lower class 
neighborhoods and providing services such as running hospitals, schools, and charitable works. 
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ethics (Foucault 1997), where ethics is viewed “as the component of morality that concerns the 
self’s relationship to itself” (Davidson 1994: 65). This approach to ethics, therefore, allows one to 
study the process and different forms of moral subjectification historically and in different cultures. 
By not focusing directly on the state or making claims in the language of state politics, these 
movements appear apolitical, but they are nevertheless involved in a political project due to their 
cultivation, through ethical practices, of subjectivities with specific sensibilities that inevitably 
influences their public conduct. In so doing, these movements seem to undermine the 
modern/liberal distinction between the private and the public which is one reason they seem to 
befuddle the state. In Why I am not a secularist (1999), William Connolly has demonstrated that 
the public of liberal politics is maintained not only by rational modes of argumentation, but also 
by affective modes of assessment, what he calls “guttural registers” (1999: 28), which 
problematize the simple separation between the private and the public sphere. An 
acknowledgement of the complicated relationship between affective and embodied sensibilities 
and political engagement makes an analysis of a movement whose central project is the cultivation 
of an ethico-political subject a worthwhile undertaking.53 This is one reason why piety movements 
have attracted scholarly attention and engendered a debate about the efficacy of ethical self-
cultivation.54  
                                                          
53 This is essentially what Saba Mahood is doing in The Politics of Piety (2005).  
54 There are some (Marsden 2005; Schielke 2010; Soares 2006) that critique the emphasis on ethical cultivation in 
the works of S. Mahmood and C. Hirschkind by arguing that their emphasis on ethical self-cultivation is all 
encompassing and leaves no room for the contradictions of everyday experience, “I argue that moral subjectivity is a 
very important issue indeed, but there is a risk – especially when morality and piety come together – of favoring the 
complete, the consistent, and the perfect in a way that does not do justice to the complex and often contradictory 
nature of everyday experience” (Schielke 2010: 25).  
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Another reason why piety movements are fascinating, as mentioned above, is on account 
of the fact that da‘wa movements are a modern expression of an old Islamic tradition.55 This is the 
old and well known Islamic traditional duty know as al-amr bi’l-ma‘ruf wa’l-nahy ʻan al-
munkar,56 roughly translated as “commanding right and forbidding wrong.”57 Based on various 
Qur’anic verses and hadiths58 and commented and reflected on throughout the centuries by Shari‘a 
scholars, the tradition makes it a duty upon every Muslim to try to correct another’s conduct if it 
contravenes what the Shari‘a considers an appropriate conduct for a Muslim person and a Muslim 
community. The correction can be done in a variety of forms such as advice or counsel, by force, 
or simply in one’s heart. What action is appropriate for the individual believer and under what 
circumstances is what the discourse of the Shari‘a of the various schools commented and debated 
on over the centuries and in various contexts. The principle amr bil ma‘ruf is one specific 
expression of a general teaching that runs throughout the Shari‘a discourse. This is underlined by 
the understanding of the Shari‘a as a process through which one cultivates a self whose heart is 
attuned to the guidance of the Shari‘a. In this sense all of life is worship. That is to say, it is a 
process of cultivating a Shari‘a-minded subject. This is why iman or “faith” in Islam is so closely 
tied to action. Those that have iman are the “good-doers” (muhsinun) or, to say it in another way, 
iman is materialized through “good works” (salihat).59 It is this idea of honing the appropriate 
                                                          
55 Part of the reason why this work on da‘wa movements is interesting for my work on the Shari‘a courts has to do 
with, a) this movements are building on a long-standing concepts and practices from the Islamic tradition; b) their 
emphasis on ethical cultivation of the self, while not political in the modern sense, has the potential to generate an 
ethico-political project.  
56 This tradition is treated in this excellent book, Michael cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in 
Islamic Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).   
57 see chapter five for more on how this and other concepts from the Islamic tradition informed the practices and 
modes of reasoning of the Shari‘a courts.  
58 Two of the more common ones are the verse, “Let there be one community of you, calling to good, and 
commanding right and forbidding wrong: those are the prosperers” (Q3: 104), and the hadith, “Whoever sees a 
wrong (munkar), and is able to put it right with his hand, let him do so; if he can’t, then with his tongue; if he can’t, 
then with [or in] his heart, which is the bare minimum of faith,” quoted in Cook 2006: 33. 
59 Izutsu, (1966: 185).  
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sensibilities through daily activities, whether the activities are the rituals of worship (‘ibadat) or 
social interactions (mu‘amalat), which informs the principle of amr bil ma‘ruf. Not only does 
practicing this principle help to shape social interactions in such a way that they are conducive to 
living a life in accord with the Shari‘a, but exercising this principle is productive of the courage 
necessary of a Shari‘a subject. The most popular contemporary expression of this traditional duty 
are the piety movements60 that exist throughout the Muslim world thus showing the continued 
relevance of Islam as a tradition. This is not to say that the contemporary expression of this duty 
is unchanged from its manifestation in earlier times. As Michael Cook points out an important 
change in the current manifestation of this traditional principle is the organizational form it takes 
today, which the da‘wa movements are the best expressions of, “the core of the old conception 
was a personal duty to right wrongs committed by fellow-believers as and when one encountered 
them; the core of the new conception is a systematic and organized propagation of Islamic values 
both within and outside the community. . . . On the assumption that the ‘community’ who are to 
perform the duty are a subgroup of the community at large” (2000: 515-16).   
Conclusion 
The Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu were products of their users. The courts, therefore, reflect the 
ethical and moral outlook of the community. They built on historically sedimented and socially 
embodied practices and concepts that informed the ethical reasoning and notions of justice that 
undergirded the rise of the courts. I submit that the prolonged absence of the state and with that its 
modernizing project of cultural and religious reform since its disintegration in 1991 meant that the 
                                                          
60 For a transnational da‘wa movement known throughout the Muslim world, Jamaʻat Tabliqh, see Metcalf (1994), 
“Tabliqh emphasis on the priority of action, and the dialectic between experience and doctrine in fact strongly recall 
Islamic theories of the effect of Islamic ritual like salat (the canonical prayer) in transforming human life” (1994: 
718).   
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attempt to separate Shari‘a-informed communal ethics and morality from politics came to an end. 
The Shari‘a courts movement was an expression of a movement that was grounded in the practices, 
concepts, and norms of the historically-rooted Islamic tradition of the community from which the 
courts emerged. The courts weren’t simply a result of the imposition of religious “law” by a group 
of conservative clerics taking advantage of the absence of an overarching state power to advance 
an Islamist political project. They were a manifestation of a complex engagement with the 
challenges of the present through history and tradition. They are an example of what an organic 
socio-political movement in Somalia looks like, and an indication that such a movement isn’t 
adequately captured by labelling it political, economic, legal or religious. It was all of this and 
more. One place to begin to better understand the Shari‘a courts is the Islamic tradition, particularly 
the Shari‘a, in its historical formation and transformation as well as a lived reality in Somalia. I 
approach the Shari‘a courts as something resembling a daʻwa or piety movement in that they were, 
like daʻwa movements, informed and conditioned by the practices and discourses of ethical 
cultivation of pious selves and social responsibility central to the Shari‘a, and partly captured by 
the principle of amr bil maʻruf.61 As such the Shari‘a courts testify to the vitality of an Islamic 
tradition where Islam’s divine and authoritative texts “are one of the central elements in a 
discursive field of relations of power through which truth is established” (Mahmood 2005: 116). 
And, one might add, that this tradition informed a particular understanding/constitution of the past 
and engagement with the present.  
My aim in this work is to provide a historically and socially grounded account of the 
emergence and evolution of the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu by looking at the discourses and 
                                                          
61 Speaking to the relationship between contemporary daʻwa movements and this traditional principle, Mahmood 
writes, “in fact, one could argue that the modern doctrinal justification for daʻwa has been established through the 
considerable moral scholarship conducted on the principle of amr bil maʻruf” (2005: 58-59).  
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practices about justice and social responsibility that motivated the individuals and events that led 
to the formation of the Shari‘a courts. By telling this story I want to underline how Shari‘a-
informed practices and forms of reasoning as well as the contingent circumstances of a crisis-
ridden post state-collapse environment generated the movement of the Shari‘a courts. And, how 
the contradictions latent in such an ethico-political movement in the contemporary world were 
made evident in the web of a global conflict between international Islamic militants and the West’s 
“war on terror.” This project thus provides an opportunity to reflect upon the promise and peril of 
the emergent societies and social imaginaries latent in an African Islamic-oriented socio-political 
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Governing through the Shari‘a: religious authority in pre-colonial Somalia 
Instead of seeing disjunctions based on historical periodization, a geographical 
orientation provides a view of the longue durée in which a multiplicity of travels, 
contacts, and exchanges take place within one geographical space over time. 
Within this space, new impulses, say toward orthodoxy, are not completely novel 
phenomena that signal absolute change. Rather they are ripples across a body of 
water that is already interconnected.62 
While the outcome at the time of writing remains to be seen one thing seems 
clear; the social forces that brought the ICU to power were hardly new. They, in 
fact, seem a clear echo of the circumstances that saw the emergence of an 
influential Sufi movement little more than a hundred years before. In a time of 
trouble and confusion it was not solely to the comforts of clan that Somalis 
turned. They also sought out the wisdom and guidance of their religious leaders. 
It was the ‘Ulama to whom they looked as the Renewers of the Age.63 
The courts reflected a feeling that exists within the Muslim Somali community, 
just like the rest of the Muslim world they want to be ruled according to the 
Shari‘a. They wanted it during colonialism, they wanted it after they became 
independent, they wanted it during the revolution (ka‘aanka, as in the socialism 
                                                          
62 Engseng Ho, The Graves of Tarim: Genealogy and Mobility across the Indian Ocean (Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press, 2006), p. 65.  
63 Scott Reee, Renewers of the Age: Holy Men and Social Discourse in Colonial Banaadir (Leiden, Netherlands: 
Koninklijke, 2008), p. 222.  
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military revolution of 1969), they wanted when it when the central government 
and Mohamed Siyad Barre (the military socialist leader) left the scene, and they 
still want it to this day. It’s part of the Muslim person’s belief that he practice the 
Islamic religion, let it be at the personal, family, clan or national level. So, that 
we should rule ourselves according to Islam isn’t new to the Somalis.64 
 
In this chapter, and the next (chapter three), I provide a historical context to the rise of the Shari‘a 
courts by examining the relationship between authority i.e. religious authority, and power i.e. 
political power, in pre-colonial Somalia. In this chapter I specifically look at the role of religious 
authorities in relation to social organization and leadership. I argue that religious authorities, in 
their role of mediating and settling disputes, were integral to the activity of governing a society 
that in general lacked a centralized and a hierarchical political offices. In the next chapter, I 
continue this line of analysis by demonstrating that on the few occasions when political power 
emerged in pre-colonial Somalia it was founded upon and led by religious authorities. Together, 
the two chapters substantiate the argument that religious authority has been integral to political 
power in pre-colonial Somalia. In making this argument, these chapters accomplish two things. 
First, by providing a view of the longue durée in which the centrality of religious authority to 
political formations and political experience becomes evident, I show that the rise of the UICs 
should not be viewed as a rupture with the region’s religious and political traditions, but as an 
event with a more complex relationship to the past and the present. Second, by showing the close 
association between religious authority and political power in pre-colonial Somalia, I demonstrate 
                                                          
64 Interview with a former UICs official in Mogadishu on August 13, 2014.  
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that authority and power were intertwined in the pre-colonial Islamic periphery contrary to the 
historical experience of the so-called “Islamic heartland,” where the literature (Asad 2015; Hallaq 
2003, 2009, 2013; Lapidus 2002; Messick 1993; Weiss 1992; Zubaida 2005) contends there has 
been a separation of authority and power prior to the rise of the modern state.   
I must admit at the outset to be working with under-theorized concepts of the political and 
the religious. I hope, however, to approximate my understanding and usage of these concepts 
through a discussion of the concept of authority as articulated in Hannah Arendt’s well-known 
essay, what is authority?65 Arendt begins her essay with the assertion that there is a general 
difficulty in understanding the concept of authority in the modern world. This is reflected in the 
so-called crisis of authority, which speaks to the fact that the political experience which gave the 
concept its meaning has long ago ceased to exist. Consequently, the concept of authority has lost 
its validity. To try to understand what authority originally meant Arendt explains what authority 
is not. She writes that since authority always depends on obedience there is a wide-spread 
misconception which equates authority with power and violence. To the contrary, She notes that 
authority “precludes the use of external means of coercion; where force is used, authority itself has 
failed” (1961: 93). Similarly, authority doesn’t involve persuasion because persuasion assumes 
equality between individuals and works through argumentation, “where arguments are used, 
authority is left in abeyance” (93). Authority therefore contains neither coercion nor consent. 
Authority, she writes “implies an obedience in which men retain their freedom” (106). Or to put it 
in other words, it implies coercion without the use of force.  Different models of authority, she 
points out, do exist in different arenas of social life. She makes an important distinction between 
authority in the political arena and non-political authority such as child-rearing and education. To 
                                                          
65 Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought (New York: Viking, 1961) 
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be sure, pre-political models of authority such as that between children and parents have been used 
as metaphors and models for authority in politics, especially in contexts where experiences of 
authority in politics is lacking. She contends, for instance, that Greek political experience lacked 
authority, which explains why Greek political philosophy, particularly that of Plato, was concerned 
to find a transcendental source against which political conduct could be measured in the hope of 
saving the polis. Significantly, this distinction of authority in different realms allows Arendt to 
argue that the political realm can have or lack authority. There is authority in the political realm 
when there is a common foundation that transcends political power, and by which such power can 
be measured and contested.  
Arendt asserts that in the history of the West authority in the political realm originated in 
the political experience of Rome. Central to Roman political experience was the sacredness of 
foundation. It’s in the Roman emphasis on the sacredness and unrepeatability of the founding of 
the city that the concept of authority in politics first appeared. By politics Arend simply meant the 
management of public affairs. Political experience is, in her understanding, the experience of 
ruling and regulating derived from the realm of human affairs. When Romans sanctified the 
foundation of Rome and made it a tradition binding for all future generations they turned politics, 
or the management of public affairs, into the preservation of the founding of the city. Those in 
politics based their authority on their relationship to the sacred foundation, “the word auctoritas 
derives from the verb augere, ‘augment,’ and what authority and those in authority constantly 
augment is the foundation” (121-22). The founding fathers and ancestors whose superhuman 
efforts led to the foundation of the city were the authoritative models whose conducts provided the 
transcendental standards of measurement. There was thus a clear distinction between power, which 
was, theoretically, in the hands of the people, and authority, which was vested in the senate, in the 
A h m e d  I b r a h i m  
 
Page | 69  
 
political experience of Rome. To be in authority was to be tied to the traditions that transmitted 
the lessons of the foundational event, and “as long as this tradition was uninterrupted authority 
was inviolate” (124). The binding force of this authority and tradition was closely related to the 
roman concept of “religion.” The bonds which tied men back to the founding moment was what 
the Romans referred to as “religion” or re-ligare. It meant “to be tied back, obligated, to the 
enormous, almost superhuman and hence always legendary effort to lay the foundations” (121). 
The three concepts of religion, authority, and tradition constituted an inter-related trinity in Roman 
thought. According to Arendt, “the strength of this trinity lay in the binding force of an 
authoritative beginning to which ‘religious’ bonds tied men back through tradition” (125). The 
inter-connectedness of the trinity was, therefore, based on the fact that they were related to the 
same source, the foundation of the city. The loss of one inevitably meant the loss of the other two. 
Hence, Arendt argues that the so-called crisis of authority and the loss of religious traditions in the 
West are the same phenomenon.   
What I find useful in Arendt’s discussion of authority is her emphasis that authority is 
contrary to both coercion by force and persuasion through arguments. Authority obviously implies 
obedience but obedience that doesn’t undermine freedom. This is only possible, according to 
Arendt, if the source of authority is beyond the sphere of power. In Roman political experience 
this source of authority was the foundation of the city. Notwithstanding the actual realities of power 
and the hierarchical relationship that accompanies authoritarian structures, the existence of a 
transcendent source allows for equality between individuals in a relationship of authority. An 
equality that puts limits on abuses of power, and provides the language for critiquing and opposing 
it. I find this discussion of authority to illuminate the nature of religious authority, especially when 
such authority becomes foundational to politics. Her distinction of political authority from non-
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political authority is also important because it helps to distinguish between different kinds of 
authority. But more importantly, to appreciate that the political realm can have or lack authority. 
This allows me to analyze the difference in the political realm between pre-colonial and 
postcolonial Somalia. I submit that one of the differences in the political realm between the pre-
colonial and postcolonial Somalia is the absence of authority in postcolonial politics. The political 
realm in Somalia has since the onset of European colonialism, when religion and tradition were 
alienated from the political realm, lost its transcendent foundation. In the absence of a transcendent 
foundation politics was reduced to the naked assertion of violent coercion or persuasion. When the 
ability to convince through argumentation or obtain obedience through coercion eroded with the 
end of the Cold War, which ended the patronage system that sustained the postcolonial state in 
Somalia, the political realm was in complete disarray. The contemporary Islamic movements in 
Somalia that are commonly referred to as “political Islam” is, in this regard, characterized by the 
re-emergence of authority in politics; the anchoring of the management of public affairs in a 
transcendent source. It is a political event of the first order. The essential question that the Shari‘a 
courts of Mogadishu answered was, how was political authority to be established in an 
environment where neither external force nor persuasion could form the base for the management 
of public affairs or compel men to follow?  In the case of Somalia, the re-emergence of religious 
authority in the political realm is conditioned by the fact that there is already a tradition of political 
experience and imagination that anchors politics in a transcendent source. This chapter and the 
next will underline that historical experience by historicizing authority and power in the political 
experience of pre-colonial Somalia. Additionally, Arendt’s account of the concept of authority is 
intimately linked to the concepts of tradition, religion, and politics. I find the interconnectedness 
of these concepts useful to think through the argument I want to make in this chapter and the next.  
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This historicization of the relationship between authority, as in religious authority and 
power, as in political power, is necessary for two reasons that are central to the overall argument 
of the dissertation. First, one of the main goals of this dissertation is to historically contextualize 
the emergence of the Shari‘a courts. This longue durée approach on the formation of the courts is 
a counterweight to a historical periodization that overlooks the historical continuities that inform 
the cultural and religious practices that undergirded the formation of the courts. This, however, is 
not to say that there weren’t new intellectual, religious, and organizational currents originating 
outside of Somalia that came to exert a lot of influence on developments in Somalia, including the 
rise of the courts. But the tendency by many commentators (see chapter one) to simply attribute 
the rise of the courts to nefarious and conservative foreign i.e. Middle Eastern, influences that 
politicized and radicalized the supposedly ‘traditional’ and tolerant ‘African Islam’ is wrong in 
many fronts. This approach has a long history in the study of Islam in Africa, (Westerlund and 
Rosander 1997) and has recently gained more prominence in the proliferation of terrorist experts 
in response to the demands for more information on Islamic movements by Western policy makers. 
In the case of Somalia, it has led to studies and commentaries (Menkhaus 2005, 2007; Rotberg 
2005) that purport to show how these foreign religious and intellectual currents “radicalize,” the 
networks that introduced these currents into Somalia, the local conditions that made the population 
susceptible to stricter and more militant interpretation of the Shari‘a, and the differences among 
the various Islamic movements in Somalia in terms of their “radical” and “moderate” tendencies. 
Rather than attributing the emergence of the courts to modern foreign-inspired intellectual and 
political currents associated with the so-called Islamic Awakening (al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya), the 
historicization of authority and power sheds light on some of the continuities in religious and 
political experience that informed the rise of the courts. I do this not to argue for a simple continuity 
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between the past and the present but to problematize the historical periodization that often informs 
much superficial analysis. Furthermore, I contend that a sensitivity to and understanding of the 
longue durée is necessary to better grasp the ruptures and novel elements that the transformation 
from independent communal Shari‘a court to the UICs was an articulation of and advanced (see 
chapter 6 for more on this shift). To that end, the main goal of this chapter, and the following one, 
is to analyze the emergence of the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu in light the historical experience 
of religious authority in politics in precolonial Somalia. 
The second objective in historicizing the relationship between power and authority is to 
contribute to the scholarship on the structural and epistemological bases of Shari‘a authority, and 
its relationship to political power in pre-colonial and postcolonial Muslim societies. It’s something 
of a consensus in the literature (Asad 2015; Hallaq 2003, 2009, 2013; Lapidus 2002; Messick 
1993; Weiss 1992; Zubaida 2005) that in pre-colonial Muslim societies there was a separation 
between authority and power. Authority in medieval Muslim societies, it’s argued, was vested in 
religious scholars (‘ulama),66 and the amir or ruler was expected to adjust his actions to the 
demands of the Shari‘a, as articulated by the ‘ulama.67 It was, therefore, specifically the authority 
the ‘ulama derived from the Shari‘a that conditioned the separation of authority and power. The 
independence of the ‘ulama was made possible by the structural and epistemological bases of the 
Shari‘a. The epistemology of the Shari‘a, premised on the individual scholar’s quest to 
approximate the intentions of God as revealed in the scriptures, authorized the ‘ulama to set the 
norms that regulated social conduct, including the conduct of political and military rulers. In 
essence the ‘ulama, as Shari‘a experts, controlled the legislation and governance of Muslim 
                                                          
66 Ira Lapidus (2002) traces this separation to ninth-century Baghdad when the ‘Ulama won against the amir’s claim 
to theological authority. Also, see Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds (1986).  
67 Samy Ayoub (2016) challenges this position by arguing that during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the 
authoritative opinions of Hanafi jurists were directly influenced by the orders of the Ottoman state.  
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societies. The independence of this Shari‘a-derived authority from political power was exemplified 
by the figure of jurisconsult (mufti), the preeminent character in Shari‘a hermeneutics. 
Consequently, in pre-colonial Muslim societies, “it was the ruler who – from the beginning of 
Islam until the middle of the nineteenth century – consistently had to bow to the jural wishes of 
the Shariʻa and its representatives in governing the populace. As a moral force, and without the 
coercive tools of the state, the law stood supreme for over a millennium” (Hallaq 2009: 125).  
This separation of authority and power began to change in the nineteenth century with the 
onset of European colonialism of Muslim societies and the subsequent rise of the postcolonial 
state. Expectedly, it was through the transformation of the Shari‘a that the independent authority 
of the ‘ulama was undermined. The Shari‘a in the pre-colonial Islamic world was very distinct 
from what it had become over the past two centuries after the “reforms” of the colonial and 
postcolonial periods. In its drive to centralize the administration of justice and take over the power 
of legislation, the colonial and postcolonial state delimited and transformed the Shari‘a such that 
it became something resembling “law,” whose application could be limited to a specific sphere. In 
the words of Talal Asad, the pre-colonial Shari‘a “is not ‘law’ in the modern understanding of that 
concept, not a system of legal doctrines backed by sovereign state power, but a tradition consisting 
of normative practice and commentary that includes (but is not exhausted) justiciable cases” (2015: 
179). With the emergence of the nation-state in the Muslim world, the Shari‘a was incorporated 
into the judicial system of the state and delimited to the sphere of the family. Through such 
processes as codification, centralization and new hierarchical law schools and lawyers the modern 
state has irredeemably altered the world of the Shari‘a (Hallaq 2004; Messick 1993). In doing so 
the modern state has sought to undermine the Shari‘a-derived independent authority of the ‘ulama.   
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By noting the place of religious authorities, specifically Shari‘a specialists, in the 
foundation of political power in pre-colonial polities, my dissertation contributes to this literature 
in two regards. First, I contend that the historical separation between authority i.e. religious 
authority and power i.e. political power in the pre-colonial Islamic world that most of this literature 
asserts is not necessarily true for the entirety of Muslim societies. In the case of pre-colonial 
Somalia, the relationship between authority and power was rather different than what is depicted 
in the literature. Religious authority was crucial to the formation and maintenance of political 
power in pre-colonial Somalia. In fact, it was religious authorities, particularly Shari‘a specialists, 
that often assumed the role of political leaders. I suspect the reason much of the above-cited 
literature emphasizes the separation of authority and power in pre-colonial Muslim societies is 
because this literature is based on the historical record from the so-called “Islamic heartland.” It 
reflects the historical record of typical pre-colonial Sunni states led by a sultan or a king in the 
Islamic heartlands. Theories based on reflections of the historical processes in the center is thus 
taken to apply to the periphery. It’s assumed that what is true for the lands of the Islamic center is 
true for its periphery. Could the historical record from the Islamic periphery provide us with a 
different vantage point in the analysis of Shari‘a authorities and their relationship to political 
power? I argue that this is indeed the case, and that the Islamic periphery might do for the Islamic 
heartland what theory from the global south does for the global north (Jean and John Comaroff, 
2012). That is, analysis of the history of Islam in Somalia, part of the Islamic periphery, might 
shed light on processes at the center. A historical analysis of religious authority and political power 
in Somalia redefines our understanding of the Shari‘a in relation to political power in pre-colonial 
Muslim societies. It also provides a different vantage point from which to analyze contemporary 
Islamic movements.  
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This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section is a general introduction of the 
anthropological literature on authority in Islam. The second section covers the specific case of 
authority in Islam based on the structural and epistemological bases of the Shari‘a. This section 
will also cover the transformation of Shari‘a structures of authority during the colonial and 
postcolonial periods. To underline the difference between the general structures of authority in the 
Shari‘a and the specific manifestations of Shari‘a authority in the context of Somalia, the third 
section looks at the role of religious authorities in the government of social relations in pre-colonial 
Somalia.  
I. Religious authorities in Muslim societies 
The anthropological literature on Islam and Muslim societies has viewed the analysis of authority 
as an important lenses through which to understand Islam and Muslim societies. Perhaps as an 
inevitable result of the anthropological impulse of trying to understand a world-historical religion 
in terms of its varied local manifestations, a dominant approach in the study of Islam has been a 
dichotomous method that analyzed Islamic beliefs and practices in terms of “textual” versus 
“everyday” or “urban” versus “rural” or “Indonesian” versus “Moroccan.” Associated most 
famously with Ernest A. Gellner (1981) these studies have viewed religious authority in Muslim 
societies in relation to a distinction between rural Islam and urban Islam or in relation to the larger 
cultural complex of the society studied. Rural Islam exemplified one kind of authority associated 
with heterodox, ecstatic, charismatic, and Sufi Islam. The other Islam, viewed as prevalent in urban 
milieus, was associated with textual, puritanical, and reformist Islam. These different versions of 
Islam were said to have distinct forms of legitimating religious authority based on different 
religious practices and ways of knowing. Exemplified by Sufi orders (tariqa, plu., turuq, ‘path’), 
traditional/popular Islam places emphasis on esoteric knowledges and practices that are only 
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accessible to a disciple who is initiated and introduced to these knowledges and practices by a 
master (Brenner 2001). In other words, in this form of Islam, popular among rural population, 
Islamic authority is hierarchical and based on master-disciple relations. Such a relationship is 
undergirded by the perception that Islamic knowledge is gained through secret (sir) or esoteric 
practices that cannot simply be learnt in the books (Ibid). This type of Islamic authority is 
hierarchical and other-worldly.  
Opposite to this is what is generally referred to as reformist, Salafi, or Wahhabi (named 
after Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the eighteenth-century Arabian reformer). Reformist Islam 
questions the validity of Sufi practices such as tomb visitation and veneration of saints, among 
others. Reformist Islam also rejects the hierarchical claims to authority that is an integral part of 
Sufi organizational structures. They promote a form of knowledge that has often been called 
rationalistic with a democratizing tendencies (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996). This is a 
consequence of the reformist position that every Muslim who has an understanding of the Arabic 
language should have direct access to religious knowledge without the need for an intermediary 
master. Such a stance potentially opens up religious discourse and argumentation to a larger 
audience.  Another dichotomous approach to the study of Islam, somewhat parallel to this one, is 
the distinction between local and supra-local Islam. In this approach local Islam is associated with 
popular and traditional Islam, while supra-local Islam is scriptural. Scripturalist tendencies are 
often seen as the inspiration for contemporary reformist Islamic movements. Such a dichotomous 
approach has often been accompanied by a historical sociology of Islam and Muslim societies that 
reads developments in Islam against what are known of the historical developments in the West. 
In such a reading scriptural or reformist Islam is said to be on the march abetted by modern 
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developments such as mass media and mass education (Eickelman 1993; Starrett 1992). Recent 
scholarship on Islam has tended to move away from these dichotomous approaches.  
Recent anthropological studies of Islam (Bowen 1993; Hirschkind 2006; Mahmood 2005; 
Soares 2005), influenced by Talal Asad’s notion of Islam discursive tradition68 (Asad 1986), have 
tended to move away from the dichotomous approach to studying the nature of authority in Islam. 
Asad’s notion of discursive tradition is clearly indebted to the work of Alasdair MacIntyre on 
tradition (MacIntyre 1984, 1988) and Michel Foucault’s notions of power and discourse (Foucault 
1978, 1980). Under the notion of discursive tradition Islam is viewed as a tradition whose 
pedagogical practices aim at the cultivation of a Muslim subject with virtues deemed central to the 
tradition through an engagement with the foundational texts (the Quran and the hadith), 
commentaries on them, and the conduct of exemplary figures. In this concept of tradition, power 
is seen as essential in determining which practices and arguments become hegemonic. Power, 
however, is understood in a Foucaultian sense, and isn’t prior or outside the subject, but works 
through subject formation and the production of specific forms of desires, relations, and 
                                                          
68 In approaching Islam as a discursive tradition (1986) Talal Asad identifies the centrality of the foundational texts, 
Qur’an and hadith, in Islamic discourse as the defining feature of this tradition. The implication being that the 
emphasis on the foundational texts isn’t unique to modern times. Additionally, Asad points out that the argument of 
the need to return to the ‘original’ texts is a common technique of reformists throughout Islamic history in 
challenging the positions of conservatives, read ‘traditional’ ‘ulama. When Islam is understood as a discursive 
tradition then dispute and even violent conflict can be approached as part of the tradition. Relatedly, Asad asserts 
that orthodox Islam shouldn’t be understood as a set of doctrines, rather “it belongs to religious dispute between 
reformers (who invoke the authority of the text over that of the interpretive community) and conservatives (for 
whom authority is vested in the community of interpreters, the keepers of texts), because both of them are 
committed to doing certain things to what they regard as the essential tradition” (2003: 220). One need not, I think, 
assume that the emphasis on the foundational texts is a recent phenomenon in order to hold that such an emphasis 
under current conditions has had novel effects. Samir Hajj contends as much when she writes that it was particularly 
the easy availability and accessibility made possible by print technology and literacy that gave added poignancy to 
the old Islamic discursive trope of finding evidence in the foundational texts as the final arbiter of right and wrong 
(1999: 11). Along the same lines, Hefner and Zaman (2007) point out that the ‘functionalization’ of education has 
never been completely absent from Muslim societies since elite sponsorship of madrasas in early Islamic history was 
partly motivated to legitimize  rule or promote one school of thought over another. What is new about modern 
educations, they contend, is that modern states began to “functionalize Islamic education for a new and distinctly 
modern ends: creating broadly shared public culture for the purpose of national building” (8). 
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discourses. And it’s through such subjectivation that a particular discourse establishes its authority 
in a specific historical moment. Discursive tradition in this sense brings within its analytical 
purview both the local and the supra-local. It draws attention to the local and micro-practices of 
interpersonal pedagogy through which particular orthodoxies are established, and the larger and 
supra-local historical discourse that conditions what’s doable and debatable in the present. This 
approach has the benefit of framing Islam in a single analytical framework which captures its unity, 
while making room for change and diversity by recognizing the role of power in determining the 
direction the tradition takes. It thus allows for an analysis of Islam and Muslim societies that isn’t 
structured around the polarity of local versus supra-local or rural versus urban Islam. In terms of 
authority the notion of discursive tradition emphasizes the embodied nature of authority. That is 
to say, Islam as a discursive tradition creates sensibilities and embodied capacities, including the 
capacity to inscribe the teachings of the tradition in one’s body, and the aptitude to recognize the 
authoritative in the tradition and be obedient to it. It’s therefore within a tradition that authority is 
created as well as the subjects that embody the capacities for willing obedience to that authority. 
External authority isn’t, as in the liberal context, an impediment to individual freedom and self-
realization, but is part of the structure of necessary conditions for the formation of a subject in a 
tradition. One has to turn to minor traditions within Islam to get a better understanding of the 
structures of authority within Islam.   
One of the most fascinating and consequential of the Islamic discursive tradition is the 
shariʻa tradition, which as one of the world’s most important tradition of jurisprudence, has its own 
tradition of extensive practices and commentary (Zaman 2002: 6). The Shari‘a constitutes one of 
the most important branches of Islamic knowledge and a key source of religious authority. In fact 
knowledge of the Shari‘a is an indispensable element of all religious knowledge. It’s the Shari‘a 
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that guides the believer’s daily conduct, whether such conduct concerns relations between 
individual believers (mu‘amalat) or relations between individuals and God (‘ibadat). The ability 
to answer believers’ basic inquiries regarding the Shari‘a’s position on everyday issues of life in a 
Muslim community is central to the realization of religious authority. The centrality of the Shari‘a 
to Islamic knowledge and authority is such that it wouldn’t be an exaggeration to say that religious 
authority in Islam is in many ways based on Shari‘a-derived authority.  
II. Structures of authority in historical Shari‘a  
The claim that authority in pre-colonial Islamic societies was separate from power is premised on 
an understanding of the Shari‘a’s epistemological bases and structures of authority. The 
epistemological foundations of the Shari‘a conditioned its separation from political power, while 
at the same time creating a hierarchy of authority within the Shari‘a. I want to lay out in this section 
an extremely rough sketch of the epistemological bases and structures of authority of the Shari‘a. 
Since the epistemological bases and structures of authority of the Shari‘a conditioned the 
separation of authority and power in precolonial Muslim societies, it’s important to understand 
them. Additionally, an understanding of these will afford a comparison to the pre-colonial situation 
in Somalia, and shed some light on why a separation of religious authority and political power 
didn’t materialize in pre-colonial Somalia. We will see that the Shari‘a as described in much of 
the literature, both in its textual and social landscape, didn’t exist in Somalia.  
 The Shari‘a, or the “right path,” commonly and mistakenly understood as “Islamic law”69 
is one of the world’s most important and unique traditions of jurisprudence. It begins with the basic 
assumption that God has revealed in the foundational scriptures, the Quran and Sunna (the 
                                                          
69 See Chapter 2 for a thorough discussion as to why this designation is problematic.  
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exemplary behavior of Prophet Muhammad as recorded in narrative reports, or hadith), a path and 
a guidance for humanity for a just and virtues life in this world and salvation in the hereafter. The 
explicit legal content of the scripture, however, are very limited and fall far short of the legal 
demands of an evolving, geographically spreading, and culturally diverse umma (Muslim 
community). This led to the emergence of Shari‘a specialists whose task it was to elaborate and 
tease out God’s intentions in the revealed texts. Consequently, there emerged at the core of Islamic 
legal thought and practice a gap between divinely revealed truth and the human interpretation and 
approximation of that truth. The search for the revealed “right path” or Shari‘a took the form of 
individualistic quest for the meaning of revelation based on intense knowledge and engagement 
with the primary legal sources: Quran, hadith, reasoning by analogy (qiyas), the authority of 
doctrinal consensus (ijma‘), and custom (‘urf, has been recognized since the sixteenth century). 
Based on engagement with these sources and through a devise known as ijtihad (independent legal 
opinion; the specialists who undertake ijtihad are known as mujtahid), Shari‘a specialists began to 
elaborate on their interpretation of revelation. It was in the strivings of these legal specialists that 
led to the formation of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). This ijtihadic hermeneutics is therefore key to 
the epistemic foundations of the Islamic legal tradition. Through the process of ijtihad, Shari‘a 
specialists “established a legal epistemology that depended on its entirety upon the premise of an 
individualistic interpretation of the law. This feature was to win for Islamic law, in modern 
scholarship, the epithet ‘jurists’ law’” (Hallaq 2009: 125).  
 The potentially endless ijtihadic possibility and plurality of Shari‘a opinions that would 
inevitably result from the independent and individualistic legal interpretation was curtailed 
between the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries by the emergence of distinct schools of legal 
thought, or madhhab (literally, “a way or manner of conduct,” but conventionally referred to as 
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school). The madhhabs were formed from the corpus of substantive law and the multiple levels of 
commentaries and summaries that have accumulated over the formative centuries of Islam. Within 
Sunni Islam there are four madhhabs: Hanbali, Hanafi, Maliki, and Shafi‘i. They are named after 
the founding imams of Abu Hanafi (d. 767), Malik (d. 795), al-Shafi‘i (d. 820), and Ibn Hanbal (d. 
855). These schools of legal thought agreed upon the theory of the four sources of the Shari‘a 
articulated by the science of legal method and theory, or usul al-figh (literally, ‘roots of fiqh). They, 
however, differed on substantive principles, legal methodology, and what each considered 
authoritative opinions. Once the schools were established, the interpretive activities of the legal 
specialists (fuqaha, those specializing in fiqh) were from then on expected to be confined within 
the boundaries set by the particular school the legal specialist belonged to. Thus the independent 
and direct engagement with the sources, which was characterized by ijtihad pre-madhhab 
formation were replaced by a new mechanism known as taqlid. That is, a legal interpretation within 
the doctrines of a particular schools. Modern interpretations of taqlid have construed it as “blind 
imitation,” but, as Hallaq argues, there is a difference between loyalty to a specific maddhab, 
which taqlid is, and blind imitation.70 This is because diversity of opinion “within a given school 
was literally the name of the game. Each school possessed a vast corpus of opinions attributed to 
the founder, his immediate followers, and later authorities” (Hallaq 2009: 122). After the formation 
of the four maddhabs in Sunni Islam, the authority of Shari‘a specialists were circumscribed within 
the boundaries of the doctrines, authoritative opinions, and methodology of a specific madhhab. 
Needless to say, this didn’t end the authority to undertake legal interpretation by Shari‘a specialists 
such as muftis (jurisconsult), albeit within the bounds of a specific madhhab. 
                                                          
70 Many scholars assume the creative process of ijtihad to have closed at the end of the third/ninth century leading to 
juristic stagnation. This position is known as “closing the gate of ijtihad.” For more on this see, (Anderson 1976; 
Coulson 1964; Schacht 1964; Watt 1974). Hallaq (1984) counters this argument in an important essay.   
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 Along with the formation of the various schools of law, there also emerged a hierarchy of 
authorities in relation to Shari‘a interpretation. I want to focus on two agents and their roles in 
Islamic legal interpretation: the mufti (jurisconsult), and the qadi (judge). The roles and 
relationships between these agents are important to understanding the world of the Shari‘a, and 
particularly how its structures of authority prevented it from political manipulation. As pointed out 
earlier, legal interpretation in Islam is an individual undertaking based on the epistemic authority 
of Shari‘a specialists. Among individual interpreters the mufti was the preeminent and central 
agent in the elaboration of the Shari‘a. This preeminence was expressed in that the mufti was the 
go-to agent in legal consultations (futya). It was in that capacity that the mufti provided fatwas 
(nonbinding legal opinions) at the behest of a questioner (mustafti). The fatwa was the mufti’s 
educated individual opinion in response to a question that was posed to him in writing or orally by 
an ordinary Muslim seeking guidance or a qadi. A qadi sought the fatwa of a mufti when the case 
before him had no precedence in Shari‘a manuals before him. Important fatwas were written down 
and saved. Over the course of a career a mufti could give thousands of fatwas. The fatwas of famous 
muftis were collected in manuals and incorporated into the authoritative legal opinions of the 
school that the mufti belonged to. According to scholars it was in his capacity as fatwa giver that 
the mufti formed the key link between the ever-changing social reality and the Shari‘a, “as the 
corpus of substantive law and jurisprudence grew, acquiring both multiple levels of commentary 
and authoritative summaries, the accumulation of fatwas issued by muftis in diverse social and 
historical settings served to stimulate the development of the Shari‘a from below, in response to 
the specific needs of particular Muslim communities” (Masud, Messick, and Powers 1996: 4). In 
giving his educated opinion, fatwa, to daily inquires the mufti was inevitably having to reconcile 
the Shari‘a with the daily realities of social life. The fatwas that materialized from such an 
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interaction between the Shari‘a and the daily conduct of life were incorporated into authoritative 
manuals that formed the substance of the Shari‘a and were continuously commented by the 
scholars of later generations. This completed the circle and institutionalized the office of the mufti 
as the central figure in Shari‘a hermeneutics and Shari‘a structures of authority.  
The significance of the office of the mufti to the Shari‘a wasn’t only due to his place in the 
hierarchy of Shari‘a authorities, but also owed to the mufti’s independence from formal 
institutionalization. There were some official and salaried muftis recognized by political powers, 
but in the vast majority of cases the office of the mufti remained outside the bounds of centralized 
political control, “many muftis operated privately and unobtrusively without any ties to the 
political authorities” (Masud, Messick, and Powers 1996: 3). The individualistic structural 
hallmark of the Shari‘a as well as its epistemic and moral authority and independence from 
political power, therefore, rested on the office of the mufti, the preeminent jurist among Shari‘a 
specialists (fuqaha, those specializing in fiqh or jurisprudence). So when it’s pointed out that in 
pre-colonial Muslim societies the power to determine the law had lain not with a central legislative 
authority but rather with independent Shari‘a specialists, it was particularly the office of the mufti 
who elaborated on the Shari‘a through the fatwas he gave. The mufti’s centrality to Shari‘a 
interpretation and legal development as well as the mufti’s independence are in contrast to the 
position of the qadi. Although a mufti could and did serve as a qadi at times, the expertise and the 
expectations from the office of the qadi were very different from that of the mufti. The qadi heard 
cases and rendered judgments based on the authoritative opinions in his school. The qadi wasn’t 
expected to have the mastery of the Shari‘a to enable him to derive his own Shari‘a-based rulings 
like the mufti did in the form of fatwas. The qadi was expected to have mastered the authoritative 
fiqh manuals of the particular school he belonged to, to be able to match the cases that came before 
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him to similar cases in the manuals. Manuals that were collections of fatwas by well-regarded 
muftis. Thus when a qadi was confronted with a difficult case and he found no guidance in the 
manuals he would seek a fatwa from a mufti: “the mufti solved, or attempted to solve, new and 
difficult cases, while the qadi applied the solutions in his court” (Hallaq 2009: 76). The qadi, 
therefore, unlike the mufti, wasn’t integral to the development and hermeneutics of the Shari‘a. 
This difference between the mufti and the qadi regarding their place in the hierarchy of Shari‘a 
structures of authority was significant for another reason. Whereas the fatwa of a mufti was a 
nonbinding legal opinion, the judgment (hukm) of a qadi was binding. This might imply that the 
position of qadi was vested with more authority, but it wasn’t since the qadi could only base his 
judgments on the collections of authoritative fatwas in his school. This is the reason why qadi 
judgments were never collected or formed legal precedence. Additionally, the qadi, unlike the 
mufti, was a government appointed official. The qadi’s role as a political appointee didn’t 
drastically effect the independence of the Shari‘a from political power since the position of the 
qadi played a very limited role in the development and interpretation of the Shari‘a. It was thus 
the subverting of the position and authority of the mufti during the colonial and postcolonial 
periods that led to the transformation of the pre-colonial world of the Shari‘a.  
As many scholars have pointed out the world of the Shari‘a started going through 
momentous transformations beginning in the nineteenth century. These transformations altered the 
structure of the Shari‘a as a legal tradition. The changes began with the Shari‘a-derived civil code 
(majalla) promulgated in 1876 by the Ottoman Empire in an attempt to centralize and rationalize 
the administration of justice as part of a project of modern reform. These processes of 
transformation continued with the onset of colonial apparatus over most Muslim societies and with 
the postcolonial states. In general, the most important factors in these transformations were the 
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codification of the Shari‘a, the abolishing of waqfs (inalienable religious endowments), and the 
introduction of modern law schools and Western style court systems. All these factors altered the 
world of the Shari‘a by displacing the position and authority of the mufti to interpret the Shari‘a 
thereby undermining the individual-centered Shari‘a hermeneutic tradition. In dislodging the 
authority the authority of the mufti to interpret the Shari‘a the hermeneutic pluralism that was made 
possible by the position of the mufti was ended. This was a direct product of the modern state’s 
derive to centralize the administration of justice. Also key to undercutting the plurality of Shari‘a 
opinions was the process of codification. The codification of the Shari‘a, as Messick writes, was 
an “important step towards silencing the open-ended argumentation of shari‘a jurisprudence, once 
central to a vital intellectual culture, openness was now considered a drawback” (Messick 1993: 
56). As noted earlier, the mufti was the Shari‘a specialist who undertook the interpretation of the 
Shari‘a in response to questions posed to him by judges and ordinary people. In making a codified 
Shari‘a available to judges, state codification ended the open-ended argumentation process that 
was central to the authority of the mufti. The abolishing of waqfs was also important in 
undercutting the development of muftis since it was waqfs that supported that traditional madrasa 
education system where muftis were trained. Finally, the introduction of modern institutions of 
learning, particularly modern law schools, led to the emergence of new legal practitioners such as 
lawyers and judges who took up new the positions created in the new court system. As Masud et 
al. write: 
Of the fundamental changes that have had a direct impact on muftis, perhaps 
none is more important than the transformation in the essential character of 
knowledge and its means of transmission. Curricular and organizational changes 
in educational institutions have meant that the shari‘a, or fiqh, formerly the 
A h m e d  I b r a h i m  
 
Page | 86  
 
centerpiece of advanced instruction and of Muslim knowledge itself, has been 
largely displaced by a spectrum of ‘secular’ subjects, many derived from Western 
models. Typically, the study of fiqh has been moved to Islamic institutes or to 
specialized law schools, where it competes with offerings in Western-style law. 
Rather than muftis, lawyers and law professors are the legal professionals now 
produced by most mainstream educational systems. (Masud, Messick, and Powers 
1996:26-27) 
The centralization and bureaucratization of the Shari‘a, which curtailed the position and 
interpretive authority of Shari‘a specialists, particularly the mufti, was accompanied by the 
establishment of the office of the mufti as a state employee. The figure of the “Grand mufti” is 
now a well-established position in many Muslim countries. The office of the public mufti was 
created to provide governments authoritative interpretations of the Shari‘a that would support the 
reform agenda of modern states. The official mufti thus “represented the interests of the state” and 
their activities regulated by legislation (Skovgaard-Petersen, 1997: 29). Another development that 
is crucial to the formation of public muftiships in the modern Muslim world is the appearance of 
specialized committees that provide collective fatwas. Examples of such organizations include the 
Egyptian Dar al-Ifta, the World Muslim League in Mecca, and the Council of Islamic Ideology in 
Pakistan. The creation of the office of the “Grand mufti” as well as specialized committees in many 
Muslim countries is an illustration of the modern state’s desire to control the interpretation of the 
Shari‘a, and to use that interpretation to underwrite the state’s agenda and policies. It was also an 
admission on the part of the state of the authority of the Shari‘a, and by extension the authority of 
the mufti, and thus the need for the state to simultaneously curb the autonomous authority of the 
mufti and to use that authority to buttress the state’s legitimacy. The establishment of public muftis, 
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however, didn’t mean that the state has placed the entire fatwa-giving phenomenon within its 
purview. Private individuals with the aid of mass media and general literacy (Eickelman 1992) 
continue to provide fatwas. In recent times not only has fatwa been disseminated by private 
individuals outside the purview of the state-sanctioned offices and institutions, but such individuals 
often lack the religious training and qualification that was traditionally necessary to give a fatwa.  
The above brief description of the epistemological foundation of the Shari‘a, its structures 
of authority, and the transformations to this structure during the colonial and postcolonial period 
is generally regarded in the literature as representing the general historical record of Muslim 
societies. As we saw above, an important claim in this narrative is the separation of religious 
authority from political power in pre-colonial Muslim societies. A separation was made possible 
by the epistemological bases of the Shari‘a, which allowed independent Shari‘a specialists the 
authoritative voice in Shari‘a hermeneutics. The highest authority in the hierarchy of Shari‘a 
authorities whose independent legal opinions formed the normative Shari‘a positions was the 
mufti. The mufti’s authority was acquired through individual-based and life-long endeavor of 
Shari‘a education and scholarship which was ultimately acknowledged by one’s peers. The 
position of the mufti could not, therefore, be easily brought under political control. As such the 
figure of the mufti, more than any other Shari‘a specialist, was responsible for the separation of 
religious authority from political power in pre-colonial Muslim societies. In Somalia, however, the 
Shari‘a in its structures of authority and social landscape as described above didn’t exist. Religious 
authority in pre-colonial Somalia was separate from political power.  
There are two main interrelated factors that account for the difference. First, there didn’t 
exist among Shari‘a specialists in pre-colonial Somalis the unique position of the mufti. In other 
words, there were no Shari‘a specialists, whose knowledge of the Shari‘a were so authoritative 
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that their legal opinions were incorporated and became part of the legacy of the Shari‘a. This isn’t 
surprising given that Somalia was primarily rural society on the Islamic periphery, where there 
didn’t exist the sophisticated textual and institutional structures or the economic means that could 
support such an undertaking. This didn’t mean that Shari‘a learning and authority weren’t key 
features of religious life and authority. To the contrary, like the rest of Muslim societies, 
knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence was the most important element in all religious education. But 
Somali sheikhs’ religious training was limited by the scarcity of religious texts available and the 
inadequacy of the learning institutions.71 Schooling in Islamic jurisprudence in Somalia was 
limited to the texts of the Shafi‘i madhhab. The mainstay Shafi‘i texts studied in Somalia include 
Minhaj al-Talibin, Kitab al-Anwar, Mughni al-Mukhtaj, and Ishadul Qaawi. These are Shari‘a 
manuals that contain the authoritative opinions of the Shafi‘i madhhab. The learning of Somali 
sheikhs and Shari‘a specialists were thus limited to the mastery of Shafi‘i authoritative opinions. 
The best among them mastered the sources from which the authoritative opinions were derived to 
be able to select which among the various opinions within a particular school was strongest. I have 
not yet heard of a Somali sheikh who had mastered the Arabic language, the various sources of the 
Shari‘a, and the methodological preference of a particular school, to be able to originate his own 
Shari‘a interpretation becoming an independent mufti. The second reason why there wasn’t a 
separation between religious authority and political power in pre-colonial Somalia is there didn’t 
exist centers of political power in pre-colonial Somali history. Absent such centers of political 
power and leadership, religious authorities, particularly Shari‘a judges, emerged as political 
leaders, who because of their Shari‘a-derived authority, found themselves governing society 
through dispute settlement. As a peripheral territory to the Muslim world system, pre-colonial 
                                                          
71 See chapters 6 for “traditional” religious education in Somalia and its transformation. 
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Somalia neither had the educational structures that led to the development of the multifaceted 
Shari‘a discourse and its structures of authority nor the powerful political centers with their 
complex administrative structures. The separation of authority and power in the lands of the 
Islamic heartland made possible by the social and political developments there didn’t apply to pre-
colonial Somalia. This doesn’t mean, however, that Islam is any less significant in understanding 
the history and experience of authority and power in pre-colonial Somalia. The next section is an 
exploration of the social and cultural landscape of pre-colonial Somalia and the place of religious 
authorities within that landscape.  
III. Religious authority and political power in pre-colonial Somalia  
The previous section was a discussion of the claim that there was a separation of authority and 
power in pre-colonial Muslim societies. We saw how the separation of authority and power was 
made possible by the epistemological bases and structures of authority of the Shari‘a, particularly 
the position of the mufti as the preeminent Shari‘a authority. We pointed out that contrary to this 
literature, there was no separation of religious authority from political power in pre-colonial 
Somalia. This was partly because there were no centralized political centers of power in pre-
colonial Somalia that were structurally separate from society. In other words, there were no sultans 
or amirs and their administrative structures and armies in pre-colonial Somalia as was the case in 
the typical Sunni state in the lands of the Islamic heartland. There were thus no political centers of 
power from which religious authorities would establish their independence from. In fact, in the 
few instances where there emerged regional and localized centers of political power, it was often 
religious authorities, particularly Shari‘a specialists, that laid the foundation for the emergence of 
political power through their practice of conflict mediation and arbitration. The formation of pre-
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colonial polities will be further analyzed in the next chapter. In the rest of this chapter, we look at 
the social and cultural landscape of pre-colonial Somalia.   
 
Figure 1 Map of Somalia. Source: United Nations Cartographic section, Map No. 3690 
Rev. 10, December 2011.  
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Though the Somali people constitute a relatively homogenous cultural and linguistic group 
in the Horn of Africa, they can be divided into three distinct regional sub-cultures: the pastoral 
nomads in the arid plains of the interior and the northern and central regions, the sedentary agro-
pastoralists between the rivers of Shabeelle and Juba in the south, and residents of the Indian Ocean 
coastal towns in the south known collectively as the Benaadir.72 Influenced by different ecologies, 
modes of economic life, and histories, these regions have developed slightly different socio-
political organizations and cultural norms. Given their economic interdependence, a shared 
language, and common religion, movement of people between these different regions was very 
common in the pre-colonial era and has become even more so since the beginning of European 
colonization towards the end of the nineteenth century. With the subsumption of most of these 
territories and peoples in the postcolonial state of Somalia their histories have more or less merged. 
For our purposes, however, it’s important to understand their different histories, modes of 
livelihoods, and social and cultural characteristics to appreciate the role of religious authorities in 
their respective social organizations. We analyze the pre-colonial pre-colonial roles of religious 
authority of these three different sub-regions separately, beginning with pastoral nomadic society. 
A. Pastoral nomadic society 
 Except for the area between the two rivers of Shabeelle and Juba in south of the country 
and the coastal areas, most of the Somali inhabited regions in the Horn of Africa is semi-arid. 
These regions include the Ogaden plateau in eastern Ethiopia and the central and northern regions 
of Somalia. Primarily, as a result of this ecological reality pastoral nomadism has been the 
prevailing mode of life in these regions, particularly so in pre-colonial times. This resulted in the 
                                                          
72 The name Benaadir is derived from the Persian word for ports. The major cities on the Benaadir coast are 
Mogadishu, Marka, and Barawe. 
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development among the pastoral nomads of specific social organizations and cultural norms that 
distinguished the nomads from people in the coastal towns of the Benaadir and the inter-riverine 
areas. And because of this difference the place of religious authorities in relations to society was 
different among the pastoral nomads than it was in the other sub-regions.  
Pastoral nomadism has been the prevailing mode of life among the majority of the Somali 
people for most of their history. It’s only in the last few decades that many pastoralists have 
urbanized in response to restrictions to their movement caused by securitized political borders and 
the increasing frequency and severity of draughts. This isn’t, however, to deny the existence of 
significant sedentary and agricultural populations in coastal cities and in the inter-riverine area.73 
There are few Western eye-witnesses documenting the life and history of Somali nomadic groups 
prior to the pioneering work of British social anthropologist, I. M. Lewis,74 in mid-twentieth 
century. Our best approximation of what pre-colonial pastoral nomadic life was like, therefore, 
comes from Lewis’s work and those after him. Influenced by the work of Lewis, many scholars 
(Cassanelli 1982; Helander 2000; Hohne 2006; Lulling 2006) have viewed kinship as key to 
understanding pastoral Somali nomads, and Somali society in general, since many view pastoral 
nomadic culture to be the defining feature of Somali society. Lewis unyieldingly held on to his 
interpretation that the key to understanding politics and social organization in pastoral Somali 
                                                          
73 Influenced by the work of anthropologist I. M. Lewis, who did his work among pastoral nomads in northern 
Somalia and the adoption and promotion of the postcolonial state of the specific dialect and cultural expressions of 
pastoral nomads, many have viewed Somali society primarily as pastoral nomadic in character. Such an approach, 
however, overlooks the existence of regions, the inter-riverine area and the coastal towns of southern Somalia, with 
different historical and cultural characteristics as will be described later in this chapter. For works on the history and 
socio-political structures of southern Somalia, see Catherine Besteman (1999), Besteman and Cassanelli (1996), 
Menkhaus (1989). For the coastal towns, particularly the Benaadir coastal towns of southern Somalia, see Alpers 
(2009), (Jama (1996), Reese (2008). 
74 For examples of Lewis’s work, see, I. M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics 
among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa (London, Oxford University Press, 1961); A Modern History of 
the Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2002). 
A h m e d  I b r a h i m  
 
Page | 93  
 
society even after the British structural functionalist school75 that inspired his work was critiqued 
and generally discredited.76 Lewis’s work has been amply and rightly critiqued by scholars within 
the small field of Somali studies as well.77 Despite Lewis’s ahistorical78 and rigid description of 
the kinship system among the pastoral groups, his work on the socio-political organizations of 
Somali pastoral nomads groups is an important place to begin to understand various aspects of 
pastoral society. Influenced by British social anthropological theory of the socio-political 
organizations of non-state African i.e. acephalous tribal/clan societies,79 Lewis viewed pastoral 
Somali social organization through their kinship system. As in Evans-Pritchard’s The Nuer (1940), 
Lewis describes Somali kinship system as a segmentery lineage system. That is, a kinship system 
which maintains an equilibrium between segments of a clan/tribe based on the two contradictory, 
and yet complementary, tendencies of fission and fusion (E. E. Pritchard 1940: 148). The Somali 
kinship system is based on agnatic descent i.e. descent traced through males to a common ancestor. 
Members of the clan, however, are not an undifferentiated group of persons who recognize their 
common agnatic kinship. Rather, each member of a clan belongs to a specific lineage within the 
clan, which is established genealogically. A lineage is thus an agnatic group of kinsmen between 
                                                          
75 Lewis’s understand of Somali kinship and lineage system was an application on the Somali peninsula of the 
segmentary lineage theory advanced by E. E. Evans-Pritchard and M. Fortes. See, M. Fortes, The Dynamics of 
Clanship among the Tallensi (London, Oxford University Press, 1945); E. E. Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer: A 
Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People (London, Oxford University 
Press, 1940). 
76 See Talal Asad, “political Inequality in the Kababish Tribe,” in Essays in Sudan Ethnography, Presented to Sir 
Edward Evans-Pritchard, edited by Ian Cunnison and Wendy James (London: Hurst, 1972); Cate Crehan, The 
Fractured Community: Landscapes of Power and Gender in Rural Zambia (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1997).  
77 There was an important exchange between C. Besteman (1996, 1998) and Lewis (1998) in the journal Cultural 
Anthropology. For other critiques of Lewis’s emphasis on kinship, see Abdi I. Samatar (1992, 2010) and Kapteijns 
(1994). 
78 Lewis viewed the outbreak of a civil war in 1991 as a vindication of his theory that clan is the key to 
understanding Somali social and political organizations. See Lewis, Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali 
Society (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red sea Press, Inc., 1994). 
79 As mentioned in footnote 2 in the introduction, I prefer to use the terms lineage, descent, or genealogical 
unit/group rather than “clan” to refer to kinship-based identities or political alliances because I find these terms to be 
less saddled by controversy mentioned above.  
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whom kinship can be traced genealogically to a common ancestor. A “clan” is therefore segmented 
into different lineages, which are diverging branches of descent from a common clan ancestor.   
What is unique about the segmentary lineage system is that the point at which the line of 
descent is reckoned is never fixed. Rather, the male ancestor, fiction or otherwise, that is the point 
of reference for genealogies (abtirsiinyo) is constantly shifting depending on the context, “like the 
classical lineage systems of the Nuer and to a lesser extent of the Tallensi what is most 
characteristic of the Somali system is its relativity and flexibility” (Lewis 1961: 133). Because 
there is no territorial identity or a hierarchy of political offices, the individual’s socio-political 
identity is determined by the ever-shifting genealogies, argued Lewis. The environment and 
nomadic lifestyle of pastoral nomads prevented the formation of large stable corporate groups. The 
security and property of the individual was therefore guarded by a small association of agnatic 
equals held together by the duty to receive and pay compensation and seek revenge in case of 
conflict. These small units are considered by Lewis to have been the most stable social units among 
pastoral nomads. Such groups, referred to as jilib or diya-paying group (diya means blood-money), 
were “the most fundamental and stable social unit and consisted of a number of families whose 
alliances were essentially based on the security need of member families” (Samatar 1989: 25). 
They were held together by an unwritten contract (heer) of mutual support and defense. Foremost 
among the duties such groups shared was the responsibility to receive and pay blood compensation 
collectively. Lewis identifies the following units in the lineage system as points of signification 
for individual and group identity and socio-political organization: “clan-families,” “clans,” “sub-
clans,” “primary lineages,” and “diya-paying groups.” The fixity and ahistorical emphasis of 
Lewis’s approach to Somali lineage has, as mentioned earlier, been rightly criticized. What is 
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important for our purposes is the traditional lineage system’s relationship to patterns of social 
organization and the place of religion and the influence of religious men.  
 In terms of settlement patterns Somali pastoral nomads moved across an expansive territory 
in the Horn of Africa in search of pasturage and water for their livestock, which include herds of 
camels and flocks of cattle, sheep, and goats. There was no corresponding territorial identity 
overlapping with kinship identity. Access to land and water among the pastoral nomads is flexible, 
only becoming an issue and a potential source of conflict during dry seasons. Settlement patterns 
usually consist of small hamlets made up of the families of small parties of kinsmen (reer). These 
small parties of kinsmen disperse widely during the rainy season, when water and pasture in 
plentiful, and congregate around cluster of wells during the dry season.80 The “clans” and lineage 
groups among Somali nomads thus have no clear territorial boundaries that separates them from 
each other, and despite Lewis’s emphasis on rigidity neither was the boundary between lineage 
groups fixed. Significantly, there are no traditional political offices among pastoral nomadic 
groups, and “as a whole northern Somali society is characterized by a lack of chiefs and absence 
of any hierarchical system of politico-administrative offices” (Lewis 1962: 37). Consequently, 
pastoral nomadic society was horizontal in the extreme. Decisions effecting a group of related 
kinsmen living together in a hamlet were made at councils (shir) that were open to all adult males, 
though influence was not equal, and presided over by elders. Among some lineage groups there 
was a figurehead whose position was entirely symbolic with no real power.81 In terms of 
subsistence pastoral nomads primarily lived off the products of their herd: milk and meat. To obtain 
additional necessary products for consumption, pastoralists exchanged pastoral and wild products 
                                                          
80 Lewis, “Modern Political Movements in Somaliland I.” Africa: Journal of the International African International, 
28, no. 3 (1958): 244-261, p. 47  
81 These figures were transformed into salaried clan representatives during the European colonization of Somali 
territories.    
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such as ghee, skins, gum, incense, livestock, and ivory for grain, sugar, and clothing in the markets 
of coastal towns, Zeila and Berbara in the north82 and the Benaadir towns in the south, or in small 
trading villages in the interior (Samatar 1989). There did emerge among pastoral nomads small 
sedentary agricultural communities, but farming remained relatively insignificant and limited to 
religious communities (Lewis 1961; Samatar 1989).   
 It’s in this socio-cultural landscape that Islam spread among the Somali pastoral nomads. 
Somalis are one of the most thoroughly Islamacized peoples in Sub-Saharan Africa (Hersi 1977; 
Lewis 2003), with well over 90 percent of the people claiming adherence to the Islamic faith. Islam 
came to the Horn of Africa by crossing the Red Sea and the Guld of Aden into Abyssinia and 
northern Somalia, and the Indian Ocean into the Swahili coast of East Africa. There is evidence to 
suggest that Islam was present in the Horn as early as the first century of Islam’s advent or seventh 
century A.D.83 It appears, however, that the first few centuries Islam84 was confined to the coastal 
towns, the Asiatic and mixed populations that lived there, and the neighboring Somalis. It wasn’t 
until after the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries that the majority of Somalis in the interior were 
Islamized.85 The itinerant Arab preachers,86 who led the conversion of the Somali nomads in the 
                                                          
82 The historical coastal towns located on the Gulf of Aden in northern Somalia were important and old 
cosmopolitan centers of Islam since at least the thirteenth century (Lewis 1961; Trimingham 1952). Zeila, for 
example, was the base of the medieval Islamic principality of Adal. Despite the importance of the towns on the Red 
Sea coast in the spread of Islam throughout the Horn of Africa, and particularly among Somali pastoral nomadic 
groups, they didn’t develop a unique social organizations and cultural characteristics like the Benaadir towns on the 
Indian Ocean coast did. It appears that their significance waned after the defeat of the Islamic principalities in the 
interior by Abyssinia in the sixteenth century. The biggest difference between the Red Sea coastal towns in the north 
and the Indian Ocean coastal towns in the south is that the latter was part of the larger trading world of the Indian 
Ocean that linked the Swahili coast of East Africa to other shores of the Indian Ocean. That smallness of the trade in 
the north compared to the south is made evident by the fact that no interior town market towns of any significance 
developed in the north prior to the twentieth century (Samatar 1989: 27). 
83 Ali Hersi, The Arab Factor in Somali History: The Origins and the Development of Arab Enterprise and Cultural 
Influences in the Somali Peninsula. Ph.D. dissertation UCLA, 1977, p. 113 
84 Islam on the coastal towns of Somalia in the few centuries after the advent of Islam was Shi‘a Islam due to Zaidi 
domination across the Red Sea in Yemen (Sheikh-Abdi 1993; Pouwels 1987; Hersi 1977).   
85 Hersi, The Arab Factor in Somali History, p. 116 
86 They were mostly from Hadhramaut and Yemen.  
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interior, have in time become revered and venerated progenitors of the major lineages among the 
pastoral nomads where their tombs are sites of visitations (siyaaro).87 The Islamic identity of 
Somalis was expressed and cemented in their active participation in the medieval struggles 
between the Christian kingdom of Abyssinia, whose base was the highlands of today’s Ethiopia, 
and the string of Islamic principalities to the southeast of Abyssinia.88 The complete Islamization 
of the Somali pastoral nomads and the spread of Islamic learning, however, was only completed 
in the latter half of the nineteenth century with the spread of organized and popular Sufi orders 
(tariq, pl. turuq).89  
 After the nearly complete Islamization of the Somali pastoral nomads, Islamic authorities 
became integrated into their social structure in specific ways. Because of their status as outsiders 
to the lineage structure, Islamic authorities were simultaneously lacking any bases for wielding 
influence within lineage politics, but at the same uniquely positioned to translate their religious 
and outsider status as a basis for a politico-religious leadership transcending lineage allegiances. 
As mentioned earlier, the social organization of Somali pastoral nomads lacked a hierarchical 
structure and political offices (Lewis 1963). Lineage group decisions were made in consultations 
(shir) open to all adult males and overseen by lineage elders. In cases of disputes between members 
of a particular lineage or between individuals belonging to different lineages, a panel of arbitrators 
(guddi) made up of elders known for their wisdom was appointed on an ad hoc bases. Such panels 
often included religious men (wadaad) who were consulted to assist the elders in reaching 
                                                          
87 I. M. Lewis, Saints and Somalis: Popular Islam in a Clan-Based Society (Lawrence, NJ: New Sea Press, Inc. 
1998).  
88 See, Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia; Hersi, The Arab Factor in Somali History.  
89 The impetus for the growth and popularity of Sufi organization was, similar to other parts of Islamic Africa, a 
response to the social upheavals at the outset of European colonization (Peterson 2011; Soares 2005; Ware III 2014). 
Organized and popular Sufi orders emerged in Somalia in the latter half of the nineteenth century with the 
appearance of charismatic saints (Reese 2008). There were and are (though much less popular today) three Sufi 
orders in Somalia: the Ahmadiyya, the Salihiyya, and the Qadiriyya.  
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decisions that were in accord with the Shari‘a. Within specific lineage groups religious men’s 
authority and competence over matrimonial affairs, inheritance of property, contract, etc., was 
recognized. In terms of disputes between lineages groups, the role of religious authorities was to 
bless the proceedings and to assess compensation for injury based on their knowledge of the 
Shari‘a. They thus served as unofficial and consensus-based mediators within the social structure 
of the nomads. An authority founded on their status as “the champions of the Shari‘a” (Lewis 
1958: 249). It’s under these conditions and influence of religious authorities that a Somali 
customary law (heer) developed that is deeply influenced by Shari‘a norms. The Shari‘a authorities 
i.e. the sheikhs and wadaads, however, didn’t have power to enforce their judgments upon anyone. 
The final decisions on all matters both within the lineage group and between lineages lay with the 
elders.  
 Based on religious men’s lack of effective authority over lineage politics, scholars have 
described religious authorities among Somali nomads as apolitical (Lewis 1998; Cassanelli 1982). 
Cassenelli writes that “spiritual authority did not of itself constitute a basis for the exercise of 
secular leadership” (1982: 86), while Lewis asserts that the application of the Shari‘a is constrained 
by the lineage structure of the nomads (Lewis 1958). Lewis claimed, and many others have since 
followed suit, that Somali pastoral nomads have a clear separation of secular and religious power 
based on the distinction between “men of the spear” (waranleh) and “men of God (wadaad) (Lewis 
1963: 112). Based on this distinction religious authorities are said to be confined to an intermediary 
role between lineage groups in times of conflict, and intercession with God on behalf of human 
beings based on the authority of their religious learning, piety, and possession of divine blessings 
(baraka). This religious authority, however, doesn’t translate to political power in terms of lineage 
politics. Thus the supposed separation of religious authority and secular power among the nomads.  
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 This supposed separation between religious authority and secular power doesn’t tell the 
entire story of the relationship between religious authority and political power among Somali 
pastoral nomads. To begin with, as stated earlier, traditionally there were no political offices 
among the nomads save for the symbolic lineage head who had no real political power. On this 
point, Lewis himself writes, that pastoral Somali society is characterized by the lack of “chiefs 
properly called, and almost complete lack of instituted government. Society indeed is egalitarian 
in the extreme” (1963: 110). Lineage figureheads gained more prominence as they were made into 
the local representatives of colonial administrations beginning in the late nineteenth century. What 
is meant then when scholars argue that religious authorities in Somalia were apolitical is that they 
remained aloof and that their authority had no influence in the conflicts between the various 
descent groups within Somali society. In other words, they could neither thwart nor lead a 
particular lineage group’s decision over whether or not to go to war with another lineage, except 
when consulted by elders90. I argue, however, that their detachment from lineage politics should 
be seen as a function of their station as Shari‘a authorities, which required that they remain 
impartial to conflicts between lineage groups. Conflict that were in the eyes of religious authorities 
unjustifiable wars between fellow Muslims. To have participated in these conflicts in any way 
would have been to undermine their position as impartial Shari‘a authorities. As a sheikh from the 
Ogaden region in the interior told me, “there are two types of wadaads (men of religion). There 
are the good wadaads who fear God and are honest. They are the only ones that can intervene 
directly when there are conflicts between different groups. There are also bad wadaads who side 
                                                          
90 It’s questionable whether lineage elders had in fact the power over the group as the literature suggests. A 
European visitor of northern Somalia in the late nineteenth century writes that the elders told them “that they could 
not promise that raiding should entirely cease, as a raid was often got up by a few young men of a tribe, anxious to 
distinguish themselves, and acting against the advice of their elders. We were aware of this, and knew that the 
nominal headsmen, or Akals s they are called, have little real authority in their tribes” (Nurse 1891: 661). See 
Charles G. Nurse, “A Journey Through Part of Somali-Land between Zaila and Bulhar.” Proceedings of the Royal 
Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography 13, no. 11 (Nov. 1891): 657-663.  
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with one group when there is a dispute. Everyone knows who the bad wadaads are and no one 
listens to them (emphasis added).”91  
 Additionally, I submit, that rather than seeing religious authorities’ position as impartial 
Shari‘a authorities as a mark of their apolitical nature, one should see it as the foundation of their 
politico-religious authority. A number of studies (Messick 1993; Saad 1983; Stewart 1973) have 
shown that in contexts where there are no prevailing political powers, Islamic judges (qadi) 
essentially governed society through their role as mediators and arbitrators. Stewart (1973), for 
instance, demonstrates in his study of nineteenth-century Mauritania, a segmentary society like 
pastoral Somalia, that Shari‘a authorities governed social relations through the Shari‘a. Similarly, 
Shari‘a specialists governed social relations among pastoral Somali nomads. A role which was 
made possible by their relative distance from lineage politics. That same distance from lineage 
politics rendered religious authorities well positioned for political leadership when circumstances 
permitted. As Abdi I. Samatar writes, the religious authorities “partial freedom from clan politics 
and their supralineage position made them likely potential alternatives to lineage leaders as a 
leadership group” (Samatar 1989: 27). Many scholars (Lewis 1998; Cassanelli 1982; Hersi 1977; 
Sheik-Abdi 1993) have noted that one of the ways religious authorities assumed political power 
was through their rise to politico-religious leadership in moments when the domination of a non-
Muslim foreign power became a threat to pastoral livelihoods. There are many examples of such 
politico-religious leadership from throughout Somali history, but the most well-known examples 
are the sixteenth-century struggles (1529-42) with Christian Abyssinia led by Ahmad ibn Ibrahim 
al-Ghazi (Hersi 1977; Trimingham 1952), and the early twentieth-century anti-colonial struggle 
(1899-1920) led by Mohamed Abdillah Hassan (Hess 1964; Jardine 1923; Sheik-Abdi 1993). Such 
                                                          
91 Interview in Mogadishu July 2015.  
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struggles unified the various pastoral clans and lineage groups in the face of a common threat. In 
other words, pan-Somali political leadership that unified the various lineages in the name of Islam 
was only possible under religious authority.92 Such political unity would have been impossible 
without the sanctioning of religion and leadership of religious men. The leadership provided by 
religious authorities was conditioned by the standing of religious men as impartial Shari‘a 
authorities. They could not have unified the various lineages if they were the bad wadaads. In the 
same way that the source of the Shari‘a was transcendental, the earthly representatives of the 
Shari‘a could only exercise political authority if they were seen to transcend the mundane power 
and politics of lineage groups. In addition to their politico-religious leadership in times of crises, 
religious authorities also exercised politico-religious leadership over religious communities 
(jama’a). Such communities were established by itinerant sheikhs belonging to various Sufi 
brotherhoods. They were often established as agricultural communities. These sheikhs exercised 
religious and political authority not only over the member of the jama‘a, but adjacent communities 
who were not necessarily members of the religious communities (Reese 2008: 133).  
It’s possible that scholars have overlooked the politico-religious leadership of religious 
authorities because they viewed such leadership as “religious” in nature. This position, I suggest, 
is flawed on two fronts. First, such an approach, would be to anachronistically apply the modern 
and distinct categories of the “political” and the “religious” into a pre-colonial social landscape 
where such categories don’t exist. Furthermore, as will become clear later in the next chapter, the 
Shari‘a-sanctioned role of religious authorities as mediators between different lineages was the 
                                                          
92 Given the utilization of E. E. Evans-Pritchard’s The Nuer by commentators on Somali pastoral nomads, it’s 
interesting to note Evans-Pritchard’s description of the rise of prophets among the Nuer. He interpreted the rise of 
prophets as the first sign of the emergence of a political leadership that unified the various tribes. Nuer prophets 
“achieved greater sanctity and wider influence than any other person in Nuer society” (1940: 185). Among other 
things Nuer prophets were, he writes, “pivots of federation between adjacent tribes and personified the standard 
principle of opposition in its widest expression, the unity and homogeneity of Nuer against foreigners” (1940: 189).  
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basic foundation upon which pre-colonial political formations was built. But first, we will do for 
the other two sub-regions, the coastal towns of the Benaadir and the inter-riverine region, what we 
did for pastoral Somali society in describing the social landscape and cultural norms.  
B. Benaadir Coast   
The East Coast of Africa, including the Benaadir Coast of Somalia, has been shaped by the Indian 
Ocean World, which connected East Africa to the ports of India, Arabia, and the Persian Gulf.93 A 
movement of people and goods made possible by the Indian Ocean has shaped an East African 
civilization based on the growth of towns along the coast. As early as 1000 A.D. important 
commercial entrepôts developed into interconnected but autonomous and self-governing towns 
and city-states that traded with each other and with other ports of the Indian Ocean.94 Among the 
factors that led people to migrate to the East African coast included commercial interests, fleeing 
from sectarian-based religious persecution, and missionary work. Regardless of the reasons for 
migration to the East African coast, the entrepôts on the coast developed as intermediaries that 
linked the East African coast to other ports in the vast shores of the Indian Ocean. Taking 
advantage of the cyclical monsoon winds, dhows95 traversed the Indian Ocean carrying goods and 
people from and to the various ports on the shores of the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Persian 
Gulf. The connections of the East African coast to ports in India, Arabia, and the Persian Gulf 
existed prior to the emergence of Islam, but by the time of the development of the East African 
                                                          
93 The first account of external trade in East African, including Somalia, come from Periplus of the Erythrean Sea 
written around the second half of the first century AD in Greek by a trader likely living in Egypt.  
94 See, Elkis, H. Terry, “Kilwa Kiswani: The Rise of an East African City-state.” African Studies Review 16, no. 1 
(1973): 119-130; Mark Horton and John Middleton, The Swahili: The Social Landscape of a Mercantile Society 
(Blackwell Publishers: Oxford, 2000).  
95 Abdul Sherif, Dhow Cultures and the Indian Ocean: Cosmopolitanism, Commerce and Islam (London: Hurst & 
Company, 2010).   
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commercial entrepôts into towns and city-states, Islam was crucial in the identity and social 
organization of the people in these areas (Pouwels 1987; Trimingham 1964).96 
The Benaadir coast, which includes the southern Somali coastal towns of Mogadishu, 
Marka, Brawe, and Kismayu, were part of the commerce and migration networks that intertwined 
the Indian Ocean world with East Africa. The port towns of the Benaadir coast constitute the most 
northern part of the East African trading coast. My description of the history of the Benaadir coast 
and its social organizations is primarily based on Mogadishu because it was the biggest and most 
important town on the coast, and most of the available material is from there.97 Most of the 
information on the East African coast, including the Benaadir region, up to the fourteenth century 
is from Arab geographers.98 The information provided by these geographers indicate that 
Mogadishu was founded around the ninth century by Arab and Persian immigrants (Hersi 1977; 
Lewis 1955; Puzo 1972; Reese 2008). These sources clearly show the importance of the Benaadir 
ports in general, and Mogadishu specifically, to the Indian Ocean commerce. Until the fifteenth 
century Mogadishu, along with Kilwa, further down south on the Swahili coast, was one of the 
largest and most important commercial towns on the East African coast (Elkis 1973; Puzo 1977). 
The traditional export goods from Somalia through the Benaadir ports included ghee, ivory, 
                                                          
96 Most significant archeological evidence of trade contact between the Swahili corridor and other parts of the 
Islamic world comes from several sites, but mostly from Kilwa (Coupland 1938; Horton 1987). The archeological 
evidence suggests the presence of Islam on the East African coast by the eighth century. For links between trade, 
slavery, and Islamic conversation see, Mark Horton, “The Islamic Conversion of the Swahili Coast, 750-1500,” In 
Islam in East Africa: New sources: archives, manuscripts and written historical sources, oral history, archeology: 
International colloquium, Rome, 2-4 December 1999, edited by Biancamaria S. Amoretti, (Rome: Herder, 2001).  
97 See Edward A. Alpers, Mogadishu in the Nineteenth Century: A Regional Perspective” in East Africa and the 
Indian Ocean (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2009); Ahmed D. Jama, The Origin and Development of 
Mogadishu AD 1000 to 1850: A study of urban growth along the Benadir coast of southern Somalia (Upsala, 
Sweden: Repro HSC, 1996); Scott Reese, Patricians of the Benaadir: Islamic Learning, Commerce and Somali 
Urban Identity in the Nineteenth Century, Ph.D. dissertation University of Pennsylvania, 1996; Ali Hirsi, The Arab 
Factor in Somali History; Neville Chittick, “Medieval Mogadishu” Paideuma 28 (1982): 45-62.  
98 For Arab geographers on the East African coast, see J.S. Trimingham “The Arab Geographers and the East 
African Coast,” in East Africa and the Orient: Cultural Synthesis in Pre-Colonial Times (Holmes and Meier 
Publishers, Inc.: New York, 1975), 115-146. For the specific case of Somalia, see, Ali Hirsi, The Arab Factor in 
Somali History.  
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animals, hides, frankincense and myrhh (Puzo 1972; Reese 2008). In the eighteenth century 
agricultural products and cotton would be added to the list of exports from Somalia. Beginning 
around the end of the fifteenth century the Benaadir coastal towns began to experience a decline. 
This decline was a result of Portuguese intrusion into the Indian Ocean and an expansion 
of Somali pastoral nomadic groups into the coastal towns (Alpers 2009; Reese 2008). Whether it 
was due to lack of interest (Alpers 2009) or to the resistance put up by Benaadir towns, the 
Benaadir towns, unlike the rest of the East African coast, never submitted to the Portuguese.99 In 
all likelihood, given their interest in capturing the gold trade, dominating the trading networks, and 
displacing Swahili traders, the Portuguese had no interest in controlling the Benaadir towns. 
Nevertheless, the Benaadir towns suffered during the Portuguese dominance of the commerce of 
the Indian Ocean. Perhaps simply as a demonstration of their power, the Portuguese bombarded 
Mogadishu in 1499 and completely destroyed Brava in 1507. The economic decline of the 
Benaadir towns between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries was also the result of the arrival of 
large Somali pastoral nomadic groups on the coast. The presence of pastoral nomadic groups 
disrupted the caravan routes to the interior and led to the emergence of internal discord in 
Mogadishu. One scholar suggests that the Somali invasion of the city “contributed to the 
commercial decline of Mogadishu largely because of the end of Arab administrative and 
commercial skills in the city” (Puzo 1972: 36). A new quarter dominated by Somalis was added to 
the city. This led to the city’s division into two quarters100, one dominated by Somalis and the other 
by the old Arab-Persian residents of the city. The two quarters competed for control over the city. 
                                                          
99 For more on the Portuguese presence on the Swahili coast, see Jestus Strandes, J.S. Kirkman, and Jean F. 
Wallwork, The Portuguese Period in East Africa (Nairobi: East Africa Literature Bureau, 1968).  
100 The two quarters of Mogadishu were Hamar Weyn (old city) and Shingani (on the sand). The first was dominated 
by newly arrived Somalis from the interior, while the latter was the Arab-Persian section. The local names of the 
quarters reflected their ethnic make-up; the name Hamar Weyn comes from the Somali language, whereas Shingani 
is Swahili, one of the dominant languages in the city prior to its Somalization.  
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By the first half of the seventeenth century, a Somali lineage group from the interior established 
control over a section of the city and eventually over the entire city.101 Benaadir coastal towns’ 
fortunes revived again in the nineteenth century after their integration into the “economic orbit of 
Omani Zanzibar” and after coming under the nominal sovereignty of the sultan of Zanzibar in 
1840 (Alpers 2009: 65). Zanzibari suzerainty over the Benaadir coast was limited to the collection 
of export duties. The economic revival of the Benaadir coast was also a consequence of the rise of 
what one scholar refers to as “pastoral polities” in the near-hinterland of the Benaadir coast 
(Cassanelli 1982). These Somali political formations were both the result and consequence of the 
expansion of agriculture in the inter-riverine area and the opening of caravan routes to the interior 
(Alpers 2009; Reese 2008). As a result, the coastal towns became important outlets once again for 
trade from the interior (Hess 1966: 7). At the end of the nineteenth century European colonization 
brought the Somali coast under the control of different European power. The Banaadir coast was 
leased to Italy in 1890 by the Sultan of Zanzibar, becoming part of the colonial territory of Italian 
Somaliland.102 Italian rule lasted until 1941 when they were expelled by British forces during 
WWII. Later chapters will address the impact colonial rule, particularly as it relates to Islamic 
leadership and Shari‘a practice of the Benaadir towns, but for now let’s turn to the pre-colonial 
relationship between religious authority and political leadership in the Benaadir towns.  
                                                          
101 Alpers argues that the early date of Somali settlement gave the city of “Mogadishu a resolutely Somali cultural 
tradition that marks it off from the major towns of the Swahili coast” (2009: 78). Whether the Swahili towns of East 
Africa were African or Arab/foreigner in their cultural characteristics and orientation was one line of research and 
debate among scholars of East Africa (Allen 1981; Pouwels 1977). It’s evident, however, as Alpers points out, that 
the settlements on the Somali coast were intimately linked to the interior and Somalized early one. The reasons for 
this could be, among others, that unlike the other major Swahili towns like Kilwa, Lamu, and Mombasa, the coastal 
towns in Somalia weren’t located on islands removed from the mainland. Also, unlike the other East African towns, 
the towns on the Somali coast weren’t separated from the people of the mainland by the fact of being Muslims. The 
Islamization of the interior of Somalia was complete perhaps as early as the fourteenth century (Hersi 1977), and 
Islam spread not only from the southern Benaadir towns on the Indian Ocean, but also from the port towns on the 
Gulf of Aden such as Zayla, which is a short distance from Yemen.  
102 For the first 15 years the Benaadir was administered by two Italian chartered companies. The colony came under 
direct Italian administration in 1905.  
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Even more so than among the pastoral nomads, Islam and Islamic authorities were central 
to every aspect of life of the coastal towns, including political leadership. Until around the fifteenth 
or sixteenth centuries, when the process of Somali settlement began, the Benaadir coastal towns 
very much shared the characteristics of the East African towns. Pouwels (1979, 1987) describes 
the central place of Islam in the life of the population of coastal towns. Islam was key to everything 
from the spatial organization, trade, and political power. As Pouwels points out, the residents of 
the Swahili coastal towns were made up of mixed ethnic and descent groups who claimed Arab or 
Persian origin. The spatial setting, commercial life, and leadership of the towns were organized 
around descent groups. Spatially “descent groups were associated with particular mitaa.103 Indeed, 
each district or mtaa had a shared genealogical core” (Pouwels 1987: 79). Life in the various 
districts centered around the mosque where people exchanged news and information and received 
blessings for future undertakings from the sheikhs at the mosques. The sheikhs were thus not only 
religious leaders but community care-takers known of their knowledge of town history. Each mtaa 
had its own elders who were responsible for judicial and civic duties within the district and 
represented it in town politics. Sitting atop the council of elders representing the various descent 
groups were the town’s political leaders styled as sheikhs or sultans. These often came from 
specific lineages known for producing religious men who were especially influential in town 
politics. These religious lineages were tasked with administering “the laws of the town in most 
situations where disputes arose among the clans of the town” (Pouwels 1987: 83). Knowledge of 
Fiqh (jurisprudence) was particularly valued in the towns’ religious learning. This is no surprise 
given that mediation between the various lineages was one of the crucial roles of religious 
authorities and the basis of their political power, “political advantage started with the power to 
                                                          
103 Mitaa or mtaa is district in Swahili.   
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arbitrate” (Pouwels 1987: 96). Thus the political leaders who “controlled the religious and military 
offices” of the towns often came from religious lineages who specialized in Islamic jurisprudence 
(Elkis 1973: 125), and were renowned for their religious knowledge and piety. In relation to town 
politics Islamic discourse and institutions were “an egalitarian, unifying religious force” that was 
“more easily associated with more community-wide institutions” (Pouwels 1979: XIX). The 
Shari‘a-sanctified and legitimated leaders of these community-wide institutions were thought to 
assure the prosperity and well-being of the coastal towns.    
Like the rest of the East African coast, Islam in the Benaadir coastal towns was critical to 
town life, “town and clan origins, social and political structure were all viewed through a Muslim 
lens and deemed thoroughly Islamic in their roots” (Reese 2008: 33). Although it appears that 
settlement along the coast preceded the arrival of Islam, and that Islam was limited to the ranks of 
the elite in society until the thirteenth century, in the eyes of the local people “the city’s very roots 
are viewed as Muslim ones (Reese 2008: 38). As in the other Swahili towns in East Africa, one of 
the ways Islamic history became one with Mogadishu’s history was through the way many descent 
groups conceptualized their origins. Many groups in the Benaadir region claim Arab or Persian 
lineages. As Reese writes, “Bida and Hatimi of Barawe both considered themselves of Arab stock 
while the Banu Qahtan, Gudmane and Shanshiyya clans of Mogadishu lay claim to Arab as well 
as Persian (in the case of the Shanshiyya) beginnings” (2008: 44). Other urban lineages known 
collectively as Ashraf claimed Arab descent through Prophet Muhammad via his two grandsons, 
Hassan and Hussein. Over time many of these lineages would be Somalized by linking their origin 
traditions to Somali pastoral nomadic lineages. Even this, however, doesn’t negate the centrality 
of Islam to people’s understanding of history since the majority of Somali lineages also claim 
foreign Muslim progenitors in their origin traditions. Mogadishu, like the other East African 
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coastal towns, was governed by a council of elders representing the various descent groups (Alpers 
2009; Reese 2008). At the top of these council of elders sat a leader who was referred to as a sultan 
or a sheikh. Similar to what we saw in other coastal towns, religious authorities formed the 
leadership of the Benaadir coastal towns. Furthermore, their role as conflict arbitrators and 
mediators, a role sanctioned by their expertise of the Shari‘a, buttressed their claims to town 
leadership, “the ulama by operating both the legal and educational systems and by their 
involvement in trade, exercised political power in these city-states” (Kassim, 1995: 37).  
The earliest and most complete description of the Somali coast, and particularly of 
Mogadishu, comes from the famous North African scholar and traveler ibn Battuta who visited 
Mogadishu in 1331. From Ibn Battuta’s description of Mogadishu we get a sense of the centrality 
of religious authorities to the political leadership of the town, and a brief description of the figure 
of the qadi. Ib Battuta described Mogadishu as an “exceedingly large city” where he was made the 
guest of the qadi:  
When it was heard that I was there, the Kazi104 came with his students to the 
beach: and I took up my abode with him. He then took me to the Sultan, whom 
they style Sheikh. Their custom is that a noble or theologian, must be presented to 
the Sultan, before he takes his abode in the city. When, therefore, the Kazi came 
to the palace, one of the king’s servants met him. The Kazi was then Burham 
Oddin El Misri (of Egypt), and to him he mentioned my having come.105 
Ibn Battuta continues and explains how he was invited to dine with the Sultan, and sitting with 
him and the Sultan was the qadi, who, besides his position as the chief judge, we are told, was also 
                                                          
104 qadi 
105 H. A. R. Gibb, Travels of Ibn Battuta A.D.  1325-1354 (Cambridge: University Press, 1958), p. 54.    
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a key court advisor. Ibn Battuta describes the qadi as an important religious educator who 
instructed many students who were housed in hostels. Religious learning it seems was thoroughly 
established in Mogadishu by the fourteenth century. From ibn Battuta’s description we get a sense 
of the qadi’s proximity to the town’s political leadership. This is also noted by Hersi who writes, 
“none other than the qadi, not even ministers of state or military commanders, could boast the 
honor of sitting next to the Sheikh on the royal platform, and it was only the fuqaha (jurisconsults) 
and the ‘ulama (the learned) who sat with the Sheikh (Hersi 1977: 187). The centrality of religious 
authority to political power is further shown by ibn Battuta’s description of the town’ political 
leader. Ibn Battuta tells us that the town’s political leader was also a leader in religious matters. 
He describes that the town’s leader, a certain Abu Bakr, carried the title of ‘Sheikh,’ and led the 
communal Friday prayers (Reese, 2008: 38). An early nineteenth century visitor to Mogadishu 
also underlines the religious character of the town’s political leaders. He explains that upon 
reaching Mogadishu he sent his guide “to inform the Sheikh I would wait on him,” and when the 
Sheikh arrived he “procured letters of introduction from the Sheikhs of the Merkah106 tribes” 
(Christopher 1844: 87). Christopher points out that the coastal towns he visited were led by “heads 
of the Somali tribes” led by a principal chief styled a sultan (1844: 88). From the information that 
can be pieced together from these descriptions, it’s apparent that religious authority was essential 
to the making of political power in pre-colonial East African coastal towns, including the Benaadir 
towns. We now turn to the third sub-region of Somalia to complete our survey of the social and 
religious landscape of pre-colonial Somalia.  
C. The inter-riverine region 
                                                          
106 Marka is another of the Benaadir coastal towns and to the south of Mogadishu.   
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Our survey of the history, socio-cultural landscape, and the place of religious authority therein of 
pre-colonial Somalia concludes with the most fertile region in Somalia, often referred to as the 
breadbasket of Somalia. This arable region is formed by the two rivers of Shabeelle (leopard) and 
Juba. The area between the two rivers in the south of the country constitutes the country’s most 
watered and arable zone. The Shabeelle river begins in the Ethiopian highlands crosses the Ogaden 
plains and gets very close to the Indian Ocean before turning in an eastward direction and runs 
along the coast for about 180 miles before drying up close to Jilib. Parallel and to the South of the 
Shabelle is the Juba River which also descends from the Ethiopian highlands towards the Indian 
Ocean entering it near the port of Kismayu. The area between the two rivers forms a fertile near-
hinterland of the Indian Ocean. Because of its fertility and proximity to the Indian Ocean ports this 
inter-riverine region has attracted throughout its history different population groups developing 
unique economic and political formations. It has also developed its own social and cultural 
characteristics as well as a distinct Somali dialect called maay, which is not necessarily understood 
by the speakers of the main Somali dialect mahaa. As we will see in the next chapter, this region 
has seen the development of the most important indigenous Somali political formations led by 
religious authorities in pre-colonial Somalia. Owing to its distinct ecology, the existence of 
regional trade networks linking this region to the Benaadir coast and the larger East African coast, 
the formation of plantation economy based on slave labor in the nineteenth century,107 the 
emergence of numerous independent and large religious communities (jama‘a), and the rise of pre-
colonial polities, have all led to the formation of a region that is culturally and socially distinct 
from the rest of pre-colonial Somalia.  
                                                          
107 For more on the slave trade in Somalia, see Esmond B. Martin and T.C.I. Ryan, “The Slave Trade of the Bajun 
and Benaadir Coasts,” Transafrican Journal of History 9, no. 1/2(1980): 103-132; Lee V. Cassanelli, “The Ending 
of Slavery in Italian Somalia: Liberty and the Control of Labor, 1890-1935,” in The End of Slavery in Africa, edited 
by Suzanne Meirs and Richard Roberts, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988).  
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 The inter-riverine population formed from the mixture of various population groups that 
moved into the area at different points in history. Most of these migration waves were Somali 
pastoral nomadic groups who moved into the area attracted by the expansive pastureland of the 
area. Upon reaching the region the pastoralists encountered small sedentary Bantu-speaking108 
cultivators living in small villages along the rivers. These cultivators assimilated or become clients 
of the pastoral groups. In the nineteenth century many Bantu cultivators became slaves on 
plantation farms owned by a previously pastoral group. In the process of their settlement, the 
pastoral nomads created fixed villages and each village claimed the pastureland in its immediate 
vicinity and access to a source of water. The affairs of each village were “organized by the elders 
of the various lineage fractions living together, and collective work in cultivation, water-
management, hunting, recreation, and ceremonials” assigned to young men (Lewis 1969: 73). In 
many cases a number of villages in close proximity developed their own common lineage.109 In 
such formations, a specific lineage within the larger confederation became recognized as ‘urad 
(literally “the first born”). The ‘urad lineage was seen as the first occupant of the land and 
traditions developed where the ‘urad lineages were invested with right of granting and distribution 
of land to subsequent arrivals. Overtime, a patron-client relationship also developed in the region 
(Cassanelli 2015). New arrivals became clients (Sheegad) and received the protection as well as 
land (for farming or pasture) in exchange for allegiance to the patron group. Such client groups 
often assimilated to the patron group overtime. Through this process a new “clan”/tribal” 
confederations were formed in the inter-riverine regions based on territorial belonging and, often, 
                                                          
108 This is different from the Somali language which belongs to the family of languages spoken in the Horn of Africa 
known as Cushitic.  
109 Most of the populations that moved into the inter-riverine region overtime formed a clan called Digil and 
Rahanweyn. Of this clan Lewis writes “The present Digil and Rahanweyn populations are in large measure the 
outcome of a long, disjointed series of migrations and expansionary movements by Somali nomads from the north 
and north-west, their conflicts and agreements with earlier Galla and Bantu communities, and the blending of these 
elements in a variety of patterns of mutual accommodation" (Lewis 1969: 60).  
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a fictitious lineage. Such “tribal” confederations, though they held a nominal claim over a specific 
territory, didn’t have a unified leader. Actual life and everyday solidarity was maintained at the 
village level.  
 Due to the varied environment which supported both agriculture and pastoralism and close 
proximity to the ports on the Indian Ocean, the livelihoods and economic activities in the inter-
river region was diverse. It included agriculture, pastoralism, and trade. There were two forms of 
traditional cultivation: dry farming on the upland soils of the hinterland (adableh), and wet-
farming on the rich alluvial soils (doobay). The traditional crops grown in the inter-river region 
included maize, sorghum, beans, sesame, various fruits, and cotton in the nineteenth century. 
Agriculture was produced for local consumption as well as for export. Farmers exchanged their 
products for commercial products in the port towns of the Benaadir. Prior to the nineteenth century 
agriculture didn’t involve the use of slave labor, though the pastoral groups who came to dominate 
agriculture relied on client cultivators. The exponential growth of agriculture in the nineteenth 
century was partly a result of Somali pastoral entrepreneurs using slave labor, “client cultivators 
and imported slave labor from southern Ethiopia and elsewhere in East Africa, were producing 
large amounts of grain, sesame and later, cotton for commercial markets” (Reese 2008: 50). During 
this period the farming plantations in the inter-riverine area was said to be producing so much 
grain for export that a visitor in the 1840s described the Benaadir coast as “the grain coast for the 
supply of southern Arabia” (Christopher 1844: 87).  
Besides producing for local and external markets farmers in the inter-riverine region 
coexisted in a symbiotic relationship with pastoralists. Often the same families and lineage groups 
were both cultivators and pastoralists. Communities that practiced cultivation alone exchanged 
their products for livestock milk, and meat with the pastoral nomads, who came to the region in 
A h m e d  I b r a h i m  
 
Page | 113  
 
dry seasons to use the pastureland and watering sites in the region. They, in exchange, provided 
milk, ghee, and a few heads of livestock to the sedentary groups that claimed the territory 
(Cassanelli 1974; Lewis 1969). Another economic activity in the region involved the caravan trade 
that linked the Indian Ocean port towns of the Benaadir to the interior, all the way to Ethiopia. 
This trade involved products from the interior destined for export to other parts of the world, such 
as ivory, rhinoceros horn, aromatic woods, gum, myrhh, and cotton after mid-nineteenth century. 
They were exchanged for imported goods such as dates and sugar. Merchants from the coastal 
towns met with people from the interior in the towns of the inter-riverine region turning the towns 
of the region into important nodes of a regional trade. Some of these towns grew and became 
centers of “clan” confederations that attempted to control this regional trade. The town of Afghoye 
located on the Shabeelle River is a good example of such a town. It became the center of the 
politico-religious head of a territorial “clan” confederation known as the Geledi that dominated the 
region and all of southern Somalia in the nineteenth century.110 Now let’s turn to the place of 
religious authorities in the social and cultural landscape of the inter-riverine region.  
 Like the other two sub-regions religious authorities in the inter-riverine region governed 
communal and individual relations on the basis of their Shari‘a-derived authority. When the place 
and role of religious authorities in the inter-riverine was dissimilar, it was as a result of the distinct 
environment and social organization of the region. As we noted earlier, for example, there were 
small independent farming religious communities (jama’a) among the pastoral nomads in the 
semi-arid regions of the country. Independent, that is, from the lineage loyalties and settlement 
patterns that characterized pastoral Somali nomads. But because of the barren nature of the land 
such communities could not engage extensive farming to support a larger community. This wasn’t 
                                                          
110 See Chapter three for more on the Geledi 
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a problem in the inter-riverine region. Consequently, there emerged innumerable farming religious 
communities in this region throughout its history (Lewis 1998; Cassanelli 1982). Such 
communities founded by itinerant individual sheikhs, sometimes affiliated to a particular Sufi 
order, were “regarded as places of refuge for those seeking a life of quiet prayer and contemplation 
as well as individuals seeking social protection” (Reese 2008: 52). Because of the relatively easy 
availability of fertile land, the religious communities in the inter-riverine region could attract many 
members and grow to a significant size. The leading sheikh of the jama‘a exercised economic and 
political leadership over the members of the community. The sheikh accepted new members into 
the group, parceled out land, and decided on political matters. Besides distributing land, the sheikh 
didn’t exercise any further economic control over community members, as the members cultivated 
their lands individually and pursued independent economic activities (Cassanelli 1982). As they 
grew, such communities could rely on the loyalties of many community members, as well as the 
loyalties of surrounding communities. The leading sheikhs of such communities could wield 
significant powers to influence, or attempt to influence, regional economies and politics. One such 
community was the Baardheere Jama’a. Founded in 1819, this community had at its height in 
1840 around 20,000 members (Cassanelli 1982; Reese 2008: 53). The leaders of the community 
undertook a reformist campaign in the region where they attempted to enforce a prohibition against 
selling of ivory as well as “the consumption of tobacco, public dancing, intermingling of the sexes 
and saint veneration” (Reese 2008: 53). Their campaign threated the regional trade and led to the 
mobilization of various other groups led by the politico-religious leader, Sheikh Yuusuf, of the 
Geledi.111 A British visitor to the region described the mobilization, “the whole country is about 
                                                          
111 For more on the Geledi see Virginia Lulling, Somali Sultanate: The Geledi City-State over 150 years (UK: Haa, 
2000). 
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to follow at the heels of Sheikh Yusuf in order to annihilate the fanatical tribe of Barderh,112 and 
burn their villages to the ground” (Christopher 1844: 90). This is one example of the place of 
religious authorities in the inter-riverine region. That is, as leaders of large and, sometimes 
politically significant, religious communities.  
 Another important role of religious authorities was in relation to the formation of “clan” 
confederations. In terms of their social organization, the most important distinction between the 
pastoral Somali nomads and the inter-riverine population is the formation of a hierarchical and 
more formalized political structures in the inter-riverine region. There is in the inter-riverine region 
“a wider range of ranked offices, of specialized functionaries, and tribal sultans, at any rate before 
the arrival of colonial powers than among the northern nomads” (Lewis 1958: 250). As mentioned 
earlier, a large segment of the inter-riverine population were originally cattle- or camel-breeding 
nomads who arrived in the area in different waves of migration. Naturally, there were conflicts, 
negotiations, and accommodations between the different immigrant groups and the sedentary 
populations before they merged into more stable territorial “clan” confederations. The 
cohesiveness of many of these “clan” confederations were built around traditions of saints who led 
the mediation and reconciliation process that led to the original acts of alliance (balan, promise), 
and their continued loyalty to the politico-religious leadership role of the saint’s descendants. 
Religious lineages formed by the descendants of the saint comes to stand at the “clan” 
confederation’s political center.  
When scholars mention the existence of a more hierarchical structure and political offices 
in the inter-riverine region in opposition to the horizontal social organizations of the north, they 
                                                          
112 Baardheere 
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are referring to these “clan” confederations, whose political center often stood a religious lineage. 
The same processes that led to the rise of religious lineages as politico-religious leaders also led 
to the formation of more coherent pre-colonial polities in the inter-riverine region and on the 
Benaadir coast. The next chapter will explore the role of religious authorities in the few instances 
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Religious authority and political power in pre-colonial Somalia 
 
In the previous chapter, chapter two, I divided pre-colonial Somali inhabited regions in the Horn 
of Africa into three sub-regions with distinct ecologies, histories, and social organizations. I did 
this to better understand the place of religious authorities in pre-colonial Somali society. We saw 
that in all three sub-regions, religious authorities, because of their Shari‘a-derived authority to 
arbitrate conflicts, were instrumental in governing social relations and maintaining societal 
cohesion. Dispute settlement, the turf of religious authorities, was the most important arena in the 
governance on individual and groups relations. This was especially important given the general 
absence in pre-colonial Somalia of structured and hierarchical political authority. We saw that 
among the extremely horizontal society of pastoral nomads, where corporate existence was limited 
to small groups of agnatic kinsmen, the role of “men of religion” (wadaads) was to mediate 
conflicts between lineage groups, and to determine the amount of compensation in case of injuries 
or death in accordance with the Shari‘a. Religious authorities also oversaw matters of divorce, 
marriage, inheritance, and religious celebrations. In terms of running the daily affairs of the lineage 
groups, it was the lineage elders in general, rather than religious authorities specifically, that 
decided matters. This has led many commentators (Cassanelli 1982; Lewis 2002; Lulling 2002) to 
conclude that religious authorities among Somali pastoral nomads were apolitical. On the contrary, 
I argued that it was precisely because religious authorities were outside lineage politics that they 
were well-positioned to assumed politico-religious leadership transcending lineage loyalties. This 
was often realized in periods of external threat when religious authorities and religious discourse 
became the central nodes around which resistance was framed and organized.  
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In the other two sub-regions, the port towns of the Indian Ocean coast or the Benaadir coast 
and the fertile region between the rivers of Shabeelle and Jubba, where sedentary life had led 
people of diverse genealogical and ethnic origins to interact more intimately, religious authorities 
were even more important in governing their interactions.113 More so than among the pastoral 
nomads religious authorities in these two sub-regions governed the social framework and ethical 
language which made cohabitation possible. Among the inter-riverine populations religious 
authorities were integral to resolving conflicts between the various nomadic groups that moved 
into the region and the established populations in the area. We saw that in mediating and resolving 
conflicts between various groups, individual saints and sheikhs became the eponymous ancestors 
of clan confederations. By resolving conflicts between the different groups and bringing them 
together, religious authorities became vehicles for integrating people of diverse genealogical 
origins. Similarly, we saw that in the Benaadir coastal cities, where people of diverse genealogical 
origins and ethnicities lived together, religious authorities, in the form of lineage representatives, 
governed the affairs of the town. Each lineage was represented in the town council by a 
representative whose authority was sanctioned by the reputation for religious knowledge and piety.  
 In this chapter, I take the exploration of the relationship between religious authorities and 
society in pre-colonial Somalia further by arguing that not only were religious authorities 
governing social relations in the absence of political power, they were the foundations upon which 
political power arose the few occasions it did. In making this argument, I refute a general position 
in the literature on pre-colonial Muslim societies (Asad 2015; Hallaq 2003, 2009, 2013; Lapidus 
2002; Messick 1993; Weiss 1992; Zubaida 2005), which posits that there was a separation of 
                                                          
113 The relative populations of each region is hard to know given the absence of population statistics in Somalia. It’s 
commonly understood, however, that the vast majority of the population in Somalia has pastoral nomadic origins.  
A h m e d  I b r a h i m  
 
Page | 119  
 
religious authority and political power in these societies. This literature has identified the Shari‘a 
as the reason for the separation of authority and politics in pre-colonial and precolonial Muslim 
societies. The argument is that the epistemological bases and structures of authority of the Shari‘a 
authorizes an individualistic undertaking of Shari‘a interpretation, thereby preventing pre-colonial 
Muslim states from controlling the powers of legislation. Since the Shari‘a provides the blueprint 
for the life of the Muslim individual and society, in de-linking the interpretation of the Shari‘a 
from political power, authority in pre-colonial Muslim societies was vested in the ‘ulama and 
separated from the centers of political power.114 In this chapter, I argue that in pre-colonial Somalia 
religious authority, rather than being separate from political power, was the very foundation upon 
which pre-colonial political power was formed. Through a study of three political formations in 
pre-colonial Somalia, I show that religious authority was the foundational to the formation of 
political and military power. In contradistinction to the literature above, it was specifically the 
authority of the Shari‘a that allowed religious authorities to become the axis around which 
processes of political centralization formed. There are two main reasons why religious authorities 
became the centers of and led pre-colonial polities.  
First, as we saw in the last chapter, religious authorities, based on their role in conflict 
mediation and dispute settlement, were integral to governing social relations in contexts where 
there were no political centers of power. It was their role as mediators that led to the formation of 
political societies that coalesced around them. Saints and sheikhs115 were ideal mediators in 
                                                          
114 See chapter two for a discussion of how Shari‘a authority and structures of epistemology separate the Shari‘a 
from centers of political power. 
115 In using the terms saints and Shari‘a specialists interchangeably, I am following Vincent J. Cornell’s argument in 
The Realm of the Saint: Power and Authority in Moroccan Sufism (2008). In this work Cornell argues against a 
dominant approach in the literature on Sufi Islam that distinguishes between the eighteenth and nineteenth century 
Sufi organizations and movements from previous Sufi traditions that are associated with mysticism and esoteric 
practices aimed at spiritual cultivation. The more organized Sufi movements of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries referred to as neo Sufism are characterized in the literature as emphasizing the scriptural and legalism of 
A h m e d  I b r a h i m  
 
Page | 120  
 
conflicts which made them appropriate vehicles for integrating people of diverse ethnic and 
genealogical origins (Cassanelli 1974). Over time such saints and sheikhs became the founders of 
religious lineages who continued to stand at the political center of territorial lineage 
confederations. In many cases it was the traditions of mediation by saints and Shari‘a specialists 
that held various lineage groups together and symbolized their unity. It was thus the practice of 
the Shari‘a and the authority derived from therein that facilitated the formation of political power 
by turning Shari‘a practitioners into vessels of political loyalties. Specific religious lineages known 
for their expertise in jurisprudence (fiqh) formed and monopolized the authority to mediate and 
arbitrate conflicts between individuals and groups. These religious lineage groups often became 
the politico-religious leaders of new political formations. Shari‘a was, therefore, not only not 
independent of political power, it was one of the most important foundations of political power. 
This is the opposite of the claim in much of the literature regarding how it was the Shari‘a tradition 
of individual hermeneutics that maintained the separation of religious authority from political 
power in pre-colonial Muslim societies. In the case of Somalia, a country in the Islamic periphery 
with very limited experience in centralized in political power, Shari‘a practice and authority 
enabled the emergence of political power thereby linking religious authority and political power.  
Second, religious authorities became political leaders because religion provided the 
administrative and ideological framing that made possible the rudimentary mechanisms of rule 
that characterized the emergence of pre-colonial polities. Religious language and discourse, for 
example, produced the ideological justification for the collection of revenues thereby making the 
                                                          
the Shari‘a rather than the esoteric practices aimed at spiritual cultivation. Contrary to this distinction, Cornell 
argues that Sufi saints throughout Islamic history have been the foremost promoters of the Shari‘a among the 
common and rural classes, “apart from holy warriors and tribal eponyms, the most important saints of early 
Moroccan Sufism were legal specialists” (1998: 7). Since the saints, like all Muslims, held that to be morally 
upstanding and socially constructive individual the believer had to be trained in and abide by the ethics represented 
in the Shari‘a, they saw the teaching of the Shari‘a as the central element of their social activities.  
A h m e d  I b r a h i m  
 
Page | 121  
 
exercise of power possible. The third of the five pillars of Islam (zakat) obliges Muslims to give 
annually a small percentage of their wealth to the needy, the poor, and travelers, among others.  
Another category of individuals who are legitimate recipients of zakat are those who mediate 
disputes or attend to social affairs i.e. religious authorities. Even when they are not the intended 
beneficiaries of zakat, religious authorities often receive zakat because they are considered best 
placed to judge who the appropriate recipients should be. In fact, since the ordinary Muslim only 
knows that he or she should pay zakat, and not the amount or the appropriate recipients of it, it 
falls on the ‘ulama to assess the amount to be paid, collect it, and redistribute it. Through zakat, 
the ‘ulama often became the centers of annual income redistribution. In a context where religious 
authority is institutionalized and identified with the governing authority, zakat is turned into an 
important and religiously sanctioned source of revenue. One of the foundational pillars of Islam, 
therefore, made possible the collection of revenues for pre-colonial polities. Additionally, the only 
literate segment in pre-colonial Somali society were religious practitioners. They were therefore 
able to establish and run the rudimentary administrative structures of pre-colonial polities. For 
these reasons religious practice and discourse enabled the formation of political power led by 
religious authorities.  
I will demonstrate this argument by providing a brief sketch of the history of three political 
formations in pre-colonial Somalia. These are, the first political dynasty of Mogadishu116 from the 
early sixteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth century, the Ajuran dynasty117 of late 
                                                          
116 For a description of political leadership in Mogadishu before the onset of colonialism see Scott Reee, Renewers 
of the Age: Holy Men and Social Discourse in Colonial Banaadir (Leiden, Netherlands: Koninklijke, 2008); 
Patricians of the Benaadir: Islamic Learning, Commerce and Somali Urban Identity in the Nineteenth Century, 
Ph.D. dissertation University of Pennsylvania, 1996. 
117 For the Ajuraan dynasty see Lee V. Cassanelli The Shaping of Somali Society: Reconstructing the History of a 
Pastoral People, 1600-1900 (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1982); Ali Hersi, The Arab Factor in 
Somali History: The Origins and the Development of Arab Enterprise and Cultural Influences in the Somali 
Peninsula. Ph.D. dissertation UCLA, 1977.  
A h m e d  I b r a h i m  
 
Page | 122  
 
fifteenth to mid-seventeenth century, and the Geledi Sultanate118 of the nineteenth century. The 
case of Mogadishu helps us to understand political leadership from the coastal area, specifically 
the Benaadir towns, while the Ajuraan and the Geledi sultanates are, in the words of Cassanelli, 
“pastoral polities”119 that emerged in the arable near-hinterland of the Benaadir coast between the 
two rivers. These three cases of pre-colonial polities are from the more sedentary areas of southern 
Somalia. In our division of pre-colonial Somalia into three sub-regions in the previous chapter, the 
pre-colonial polities discussed in this chapter developed in the Benaadir towns of the Indian Ocean 
coast and the inter-riverine region near the Benaadir.120 Given that religious practice and religious 
authorities were present in these regions as well as in the more arid regions inhabited by pastoral 
nomads what explains the absence of pre-colonial polities among the pastoral nomads?  
As explained in the last chapter the Somali inhabited regions in the Horn of Africa can be 
divided into three sub-regions. The largest of these sub-regions is the semi-arid region inhabited 
by pastoral nomads, who live in small groups of kinsmen and move across the vast plains in search 
of water and pasture. Rarely has centralized political power emerged among the pastoral nomads. 
One of the ways a centralized power could have been established might have been through the 
control of essential pastoral resources such as pasture land and the cluster of wells during dry 
                                                          
118 For the Geledi sultanate see Virginia Lulling, Somali Sultanate: The Geledi City-State over 150 years (UK: Haa, 
2000); Ali Hersi, The Arab Factor in Somali History: The Origins and the Development of Arab Enterprise and 
Cultural Influences in the Somali Peninsula. Ph.D. dissertation UCLA, 1977. 
119 Cassanelli, The Shaping of Somali Society. 
120 I am excluding from consideration the string of medieval sultanates including Ifat, Dawaro, Bale, and Hadiya on 
the eastern fringes of the Abyssinian Kingdom or Western fringes of Somali territory (Cassanelli 1982; 
Trimmingham 1952) or in the northern Somali coast and along the border region between the post-colonial states of 
Ethiopia and Somalia. These sultanates were established either on the Red Sea coast or along the trade routes that 
connected the coast to Abyssinia. The populations of these medieval Islamic principalities were a mix of various 
ethnicities including Arabs, Somalis, and Afars. Somalis figure prominently in the sixteenth century conflict (1529-
43) between the unified Islamic principalities led by Imam Ahmad Ibrahim al-Ghazi or Gran (Gurey in Somali) and 
the Kingdom of Abyssinia. Interestingly, one of the first mentions of the name Somali on record is from songs by a 
fifteenth century Abyssinian ruler celebrating victories over the Muslims. In the snippets of material on these 
principalities provided by Arab geographers and travelers, the Somalis, though a major component of the fighting 
force, weren’t in political leadership of these principalities. On that account and because of the scarce material on 
these principalities I won’t consider them in these short descriptions of pre-colonial polities on the Somali peninsula. 
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season by a strong lineage group. This would have allowed the controlling lineage to exert 
influence by demanding political allegiance and tribute in exchange for access to these resources. 
This is in fact Cassanelli’s argument in his explanation of the rise of “pastoral polities” in pre-
colonial Somali history (Cassanelli 1982: 72). Revealingly, however, all of the historical examples 
that Cassanelli takes up in his study are from the inter-riverine region and not from the pastoral 
regions. This is not surprising because, outside of the medieval Islamic sultanates in the Horn of 
Africa, where Somalis constituted a segment of the component population groups (see footnote 
seven), no centralized political entity arose among pastoral Somali nomads.121  The only example 
of a pastoral polity emerging among the pastoral nomads in the semi-arid regions of central and 
northern Somalia is the Majerteen sultanate, which came to control the coast of the north-east 
Somalia around the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and lasted, however feeble, until the 
beginning of European colonization.122 Even here it appears that the so-called sultan was simply a 
titular head of a “clan” confederation with very little actual powers, as the Italian ethnologist, 
Enrico Cerulli, who visited the sultanate in the early twentieth century writes,  
In official acts, the Europeans give to the Migiurtini123 state the name of sultanate 
and to its sovereign the title of sultan. Actually a sultanate in the usual sense that 
is given this word does not exist among the Migiurtini; the sultan is only the chief 
(capo, head, chief, leader) of the tribe of the Migiurtini and does not have powers 
different from those of any other chief of a Somali tribe. (Cerulli, 1959: 55) 
                                                          
121 Speaking of the precolonial history of centralized governance among the Somalia people, Lewis writes “with the 
exception for a time of Adal in the north and of states such as those of the Ajuraan and the Geledi in the south, it 
was only on the coast that any degree of centralized government was established and maintained, however 
irregularly, over long periods of time” (Lewis 2002: 33). 
122 Lewis, Modern History of the Somali, p. 26  
123 Majerteen is the name for one of the major lineage groups in northeast Somalia.  
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Additionally, what actual benefits the Majerteen sultan derived from his position appears 
to have been obtained through religious legitimation. The sultan, for instance, received taxes or 
“sekko,” which in reality were the annual alms given as a religious duty (Cerulli 1959: 58). It was 
practically impossible among Somali pastoral nomads for a titular head of a specific lineage to 
exercise control over the politics of a lineage group, and by extension, to exert enough control over 
pasture land and wells to force other lineage groups to recognize his authority and pay tribute. 
Titular lineage heads couldn’t acquire the necessary means to establish control over pastoral 
resources. This might have become the case later when foreign powers with modern arms came to 
the Somali shore. Robert Hess, for example, points out that one reason why the Majerteen sultan 
was eager to sign a protectorate treaty with Italy in early twentieth century was to obtain arms 
(1964: 416). Additionally, the territorial and group boundaries between pastoral Somali nomads 
were very fluid, and the constant movement of pastoral nomads in small groups made control over 
people virtually impossible.  
The other two regions, the Indian Ocean coastal towns and the inter-river region, are territorially 
smaller than the pastoral inhabited semi-arid regions but more densely populated by sedentary 
populations whose economic activities are more diverse. As mentioned above, pre-colonial 
political formations more often emerged in these two latter regions than in the former. A primary 
factor in this difference is that these two regions in the south of the country were historically part 
of the Swahili coast, meaning they were part of the larger trading network of the Indian Ocean. 
This means that the same economic and socio-cultural processes that led to the rise of city-states 
on the Swahili coast also conditioned the emergence of pre-colonial polities in southern Somalia. 
Economically, the Indian Ocean coastal towns like Mogadishu, linked the Indian Ocean-based 
maritime trade to the Somali interior. The towns were essentially market places where goods and 
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commodities were exchanged. There also developed small local industries in some of these coastal 
towns. Mogadishu, for instance, had a well-developed small textile industry.124 The inter-riverine 
region was also connected to the world of the Indian Ocean trade because as the near-hinterland 
of the Benaadir coast, most of the products from this arable agricultural zone were destined for 
local consumption in these towns or exported overseas to other shores of the Indian Ocean. 
Furthermore, the inter-riverine region formed an important node for the trade routes that connected 
the Benaadir coast and the interior as far as southern Ethiopia. The commercial and cultural 
connections to the Benaadir coast and by extension to the larger Indian Ocean world “helped create 
in the hinterland the conditions conducive to the rise of political formations different from, and 
superseding, the traditional Somali tribal forms of political association” (Hersi 1979: 198). This 
confluence of economic and environmental factors brought people of diverse ethnic and 
genealogical origins to live in the same area. The subsequent intensification in social interactions 
were governed by religious authorities, making them the ideal candidates to assume politico-
religious leadership.  
My aim in this chapter is to point out that when centers of political power arose in pre-
colonial Somalia, they were founded by religious authorities, and to point out some of the reasons 
that made religious authorities the axes around which political centralization manifested. I now 
take a closer look at the three pre-colonial political formations starting with the first political 
dynasty in Mogadishu.  
I. The rise of a political dynasty in Mogadishu125  
                                                          
124 See, Edward Alpers, “Futa Benaadir: Continuity and Change in the Traditional Cotton Textile Industry of 
Southern Somalia c. 1840-1980.” In East Africa and the Indian Ocean Trade (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener 
Publishers, 2009).  
125 There are almost no firsthand accounts of Mogadishu from the time of the first dynasty except for the brief 
account from ibn Battuta in the fourteenth century. One of the first accounts of the rise and history of Mogadishu’s 
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From the time of it’s founding, sometime in the ninth century, to the thirteenth126 century, 
Mogadishu was ruled by a council of elders representing the founding Arab and Persian lineages 
of the town. These lineage representatives were headed by a council of four known as arba‘a rukn 
(four pillars). Each lineage representative was responsible for the internal affairs of the specific 
lineage group he represented in the town council. The lineage representatives stood out and were 
selected for their religious knowledge, piety, and wisdom in dispute resolution. The four members 
that headed the town council were particularly distinguished for their knowledge of the Shari‘a, 
which gave them an aura and reputation for incorruptibility. They settled disagreements and 
conflicts between lineages and oversaw the town’s general affairs in consultation with the lineage 
representatives. It’s likely that the four members either hailed from or their selection was 
influenced by a religious lineage that specialized in and monopolized the study of fiqh. 
Historically, fiqh learning was the prerogative of families that provided the town’s qadis (judges). 
Over time, there developed a religious lineage specializing in fiqh, which became known as Banu 
Qahtani or nisbah al-Qahtani, or more popularly, “reer faqi” (house of fiqh in Somali).127 The 
Banu Qahtani specialized in the study of fiqh and overtime came to exclusively produce the town’s 
                                                          
first dynasty was collected by the Italian ethnologist, Enrico Cerulli, who got a hold of “an anonymous manuscript 
fragment” given to him by the Banu Qahtan when he visited Mogadishu after the First World War (Reese 2008: 42).   
126 The exact period of the rise and fall of the various dynasties that ruled Mogadishu from the thirteenth century to 
the seventeenth century or their ethnic identity isn’t very well established.  
127 Most scholars (Cassanelli 1982; Reese 2008) attribute the lineage’s name, reef faqi, to its monopoly over the 
study and practice of fiqh, as opposed to religion in general. I suggest that this emphasis on and association of this 
lineage with fiqh in particular, rather religious learning and knowledge in general, might be inaccurate. I say this 
because there are numerous religious lineages in Somali society that are known as Reer faqi. Almost every region in 
the country or among a confederation of clans there is a lineage or family known as Reer Faqi. They are so named 
so because of their reputation for religious learning and piety, and not because of their specific monopoly over 
religion. This can be deceptive, however, because all religious learning is geared towards a mastery over the Shari‘a 
because Islam itself is identified with the Shari‘a. Almost all religious instructions, beginning with the memorization 
of the Qur’an, its translation (tafsir), Arabic grammar (nahwa), the science of prophetic traditions (hadith), and the 
methods of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) are all viewed as necessary pre-conditions in one’s qualification as a 
recognized specialist of the Shari‘a. That is why frequently the most respected religious authorities are referred to as 
faqi so-and-so, and the descendants of such persons might form a lineage called Reef Faqi. That is, a lineage 
renowned for its religious knowledge and piety, and by extension of the Shari‘a.  
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qadis. It was common in the history of the towns of the Swahili coast, including Mogadishu, for 
different lineages to specialize in different commercial and religious activities (Pouwells 1979). 
Hence the monopoly of reer faqi over the learning and practice of the Shari‘a in Mogadishu wasn’t 
unusual, but I am interested in the role of this lineage in the formation of the city’s first political 
dynasty.  
 It was in the thirteenth century that the city’s rule by council was ended and there emerged 
a sultanate with offices, functions, titles, and distinctions of clearly titled hierarchy (Hersi 1979: 
189). In short, a political transformation that turned the port town in to the Sultanate of Mogadishu, 
a city-state where power was centralized by a hereditary political dynasty. The power of 
Mogadishu’s rulers was at times extended beyond the confines of the city. The Sultanate of 
Mogadishu came to exercise control over some of the other towns of the Benaadir coast, where 
the rulers of Mogadishu were represented by chief officers. During the rule by the Muzzafar 
Sultans,128 Mogadishu had a close commercial and political relationship with the Ajuraan 
Sultanate, located in the near-hinterland of the Benaadir coast. We will see more of the Ajuraan in 
the next section. Mogadishu’s transformation from a lineage confederacy to a political dynasty 
was established with the help of religious authority. This is evidenced by the fact that the city’s 
dynastic rulers assumed the title Sheikh rather than the title of sultan or amir (Hersi 1979: 187). 
We saw in the last chapter that religious authority was essential to the governance of Mogadishu.  
                                                          
128 The Muzzafar political dynasty is the most well-known of the political dynasties in Mogadishu. Scott Reese 
(2008) following the Italian Ethnologist Enrico Cerulli places the beginning of the Muzzafar dynasty in the 
thirteenth century (2008: 42) thereby viewing the Muzzafar dynasity as the first political rulers of Mogadishu. Lee 
V. Cassanelli (1982) considers the Muzzafar to have been of mixed Persian-Somali ancestry and places their history 
in the early sixteenth century to the mid-seventeenth centuries (82: 26, 91-93). Abdirahman Hersi (1977), on the 
other hand, places their beginning in the closing of the fifteenth century or the beginning of the sixteenth century 
and their fall sometime in the seventeenth century. Similarly, I. M. Lewis (2002) places the fall of the Muzzafar in 
the seventeenth century (2002: 28). All these authors attribute the fall of the Muzzafar to the invasion of Mogadishu 
by Somali nomadic groups in the seventeenth century. 
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When ibn Battuta visited Mogadishu in the fourteenth century the ruler was styled a sheikh and he 
led the Friday sermon, indicating that religious authority was instrumental to his political power. 
The town’s chief qadi was the ruler’s closest confident, according to ibn Battuta, and an important 
source of power and prestige. The story of the founding of the first political dynasty in Mogadishu 
and the oral traditions that narrate this founding moment provide an even more illustrative example 
of the sway of religious authority in political power.     
 There are oral traditions129 and accounts in Arabic sources130 that tell the story of the rise 
of the first political dynasty of Mogadishu. According to these traditions the rise of this political 
dynasty occurred as follows.131 Prior to the thirteenth century Mogadishu was governed by a 
council of lineage heads, 39 in total, representing the founding lineages of the town, and led by 
four notables known as arba‘a rukn (the four pillars). The town’s lineages had different tribal, 
political, and cultural backgrounds, but were mostly of Arab and Persian origin.132 Even though 
the town’s elders realized that they needed to organize themselves politically and militarily to 
defend “against nomadic encroachments upon their community, as well as against piratical naval 
attacks on their cities and their overseas commerce” (Hersi 1979: 180), they couldn’t agree upon 
a leader amongst themselves. So despite the need for a more centralized political power, the town 
remained governed collectively from the ninth century to the thirteenth century by the lineage 
council.  
                                                          
129 For the oral traditions see Enrico Cerulli, Somalia Scritti vari Editi ed Inediti, 3 vols. (Rome: A Cura 
dell’Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana della Somalia, 1957, 1959; 1964); Scott Reese, Renewers of the Age, p. 42 
130 For the Arabic source accounts see, Ali Hersi, The Arab Factor in Somali History.  
131 I paraphrase the traditions as narrated by Cassanelli, The Shaping of Somali Society; Reese, Renewers of the Age, 
p. 42-50; Hersi, The Arab Factor in Somali History, p. 179-198. 
132 Hersi, The Arab Factor in Somali History, p. 177; Reese, The Renewers of the Age, p. 45.  
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All this changed in the thirteenth century when the lineage council were ousted by the 
arrival in Mogadishu of a poor stranger named Abu Bakr Farkh al-Din.133 To his good fortune, 
Abu Bakr married a wealthy woman and the daughter of one of the town’s notables. One day while 
Abu Bakr was at the Friday Mosque, an impoverished man stood after prayer and asked for help. 
No-one responded to the poor man’s pleas. Two sheikhs then stood up and pleaded with those 
present to show kindness and give the poor man something. Still no-one replied. The sheikhs were 
very saddened by the stinginess of the congregation. Dismayed by what he witnessed and moved 
by an overwhelming desire to do good, Abu Bakr promised the two sheikhs that he would give the 
destitute man one hundred dirhams. The sheikhs blessed him and everyone went home. He made 
this promise despite knowing that he had very little property to his name. Abu Bakr left the mosque 
distraught because he didn’t know where he would get the money, and he didn’t want to ask his 
wife because it would mean his humiliation. When he got home his wife saw the sadness on his 
face and asked him what was troubling him. He told her what had happened at the mosque. His 
wife graciously gave him the money. At the same that night, while walking along the shore of the 
Indian Ocean, he found a block of ambergris thrown out by the sea. It appeared that God was 
pleased with Abu Bakr. He was all of the sudden one of the riches persons of the city, and everyone 
viewed his new found wealth as evidence of God’s pleasure with him. Abu Bakr’s reputation grew.  
At one of their usual meetings, the town’s governing arba‘a rukn decided to make Abu 
Bakr the town’s ruler. The majority of the lineage representatives, however, disagreed with this 
decision. They argued that Abu Bakr was a stranger to the city, and if anyone should be made the 
                                                          
133 Trimmingham holds that it was in fact the religious lineage of Banu Qahtan, which he calls the Muqri al-Qahtan, 
which monopolized the position of qadis (judges) in the city and “formed a ruling class of ‘ulama (Trimmingham 
1952: 68).  
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town’s sultan it should be the Banu Qahtan,134 the religious lineage that monopolized the position 
of the town’s qadis and whose integrity, everyone held, to be above reproach, “If we are to invest 
one [as sultan) it should be the Banu Qahtan, who are more worthy of it as they are our qadis and 
khatibs” (quoted in Reese 2008: 43). The Banu Qahtan declined the offer to become the town’s 
rulers. And after a short stalemate, the Banu Qahtan came up with a solution. They said they would 
support Abu Bakr’s selection to be the town’s ruler but under one condition. He had to agree that 
they should receive “a monopoly over the positions of qadi and khatib (Friday sermon preacher) 
in perpetuity” (Reese 2008: 43). Abu Bakr agreed and with that the town’s first political dynasty 
was established. The Banu Qahtan for their part were secured in their monopoly over the office of 
qadi and khatib. Abu Bakr also promised to appoint them as his administrative lieutenants. Over 
the next four centuries Mogadishu was a city state governed by a series of short-lived political 
dynasties. The most well-known and the longest lasting of these dynasties is the Muzzafar dynasty, 
which the majority of opinion holds ruled Mogadishu from the end of the fifteenth century to the 
mid-seventeenth century. The dynasty was ended sometime in the mid-seventeenth century in the 
hands of Somali nomadic groups135 who cut off the trading routes that connected the port city to 
the interior, and proceeded to settle in the city leading to the division of Mogadishu into two 
quarters that jostled for power (Cassanelli 1974: 36). The economic attraction in ruling the city 
was the control over the trade with the interior and the customs duties levied on imported goods. 
The city’s political rulers also obtained profits from all commercial transactions as protectors 
                                                          
134 Hersi (1979: 180) mentions traditions that claim the Banu Qahtan religious lineage were the first to settle in the 
town and invited other lineages to join them.  
135 Hersi traces the presence of significant Somali nomadic groups in the city to an earlier period. He asserts that 
when Ibn Battuta visited the town in the thirteenth century the ruler was a Somali, “it seems reasonable to suggest, 
then, that sometime during the fifty years separating Fakr u-Din’s accession from Ibn Battuta’s visit the town must 
have been overrun by nomadic Somalis and political power rested from the colonists” (1979: 186).  
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(abans) of foreign merchants. There are no descriptions of the administrative structure of 
Mogadishu around the time of this small political dynasties.  
Weather the above story of the emergence of Mogadishu’s first political dynasty is 
historically accurate or not is not necessarily significant to my point here: that religious authority 
was integral to formations of pre-colonial political power in Somalia. Even if the story is 
apocryphal, it still highlights the importance of religious authority to local traditions of political 
legitimation, and suggests that a historical experience of such political authority. There are three 
important elements that individually and collectively emphasize that Abu Bakr’s rise to political 
power was made possible entirely by religion: his status as a stranger, his selfless giving which 
wins him God’s favor, and the intervention of the religious lineage of Banu Qahtan. Abu Bakr’s 
first and most important identity is that he is a stranger. The tradition of the auspicious appearance 
of a wise and pious stranger, who mediates between disputing lineage groups and eventually rises 
to a leadership position and spawns his own lineage, is very common in Somali traditions of origin. 
What defines many Somali lineage groups is their claim to have descended from an Arab stranger, 
often one of the noble tribes of seventh century Arabia mentioned in the Qur’an, who appeared 
mysteriously and married a local woman.136 The tradition of the pious Muslim stranger is no doubt 
common because it strengthens the people’s Islamic identity by linking them directly with 
personalities and Arabian tribes from the time of the Prophet. Evidently, these stories also 
legitimate the religious authority and political supremacy of a particular group. These traditions 
are also common because a close association with the lands and personalities of Islam, or anything 
Islamic for that matter, is viewed as possessing the qualities of piousness, knowledgeable, 
                                                          
136 See Virginia Lulling, “Men in the Tree,” Proceeding of the third Annual Somali Studies Congress, (1989), pp. 
330-334. 
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integrity, and righteousness among others. In being associated with Islam the stranger comes to 
embody these qualities. Qualities that are also seen as essential to governance and leadership. This 
is why many of the primary acts associated with the pious stranger, as well as religious authorities 
in general, is conflict mediation and settlement. The stranger is always assumed to be pious, 
righteous, and knowledgeable, i.e. a good Muslim, who can bring peace and prosperity through 
honest mediation and righteous leadership. In this sense, the figure of the stranger occupies the 
same space in the social imaginary as the Shari‘a expert, the righteous and knowledgeable Muslim, 
the religious man per excellence. Thus when the arba‘ rukn nominate Abu Bakr to be the town’s 
sultan it’s on the bases of his demonstrated piousness and kind-heartedness which won him God’s 
favor making him prosperous. It’s assumed such a man can make the town peaceful and prosperous 
as well. The lineage elders that opposed Abu Bakr’s nomination could only counter by nominating 
a group made distinct by their assumed or actual religiosity and expertise over the Shari‘a as qadis, 
the Banu Qahtan. The story of the rise of Mogadishu’s first political dynasty therefore 
demonstrates that religion in general, and the Shari‘a in particular, and those associated with its 
knowledge and practice, were essential to the formation of political power.  
The next example of a pre-colonial political formation also underscores the significance of 
religious authority to the rise of a political power. It does so, similar to the first one, through the 
figure of the stranger who spawns a lineage that then founds a polity and becomes its politico-
religious leadership.  
II. The Ajuraan Sultanate 
The historical veracity of the Ajuraan Sultanate is even less certain than that of Mogadishu’s first 
political dynasty. What we know of the Ajuraan is based entirely on oral traditions, oral traditions 
that are themselves very fragmented. In his book, The Shaping of Somali Society: Reconstructing 
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the History of a Pastoral People, 1600 to 1900 (1982), as well as in the PhD which this book is 
based,137 Lee V. Cassanelli brings together the oral fragments and provides the best attempt at 
constructing the historical processes and events that might have informed the oral narrative. In the 
various traditions Cassanelli collected, the Ajuraan are said to have dominated southern Somalia 
from the late fifteenth to mid-seventeenth century, around the same time as the Muzzafar dynasty 
of Mogadishu which they were allied with. The seat of Ajuraan power was in the Lower Shabeelle 
River valley in the inter-riverine region, but their influence extended over a large area in southern 
Somalia encompassing the territories of numerous lineage groups. Given its close proximity to the 
Benaadir port towns, the Ajuraan Sultanate either controlled or was closely allied with the rulers 
of the Benaadir coastal towns. According to Cassanelli (1974: 22), the emergence of the Ajuraan 
Sultanate coincided with the movement of two population groups into the inter-riverine region and 
the Benaadir coast: pastoral Somali nomads from the interior and Hadhrami and Yemeni Arabs. 
The inter-riverine region has at different points in history attracted waves of pastoral nomads 
attracted by the region’s water and pastureland. One half of the ancestors of the Ajuraan, oral 
tradition asserts, were one such group of pastoral nomads who recently arrived the area. The other 
were Hadhrami migrants from Yemen. Hadhrami migration into the Horn of Africa was at its peak 
during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. They often crossed the Gulf of Aden and 
migrated to what was then Islamic principalities to the southeast of Abyssinia. They came as 
merchants, preachers, and to take part in the conflicts between the unified Islamic principalities 
and the Christian Abyssinian kingdom. When the Muslims were defeated in 1543, many of the 
Hadhramis moved towards the Benaadir coast and “settled, among other places, in small 
communities on the Benaadir coast and along the lower Shabelle valley” (Cassanelli 1974: 22). 
                                                          
137 Cassanelli, The Benaadir Past: Essays in Southern Somali History, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 
1974.  
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This reading of the origin of the Ajuraan is Cassanelli’s attempt to reconcile the oral tradition with 
what the historical record reveals of population movements in southern Somalia.  
 The oral tradition simply asserts that the Ajuraan descended from the union of an Arab 
immigrant and the daughter of a local Somali. The full account of this origin story, collected by 
the Italian ethnologist Enrico Cerulli and translated by Cassanelli, is as follows: 
There once lived in the country six men born of two different women, three of one 
mother and three of another; and all of a single father. Their father was 
Hawiyya.138 Jamelle Hawiyya, Gurgaate Hawiyya, and Guggundabe Hawiyya are 
sons of a single mother. Haskulla Hawiyya, Rarane Hawiyya, and Karanle 
Hawiyya are sons of a single mother. Jambelle begat Faaduma Jambelle. She 
herded goats, pursuing them through the bush. While wondering through the 
bush, she spied a man perched up in a tall tree, like a sycamore. She said, “come 
down.” “No,” he replied, “let your brother and the brothers of your father, those 
of your tribe, call me.” Then she summoned them. They came to the place and 
said to the man, “come down.” He said, “I will descend if you will give me three 
things.” “What are the three?” they asked. “For the first, Faadumo Jambelle; 
then a hundred camels with black humps; finally, a slave.” Then he added, “if 
you accept these three, I add another: I must descend onto the back of a man.” 
The six Hawiyya thought. The people of ancient time were few. What they desired 
was help. If the stranger should have sons while he remained among them, they 
could seek his help. Then they said to him, “We accept, come down.” 
                                                          
138 Hawiyya is the eponymous ancestor of numerous lineage groups who live primarily in central and southern 
Somalia.  
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Guggundabe said, “let him descend upon my back.” Gurgaate said, “No, we who 
have given Faaduma and a hundred camels – should he now also descend upon 
our backs. No!” he said, and refused. Then the man descended upon the back of 
Rarane,139 the man. He married Faaduma Jambelle and begat Ajuraan. This man, 
who knows who he was? He was seen up in a tree.140 
Such, according to tradition, is the origin of the Ajuraan. The rise of the Ajuraan to political 
leadership is based on their inheriting the religious prestige of their father, the Arab stranger. The 
legitimating role of their religious pedigree is further underlined by the selection of a particular 
religious lineage as the imams of the Ajuraan state. The blessedness (baraka) of the Arab stranger 
is said to have been passed on to one specific family among his descendants, the Gareen. The 
religious lineage of the Gareen thus monopolized the office of the imam (leader) of the Ajuraan 
Sultanate. The elders of the Ajuraan as a whole selected the wisest and most pious from among 
the Gareen lineage to be the leader of the Ajuraan polity. The religious authority of the Ajuraan 
imam is further confirmed by accounts such as the following one which relates that “the suldan 
(sic) of the Ajuran was in the mosque, preaching as khatib (Friday sermon preacher) when the war 
began. As the people finished the qodba (sermon) and were leaving the mosque the fighting began” 
(Cassanelli 1874: 24). Having risen to positions of political power based on their religious 
authority and pedigree, the Gareen lineage maintained their position through marriage alliances. 
Through their religious authority and marriage alliances, the Gareen linage established “a series of 
administrative centers in and around the well sites and irrigated river banks of southern Somalia” 
(Cassanelli 1982: 104). It appears that the Ajuraan polity “was not a cohesive territorial entity; 
                                                          
139 Rarane means the burdened in Somali.  
140 Cassanelli, The Shaping of Somali Society, 88-89.  
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rather it consisted of several clan territories joined together by the kin, marriage, and patron/client 
ties of the inhabitants” (Cassanelli 1982: 102). What the Gareen accomplished was to unify under 
their religious authority various pastoral groups who recently arrived in the inter-riverine area into 
a “clan” confederation. It’s rather common in the history of pre-colonial Somalia for religious 
authorities or religious lineages to stand at the political center of a cluster of lineages, and in doing 
so help form a system of alliances and agreements between the collections of lineages.141 It appears 
that the Gareen stood at this political center of the Ajuraan “clan” confederation based on their 
religious authority and marriage alliances, which reinforced the kinship loyalty of the leading 
families of the region.  
The oral traditions about the Ajuraan sultanate also reveal something of the structure of the 
polity, and religion was significant here as well. As Cassanelli points out “what gave the polity its 
overall cohesiveness and longevity were the rudimentary administrative procedures and the 
theocratic ideology introduced by the Gareen” (1982: 104). The rudimentary administrative 
structure of the polity was made possible and run by the religiously educated among the population, 
“literate in Arabic, versed in the imperatives of the Shari‘a, these holy men appear to have helped 
institutionalize Islam in the Shabeelle Valley” (Cassanelli 1982: 104). Around the fifteenth century 
                                                          
141 In many cases the various lineages brought together by the agreements made possible by a religious figure 
become a collective social unit. After generations the religious figure might be remembered as a saint. A good 
example of a lineage founded by the actions of a sheikh is that of a Mogadishu lineage called Reer Sheikh Mumin as 
recounted by Scott Reese, “according to the lineage’s oral traditions, ‘in the ancient time the clans living in 
Mogadishu were few, but even these continually fought amongst themselves.’ The smallest linages suffered the most 
as a result of the constant strife and were on the verge of extinction. At the height of the crisis Shaykh Mumn 
‘Abdullahi, a wondering holy man, suddenly appeared in the town from somewhere in the interior and began 
preaching against the internecine conflicts. As a symbol of his disapproval of clan based rivalries the shaykh 
consistently refused to reveal his own origin saying, ‘whoever wishes to know my origins, should ask God.’ In a 
more pragmatic vein he set about uniting sis of the town’s smallest lineages (Reers Munyow, Hatimi, Aydarus, 
Drukhbow, Shams al-Din and the Shaykh Mumin) in an effort to protect them from the excesses of clan violence. 
These six collectively became known as the Skashatow (literally ‘the cooperative’) and began to act as a social unit” 
(Reese 2008: 45). 
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when the Ajuraan Sultanate is said to have arisen, the religious men who had such an education 
often came from the Asian communities on the Benaadir coast and Hadhrami itinerant preachers. 
These communities who lived, and still live, primarily on the coastal towns are locally known as 
gibil‘ad (white-skin). This might explain why the Ajuraan are said to have descended from a union 
of an Arab stranger and a local woman. With the aid of these holy men, the Ajuraan polity 
developed a rudimentary administrative structure. Two elements defined the administrative 
structure of the Ajuraan polity: juridical matters and tax/tribute collection. As regards the law of 
the Ajuraan, oral tradition tells us nothing more the simple fact that they practiced the Shari‘a, “the 
Ajuraan were very religious and their law was that of the Shari‘a” (Cassanelli 1982: 92). Tradition, 
however, has much more to say regarding the collection of tribute by the Ajuraan.  
In fact, the Ajuraan are identified with the collection of tribute to such an extent that some 
oral traditions claim the name Ajuraan came from the Arabic root ajara (to tax) (Cassanelli 1982: 
92). It’s said that the Ajuraan collected tribute both from the cultivators as well as the pastoral 
nomads. From the cultivators in the fertile inter-riverine region, the Ajuraan collected “tribute in 
the form of durra and bun (coffee beans roasted in butter),” whereas the pastoral nomads they 
“demanded cattle, camels, and goats” (Cassanelli 1982: 92). It appears that the Ajuraan forced the 
pastoral nomads to pay tribute by controlling access to water. This might explain why the places 
identified in the tradition as centers of Ajuraan power “are without exception sites of important 
clusters of wells,” which suggests that control over important pastoral resources such as water and 
grazing was one way the Ajuraan enforced the collection of tribute (Cassanelli 1982: 101). To 
collect tribute the polity posted agents known as emirs or naa‘ibs to the various districts of the 
polity. These agents were most likely the religiously educated literate clerics who were the only 
ones capable of book-keeping. Religious authorities were thus in all likelihood the tribute/tax 
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collectors of the polity. This is perfectly normal since tribute collection was probably justified as 
a form of worship. That is, as the duty on Muslims to give a share of their wealth annually as zakat 
(alms-giving). In the collection of tribute the agents were aided by “slave soldiers.” The Ajuraan 
also relied on the conscription of labor who “dug wells for the imam’s livestock and built 
fortifications for the imam’s soldiers” (Cassanelli 1982: 92). In short, the Ajuraan polity’s 
administrative structure was based on titles and practices of Islamic hierarchy and process of 
legitimation.  
The polity’s reliance on Islam is also demonstrated by the tradition of its fall. According 
to tradition, the Ajuraan declined because they “abandoned the law of Islam” and became tyrants 
(Cassanelli 1982: 94). This led people to rebel against them. Though they fought hard to maintain 
their polity, the Ajuraan were eventually undone, according to Cassanelli’s historical 
reconstruction, by the emergence of new politico-religious leaders who challenged the authority 
of the Gareen imams, “these frontier sheikhs might wittingly or unwittingly become the focus of 
religious loyalties which stopped with them. These local loyalties quite obviously impaired the 
authority of the imams” (Cassanelli 1974: 46). Since the politico-religious leaders of the polity 
owed their political power to their religious authority, and since the rudimentary administrative 
structure of the polity was also based on religious authority and run by religious authorities, it was 
no surprise that the downfall of the Ajuraan polity was rooted in the loss of that religious authority. 
Even though Cassanelli says “a cautious yes” regarding the historical possibility of there being a 
polity like the Ajuraan in sixteenth-century southern Somalia, such historical accuracy is not 
necessary to my argument in this chapter. Similar to the accounts regarding the rise of Mogadishu’s 
first political dynasty, it’s not necessary for the purposes of this chapter’s contention whether the 
oral traditions regarding the Ajuraan Sultanate reflect an actual historical event. It’s enough that 
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these traditions reflect a historical memory and a social imaginary that centers religious authority 
to the Somali people’s pre-colonial political experience. The next political power to emerge in 
southern Somalia is a nineteenth century sultanate whose existence is corroborated by written 
historical record. It’s interesting that the history and the nature of this polity, particularly the 
centrality of religion and religious authority to its formation, is similar to and touches on some of 
the same dynamics we saw in the first two cases of pre-colonial polities.  
III. The Geledi Sultanate 
The Geledi Sultanate was a “clan” confederation which dominated southern Somali politics at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. The Sultanate was at its peak in the 1840s under the leadership 
of Sultan Yussuf Ali. Oral tradition suggests that the Sultanate probably emerged sometime 
between mid-seventeenth century and early eighteenth century (Cassanelli 1982: 100). Similar to 
the Ajuraan polity, the Geledi Sultanate was located in the arable inter-riverine region in the near-
hinterland of the Benaadir coast. The center of Ajuran power and the seat of the sultan was in 
Afghoye, a market town on the bank of the Shabeelle River, and located on one of the trading 
routes that terminated in the Benaadir coastal towns. The Geledi was a genealogical unit consisting 
of nine lineages at the center of which stands a religious lineage known as the Gobron. Despite 
claims of common descent, Geledi identity probably formed out of different lineages and families 
who moved into the inter-riverine region around the same historical moment. The Geledi “clan” 
consisted of pastoral cattle herders, small communities of Arab and Persian origin, and sedentary 
cultivators. At the center of these various lineages, collectively known as the Geledi, stood the 
Gobron religious lineage. Even though there are eye-witness accounts of the Geledi Sultanate 
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during the reign of Sultan Yussuf in the 1840s,142 there are no written historical accounts of its 
origin. What we know of the origin of the Geledi Sultanate, therefore, comes from the oral 
tradition. The following oral accounts collected by Virginian Lulling (2002) and Lee Cassanelli 
(1982) tell us something of the formation of the Geledi “clan” confederation and the rise of the 
Gobron lineage to politico-religious dominance: 
After wandering through the country for many generations, the ancestors of the 
Geledi settled in the vicinity of the Shabeelle. As the story goes, a member of the 
Handab lineage discovered the river by following a white camel which always 
appeared to be well-watered even when the rest of the herd was suffering from 
drought. At the point where the camel reached the river, the settlement of Elqode 
was founded. Then Sheikh Mohamed Haji Yussuf of the Handab distributed the 
land to those lineages known as the Tolweyne. The Handab were henceforth 
known as the ‘urad (literally, “the first-born”) of the Geledi. A second group of 
lineages called the Yebdaale, settled downriver at a place called Balguri.143 
In this fragment from the oral tradition we are told that the ancestors of the Geledi came to 
the inter-riverine area after many years of wondering. They came to the area in search of water. 
The oral tradition suggests that the ancestors of the Geledi were pastoral nomads who migrated to 
the region attracted by its readily available water and pasturage. This confirms the historical pattern 
of pastoral nomadic groups moving into the region in different waves, especially during times of 
draught. These movements of populations into the area occasionally led to the establishment of 
alliances and the amalgamation of the different groupings to create what Cassanelli refers to as 
                                                          
142 The best eye-witness account is from Christopher 
143 Cassanelli, The Benaadir Past, 84. 
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“pastoral polities.” The Ajuraan and the Geledi were such polities. We saw that both the oral 
tradition and Cassanelli’s reconstruction of the historical record suggest that the Ajuraan polity 
also arose out of the unification around a religious lineage of different migrant groups. Similar to 
the Ajuran, the Geledi sultanate also emerged out of the migration of different groups into the area 
between the two rivers. In both cases it was the authority of a religious lineage that symbolized 
and stood at the political center of the “clan” confederations. According to the above oral fragment 
the lineages that together formed the Geledi consisted of two clusters of lineages: the Tolweyne 
and the Yebdaale. The next fragment explains how these clusters of lineages were merged together 
to form the Geledi by the authority of a religious lineage known as the Gobron:   
The Gobron originally traveled and lived with the Yebdaale. At this time, the 
villages of the Yebdaale enjoyed sunlight as they do today, but those of the 
Tolweyne lived in constant twilight or mist. A member of the Adawiin (a gibil'aad 
lineage) saw how to remedy this. By reading his Koran, he perceived that the 
Gobron would have a great future. If the Tolweyne could get the Gobron to stand 
with them, they too would have the sun. One day the young men of the two groups 
were playing in an open field near their villages. Among them was 'Aalin Warre 
of the Gobron. A member of the Abikerow lineage sent two of his slaves to capture 
the young 'Aalin. They carried him off to the Tolweyne village. Then the sun rose 
over the Tolweyne group. The Tolweyne made an offering of peace to the 
Yebdaale. The two groups then accepted the situation, and to this day, the Gobron 
stand with the Tolweyne.144 
                                                          
144 Cassanelli, The Benaadir Past, 55.  
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In this version of the oral story, the Gorbron religious lineage are presented as blessed with 
celestial favor. Their cohabitation, first with the Yebdaale then with the Tolweyne, brings light. 
Light here is a metaphor and symbolizes the presence of divine knowledge and grace, of truth, and 
by extension, of peace and prosperity. It’s common in the many traditions commenting on religion 
to associate religious authority with supernatural and mysterious powers, which is often interpreted 
as prove of divine favor. Miracles are attributed to saints as a mark of their spiritual prowess. The 
Gobron lineage were particularly renowned for their mysterious powers. For instance, the 
nineteenth-century sultan of the Geledi is said to have possessed mystical authority, which “was 
seen to improve his ability to act as a mediator, as a diviner, and as a protector of his followers” 
(Cassanelli 1982: 133). In other accounts, the Gobron’s rise to political prominence is portrayed 
as a byproduct of their capacity for mediation. It’s said that they rose to prominence at a time of 
political ferment between the various lineages that would eventually form the Geledi. They “rose 
to power because of their ability to unite the continuously squabbling sub-clans of the Geledi 
through their role as mediators” (Reese 2008: 57). Their competence in dispute settlement was 
contingent upon their Shari‘a-derived authority, which lent credibility to their rulings. That the 
Gobron were viewed as bearers of mysterious powers based on their possession of baraka only 
added to the force of their verdicts. In settling disputes, the Gobron became essential to the 
governing of relations between the lineage groups thereby helping to incorporate the Geledi “clan” 
confederation. Because of their authority to mediate they became identified with the settlements 
and alliances that they helped to reach between the various lineage groups. When the Gobron 
became the acknowledged religious authorities in the region, they simultaneously became integral 
to the establishment and governance of relations between the various groups in the area. And in 
doing so, they were well on their way to becoming the undisputed politico-religious leaders of the 
A h m e d  I b r a h i m  
 
Page | 143  
 
region. Two process are therefore interlinked; the rise of the Gobron to politico-religious 
leadership and the formation of the Geledi “clan,” “in any case the rise of the Gobroon to political 
dominance is bound up with the rise of the Geledi as a whole to power in the river area” (Lulling 
2002: 176). The Shari‘a-derived capacity to govern through dispute settlement was the foundation 
upon which the politico-religious leadership of the Gobron was founded. It is no surprise then that 
“before the colonial period the sultan is said to have acted as supreme judge” (Lulling 2002: 
178).The politico-religious leadership position which the Gobron occupied exemplified the 
agreements and alliances between various groups, agreements and alliances that became essential 
to the region’s economy.  
 After their settlement in the inter-riverine region, the ancestors of the Geledi, who were 
pastoral nomads, took up a mixed economic activity based on agriculture, pastoralism, and 
commerce. It’s unknown the extent to which the Geledi clan confederation, led and held together 
by the Gobron, used the labor of their client cultivators who lived in the region prior to their arrival 
or imported slaves. In general, however, during the nineteenth century, pastoral groups who 
migrated in to the inter-riverine region used “client cultivators and imported slave labor from 
southern Ethiopia and elsewhere in East Africa” to produce large amounts of grain, sesame, cotton 
for local markets as well as for export (Reese 2008: 50). As the predominant power in the region 
during the nineteenth century, it’s likely that the Geledi and their allies were immersed in this 
regional economy. As politico-religious leaders of the Geledi, the Gobron lineage, was 
instrumental in maintaining this regional economic system by, for example, protecting the trade 
routes. In fact, evidence suggests that Gobron sultans “consciously sought to extend Gobron 
authority along the axes of trade and commercial activity” (Cassanelli 1982: 104). The best 
demonstration of the Gobron as protectors of the regional trade came in the 1840s, when the most 
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famous Geledi sultan, Sultan Yusuf Ali, led the Geledi and their allies in a war against the reformist 
and militant religious community (jama‘a) of Baardheere, named after the location of the 
settlement (see chapter 2 for more on the Baardheere Jama‘a).  
In its drive to reform religious life, the Jama‘a forbade a number of practices such as 
chewing of tobacco and mixing of the sexes. Economically, their most significant act was to forbid 
the trade in ivory, an important product in the regional trade. The Jama‘a also began to impede 
regional trade by harassing caravans or cutting off trade routes. This disruption of the regional 
economy no doubt allowed Sultan Yussuf to put together a formidable force that completely 
defeated the Baardheere Jama‘a, burning the group’s settlement to the ground. It is no surprise 
that “immediately following his victory at Bardera, Sultan Yusuf took measures to revitalize the 
ivory trade. He encouraged his allies to patrol the routes with bands of warriors, and by 1847 has 
succeeded in routing most of the caravan trade to Mogadishu via Geledi territory” (Cassanelli 
1974: 105). The challenge of the Baardheere Jama‘a wasn’t of course only about economics. The 
Jama‘a posed a direct threat to the religious authority of the Gobron. This perhaps explains why 
Sultan Yussuf was insistent upon destroying them.145 At its height in the 1840s, this pastoral polity 
exercised enormous influence throughout southern Somalia, including over the coastal towns of 
the Benaadir. The Gobron sultans derived economic advantages from this regional economy, 
which their rule helped to maintain, but the economic advantages accrued to them more as a 
manifestation of their religious authority, and not as a result of violent coercion or administrative 
efficiency.  
                                                          
145 Cassanelli reports that Sultan Yussuf refused the peace offering of the leaders of the Baardheere Jama‘a.  
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 There was little administrative structure or territorial integrity to the Geledi Sultanate. The 
power of the Gobron sultans, therefore, didn’t rest upon a hierarchical administrative structure. 
The sultan didn’t have officials, “who attended to the day-to-day affairs of the various clans. 
Rather, he influenced them as a religious leader and as a guarantor of economic prosperity. When 
alien threat occurred in these spheres of activity, the sultan was a natural rallying point (Cassanelli 
1974: 123). The sultans might have had a representative at important locations, but these weren’t 
part of administrative structure that encompassed Geledi territory. The sultanate was a loosely 
structured and territorially dispersed confederation of lineage groups, who through their allegiance 
to the Gobron sultans, formed a web of alliances at the center of which stood the sultans (Cassanelli 
1982: 104). It was thus the religious authority attributed to the Gobron that defined the coherence 
and power of the Geledi sultanate. Lacking administrative structure, the Gobron sultans also don’t 
appear to have had the capacity to violently coerce the various lineage groups to pay tribute. The 
collective “clan” confederation of the Geledi, led by the Gobron sultans, was militarily capable of 
meeting challenges to their power. The Gobron sultans were able to rally around their leadership 
the various lineages in times when there was a common threat, as in the case of Baardheere Jama‘a. 
This show of force, however, was often on ad hoc basis and temporary in nature, with the warriors 
gathering briefly for campaigns and dispersing afterwards. Even on the few occasions when they 
were gathered for a campaign the warriors weren’t provided provisions, but instead relied on the 
spoils of war to sustain themselves (Christopher 1843: 94). The constant stream of economic 
advantages, which the Gobron sultans derived from their position was, therefore, not due to their 
ability to maintain permanent coercive threat, nor on the efficiency of their administrative 
techniques.  
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 Despite their lack of coercive power and efficient administration, the Gobron sultans, 
nevertheless, derived revenues from various sources. They included presents from merchants or 
strangers passing through the country, tolls from caravans, and customs duties collected at the port 
of Brava (Christopher 1843; Lulling 2002). The most important source of revenue for the Gobron 
sultans, however, were the tribute which they annually received from the various lineage groups 
that recognized their authority. This tribute wasn’t paid to the sultan because of the threat of his 
coercive powers. Rather, the tribute was considered zakat. The Gobron sultans of the Geledi 
sultanate received zakat in the form of annual tribute from the heads of the various lineages who 
had collected it from their respective constituents. The Gobron weren’t alone in this. In fact, almost 
all pre-colonial politico-religious leaders relied on the institution of zakat as an important source 
of income. In many ways these pre-colonial polities were centers of income redistribution as the 
religious authorities who receive zakat were expected to reallocate it to the poor, the needy, the 
traveler, allies, and as largesse at festival times.  
 Though the historical evidence is scarce and much of what is said above about pre-colonial 
political formations in Somalia is based on oral traditions, it is clear that religious authority was 
foundational to the rise of pre-colonial politico-religious leaders in Somalia. More specifically, it 
was the Shari‘a-derived authority of the ‘ulama to govern individual and social relations through 
dispute settlement that turned the ‘ulama into the central axes around which agreements and 
alliances were reached and maintained. This centrality of Shari‘a authority to the formation of pre-
colonial political power contradicts the contention in much of the literature on pre-colonial Muslim 
societies, which holds that there was a separation of authority and power in pre-colonial Muslims 
societies. It also shows that rise of Shari‘a courts in Mogadishu after the disintegration of the 
postcolonial state in 1991, and their evolution into a political formation under the Union of Islamic 
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Courts (UICs) in 2006, should not be analyzed as marking a break with people’s religious and 
political traditions. To the contrary, the emergence of religious authorities as political leaders in 
the UICs is continues with the precolonial political experience of the region.          
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter, and the previous one, has been to contextualize the rise of the Shari‘a 
courts within the history of the Horn of Africa region, particularly the history of the Somali people. 
More specifically, the two chapters intended to show that authority, as in religious authority, has 
been integral to the formation of political power in pre-colonial Somalia. In making this argument 
the chapters contributed to the literature on contemporary Islamic movements in two respects. First 
contribution dealing more with the literature on Islam in Somalia, and by extension sub-Saharan 
Africa, and the other engaging with the literature on contemporary Islamic movements in general 
as a world-wide phenomenon. As regards the firs contribution, the majority of the commentators 
(Hagman and Hoehne 2009; Le Sage 2004; Menkhaus 2005, 2006/2007; Rotberg 2005; Waal 
2004) on Islamic organizations and movements in recent Somali history analyze and understand 
these movements through a framework of historical periodization that attributes a number of 
characteristics to contemporary Islamic movements. The attribution of these characteristics allows 
for a particular kind of analysis and explanations. One of the most defining characteristic of 
contemporary Islamic movements in Somalia, we are told, is their political nature. Recent Islamic 
movements, it’s argued, have politicized “traditional” religious practices and beliefs by turning 
religion into an instrument for mobilizing the population to achieve a profoundly political goal, 
the capture of the state. To account for the newness and emergence of these movements foreign 
i.e. Middle Eastern influences are emphasized. Thus the movements, who may or may not view 
themselves as part of the larger global phenomenon known as Islamic Awakening (al-Sahwa al-
A h m e d  I b r a h i m  
 
Page | 148  
 
Islamiyya), are said to be motivated by ideas and practices that are modern and essentially foreign 
to “traditional” Somali religious practices and beliefs. The mixing of politics and religion, captured 
in the term political Islam, and viewed as the defining feature of contemporary Islamic movements 
in Somalia, underlines a historical periodization that explains current Islamic movement in terms 
of their distinction from “traditional” Somali religious practices. By stressing that religious 
authority has been fundamental to the formation of political authority in pre-colonial Somalia,  
chapters two and three destabilize this argument and the historical periodization which it 
articulates.  
In stressing the centrality of religious authority to political power in pre-colonial 
precolonial Somalia, these two chapters also problematize a different facet of the literature on 
contemporary Islamic movements. An important argument, one that has assumed added 
significance recently, in the literature on Islamic societies addresses the relationship between 
authority, i.e. religious authority, and power, as in political and military power. This argument 
posits that in pre-colonial Muslim societies, authority was separate from power (Asad 2015; Hallaq 
2003, 2009, 2013; Lapidus 2002; Messick 1993; Weiss 1992; Zubaida 2005). Authority was vested 
in religious authorities who were almost always distinct and independent from the political and 
military rulers of pre-colonial Muslim societies. The independence of religious authorities was 
made possible by the structural and epistemological bases of the Shari‘a. The epistemology of the 
Shari‘a, premised on the individual scholar’s quest to approximate the intentions of God as 
revealed in the scriptures, authorized Muslim scholars (‘ulama) to set the norms that regulated 
social conduct, including the conduct of political and military rulers. In essence, the ‘ulama, as 
Shari‘a experts, controlled the legislation and governance of Muslim societies. The independence 
of this Shari‘a-derived authority from political power was exemplified by the figure of the mufti, 
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the preeminent character in Shari‘a hermeneutics. It was, therefore, the Shari‘a that made the 
separation of religious authority from political power possible. With the emergence of the modern 
state over the past two centuries, however, the Shari‘a was transformed and delimited making it 
part of the legal structure of the modern state. Predictably, this development ended the historical 
separation between authority and power which has characterized pre-colonial Muslim societies. 
This narrative further informs the contention that the demand by present-day Islamic movements 
for the adoption of the Shari‘a by the state overlooks the reality that the Shari‘a as a historical 
phenomenon was never in the hands of state authorities. In this sense, the rise of these movements 
is itself a modern development reflecting the dramatic transformations of the past two centuries. 
In this chapter, we saw the integral role of religion and religious authorities in the formation of 
pre-colonial polities in Somalia. The brief oral and historical record of pre-colonial political 
formations in Somalia make it clear that religious authority, particularly Shari‘a-derived authority, 
rather than being separate from power, was the very foundation upon which political power was 
founded in pre-colonial Somalia.  
The two facets of the literature, which I problematized above, have something in common. 
They both understate the importance of the history of Islam in places like Somalia, which is in the 
Islamic periphery, in the analysis and understanding of contemporary Islamic movements. They 
assume that the central dramas and the historically important developments of Islam occur in the 
lands of the “Islamic heartland.” From there, it’s assumed, they reverberate to other regions of the 
Muslim world. What if one takes a different approach? One which assumes that the so-called 
Islamic periphery teaches us about Islam at least as much as in the so-called Islamic heartland. In 
the analysis of certain topics, it might be said that the Islamic periphery provides better analytical 
insight because it hasn’t been subjected to the dramatic transformations of modernity (Ware III 
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2014). In this sense, the Islamic periphery might do for the Islamic heartland, what theory from 
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The founding of a community through the Shari‘a 
In this chapter I provide descriptions of the initial events that led to the formation of four of the 
Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu based on the personal accounts of individuals who were deeply 
involved in the events and actions that culminated in the founding of the courts. The descriptions 
are drawn from interviews with key members of the Shari‘a courts, biographical146 and historical 
manuscripts,147 as well as a religious document148, all written in either Arabic or Somali by 
important players in the history of the Shari‘a courts and/or the subsequent Union of Islamic Courts 
(UICs).149 The selection of the four courts, described below, is determined by the completeness 
and coherence of the story of their formation that emerged from the interviews and the written 
manuscripts. The completeness of the picture we have of their rise helps to clearly bring to light 
various important themes that I found to have been shared in general by the different Shari‘a courts. 
It goes without saying that the way the stories of the courts are remembered and narrated, as with 
any narrative, reflects the conflicts and positions that the individual narrators found themselves in 
at the moment of narration. This is all the more so given the history of the Shari‘a courts has 
become entangled in what has followed the courts. Mainly, the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in 
                                                          
146 I got a hold of a biography of Sheikh Hassan Daahir Aweys. A man who has played a key role in much of the 
recent history of Islamic movements in Somalia. He is often referred to, by commentators, as the ‘God father’ of the 
Islamic Awakening (al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya) in Somalia. The biography is grandiosely titled, The Leader of the 
Mujahidiin in the African Continent (Amiir al-Mujahidin fi qarni al-afriq).   
147 There are two historical manuscripts, one in Arabic and the other in English. The Arabic language manuscript is 
written by a man named Dr. Omar Iman abu Bakar, who was one of the chief architects of the Union of Islamic 
Courts (UICs), though not very involved in the communal Shari‘a courts that preceded the UICs. The book’s title is: 
The Trails of the Islamic Courts in Somalia: The Success and Limitations (tajriyat al-mahakim al-Islamiyya fi 
Somali). The Somali language book, The Rise of the Somali Islamists, 1952-2002 (Kobicii Islaamiyiinta Somaaliya, 
1952-2002), is written by an amateur local historian named Abdulqadir Mire Adam.   
148 The religious tract is written by Sheikh Haamud Sheikh Ahmed Ziyar. The chairman of one of the first courts to 
be established in Mogadishu, the Islamic Court of Madina. In the pamphlet titled, The Signs of the Wholesome 
Society, Sheikh Xaamud discusses the reasoning behind the formation of the court. I came to the possession of this 
tract through the trust of the family of Sheikh Hamued, who is now deceased. I am grateful for their trust.   
149 This written material was collected and translated by the author. 
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the form of a U.S.-backed Ethiopian invasion of Mogadishu in 2006 and the rise of the militant 
Islamist group, al-Shabaab. I thus do not hold that the versions given here to be the absolutely 
“correct” accounts of how the courts formed and worked. Moreover, it’s the general and 
reoccurring themes and modes of reasoning that emerges from these narratives which is of more 
interest. In my descriptions of the following four courts, I use the exact accounts of my 
interlocutors’ answers to my questions without reproducing my questions. I provide brief 
contextualizations of the stories of the different courts, but in order to fully appreciate the context 
of the accounts below the reader should remember the general history of the Shari‘a courts from 
the introductory chapter.  
A key theme that emerges out of the accounts given below is the rise of religious authorities 
as politico-religious leaders and the simultaneous decline of the political role of “clan”-based 
faction leaders. I contend that the demise of the political role of lineage- or “clan”-based faction 
leaders was an expression of the fact that the “clan” as a political category was losing its coherence 
as the memory and experience of the postcolonial state faded. In other words, the “clan” as a 
political category only made sense in a world where genealogical units were depicted as a unit 
with authentic interests needing political representation at the state level vis-à-vis other clans. With 
the prolonged absence of the postcolonial state from the scene, the “clan” was no longer politically 
relevant. As both the “clan” and the political representative of the “clan,” the faction leader, lost 
their political significance, the general attitude that the political role of religious authorities should 
be delimited no longer reflected people’s lived reality. Consequently, religious authorities rose to 
political prominence. What we see here is essentially the de-privatization of religion as the 
experience of the postcolonial state faded from memory. The rise of religious authorities to 
political power climaxed when the previously independent communal Shari‘a courts unified under 
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the UICs and took complete control of Mogadishu. In the accounts below of the initial formation 
of the communal Shari‘a courts we see the beginning of this process. Some of the concepts and 
practices from the Islamic tradition that inform the actions and reasoning of the actors that founded 
the courts will be analyzed in the following chapter.150          
I. The Shari‘a Court of Madina 
The court of Madina was one of the first Shari‘a courts established in Mogadishu after the 
disintegration of the institutions of the central state in 1991. There was a previous attempt by some 
religious scholars (‘ulama) to establish a court in as early as February 1991, a few weeks after the 
defeat and flight of the regime of long-time dictator Mohamed Siyad Barre from the city. This 
attempt, however, didn’t materialize into anything meaningful. It was undone by two faction 
leaders, who at the time were beginning to jostle for power. The Court of Madina was established 
in the district of Madina in the south of Mogadishu in mid-July 1992. It set an example for the 
other Shari‘a courts that followed it. The themes and events that feature in the story of this court 
would regularly feature in the accounts of the other Shari‘a courts that followed it. The following 
account of the court comes from two interlocutors who were intimately involved in its creation.151  
After the start of the civil war the district of Madina became a place where every 
crime imaginable was occurring. There were so many mooryan152 in the district. 
                                                          
150 Documenting the accounts of the emergence of these Shari‘a courts in the perspective and voice, as much as 
possible, of some of the key players serves another purpose besides the agenda of this chapter or dissertation. It’s an 
attempt to provide and preserve for historical purposes an account of the memory of these events at this particular 
historical juncture. One often hears of Islamic movements, rarely does one get an intimate account of their genesis. 
151 The identities of my two interlocutors, as are most of my interlocutors, and their role within the court is 
concealed as much as possible, as per their wish.  
152 Mooryan is a term that became popular after the eruption of the civil war. It refers to the young armed men who 
roamed the streets manning checkpoints and preying upon the population to sustain themselves. For more on the 
mooryan see Roland Marchal, “Forms of Violence And Ways To Control It In An Urban War Zone: The Mooryan 
in Mogadishu,” in Mending Rips in the Sky: Options for Somali Communities in the 21st Century, edited by Hussein 
M. Adam and Richard Ford (The Red Sea Press, Inc.: Lawrence, NJ, 1997), 193-208.   
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At first, the mooryan only preyed upon the minority153 clans (qabil)154 who were 
small and unarmed. The mooryan belonged to the Dauud clan who dominated the 
area. Members of the Dauud clan weren’t targeted because the mooryan knew 
that they wouldn’t get away if they committed a crime against a member of the 
Dauud clan. Eventually, there were less and less minority clans to prey upon 
because they all fled the district, so the mooryan began to target members of their 
own clan, the Dauud. So now everyone felt the pain of the mooryan’s crimes. The 
mooryan lived in buildings whose owners had fled, and they drank alcohol and 
chewed qat155 there. They would take whichever woman they wanted and rape her 
there. That is when a group of us young men decided that we couldn’t tolerate 
that our neighbors were killed and raped right in front of us. We could not just 
watch this reprehensible acts (munkar) happen. We organized people in our 
neighborhoods. We hid these meetings. There was a small shop, and that’s where 
the young men met. Each young man who could get a weapon had one. We called 
ourselves ‘opponents of evil’ (humaan diid). And people also began to put their 
money at the shop as well, so it could be safe. 
                                                          
153 By minority clans, the interviewee is referring to members of communities who have historically lived, and still 
live, in the coastal towns of southern Somalia, including Mogadishu, for centuries and who often trace their heritage 
to Arab or Persian origin, or to Bantu language-speaking agricultural communities who primarily live in the inter-
riverine region. He is also using it in reference to members of lineage groups whose “home” region is considered to 
be elsewhere in the country 
154 My interlocutors use the term qabil, a term from the Arabic language which is best translated as “clan” or “tribe,” 
to refer to kinship-based identities. As mentioned previously, I prefer to use the terms lineage, descent, or 
genealogical unit/group to avoid the landmine of controversy that surrounds these terms in Somali studies, and in 
anthropology in general. For more on this see the exchange between Besteman (1996, 1998) and Lewis (1998) in the 
journal Cultural Anthropology. As will be clear from the accounts of the courts, the conflict after the disintegration 
of the previous regime played out along lineage identities and exasperated them. As a result, most of my 
interlocutors’ descriptions and understanding of the conflict is through lineage politics.  
155 Qat or chat is a mildly stimulant leaf that is chewed in social gatherings or just to pass time throughout the Horn 
of Africa and Yemen.  
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One day we were praying in a mosque and I noticed that a man who used to pray 
with us at the mosque wasn’t there. He always used to pray but he wasn’t there 
that day. After the prayer, I asked the people where he was, and everyone said, ‘I 
don’t know.’ The man was jareer,156 he wasn’t our lineage (reer). It was after 
‘Isha (late evening) prayer. I suggested we go to his house and see. One sheikh 
came with me. We went to the man’s house and found the whole housed 
ransacked. He lived by himself. His family had moved to another part of the city 
to escape the mooryan in Madina. He probably stayed behind to look after the 
house. We concluded he must have been kidnapped. Since he used to work in the 
bank and he didn’t come from an armed clan he was an easy target. After we 
came back from his house the sheikh went to his house and I went to the shop 
where we used to meet. There I saw some of the guys. I told them what had 
happened. We talked and we asked ourselves, why are we here? Aren’t we here to 
protect ourselves, to help each other and our neighbors? Isn’t this man our 
neighbor? Isn’t he a Muslim? Isn’t it our duty to protect him? We decided we 
would go look for him and when we find him, depending on what lineage the 
holders were, people in our group from that same lineage would take 
responsibility for dealing with the kidnappers. We looked for him all night, we 
went to the houses and places where we knew the mooryan stayed. We looked for 
                                                          
156 Jareer or hard-haired is a term used to refer to what used to be a Bantu-speaking cultivating populations who 
have historically lived in the inter-riverine region (see chapters two and three for more on the populations in the 
inter-riverine region). For more on the Bantu see Catherine Besteman, Unravelling Somalia: Race, Violence, and the 
Legacy of Slavery (University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia, 1999); Ken Menkhaus, “The Question of 
Ethnicity in Somali Studies: The Case of Somali Bantu Identity,” in Peace and Milk, Drought and War: Somali 
Culture, Society and Politics, edited by Markus V. Hoehne and Virginia Luling (Columbia University Press: NY), 
87-104; Omar A. Eno, “The Untold Apartheid Imposed on the Bantu/Jarer People in Somalia,” in Mending Rips in 
the Sky: Options for Somali Communities in the 21st Century, edited by Hussein M. Adam and Richard Ford (The 
Red Sea Press, Inc.: Lawrence, NJ, 1997), 209-220.  
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him all night and in the morning we prayed in a street in front of a house we 
suspected. The house belonged to a well-known leader of a group of mooryan. As 
we stood in front of the house thinking about what to do a man emerged with a 
gun. The man was the same lineage as one of the leaders of our group. So he took 
the initiative of capturing him and took responsibility for holding him. We took 
him to an empty house that had a big tree in front of it; we choose the house 
because of the tree. We could sit under the tree and meet people there. 
When the mooryan heard what we did they attacked us, but we defended 
ourselves. The mooryan began to be less visible in our neighborhood because 
they realized that there were armed people who would confront them. They went 
to other neighborhoods within the district. We then began to help young men in 
those other neighborhoods to organize themselves. That is when we started to 
face many challenges. People would call us when there was a robbery by the 
mooryan, we would go there and confront them. In those confrontations some 
people would be wounded, some killed, and sometimes they would put down their 
guns and run away or we would capture them. When we captured one of them, we 
couldn’t just release him back to the public because he would continue with 
robbing and killing people, and we didn’t have a prison or food to keep him. And 
we couldn’t just kill him because that would make us just another Mooryan. So 
what do you do? Everyone we captured also belonged to a specific lineage within 
the Dauud, and sometimes it so happened that the person we captured was a close 
relative of one of us. And that someone would say ‘this is my cousin, let him go.’ 
So we had many problems. If we captured someone who was injured we had no 
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way of treating them. We decided to gather the traditional elders, who were 
absolutely powerless to do anything about what was happening. They were having 
many problems themselves because of the mooryan. The elders had to resolve 
conflicts and pay money and property in compensation because of the problems 
caused by their relatives who were mooryan. People who were wronged by the 
mooryan came to the elders and held them responsible. And the elder couldn’t do 
anything about his own son or nephew who was a mooryan. If they tried they 
themselves would be shot. Their own daughters were being raped. We told the 
elders, ‘we want to fight the mooryan, and we want to do so in accordance with 
the Shari‘a.’ We asked them, ‘do you see the actions of the mooryan as something 
acceptable?’ And they all said ‘you are right, they are evil and they have troubled 
us to no end.’ We then said, ‘if we are of the same opinion, then we should do 
something. Since each of these young boys who are causing all this evil comes 
from a lineage represented by one of the nabad doons157 (peace makers) and kaba 
qabiil158 (clan chief) who are here, and other community leaders like business 
people. We want you to sign that when these mooryan are captured they can be 
treated in accordance with the Shari‘a.’ We also called the ‘ulama. There were 
big ‘ulama at the district, like Sheikh Hamud Sheikh Ahmed Ziyar.159 We told 
them, ‘if we don’t do something about their evil actions, there will fall fitna 
(affliction, destruction) upon both us and them. You know the religion of Allah. 
                                                          
157 The term was coined during the Siyad Barre regime in an attempt to transform and undercut the traditional role of 
lineage elders.  
158 Kaba qabil or clan chief came into usage during Italian colonialism of southern Somalia.  
159 Sheikh Haamud was the chairman of this court and the author of the important religious tract mentioned in a 
footnote above, where he argued, among other things, that in the absence of a government a people had a duty to 
organize and govern their affairs in accordance with the Shari‘a. For more on Sheikh Hamud’s argument in this 
document see the next chapter.  
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Everyone we capture is going to be brought before you, you will be informed of 
their transgressions, and we want you to judge these people brought before you in 
accordance with the Shari‘a. The execution of the judgment (hukm) will not be 
your responsibility.’ The ‘ulama agreed and organized amongst themselves a 
committee called the Council of the Court. The elders also organized themselves 
and created a committee called the Council of the Signatories. That is how the 
court started. The opening celebration of the court happened on July 19, 1992. By 
signing the elders agreed that anyone from their respective lineages who is 
caught doing something bad should be judged in accordance with the Shari‘a. 
The ‘ulama got together and selected some ‘ulama from amongst themselves, as 
well as the chairman and the deputy, and the general secretary of the court. They 
were all volunteers (mutadhawi‘in) just like us. This is how the court got the 
backing of the public. We found a big house in the neighborhood and we asked 
the owners and they allowed us to use the house, and that is where the court was 
based. After a few amputations and executions most of the mooryan either run 
away or they put down their weapons and became good. The leadership of the 
court was divided into three parts: the council of elders, the security force, and 
the judges. This is how the courts started and it was great success. 
Most of the people that worked for the court worked as volunteers initially. 
People took turns doing the work of the court when they weren’t busy with their 
own affairs. The general public used to help with different things. Some people 
brought food, others helped with transportation, some turned their guns over to 
the courts. That is how things were at the beginning. Then the business 
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community organized themselves and established what was called ‘Aid for the 
Workers of the Court’ (Taakulaynta Hawl Wadeenada mahkamadda), which was 
collected from shops and public transportation mini-buses. Later on we collected 
money from sales of houses, land, and cars. We didn’t call the money we collected 
tax because tax is totally against Islam. A group of young men were made 
responsible for collecting the money. After the collection of funds some of the 
people who weren’t busy with their own businesses began to receive small 
salaries. 
The actual procedures of the Court of Madina aren’t very clear from the interviews. This 
is partly because the independence of the court was undermined by the emergence of a militia 
leader who took control of the district and placed the court under his “administration” within 
months of its creation. That is when, according to a history of the Shari‘a courts written by Omar 
Iman, one of the chief architects of the UICs, “the ‘ulama who stood up to establish this court left, 
since it was no longer doing the good for which it was established. The leader of the district became 
party to the competition between the warlords of the area. And the court changed from a court of 
Shari‘a, and it became a district court under one of the warlords” (Iman 2008: 39). For instance, 
Sheikh Hamud Sheikh Ahmed Ziyar, who was a well-known sheikh in the district and the chairman 
of the court when it was first established, was forced to leave the court and flee the district after 
his life was threatened by the new faction leader whose control the district came under. According 
to one of my interlocutors, Sheikh Hamud, who is now deceased, wanted to make it public that the 
court was no longer a Shari‘a court because it yielded to the dictates of a known militia leader. He 
was prevented, however, from doing that when the people in the district told him that having a 
court, even if its rulings were circumscribed, was better than not having one at all. The Madina 
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Court thus continued under the “administration” of the militia leader until 2001, when it was 
completely disbanded by the same militia leader. Conflicts with militia leaders and warlords is a 
constant feature of the history of the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu as will be better demonstrated 
by the next account. The account of the next Shari‘a court also better reveals some of the 
procedures of the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu. 
II. The Court of Karaan160 
The next experiment with a Shari‘a court in Mogadishu took place in the district of Karaan in the 
northeast of Mogadishu. The court’s establishment came as a result of some of the same factors of 
insecurity that led to the emergence of the previous Shari‘a court in the district of Madina. The 
Shari‘a court of Karaan was established in August 1994 in the district of Karaan. Going back to as 
early as 1992 the city was divided into two zones separated by a green line. On the southern side 
of the city was under the control of the powerful warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed,161 while the 
northern side of the city was under Ali Mahdi. The two strongmen belonged to the respective 
lineages of Habar Gidir and Abgal. The two lineages are branches of the larger genealogical unit 
known as Hawiya, which lives primarily in central and southern Somalia. The two men had 
previously been members of the United Somali Congress (USC), an armed opposition rebel 
movement whose members predominantly belonged to the Hawiya. The conflict between them 
arose after they disagreed over who should assume power after the USC captured the capital. As a 
result, the city was divided into two zones after a bitter conflict between them ended in a stalemate 
in 1992. As the conflict between the two strongmen stalemated, crime increased exponentially and 
                                                          
160 This court went by a number of different names including, the Court of the Abgal and the Court of northern 
Mogadishu.  
161 Aideed is the warlord that American marines attempted to capture in 1993, but failed to do so losing the lives of 
18 marines and countless Somalis in the process. This battle has been dramatized in the move Black Hawk Down 
(2001).  
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freelance militias increased checkpoints and divided the city into racketeering fiefdoms. It’s in this 
environment that the Court of Karaan is formed.   
The establishment of the court was really motivated by insecurity. To give you an 
example there were two markets in the area. Between these two markets money 
had to be transferred because it was just too dangerous to carry money and walk. 
For example, if there was a money transfer shop in one of the markets you would 
hand in your money there and the shop keeper would call another money 
exchanger at the other market and you would pick your money there, for a small 
fee. Insecurity got worse after the conflict between Aideed and Ali Mahdi ended. 
Remember the war was a “clan” war.162 The forces weren’t encamped. Everyone 
just picked up their gun and went to the battle. The forces that were led into 
battle, they all had their own arms. They were paid nothing. No-one was taking 
orders from anyone. So when the conflict between Aideed and Ali Mahdi ended, 
everyman who had a gun set-up a checkpoint.  
On May 19, 1994, there was an incident where some Habar Gidir elders 
complained that a group of Mudulood163 gunmen had robbed them. A meeting 
was held by the Abgal. During this meeting it was decided by the Mudulood that 
Shari‘a courts should be set-up. Three Sheikhs representing the three branches of 
the Abgal were sent out. After these sheikhs failed to move the issue forward, I 
                                                          
162 As mentioned in footnote 5 in the intro, most of my interlocutors understood and explained the Somali conflict 
through lineage politics. In this regard local people’s everyday explanation of the conflict reflected the “expert” 
analysis of many commentators who saw the Somali conflict as a modern manifestation of age-old “clan” fueds.   
163 Mudulood is often used interchangeably with Abgal, but there is a slight difference. The category of Mudulood 
encompasses a number of lineages that are assumed to have descended from a common ancestor. These are: Abgal, 
Issa, Mobaleen, Illawa, Wa‘daan, and Hilib. Since the Abgal is by far the most numerous of these “brothers,” the 
name Abgal is sometimes used in place of Mudulood.  
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and three other sheikhs decided to get involved in setting up the Shari‘a court. We 
were aided in our efforts because there was already a document that had all the 
signatures of the Ahl al-Hal Wa’l-‘Aqd164 of the Abgal. Imam Abdi Iman,165 may 
Allah reward him, had got all the Mudulood ‘ulama and the elders of all the 
different families (reer)166 to sign this document. By signing this document each 
family agreed to have their sons judged in accordance with the Shari‘a, even if 
that meant their hands might be amputated or they might be executed. All we 
needed now was the signature of the politicians of the Abgal. And who was the 
political leader of the Abgal? Ali Mahdi. So we decided to go to Ali Mahdi. After 
we told him that we wanted to create a Shari‘a court, he said bring me a 
document showing that this is the decision of all the Mudulood. We showed him 
the document. As we were sitting a sheikh came in and said he was just robbed on 
his way. Mahdi said ‘this is the last time this will happen to you’ and he drafted a 
decree and signed it. We then consulted with 11 sheikhs and decided to name 15 
sheikhs as the judges of the court. We selected Sheikh Ali Mahamud aka Sheikh 
Ali Dheere as the chairman of the court, after our first selection turned it down. 
We selected Sheikh Ali because he was an ‘Alim (scholar), he was a man who 
worked for peace, and he wanted to establish and lead the court. When the names 
of the judges we selected reached other big ‘ulama, such as Sheikh Sharif Sheikh 
                                                          
164 In Medieval Islamic political practice, the term refers to those whose task it was to select the leader of the 
Muslim community (umma). In this case it’s used to refer to lineage elders and the ‘ulama. For more on this and 
other terms see the next chapter.  
165 Imam Abdi Iman is the nominal head of the Abgal. He is supposedly a direct descendent of the “imam” of the 
first Somali nomadic group to have settled in Mogadishu in the seventeenth century.  
166 Reer can refer to a family of a husband and wife. It can also refer to a subset of a larger lineage. When used in the 
latter sense, it’s interchangeable with juffo or jilib or beel.  
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Muhiyadiin,167 they refused to accept them saying the majority were “long-
beards” (gar-dheerayaal)168. In those days people considered anyone who went to 
a modern school a long-beard. After the refusal of the judges we selected we held 
a big meeting at Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Muhiyidiin’s house where 63 sheikhs 
attended. We selected a committee of 9 members and gave them 2 lists of 15. 
From the lists given to them they named 15 judges, and the 63 sheikhs in 
attendance confirmed the list. I was one of the chosen judges. After all this was 
decided, someone stood up and said we needed someone above us to oversee our 
actions. Three Sheikhs were chosen representing the three main branches of 
Abgal: Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Muhiyadiin (wa‘budhan), Sheikh Hassan ‘Adde 
(Harti Abgal), Sheikh Osman Hiddig169 (wa‘esle). The name of this three-man 
oversight committee was The Supreme Organization of the Islamic Courts (Hay at 
al-Mahakamat al-Islaamiyya). They were like the Ministry of Justice. After all 
this, we said ‘okay we have judges and an oversight committee, but we have 
nothing else: no money, no compound, no security.’  
A small group of us met and we decided to meet with the business people. There 
were four markets in the Abgal districts. The business people came from these 
markets. The business people created a committee of 21 from amongst themselves. 
The court was in the interest of the business people because with security their 
property wouldn’t be robbed and people could come to the markets and safely 
shop. Later on in 1995 the port of ‘El Ma‘an was opened. Remember the big port 
                                                          
167 Sheikh Muhiyadiin is a well-known Sufi sheikh from the Qadiriyya brotherhood who has a big center in 
Mogadishu.  
168 Gar-dheere or long-beard is a pejorative term for members of the new wave of Islamic reform movements.  
169 Sheikh Osman is also another well-known Sufi sheikh from the Salihiyya brotherhood.  
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of Mogadishu was closed after the warlords couldn’t come to an agreement over 
how to share it. Before the Islamic court, the port of ‘El Ma‘an was a small place 
with no facilities. The Islamic courts expanded the port and handed its operations 
to the business people. The business people used the port to bring in products 
from other places in the world and they were responsible for collecting money at 
the port for the courts. The port was owned collectively by the people of the area 
and we managed it. The money collected went to the central account (qasnad), 
which was called the Account for the Implementation of Islamic Shari‘a. The 
money collected for the courts was called ‘Aid for the Islamic Court’ 
(Taakulaynta Mahkamada Islaamka). After the Islamic courts were destroyed, the 
port fell into the hands of a group of businessmen with each using it according to 
his power, and they invested in the port and whoever among them was the most 
powerful managed the port.  
After we created the business committee to support the finances of the court, we 
then put together the committee for security. We began with 72 security forces. 
Later they were increased up to 300. They were volunteers. The only condition 
was that they be Mudulood or other clans that live with them. They were given 
food and a small salary. We then put together a group called Rijaalu Salihiin (the 
good men) which brought together all the traditional elders from this area. This 
committee was needed to link the various clans and the Islamic courts and to 
resolve cases that the courts couldn’t resolve. You know there are issues where a 
judgment can’t lead to a resolution. For instance, if a man who belongs to clan x 
has his property illegally taken from him by another man who belongs to clan y, 
A h m e d  I b r a h i m  
 
Page | 165  
 
and the first man responds by taking, in return, the property of another man, who 
had nothing to do with the original crime, simply because he belongs to the clan 
of the first perpetrator. How do you solve such a case? This is where the Rijaalu 
Salihiin come in. They dealt with such issues. Such issues had to involve clan 
negotiations, settlements, and forgiveness.  Rijaalu Salihiin involved clan elders 
in resolving such issues. There was also another good reason for the court to 
employ men like the Rijaalu Salihiin because it gave employment opportunities to 
many people, so more people accepted the courts. All the committees: the 
business committee, the security committee, the Rijaalu Salihiin, and the judges at 
the court, were all under the 3-men oversight committee.  
On August 11, 1994 the court was opened at Badar neighborhood in Abdul‘aziz 
district. We called the court at Badar the High Court and it was headed by Sheikh 
Ali Dheere. Of the 15 judges selected only 5 showed up. The others wanted to 
wait and see if the court would actually take off. Some of them joined us later. I 
remember one day after this decision, I was in a car with a loud microphone. We 
were going around and announcing to the people the opening of a court. A group 
of mooryan held me at gun point and said ‘hey, you want to get rid of us right?’ 
they told me to shut up and leave now. I left and got some of our security forces 
and came back with my loud microphone. When they saw I was back with forces 
they run away. 
Eventually we established 11 district courts. When we were setting up a court in a 
district we would ask the big sheikhs in that district to select judges for the court 
from the ‘ulama of the district and pass their choices to the 3-men oversight 
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committee, which was later renamed ‘the Council for the Implementation of the 
Shari‘a’ (Golaha Hergelinta Sharee‘ada) for confirmation. We were very fair; 
no-one could accuse us of favoring one lineage over another. I remember one 
time when Sheikh Osman Hiddig and Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Muhiyadiin sent me to 
revisit a case that was decided by the High Court of Sheikh Ali. After I revisited 
the case, I told Sheikh Hiddig and Sheikh Sharif that it wasn’t reasonable for us to 
call the court the High Court and for me to revisit its cases. So we created an 
appeals court in Boondheere district.  
When a case came to the court it would go to the chairman. He then would assign 
one judge or multiple judges depending on the severity of the case. If the case was 
civil, one judge was enough. If the case was criminal (‘iqaab), it required multiple 
judges because the ruling could be capital punishment. The agreed upon 
madhhab (a school of thought in Islamic jurisprudence or fiqh) was Shafi‘i (one 
of the four Sunni schools) to decrease room for disagreements, and because the 
people know this madhhab the most. Cases came before the court in one of two 
ways: some cases were brought before the court by the plaintiff. If the case was 
civil we asked the defendant to come to the court, if it was a criminal we 
apprehended the perpetrator. The other way cases came to the court was if the 
court apprehended criminals in the act. When a case came to the court, the 
accused had two options: a) confess; b) deny. If the accused denied, the plaintiff 
had to bring witnesses. The witness has to be Muslim, performs salad (daily 
prayers), a just person, mature, of sane mind, must not be someone who is known 
to be a liar or drinks alcohol or commits other transgressions, or doesn’t fast. If a 
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witness lies on purpose and the court finds out, the ruling that was carried out on 
account of the witness’s testimony will also be carried out on the witness. If the 
accused isn’t happy with the witnesses’ testimonies he would have to explain. If 
there is no confession and no witnesses than the question is who has the right of 
swearing on the Quran (dhaarta ya iska leh). The right of swearing belongs to the 
accused. If the accused swears on the Holy Quran that he is innocent of what he 
is been accused of than the plaintiff has to be satisfied with this ‘this is the 
Shari‘a’. If, however, the accused is afraid or hesitant to swear on the Quran then 
the plaintiff will be given the chance to swear on the Quran that his accusation is 
correct. 
There was a case when five men robbed a girl of her jewelry. The case was 
brought to the court. She claimed that one man held her at gunpoint, another took 
her jewelry, and the other three helped in other ways. When the man she claimed 
held her at gun point was asked, he denied it. Sheikh Ali Dheere (the chairman of 
the court) hit the man with his cane and told him, ‘stop telling lies to the court.’ 
Sheikh Ali didn’t weigh the consequences of his actions. One of the other judges 
got up and left the court. The remaining judges continued with the case and 
convicted all five robbers. Of course, they couldn’t carry out this ruling without 
the signature of the sheikh who left. All the presiding judges needed to agree. So 
the court sent respected elders and sheikhs from the same lineage as the sheikh 
who left to try to convince him to come back to the court and sign the case. They 
told him his actions were destroying the court. He replied he couldn’t sign a 
judgment for which he wasn’t present. He also told them he would only go back to 
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the court on two conditions: a) the case had to be retried; b) Sheikh Ali had to be 
removed from the case because he became the enemy of the defender when he hit 
him. They agreed and the case was retried. During the retrial he asked the man 
whom the girl was accusing of holding her at gunpoint to swear on the Quran on 
his innocence. The man declined to swear on the Quran and confessed to the 
crime. ‘This is why this case amazed me. This boy’s faith was so strong that he 
preferred to have his limps amputated rather swear on the Quran on a lie. People 
don’t lie to an Islamic court.’ After he confessed and the other three also 
confessed, only the guy who took the girl’s property with his own hands had his 
hands amputated, the other ones were spared. ‘The religion is very kind.’   
In cases where someone killed another and confessed, the first question was 
intentionality. If it was unintentional then there can be no capital punishment, 
there can only be blood compensation. If it was intentional then it goes back to 
the victim’s closest kin. Three things are open to them: forgive; take 
compensation; or have the court execute the murderer. If the relatives agree upon 
the killing and if none of them are crazy, and none of them are absent, and none 
of them is a minor, then it will be carried out. If one of the relatives is crazy or a 
minor or absent the case has to be delayed until the necessary conditions are met 
because it could be that they later on say I want compensation. If the present and 
mentally sound relatives agree upon compensation and/or forgiveness then the 
absent or the mentally unsound doesn’t have to be waited because they can 
benefit from the compensation and their share will be set aside, but if the person 
is killed they benefit nothing. In cases of disagreement: if some chose 
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compensation and others death, the person cannot be killed. The ruling belongs to 
those who want compensation. If some chose to forgive and others chose 
compensation, then those who chose to forgive can only forgive their portion of 
the compensation.170 In the case of theft or robbery, if the parties to the case come 
to an agreement before the court hears the case then it’s over, but once the case 
comes to the court the court’s decision is independent of the people involved in 
the case. This includes murder committed in the act of robbery or theft.171  
The court worked from 1994 to the beginning of 1998, but only the first 9 months 
were perfect. There were many conflicts and disagreements the rest of the time. 
The court extended from Harar Yaalle to Harar Dheere.172 The court became 
powerful because the people accepted it. After the court was first established we 
hang the first hand we amputated on a tree for everyone to notice.173 Crime 
reduced dramatically and the part of Mogadishu under the court’s power became 
very peaceful. The increasing popularity and power of the court caused a 
                                                          
170 As the sheikh explained this point, a man who was sitting with us said “it’s unbelievable how fair and just the 
Shari‘a is.” This was a very common refrain from my interlocutors. Even Shari‘a judgments in such seemingly harsh 
punishments as an amputation is conveyed as kindness to both the individual and society. People often cite a 
Qur’anic verse whose rough translation is ‘a life for a life is a kindness to you all, if only you knew.’ As one sheikh 
explained to me, the thought is that, for instance, the thief whose limp is amputated or the murderer who is executed 
are thereby saved from a far worse punishment in the afterlife, while society is also saved from the corruption which 
the continuous commission of their crimes would have entailed. Punishment is thus not seen as revenge, but as a 
cleansing of both the individual and society.   
171 As my interlocutor was explaining these Shari‘a procedural norms and authoritative opinions he would leap out 
of the mat he was sitting on and pick out a Shafi‘i manual from his personal library and point to the exact page 
where there was support for what he was saying.    
172 Harar Yaalle is a neighborhood in Mogadishu and Harar Dheere is a town in central Somalia. This is an area 
where the Abgal predominates.  
173 This court is remembered to this day for its severity in regards to hudud (crimes for which the Qur’an spells out 
punishment). Omar Iman writes that “this court was different from other Islamic courts in its severity. It carried out 
hududs of the Shari‘a impartially without showing kindness to anyone” (2008: 46). The severity of this court’s 
judgments is worthy of note because the majority of its leadership were Sufi sheikhs. This goes to show the general 
perception that the strict and harsh interpretation of the Shari‘a is a hallmark of reformist, particularly Wahhabi-
inspired, Islamic movements isn’t always true.   
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problem. The ‘ulama at the court, especially the chairman of the court, Sheikh Ali 
Dheere, thought that the court could work independently of the political leaders 
of the Abgal. Who was the political leader of the Abgal? Ali Mahdi. Sheikh Ali 
Dheere thought, why should an Islamic court be under a faction leader? People 
began to call him ‘the commander of the faithful’ (Amiir al-Mu’miniin). I think 
what happened is that some ‘ulama from the other side of the city came to Sheikh 
Ali and told him they wanted to unite with the court, so that the court could work 
for all the people in Mogadishu. But the court couldn’t work for all the people of 
Mogadishu if it was under the control of the leader of one clan, Ali Mahdi. They 
created problems for us. All they had to do was create a court of their own on 
their side, and then we could have united when we were both strong.174 The 
politicians responded by saying, ‘how can a small court that they created 
yesterday threaten them today?’ The politicians used traditional elders and the 3-
men oversight committee. Sheikh Ali Dheere and some of the other men at the 
court were relieved of their positions at the court and given other responsibilities. 
Another man was made the chair of the court. Sheikh Ali Dheere refused and he 
was told you cannot amputate a single person’s hand without our authority and 
you aren’t a judge. One of the elders said to Sheikh Ali ‘it’s us who are holding at 
the elbow the limbs which you are cutting at the wrist. If we let go you won’t be 
able to cut.’ The guards at the court were ordered not to allow Sheikh Ali Dheere 
into the premises of the court. Sheikh Ali Dheere came to the court with his 
                                                          
174 This comment reflects the memory of how the Shari‘a courts eventually overcame the warlords. Each district 
and/or lineage group created their own court thereby undermining the militia/faction leaders’ claims to lineage 
representation. The courts then unified and run the warlords out of the city.   
A h m e d  I b r a h i m  
 
Page | 171  
 
guards and fired at the court. What do you think is going to happen if he fired at 
the very court he was at yesterday? The court was destroyed and Sheikh Ali 
sought shelter in his clan. After the court was destroyed the people went back to 
their clans, and the problems and insecurity came back.  
There is much to unpack in this account of the formation, structure, and demise of the Court 
of Karaan. More will be said of this account, and of the other ones, in the next chapter. It’s 
important, however, to underline a couple of issues at this point. As is readily evident from the 
account, the complicated relationship between religious authorities or the Shari‘a and political 
leadership is more stark in the experience of this court. There is an idea of a political space, 
personified in Ali Mahdi, whose sphere of operation is assumed to be distinct from the sphere of 
religious authorities or the Shari‘a. The sheikhs needed the permission of the overall political 
leader of the “clan,” Ali Mahdi, in order for them to institute Shari‘a rule within the clan. I believe 
this idea of a political sphere distinct from the sphere of the Shari‘a is a product of the experience 
and memory of the colonial and post-colonial periods. It’s worth noting that the “clan” political 
leadership’s relationship to Sufi religious authorities is amiable and free of suspicion, while their 
relationship to the “long-beards” (gar-dheerayaal) is characterized by suspicion and fear. This 
isn’t surprising because many of the political leaders of the “clan” were former members of the 
previous regime. The “long-beards” are those associated with contemporary Islamic reform 
movements. Ali Mahdi viewed the partisans of the so-called Islamic Awakening (al-Sahwa al-
Islamiyya) as a threat to his political position. This is characteristic of the post-colonial state’s 
relationship to partisans of reformist movements. Many of those I spoke to about this court 
mentioned a specific event that clarified for them the conflict between Ali Mahdi and Sheikh Ali 
Dheere, and led to the court’s demise. In the midst of the conflict between the court’s leadership 
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and the politicians, Sheikh Ali Dheere, the chairman of the court was interviewed on the BBC 
Somali language service. He was asked about the nature of the conflict between him and Ali 
Mahdi. The interviewer asked him, was it political? To everyone’s surprise, Sheikh Ali said “yes, 
of course it’s political. He doesn’t want me to be visible in the public arena.” Everyone thought 
this was a terrible blunder on Sheikh Ali’s part because he basically admitted that he was 
attempting to operate in a sphere, the political, where, as a religious man (wadaad), he shouldn’t 
have been. Clearly, he overstepped the bounds of his field, most people thought.  
 The concept and practice of politics that is articulated in this account underlines an 
understanding of the political as an autonomous sphere with its own logic and apparatus of 
managing and directing the affairs of society. The “clan” in this account is understood as a political 
society. This understanding and experience of the “clan” as a political category with authentic 
interests is a product of the colonial and postcolonial periods. We will see in the following account 
that as the civil war continued and the experience and memory of the postcolonial state dissipated, 
the clan lost its significance as a political category. Without the sovereign territorial state the 
concept and practice of politics as an autonomous sphere lost all coherence. Concomitantly, the 
“clan” as a political category ceased to reflect people’s daily experience, and clan politicians 
simply became “qab-qablayaal,” individuals who said and did whatever was to their selfish gain. 
In short, they became and began to be viewed as warlords rather than legitimate political 
representatives of a “clan.” And with those two developments, the attitude that the sphere of the 
Shari‘a, and by extension Shari‘a authorities, should be delimited by the political was no longer 
socially meaningful. Consequently, a notion of authority embedded in the Islamic tradition became 
operative in politics.  
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 Another important issue is the fact that the work of the Shari‘a courts, was as much about 
mending broken relationships and finding equitable solutions as applying the strict legal positions 
of the Shari‘a. One aspect of this work is captured by the creation and work of “the good men” 
(Rijaalu Salihiin), who were tasked with finding solutions to complex problems. The “good men” 
were mostly traditional elders and not necessarily Shari‘a experts. They were chosen for their 
wisdom, good reputation, and knowledge of Somali custom (heer). Somali custom recognizes a 
distinction between what is justice (haq) and a solution (hal).175 When resolving a dispute, Somali 
elders ask themselves whether the best way forward is to find a solution, irrespective of whether 
it meets the standards of justice, or whether they should be guided by what’s just. They frequently 
say that the best way forward is to find a solution to a dispute rather than justice. Moreover, a 
Shari‘a court was frequently a site for advice, warnings, and moral exhortations. Advice, warning, 
and moral exhortation was an integral part of hearings. For instance, before asking litigants to 
swear on the Qur’an or before the testimony of a witness, the judges would go on lengthy lectures 
about the dangers of false testimony or swearing on the Qur’an on a lie. As a judge in one of the 
courts explained to me, “we always gave good lessons to the people before and during the hearing 
of a case to help them understand the evils of doing wrong, of transgressing, of lying, and robbing 
people. By the time the actual hearing of the case began they would be ripe, ready, and satisfied. 
This was even more important than the case. Sometimes a person simply confessed to a crime and 
asked to be forgiven after such a lesson.”176 When I pushed the sheikh that it was still possible for 
someone to swear on a lie on the Qur‘an or give false testimony. He responded by citing a hadith 
and saying that in Islam a court’s decision is viewed as helping to bring to a close a dispute but 
                                                          
175 The fact that these terms are Arabic and not Somali indicates that they developed in a social milieu that was 
saturated by the language and concepts of the Shari‘a. This is a reflection of the complex intertwinement of Somali 
custom with the Shari‘a.   
176 Interview, May 2015.  
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not as a final say on justice. Justice, he said, can only be had on the Day of Judgment. Evident here 
is an idea of worldly justice that is neither final nor infallible. For Shari‘a justice to have worked 
in a context like Mogadishu, where there was no overarching power whose threat of force would 
ensure that a court’s decision was adhered to, the idea that the justice of the courts was neither 
final nor infallible, and that a day of final reckoning was coming, was absolutely necessary.  
III. The Court of Sissii 
Like with the accounts of the other courts before it, insecurity is underlined as the primary reason 
for why the Court of Sissii was established. The neighborhood of Sissii in the north of Mogadishu, 
where the court was established around 2003, was said to have been a “predator’s den” (bahalla 
galeen). Sissii by the early 2000s had become a center for criminal networks throughout 
Mogadishu and beyond. Hostages and stolen or robbed property, particularly cars, were brought 
to three garages in Sissii and sold to the highest bidder. The Militia there were so heavily armed 
that it was difficult for the relatives of the victims to attack the criminals and try to rescue the 
hostages. Criminals in other parts of the city, who could not keep hostages in their location for fear 
of reprisals from the victims’ family and friends, used to make deals with the criminal bosses in 
Sissii and bring their hostages or stolen property there. For this reason the criminals called Sissii 
the “house of safety” (Bayt al-Ammaan). By the time the court of Sissii was founded, there were 
Shari‘a courts in various neighborhoods and districts throughout Mogadishu that were established 
by different families/lineages. These lineage-based Shari‘a courts were able to establish a 
modicum of security in their neighborhoods, but the dismal insecurity in Sissii directly impacted 
their neighborhoods. The security forces of these courts couldn’t attack the criminal centers in 
Sissii because in the course of the civil war districts and neighborhood throughout Mogadishu had 
become the “home” areas of different lineages. The criminal centers in Sissii were run by members 
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of the lineage that lived in that same neighborhood. Thus an attack on these criminals by a Shari‘a 
court from a different neighborhood and thus a different lineage might have provoked a lineage 
conflict, which the Shari‘a courts were keen to avoid.  
This meant that the only people who could have done anything against the flourishing 
criminality in Sissii, which was affecting the entire city, were the people who lived in the 
neighborhood. It had to be the relatives of the criminals. It’s against this background of insecurity 
in Sissii, and the presence of Shari‘a courts in other neighborhoods, that the Court of Sissii 
emerges. The account of the formation of this court reveals two things. It shows, more profoundly 
than other accounts how the criminality of the mooryan had so outraged one’s very being that 
inaction was no longer a choice. This reveals an idea of an embodied virtue that compelled one to 
recognize injustice and to act. This idea of being forced to act in the face of evil is present in the 
accounts of the other courts, but not as stark as the account of the Court of Sissii. Another issue 
that becomes noticeable in the account of the creation of the Court of Sissii is the beginning of a 
process of collaboration between different Shari‘a courts. This process would eventually lead to 
the eviction of the warlords from Mogadishu and the formation of the UICs. In this account of the 
Court of Sissii, we see some of the initial reasons for the collaboration, as well as the fact that from 
the very beginning the creation of a Shari‘a court was motivated by a need to undercut warlords 
and clan militias. The following accounts are two reactions to the same event, reactions that 
culminated in the formation of the Court of Sissii.  
It all began as a result of the crimes that were taking place in Sissii. There were 
three garages in the area. Hostages and stolen cars were kept there. All the 
criminals in Mogadishu used to come there. The mooryan called the garages bayt 
al-Ammaan (the house of safety) because no-one could come and attack them in 
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this place. Every Friday night all the criminals came from all over the city, and 
they bought and sold the hostages and stolen property between themselves. It was 
an auction. The hostages were forced to auction themselves. They were forced to 
describe their wealth and their health. The hostage would say ‘my health is fine, 
my family can pay this much, we have such and such property. I have a daughter 
and a son in the diaspora. I will talk to them, they will send money.’ He auctions 
himself like that. Kidnapping was a big business. There was internal kidnapping 
and external kidnapping.177 There was one incident which really made us angry. 
The criminal kidnapped a gibil‘ad (light skin) man.178 He had diabetes. He died in 
captivity. This made me and a lot of other people sad and angry. There were 
seven of us who were friends. We decided to do something about this. We visited a 
local sheikh. We put the matter before him. He took the decision to advise us that 
it was unacceptable that people should be sold at these garages. We shouldn’t 
watch this and go to our mosques every Friday and not talk about or do 
something about these reprehensible acts (munkar). It was unacceptable. He said 
a jihad was compulsory upon us. The seven of us were just friends in the same 
neighborhoods. We weren’t wadaads (religious men). We just refused to accept 
the evil that was happening in our neighborhood.  
                                                          
177 Around the early 2000s there were a group of Mogadishu warlords who were in the CIA payroll. They were 
tasked to capture individuals the CIA suspected of involvement in the 1998 East Africa bombings. The warlords of 
course viewed this as a business opportunity and began to kidnap people who had nothing to do with the bombings 
and not wanted by the CIA. This is what is being referred to as external kidnapping. Internal kidnapping was 
kidnapping by common criminals in the city.  
178 gibil‘ad or light-skin refers to members of communities who live primarily on the coastal towns of the Indian 
Ocean in southern Somalia, including Mogadishu. They trace their origins to Arab or Persian descent. The term 
gibil‘ad refers to their lighter complexion compared to Somali nomadic groups.   
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The 7 of us managed to convince a guy in the neighborhood to join us. This guy 
had weapons and a security force because he had business with Western aid 
organizations. He used to protect them when they were doing projects in Somalia. 
He hated the garages and the criminals because he wanted to be the top guy in 
the district. He agreed to work with us. One day we decided to block the road that 
the hostage takers used to come to the garages in Sisii from other parts of the city. 
They took this one road because all the other roads had checkpoints manned by 
the militiamen of other warlords. It rained heavily that night, but we told 
ourselves that Allah was testing our resolve and we should bear it. Finally a van 
came and we stopped it at gunpoint. The gunmen on the bus told us that they were 
the men of one of the garage owners. We told them to hand over their guns and 
they did. They probably thought we were just another mooryan and we would just 
let them go. We found six tied and blindfolded men in the minivan. We untied 
them and, instead, we tied and blindfolded the gunmen. We handed their guns 
over to the hostages and told them to keep guard as we transported the criminals 
to the center of the neighborhood strongman who agreed to work with us. We held 
the kidnappers there. The next morning we were attacked by other mooryan, but 
we managed to defend ourselves. That same day we were joined by 24 other men 
with their guns. We were also joined by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed,179 who told 
us he wanted to become part of this civilian security force. We wanted to judge 
the kidnappers in accordance with the Shari‘a and maybe kill them. But we 
                                                          
179 Sheikh Sharif would go on to become the chairman of the unified Shari‘a courts and the UICs. He then defected 
from the UICs after they were defeated and joined the UN-funded and protected government and became the 
president of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2009.  
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released the mooryan after Sheikh Sharif convinced us that it would do more 
harm to judge them in accordance with the Shari‘a now since we are weak and 
we don’t have a Shari‘a court. He also suggested that we should create a Shari‘a 
court. We brought together all the Ahl al-Hal Wa’l-‘Aqd (see footnote 17 and the 
next chapter for more on this term) of the area. They all agreed to establish the 
Court of Sissii, and they made Sh. Sharif the chairman of the court. Sh. Sharif was 
chosen for three reasons: 1) he was an ‘alim (scholar) who knew about religion 
and also about the world. Both his father and grandfather are well-known Sufi 
sheikhs; 2) He was someone from the area. He belonged to the lineage whose 
mooryan were causing all the problems; 3) he was ready to do the job and had 
shown his readiness. 
After the creation of the court, one of the first things we did was to go on radio 
stations and broadcast the court’s formation and request money. Up to 500 
people called in and donated money as small as $5 and as much as $1000. People 
called in from all over Somalia, even Somaliland.180 From this broadcasting we 
got a lot of money. We did this twice with the same response. We used some of 
this money to recruit and pay former militia gunmen to become the court’s 
security. We recruited enough gunmen to be able overrun the garages and release 
many of the detainees. We didn’t really put these gunmen through re-orientation. 
We wanted to use them first, and then as we recruited more good people to slowly 
weed them out. After taking out the three garages there emerged, a conflict 
between the neighborhood strongman who initially agreed to work with us and 
                                                          
180 Somaliland is the secessionist region in the north.  
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the Shari‘a court. He wanted to collect taxation from a market in the area. Sheikh 
Sharif refused because the people were helping us with money and there was no 
need to extort money from them. When we refused he kicked the Shari‘a court out 
of the area. We were now weak and without much support, but we decided to not 
give up. We came up with this idea to encourage ourselves. The idea was if you 
are engaged in a game of pull-a-robe and you are losing, you let go of some of the 
robe and concentrate on getting a better grip and holding on to the parts you can 
hold on to. This meant that even though we were defeated we weren’t completely 
defeated, and we should still strive to do what we can. We also didn’t want the 
population to think that the Shari‘a court was done for and become disillusioned. 
So we began making rounds during nights after 10 pm. We couldn’t come to the 
main streets because that is where the armed militias were. We patrolled the 
small streets and alleyways for tuug na‘as (petty criminals). If we captured one 
we would beat him up. If the thief had any property we would force him to tell us 
whom he had stolen it from. Then we would return the property and release the 
thief. No families came to defend the thieves. Who would want to claim and 
defend a thief? After doing this for a while Sh. Sharif decided to go back to the 
University Graduates,181 and the Graduates decided a union of the existing courts 
at the time should be made. They met at the court of Harar Yaalle, which was 
called the mother of the courts (hooyada mahkamadaha), and then at Hotel 
Daameeye. They decided to form a union of the then existing courts. It was at this 
meeting that Sh. Sharif was elected the chairman of the courts. This was done in 
                                                          
181 See chapter six for the story of the university graduates from Sudan and their influence on the unification of the 
courts and the rise of the UICs.   
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order to support the Court of Sissi because everyone wanted to solve the 
criminality in Sissi. The entire city was suffering because of Sissii.   
The following is an account from a different interlocutor who was also moved to 
act by the reprehensible act (munkar) that led to the old man’s death.   
It was sometime in 2003 maybe 2002, I am not sure. You know Mogadishu was 
divided between the Abgal and Habar Gidir. Each area had its own terrible place 
where there was a lot of crime, but the worst was here in Sissii. I used to live in 
Madina (a district on the other side of the city) but I fled here after two militias 
began to fight over Madina. Sissi wasn’t so bad then, but it became really bad 
later on. For example, there was a girl who came back from Sweden. She came to 
visit her family but soon as she back her father was kidnapped. Hostages were 
burnt with plastic. This woman was pregnant. Her father died while they were 
torturing him. This incident really bothered me. There were traditional elders but 
some of them were bad. They are ‘pirates of tradition’ (bur‘ad dhaqameed). They 
worked with the criminals. When a person was kidnapped or property taken, they 
would broker a deal (dilal) between the criminals and the victim. For example, if 
your relative was kidnapped, they would come to you and tell you, ‘this is how 
much the kidnappers are asking for,’ and you would tell them, ‘this is how much I 
can pay,’ and so forth. I know some of these elders, but I don’t want to name 
names. In Islam when you see evil being done you must do something. So one day, 
it was Friday, after Friday prayers I stood up and said ‘I have something to say. 
Anyone who leaves now is a thief.’ I told them that the people who are doing all 
these reprehensible things (munkar) are our boys. In fact, some of them may be 
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praying here with us. How can we be in the mosque everyday praying when 
Muslims were being burnt and killed in front of us? What happened to us? Our 
family (reer) used to be known all over Somalia for its goodness, for its 
religiosity. I told them in Islam when there is evil taking place where you live you 
have two options: either you move away and go live elsewhere (hajir) or you must 
do something about it. I said these are the only options, so what are we going to 
do? I didn’t plan to give a speech. I was just moved, my body was shaking. I 
couldn’t stop my tears from flowing. I saw other people were also crying. There 
was a sheikh there and he stood up and said I was right. I am not a sheikh, I am 
Tabliqh.182 I joined the Tabliqh in 1995. But I know the religion and I always 
worked so that people would understand the religion. I have always worked to 
protect those who were suffering injustice and tell people they are equal in 
religion. Also, my family is respected, we are listened to. After I finished my talk a 
young boy stood up and said, has anyone gone to the garage where the criminals 
keep their stolen property and hostages and told them how evil and anti-Islam 
their actions are? After the young boy said that, I said let’s go to the garage now 
and tell them. So we all left and went to the garage. We were about 100. When we 
got closer to the garage they started shooting at us. Everyone run away except 
three of us. We kept going straight. They yelled at us ‘we will kill you.’ We said 
‘only Allah can kill, and we will tell you what we need to tell you.’ They stopped 
shooting at us. We told them what they were doing was wrong and all the people 
                                                          
182 Jama’at al-Tabliqh is a transnational Islamic piety (da‘wa) movement, which originates from India. For more on 
this movement see Barbara D. Metcalf “’Remaking Ourselves:’ Islamic Self-Fashioning in a Global Movement of 
Spiritual Renewal.” In Accounting for Fundamentalism, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994).   
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wanted them to stop. We asked them ‘will you stop what you are doing or not?’ 
They told us ‘we won’t stop, do whatever it is you think you can do.’ We left and 
we stopped on the road and we prayed. A few days later we heard what the 
madani183 did. Then Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed joined the madani and a Shari‛a 
court was declared. I think Allah answered our prayer. I, of course, joined the 
people who were working with the court. After the court was established, the bad 
guys came to us and said they wanted to join the court. They heard the court was 
giving food and some money to its security force. We allowed them to join. We 
didn’t say you were a thief, so you can’t join. We allowed them to join, but we 
opened a madrassa where they learned religion, and a center where they trained 
on how to use weapons. I worked in both places.184  
Viewed in relation to the Court of Karaan, which was about a decade before the Court of 
Sissii, there is no mention in the account of the Court of Sissii of a need to get the permission of 
the “clan’s” political leader. There was a local strongman of course that those wanting to establish 
a Shari‘a court had to contend with, but by no means was he seen to occupy a legitimate political 
space encompassing the entire lineage group. A political space that would have given him the right 
to have a say about whether or not a Shari‘a court was established. The “clan” as a political 
category was no longer relevant and thus there was no need for a clan political leader. The clan as 
a political category existed in a world where there was competition for political power at the state 
level. After the conflict stalemated in the early 1990s, the anti-regime rebels that were previously 
organized along kinship lines fractured and the number of militia leaders and mooryan increased 
                                                          
183 A self-organized and all voluntary neighborhood watch group.  
184 This account is the same vignette from the introduction.  
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tremendously, and began preying upon the very communities whose interests they were 
supposedly organized to protect. Consequently, communities at the neighborhood level began 
experimenting with ways of addressing insecurity and governing relations between and amongst 
themselves outside of these militia groups and their leaders. The Shari‘a courts emerge as one of 
the most effective of these local self-governance initiatives.185 By the time the Court of Sissii is 
being established, around early 2003, there are at least 4 other Shari‘a courts in Mogadishu. The 
various Shari‘a courts helped one another as each court engaged in a conflict with the militia 
leaders and mooryan in its specific area of operation. The Shari‘a courts from this time are often 
called “clan courts,” and rightfully so, because they were formed for and by specific lineages and 
extended families. The courts weren’t, however, advancing clan interests. To the contrary, the 
formation of the Shari‘a courts were part of developments that were undermining the very idea of 
the “clan.” The “clan” had lost its significance as a political category and had become a category 
that was used by militia leaders and mooryan to justify their wars and criminality. That is, their 
very existence.  
One of the motivations for undermining the significance of the “clan” was to personalize 
and individualize criminal responsibility so as to curtail the criminality of the mooryan. To 
accomplish this the attitude that the lineage should bear collective responsibility for the harm 
inflicted by of one of its members had to be broken. In Somali society, particularly among the 
pastoral nomads, there was, and still is, a practice that kinsmen collectively receive blood-
compensation (diya) or seek revenge if one of their members is harmed by a member(s) of another 
lineage group. In fact, one of the defining characteristics of the kinship system in Somalia is this 
                                                          
185 For more on the none-state-centered local governance initiatives of this period see Ken Menkhaus, “Governance 
without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping,” International Security 31, no. 
3 (Winter 2006/2007): 74-106.  
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collective responsibility and duty. This feature of Somali kinship relations has led British social 
anthropologist I. M. Lewis to coin the term diya-paying group to categorize what he viewed was 
the most stable of Somali kinship units.186 The traditional practice of collective responsibility led 
to abysmal outcomes in the context of the conflict in Mogadishu. The various militias and armed 
young men started using the idea of collective responsibility both to justify their crimes and to 
seek shelter from criminal responsibility. For instance, a mooryan or a group of mooryan who 
belonged to a specific lineage would rob, harm, or kill a person who belonged to another lineage. 
In response, a mooryan belonging to the victim’s lineage would target any member of the lineage 
whose mooryan had perpetrated the first act. The mooryan targeted notable or wealthy members 
of the target lineage for vengeance. The mooryan were of course doing this for their own financial 
ends. But it was justified in the name of lineage politics. It was as though the people had become 
hostage to the category of the “clan.” Establishing a Shari‘a court was an effective way to undercut 
the logic of this cycle of crime, on the basis of which the mooryan justified their criminality. I was 
frequently told that a Shari‘a court was established to “save ourselves and other people from our 
mooryan.” One way this was achieved was when, for instance, a mooryan committed a crime, his 
closest relatives would capture him and bring him to the nearest Shari‘a court. This was done to 
pre-empt any rationale for revenge by the family of the victim. Since the offender was captured 
and brought before a Shari‘a court, the family of the victim could go to the court to seek redress. 
Through the Shari‘a court the perpetrator’s crime was his alone. The rehabilitation centers of the 
Shari‘a courts also allowed families with young delinquent men, who were on the streets and likely 
to commit crimes, to pre-empt such eventuality by bringing the young man to the court for 
                                                          
186 See I. M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the 
Horn of Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1961). 
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rehabilitation. In doing so, they avoided having to be held responsible for future crimes he might 
have committed.   
By establishing clan-based Shari‘a courts, the people were repossessing and taking 
ownership of the clan as a category, and at the same undermining it. It was often said that when a 
lineage established its own Shari‘a court, the mooryan could no longer find shelter in their “clan.” 
By establishing a Shari‘a court a community was defending itself from becoming a direct target of 
the mooryan as well as being responsible for the crimes which their own members might commit. 
It wasn’t just armed and dominant lineages that were creating Shari‘a courts. Our last case is a 
brief account of a Shari‘a court established by one of the so-called minority clans to protect 
themselves from being constantly victimized by the mooryan.  
IV. The Court of Buula Tignico 
The Court of Buula Tignico was, unlike the other Shari‘a courts whose accounts we saw above, a 
court established and run by one of the so-called “minority” clans in Somalia. There is no Somali 
language equivalent of the term minority; it has come into use recently. It refers to members of 
lineages outside of the 4 major “clan-families:” Dir, Darood, Hawiya, Digil and Mirifle.187 There 
are countless small lineages that belong to this category. In southern Somalia, the gibil‘ad (light-
skin) communities on the coast and the cultivating communities in the inter-riverine region, who 
have recently formed a collective identity as “bantu,”188 constitute the most visible minorities. 
These groups have borne the brunt of the civil war as they were most vulnerable to militias from 
                                                          
187 Digil and Mirifle is one name 
188 For more on the emergence as a collective identity See Ken Menkhaus, “The Question of Ethnicity in Somali 
Studies: The Case of Somali Bantu Identity,” in Peace and Milk, Drought and War: Somali Culture, Society and 
Politics, edited by Markus V. Hoehne and Virginia Lulling (Columbia University Press: New York, 2010).  
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the major “clan.”189 As agriculturalists, the Bantu have historically resided in the most fertile 
region of Somalia, the inter-riverine area. Their land was thus highly sought after throughout 
Somali history. During the civil war, militias belonging to pastoral nomadic groups from central 
Somalia occupied the arable land of the inter-riverine region dispossessing the cultivating 
populations in the area of their land. That dispossession combined with draughts have led many of 
them to move to major urban centers on the Indian Ocean coast, like Mogadishu. The majority of 
the internally displaced populations that live on the outskirts of Mogadishu or in the abandoned 
and dilapidated government buildings belong to this population. The founders of the court of Buula 
Tignico were members of one such community. They lived in an area that was previously a 
vocational school. The mooryan in Mogadishu used to terrorize the entire population of the city, 
but the so-called minorities were without any protection and completely vulnerable to their 
depredations. The mooryan had no fear of retaliations for any attacks on these groups. They were 
frequently targeted as an easy prey. The following account provides an illustration of how one of 
these minority communities organized their self-defense against the mooryan in the form of a 
Shari‘a court.   
There were a lot of problems in our area; there were kidnappings, robberies, 
rapes, and murders. People were like wild animals. They were committing every 
crime imaginable. All the people in the area were jareer. A group of mooryan 
from one of the big and armed clans accused a local man that he stole something 
from them. The Mooryan were thieves who controlled that area and did whatever 
they pleased. People belong to Allah, but after that the people in Buula Tignico 
                                                          
189 See Lee Cassanelli, “Victims and Vulnerable Groups in Southern Somalia,” Immigration and Refugee Board, 
Ottawa, 1995; de Waal, Alex, “The UN and Somalia’s Invisible Minorities.” Cultural Survival Quarterly 18/1 
(1994). (http://www. culturalsurvival.org/ourpublications/csq/article/ the-un-and-somalias-invisible-minorities  
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there were owned by the Mooryan. They raped whom they pleased, took what they 
wanted, and killed whom they wanted. The area and the people were theirs. They 
blindfolded the man and ordered him to run through a fence, while they were 
shooting at his feet. They shouted at him to tell them where he took the money. He 
screamed for help but no-one came to his aid. Anyone who dared to say ‘why are 
you doing this to this man’ would have been shot. They shot him 11 times and 
placed the corpse right in front of my house. That same place became the location 
of the court later on. When they killed him, they said no-one could move the 
corpse. I wasn’t there when this was happening; I came back in the evening. I told 
the people to move the corpse and bury it. I used to be a sheikh in the area. 
People respected me and listened to me. I had close to 60 followers (hir) there. 
Even the mooryan knew me and respected me a little because I was a Sheikh. I 
wasn’t abused like the rest of the people. After this incident, we held a meeting 
among the jareer people, and we asked ourselves, what can we do? ‘This 
happened today and it will happen tomorrow.’ At that time preparations were 
ongoing for a Hawiya conference in Jowhar.190 I think it was 2003. We asked 
ourselves, ‘should we go join the Hawiya?191 Should we go and say we want to be 
part of you. And if we decide to do so, since the Abgal and Habar Gidir are in 
conflict, which of the two families should we join? We can’t just be alone.’  
                                                          
190 A small town about 90 km to the northwest of Mogadishu 
191 The idea of joining the Hawiya probably refers to a tradition of clientship (sheegad) in Somalia, where a smaller 
and/or weaker lineage receives the protection of a larger one in exchange for pledging political allegiance to it. For 
more on this tradition in southern Somalia, see Lee Cassanelli, “Hosts and Guests: A Historical Interpretation of 
Land Conflicts in Southern and Central Somalia,” Rift Valley Institute Research Paper 2 (2015): 1-39.   
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There were also the courts. There was the court of Ifka Halane and the court of 
Shirkoole. Or, should we establish a court and join the courts? So that our people 
are safe from each other and from the other clans. We decided that we shouldn’t 
join any clan. They couldn’t handle us because we were our own clan and more 
numerous than many other clans. For us Jareer to join Habar Gidir or any other 
clan is an insult, we thought to ourselves. The people that were behind this were 
reer shabeelle.192 But once we stood up to establish this court, all the other jareer 
came to us and the court became the court of jareer. The Court of Sissii was only 
six days ahead of us. The other courts in existence were Ifka Halane, Shirkoole, 
Harar Yaale, Sissii, Towfiiq. They were all clan courts. I went to the men of the 
courts, and I told them that we as jareer want to build our own court. They 
welcomed us very nicely. I went to them individually. While I was visiting with 
them, there was also a jareer meeting that went on for 14 days. We had nothing. 
We had no guns, no money, all we had was the Qur’an. We decided we had to join 
the courts. The people meeting were Ahl al-Hal W’al-‘Aqd. They were the elders 
and the ‘ulama. They said to me, I had to be the one to lead the court. They said 
they had no-one else. They said, it had to be me since I was one of the family, and 
I had some knowledge (‘ilm), and I knew many of the ‘ulama in the other courts. 
They asked me to establish the Shura council and the Executive Council. The 
Shura is a committee from the clan made up of ‘ulama and elders that can reach a 
                                                          
192 Reer Shabeelle means the people of the Shabeelle in reference to the Shabeelle River. These are people that have 
traditionally live on the banks of the Shabeelle River.  
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decision on behalf of the clan and say that’s the clan’s position. When we created 
the court it meant the jareer were saying ‘we have accepted the Book of Allah.’  
After establishing the court the community proceeded to expel the mooryan that have 
terrorized them out of the neighborhood. They did this by organizing themselves, collecting a small 
amount of money from each family in the area, purchasing weapons from the market, and putting 
together a small security force. This security force managed to attack all the houses where the 
mooryan were known to stay. After ousting the mooryan from their neighborhood the court 
notified everyone, including the mooryan, that only individuals who had the court’s permission 
could carry weapons in their neighborhood. Throughout all of this, the court was aided by the other 
already existing Shari‘a courts. They assisted them with moral support and with some weapons. 
They also promised to come to their aid should they be attacked by a large and well-armed militia. 
By 2003, when this court was being established, the practice of coming to each other’s aid had 
become a habit between the various lineage-based Shari‘a courts. The ‘ulama, through the 
institutions of the Shari‘a courts, were well on their way to creating a networked leadership group 
capable of dislodging the mooryan and militias from the city.  
The rise of the ‘ulama to positions of leadership wasn’t simply a consequence of insecurity 
and violence, which drove the people into the clutches of conservative clerics, as many 
commentators contend (Ahmad 2015; Menkhaus 2006; Rotberg 2005; Waal 2004). True, the 
insecurity and the social upheavals following the collapse of the previous regime constituted the 
background that conditioned and motivated the actors and the actions that led to the rise of the 
courts. There were, however, specific concepts and practices in the Islamic tradition that 
undergirded the reasoning and actions that resulted in the formation of the Shari‘a courts and the 
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politico-religious role of the ‘ulama within them. We take a look at some of these concepts in the 
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The Islamic tradition and the Shari’a courts of Mogadishu 
The two historical chapters, chapters two and three, posited the argument that religious authority 
has been foundational to the formation of political power in pre-colonial Somalia. The analysis in 
chapter three advanced this argument by asserting that it was particularly the concepts and 
practices of the Shari‘a tradition upon which precolonial political authority formed. In the brief 
accounts of three pre-colonial political formations, we saw that Shari‘a authorities rose to positions 
of politico-religious leadership because their Shari‘a-derived authority to mediate conflicts led 
them to be associated with the agreements and alliances they helped to broker. As a result, they 
came to stand at the political center of the lineage confederations that their mediation efforts helped 
to form. In making this argument I hoped to question two common approaches in the literature on 
contemporary Islamic movements. First, the literature on Islamic movements in recent Somali 
history holds that these movements represent a rupture of the “traditional” religious practices of 
the Somali people because they have politicized religion. I argue that, though there are many 
discontinuities between the recent phenomena of Islamic activism and the historical experience, 
the simple statement that pre-colonial religion was apolitical doesn’t capture the complexities of 
the transformations. In fact, religion and religious authorities were integral to the political in pre-
colonial Somalia. Second, by demonstrating that religious authority has historically been central 
to emergence of political power, I diverge from a broader literature which asserts that authority 
and power have been historically separate in precolonial Muslim societies. On the contrary, I 
contend that authority established through religious traditions were formative of political power in 
precolonial Somalia. The separation of religious authority from political power can be traced to 
the colonial and postcolonial periods.  
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It must be remembered here that my understanding of authority is based on the well-known 
essay by Hannah Arendt, what is authority?193 (See chapter two for a brief discussion of Hannah 
Arendt’s essay). In the Arendtian understanding, authority is characterized by a hierarchical 
relationship anchored in a tradition whose foundation is transcendent to the actual manifestation 
of the concrete authoritarian relationship. The hierarchy of such a relationship, however, doesn’t 
translate into unquestioned obedience since those in positions of authority only augment the 
authority of the tradition. In this understanding of authority, any relationship that involves violent 
coercion or persuasion lacks authority. The concept of tradition is integral to Arendt’s 
understanding of authority for its only in tradition that authority can exist. The notion of tradition 
implicit in Arendt’s essay is closer to the way tradition is conceptualized in the work of Alasdair 
MacIntyre194 and further developed by Talal Asad195 (see chapters two and three for more on 
tradition as theorized by these scholars). Based on such understanding of authority and tradition, I 
contend that when the religious tradition that formed authority in pre-colonial Somalia was 
separated from the political realm during the colonial and postcolonial periods, the political realm 
ceased to operate on authority. Instead, the postcolonial state’s monopoly over the political was 
based primarily on the state’s capacity for persuasion and/or violent coercion. When the socialist 
and developmentalist language of the postcolonial state ceased to be coherent and the state’s 
capacity for violence dissipated at the end of the Cold War, the state’s monopoly over the political 
realm disintegrated. In this reading, the emergence of politico-religious leadership in the rise of 
the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu after the collapse of the central state, was a reconstitution of 
                                                          
193 Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought (New York: Viking, 1961) 
194 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2007); A Short History of Ethics (London: Routledge, 1998). 
195 Talal Asad, “The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam,” Qui Parle 17, no. 2 (spring/summer 2009): 1-30; “Thinking 
About Tradition, Religion, and Politics in Egypt Today,” Critical Inquiry 42 (Autumn 2015): 166-2014. 
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authority in the political realm. The emergence of the Shari‘a courts was a reconstitution of 
authority in the political realm because it anchored the governance of social affairs in a 
transcendental foundation as articulated in the Islamic tradition, particularly the tradition of the 
Shari‘a.  
In this chapter, I look at a few of the concepts and ideas from the Islamic tradition that 
informed the reasoning, actions, and practices that undergirded the rise of religious authorities to 
politico-religious leadership. More specifically, I analyze how the practices, discourses, and modes 
of reasoning associated with the concepts of “collective duty” (fard kifaya), “the people of 
resolution and contract” (Ahl al-Hal wa’l-‘Aqd), and “commanding right and forbidding wrong” 
(wa-ya’muruna bi’l-ma‘rufi wa-yanhawna ‘ani ’l-munkar) have informed the practices and 
reasoning of the actors whose actions culminated in the formation of communal Shari‘a courts. 
These concepts informed the practices and modes of reasoning of not only religious scholars 
(‘ulama), but also ordinary people whose actions were crucial to the formation of the courts. The 
concepts were thus not limited to the specifically religious among the population. This shows that 
these Islamic traditional concepts formed part of the larger cultural background of the people. The 
rise of the Shari‘a courts was, therefore, not a result of an imposition of the Shari‘a, understood as 
“Islamic law,” on the population by conservative clerics. Rather, the courts built on older ideas, 
concepts, and practices that were embedded in the culture of the people and formative of their 
orientation to the world. That these traditional Islamic concepts were the resources most readily 
available and informative of people’s attempts at self-governance in the absence of the state 
suggests that though the concepts might have been pushed out of the political arena by the post-
colonial state, they remained integral to the cultural logic and worldly orientation of the people. 
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The material for my analysis of these concepts comes from the accounts of the Shari‘a courts in 
the previous chapter and a religious tract I acquired during my fieldwork.   
I. “Collective Duty” (Fard Kifaya) 
I noted in the preceding chapter that the formation of the Shari‘a courts was accompanied by a 
process that de-emphasized lineage belonging and lineage hierarchies. Instead, the courts stressed 
the egalitarian ideal of Islam. The idea of belonging to the umma (the Muslim community) was 
particularly appealing in a context where lineage differences were viewed as the primary cause of 
the divisiveness and violence that had engulfed Mogadishu since the fall of the central state. The 
only way to overcome this divisiveness was to embrace the egalitarian ethos of Islam, so went the 
argument. This line of reasoning became particularly popular as the discourse of the ‘ulama 
saturated the public sphere. In many ways, religious discourse was the only meaningful discourse 
in the public sphere attempting to articulate explanations of the conflict and ways of ameliorating 
the situation. This wasn’t just because religious discourse entered spaces that were previously 
closed to it. Rather, religious spaces and religious-based associations became the most important 
spaces where social issues were discussed and addressed. The mosque was a prime example of 
this. After the fall of the regime and the city’s division into endless fiefdoms by militias, the 
mosque became one of the few public spaces where people could gather in relative peace. Mosques 
became the central locus of social life. People gathered there not only to worship, but to also 
exchange the latest news, discuss recent events, express their outrage, and plan what to do. This is 
why many of the initial events leading to the creation of a Shari‘a court, as we saw in the preceding 
chapter, revolved around discussions and actions originating at a mosque. Religious discourse also 
became a mainstay on local radio stations, newspapers, and books written either in Arabic or in 
Somali.  
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 During my fieldwork I acquired a small religious document written by one of the most 
important individuals in the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu, Sheikh Hamud Sheikh Ahmed Ziyar. 
Sheikh Hamud, it might be remembered, was the chairman of the Court of Madina, established in 
1992 in the district of Madina. The Sheikh’s fame today is partly a result of his being credited with 
the establishment and work this court. A praise poem was even penned by a Sufi sheikh 
memorializing him and this event. Sheikh Hamud’s reputation is also due to his family’s religious 
background. His father was a celebrated Sufi sheikh who established a religious community 
(jama‘a) somewhere near Jowhar, a small town about 90 kilometers northwest of Mogadishu. 
Unlike his father, Sheikh Hamud’s sympathies in terms of the different trends in Islamic thinking 
and discourses is difficult to place. He wasn’t considered a follower of any of the Sufi brotherhood 
groups. He was also not an active member of any of the contemporary Islamic reform movements. 
His religious education included a stint in Egypt’s famed Islamic university al-Azhar. A fact which 
might explain his familiarity with the lingua and discourse of more modernist Islamic trends. On 
the other hand, the fact that a praise poem about him was penned by a Sufi Sheikh tells us that he 
at least enjoyed amicable relations with the Sufi ‘ulama of Mogadishu. The difficulty in firmly 
establishing Sheikh Hamud’s place in contemporary religious trends speaks to the fluidity, for 
many, of the boundaries between the Sufi and Wahhabi identities. Sheikh Hamud tells us that he 
finished writing the document, titled The Signs of the Wholesome/Blessed Society, on August 1993. 
In general, the document describes what, according to the Sheikh, are the characteristics of a 
wholesome society, and the ways of establishing such a society. In the course of describing the 
characteristic of the good society, he also provides an example of how the religious discourse 
explained the conflict in Somalia and the way out of it.  
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 Predictably, Sheikh Hamud explains that the violence and suffering that had befallen the 
Somali people was because they abandoned their religion, Islam. The abandonment of the 
teachings of Islam, according to Sheikh Hamud, is most evidenced by the acceptance of lineage 
differences as the basis for differentiated treatment. In embracing descent as a basis for 
discrimination, the Somali people, hey claims, have brought about their own ruin, “the closest road 
to failure and weakness is disunity.”196 In embracing the disunity of lineage politics, the Somali 
people have reverted to the practices of Jahiliyya,197 when Arab society was weakened by their 
separation into constantly warring tribes before they became unified and strong under Islam. It 
appears, he says, “as though the Somali people haven’t heard of the prophet’s word, ‘he who helps 
his relatives when they are in the wrong is the same as a male camel who falls into a well and is 
being pulled by the tail.”198 In the same way that trying to pull a heavy camel out of a well by its 
tail isn’t going to help the camel and is going to end in failure, will helping your relatives when 
they are in the wrong also end in failure for both you and them. The Somali people, he says, “have 
a diseased soul” because they have taken to despising and transgressing each other on account of 
descent (nasab).199 This is what has brought the Somali people to their current lowly and miserable 
position. This, despite the fact that the Qur’an “teaches us of the equality of human beings because 
they all come from one father and mother. Race doesn’t divide them, descent (nasab) doesn’t 
divide them. Only the fear of Allah and good deeds is what distinguishes them. Our prophet, peace 
be upon him, fought against discrimination and racism which separates two siblings.”200 In contrast 
to the divisiveness of descent and race, Islam unifies people. And it’s on the basis of embracing 
                                                          
196 My translation of Sheikh Hamud’s text, The Wholesome society, 14.  
197 Pre-Islamic period defined as the time of “ignorance” (jahil).  
198 My translation of Sheikh Hamud’s text, The Wholesome society, 14.  
199 Ibid., 14  
200 Ibid., 13 
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unity under Islam that the people can hope to come out of their miserable situation, “as you know 
brotherhood and being united and helping each other is the only way to attain power.”201 We see 
in Sheikh Hamud’s text a typical example of how the religious discourse dealt with and addressed 
the social crises. Central to this discourse was a diagnosis that viewed politicized lineage-based 
differences as the primary reason for the disunity, strife, and conflict, and argued that the only way 
out of it was to embrace the egalitarian ethos of Islam.  
This Islamic egalitarian ideal, however, belies a differentiation and a hierarchy that is 
inherent to the Shari‘a image of society. This differentiation within the Shari‘a image of society 
underwrote the authority of the ‘ulama to assume leadership roles and political power. In his 
important book, The Calligraphic State (1993), anthropologist Brinkley Messick describes the 
tension between the egalitarian ideal of Islam and the differences and hierarchies that are part and 
parcel of the Shari‘a image of society. He points out that the Shari‘a and Shari‘a texts, “lived in 
human relations, in human embodiers and interpretive articulations” (Messick 1993: 152). The 
centrality of the Shari‘a in the daily lives of Muslims meant that knowledge of the Shari‘a was 
integral to the formation of privileges. In a society where such knowledge (‘ilm) was inaccessible 
to the vast majority of the people, as is the case in Somalia, knowledge of the Shari‘a inevitably 
creates a differentiation between the few who possess such knowledge and the vast majority 
without it. The distinction between “the scholarly people” (ahl al-‘ilm) and “the ordinary people” 
(al-‘awamm) is therefore one of the central images of a Shari‘a society, “from the scholarly 
perspective society was divisible into two separate general categories of individuals, the ‘alim (pl. 
                                                          
201 Ibid., 13  
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‘ulama), and the jahil (pl. juhhal), the individual without knowledge, an ignorant person” (Messick 
93: 153).  
Messick points out that at the base of this distinction is an understanding of human nature 
that views the untutored human essentially as an ignorant being (jahil). The instructions and 
devotional disciplines that is at the core of the Islamic understanding of knowledge is meant to 
form and discipline the individual, who is otherwise seen as lacking the capacity for recognizing 
right from wrong. The two categories, “the scholarly people” and “the ordinary people,” have 
different duties and responsibilities. The duty of the scholarly people is to impart their knowledge 
and guide ordinary people onto the Shari‘a, the “right path.” Whereas ordinary people are expected 
to seek answers from those with knowledge and follow their guidance and their example. Messick 
notes that one of the common traditions through which the distinction between the people of 
knowledge and ordinary people is articulated is the principle of “collective duty” (fard kifaya). 
Fard kifaya says that “the Muslim community as a whole is kept on a legitimate and observant 
bases so long as a sufficient number of individuals perform the necessary collective duties imposed 
on the community by God” (Messick 1993: 154). In cases where the collective duty imposed on 
the community can only be performed by some, it follows that the burden of that collective duty 
falls on those capable of performing it. Since the ‘ulama are the only ones with knowledge of the 
Shari‘a, it falls on their shoulders to keep society on the path of the Shari‘a. Notwithstanding its 
egalitarian ethos, this image of society in the Shari‘a tradition, therefore, creates clear 
differentiations and associated duties and responsibilities, which give the ‘ulama the authority to 
assume leadership positions. They are, after all, “the heirs of the Prophet.”202  
                                                          
202 A popular hadith (prophetic tradition).  
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In the history of the Shari‘a courts, we can see how this Shari‘a image of society manifested 
itself on the ground. We find this image both in Sheikh Hamud’s document and on the various 
accounts of the specific stories of the establishment and workings of the different Shari‘a courts 
from the preceding chapter. In the image of society that emerges from Sheikh Hamud’s document, 
however, society isn’t just divided into the two distinct categories of the people of knowledge and 
the ordinary people. There is the third category of the mujrimin (sing. mujram), those who 
transgress on the Shari‘a and the rights of people, the transgressors and evil doers. And who are 
the mujrimin? The mujrimin are “wild animals with human bodies,” who the war has given birth 
to.203 Their “hearts aren’t moved by the screams of women when they are killing their husbands 
and sons unjustly. . . . and the cry of orphans.”204 The sheikh points to two groups of people who 
make up the mujrimin: they are the people who were let out of the prisons after the regime fell and 
who picked up guns; and the “ignorant who came from the countryside (baadiya). The latter were 
pastoral nomads who didn’t know the religion and proper behavior (adab) of Islam.”205 These 
nomads took the mujrimin before them to be “their teachers,” and they “became just like them and 
even worse.”206 The people whom Sheikh Hamud is referring to as the mujrimin are the same 
people who are also called the mooryan (see a description of the mooryan in chapter four). These 
are the young armed men who roamed the streets of Mogadishu, manning checkpoints, and 
committing every mischief imaginable. There is a society-wide perception that the young men who 
constituted the mooryan were former prisoners and/or pastoral nomads who were recruited by 
armed opposition groups before the regime fell and fled the capital city. They poured into urban 
centers, particularly Mogadishu, with nothing to do and no way to survive. These were the people 
                                                          
203  Sheikh Hamud, The Wholesome society, 14.  
204 Ibid., 1  
205 Ibid., 1  
206 Ibid., 1 
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who were committing unimaginable crimes and corrupting society through their evil and sinful 
ways, argues Sheikh Hamud.  
Ordinary people, and society in general, was under a grave threat if things didn’t change, “if 
this situation continues as it’s, it’s a warning to us that this people (the Somali people) will be 
eradicated from the face of the earth.”207 It was thus up to society itself to stop the mujrimin and 
change its fate. Foremost among those who should have stopped the mujrimin are the ‘ulama, “it’s 
the duty of the ‘ulama and the knowledgeable to catch the hand of the evil doer (zalim)”.208 For 
it’s the ‘ulama’s duty and burden to guide the people. Sheikh Hamud says he “came to believe that 
this people’s ‘ulama will be asked and made to account” for the behavior of the mujrimin before 
Allah “if they don’t defend the people against these killers and transgressors and teach them 
Islamic conduct.”209 It’s thus a divinely imposed duty (fard min Allah) on the ‘ulama to guide 
society out of the miserable status into which it has fallen. The failure of which they will be held 
to account for before God on the Day of Judgment (Yawm al-Qiyama). As for this world, the failure 
of the ‘ulama to perform this duty will lead to the corruption of society to such extent that life 
itself will become utterly unbearable. This is how the principle of fard kifaya manifested itself in 
the discourse of the ‘ulama and informed their political and religious activism in the Shari‘a courts.      
II. “The People of Resolution and Contract” (Ahl al-Hal W‘al-‘Aqd) 
The rise of the ‘ulama to politico-religious leadership was also captured in a term that was 
commonly used in describing the beginnings of the Shari‘a courts. When asked about how a 
particular court came into being most of my interlocutors noted that the decision to found a court 
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208 Ibid., 2  
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was taken at a gathering of a particular lineage’s Ahl al-Hal W’al-‘Aqd (literally, “the people of 
resolution and contract”). We saw the term used in three of the four brief accounts of Shari’a courts 
in chapter 4:  
After these sheikhs failed to move the issue forward, I and three other sheikhs 
decided to get involved in setting up the Shari‘a court. We were aided in our 
efforts because there was already a document that had all the signatures of the 
Ahl al-Hal Wa’l-‘Aqd of the Abgal. Imam Abdi Iman, may Allah reward him, had 
got all the Mudulood ‘ulama and the elders of all the different families (reer) to 
sign this document. By signing this document each family agreed to have their 
sons judged in accordance with the Shari‘a, even if that meant their hands might 
be amputated or they might be executed.210 
He also suggested that we should create a Shari‘a court. We brought together all 
the Ahl al-Hal Wa’l-‘Aqd of the area. They all agreed to establish the Court of 
Sissii, and they made Sh. Sharif the chairman of the court.211 
We decided we had to join the courts. The people meeting were Ahl al-Hal W’al-
‘Aqd. They were the elders and the ‘ulama. They said to me, I had to be the one to 
lead the court.212 
Ahl al-Hal W’al-‘Aqd is not a term that is found in the foundational texts of Islam (Qur’an and 
hadith) or the strictly religious hermeneutics of the ‘ulama. It’s more commonly found in Sunni 
medieval political theory. It refers to those qualified notables among the Muslim community 
                                                          
210 See chapter four, 9-10.  
211 See chapter four, 21.  
212 See chapter four, 29.  
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whose task it is to select the leader (imam) of the community. The origins of Ahl al-Hal W’al-‘Aqd 
can be traced back to the second caliph of Islam, Umar ibn al-Khattab, who is said to have 
designated six scholars to convene and select his successor after his death. It wasn’t necessarily a 
central element in the political practice of medieval Muslim polities since in the overwhelming 
majority of cases the inheritors of political dynasties were known well in advance. The term 
nevertheless remained relevant in political theory. In the context of the Shari‘a courts of 
Mogadishu, the term referred to the notables of the lineage group that gathered and took the 
decision to form a Shari‘a court. These notables were primarily made up of two groups: lineage 
elders and ‘ulama. Together they were taken to be the legitimate representatives of the lineage, 
and were thought to possess the wisdom and knowledge to lead the community. Their decisions 
were, therefore, seen as having the consent of the entire lineage. I submit, however, that it was 
specifically the ‘ulama, more so than traditional elders, that the term designated.  
This was the case because the office of the traditional elder seems to have lost much of the 
respect and authority which it might have enjoyed previously. Traditionally, lineage elders and 
religious authorities have worked together and complimented each other in conflict resolutions 
and governance of communal relations. This is what explains the thorough infusion of Somali 
custom (heer) with Shari‘a norms. A number of developments during the civil war, however, have 
led to the diminution in the authority of traditional elders and the rise of the ‘ulama. The role of 
the traditional elder was already altered as a result of urbanization and the “reforms” of the 
postcolonial state. Urbanization led to the emergence of new forms of associations and public life 
that were beyond the purview of the traditional elder, as well as the emergence of new set of 
problems which the traditional elder was ill-equipped to attend to. For its part, the post-colonial 
state, in its derive to undermine lineage identity and politics, transformed the office of the 
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traditional elder to a state functionary with little independent source of authority and power. 
Traditional elders were made into peacemakers (nabad doon) who were responsible, as 
government representatives, for keeping the peace among villagers and community members. 
After the regime’s disintegration the position of traditional elders further deteriorated. Their 
economic vulnerability in urban settings led many traditional elders to use their office as an 
instrument of economic gain. We saw them referred to as “pirates of tradition” (bur‘ad 
dhaqameed) in one of the accounts from chapter four. By this, it was meant that just like pirates 
of the sea, the elders were driven by monetary gain and were using tradition to achieve that goal, 
“if you see a traditional elder they are controlled by a businessman or a politician,” as another 
interlocutor put it. The view that the office of the traditional elder had been corrupted was widely 
spread in Mogadishu. The corruption of the office was also reflected in the emergence of multiple 
claimants to the position of each lineage’s traditional elder. As the legitimacy and honesty of 
lineage elders waned, the authority and politico-religious activism of the ‘ulama was on the rise. 
Thus, though in popular usage the term referred to both traditional elders and religious scholars, it 
more specifically expressed the emerging politico-religious activism of religious scholars. The 
‘ulama would eventually rise to positions of political preeminence after the Shari‘a courts unified 
and wrested control of the city from the warlords.  
The use of the term Ahl al-Hal W’al-‘Aqd as well as the principle of fard kifaya capture, in a 
discourse informed by the Islamic tradition, the emerging politico-religious activism and 
leadership of the ‘ulama. These concepts and their associated practices, as noted above, are 
articulations of a Shari‘a-informed image of society which differentiates society into two 
categories, the scholars and the ordinary people, and entitles or obliges the scholars to lead and 
regulate social life. There is, however, another term which also comes out of the Islamic tradition, 
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and which empowers ordinary people, rather than just the scholars, to be active in regulating the 
conduct of their fellow community members. This term was vital in motivating the practices of the 
ordinary people which culminated in the formation of the Shari‘a courts. As we will see, however, 
there has always been a tension in the practice of this tradition, a tension that is exasperated by 
some modern developments.  
III. “Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong/Reprehensible” (wa-ya’muruna 
bi’l-ma‘rufi wa-yanhawna ‘ani ’l-munkar) 
There is a famous tradition in Islam known, in its shortened version, as the obligation to “command 
right and forbid wrong/reprehensible.” The origins of this tradition, its different interpretations 
throughout Islamic history, and its modern articulations are well chronicled in Michael Cook’s 
excellent book, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought (2000). “Taken 
together,” these two obligations – to command right and forbid wrong – says Cook, “make up 
Islam” (2000: 38). The duty to command right and forbid wrong (hereafter, the duty to command 
right) is expressed in a number of Qur’anic verses and prophetic traditions (hadiths). In the most 
frequently cited Qur’anic verse, God addresses the believers, “let there be one community of you 
(wa-l-takun minkum ummatun), calling to good, and commanding right and forbidding wrong (wa-
ya’muruna bi’l-ma‘rufi wa-yanhawna ‘ani ’l-munkar); those are the prosperers.”213 The same duty 
is also communicated in a famous hadith, “whoever sees wrong (munkar), and is able to put it right 
with his hand (an yughayyirahu bi-yadihi), let him do so; if he can’t, then with his tongue (bi-
lisanihi); if he can’t, then with [or in] his heart (bi-qalbihi), which is the bare minimum of faith.”214 
There are many other verses and hadiths as well as the exegesis of the ‘ulama that taken together 
                                                          
213 Quoted on page 13, Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006).  
214 Ibid., 33.  
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firmly establish the obligation to command right and forbid wrong as a religious duty on ordinary 
people. The principle essentially means “that an executive power of the law of God is vested in 
each and every Muslim” (Cook 2000: 9). The practical effect of this principle, as might be 
imagined, entailed the emergence of a tension between rulers, caliphs and governors, on the one 
hand, and ordinary people, on the other. Examples abound in Islamic history of ordinary people 
confronting a caliph and justifying that confrontation on account of the duty to command right and 
forbid wrong. Such individuals would argue that they felt compelled by this principle because the 
caliph had either neglected his religious duty, as “commander of the faithful” (Amir al-Mu’miniin), 
to command right, or was himself engaged in committing wrongs (munkar). There are also many 
examples of ordinary individuals haranguing well-known scholars and demanding that the scholar 
either urge people to rebel or lead a rebellion against what they perceived were corrupt rulers.215 
Understandably, there was a legitimate concern that the principle of commanding right was 
empowering uneducated zealots to abuse people’s rights and harm the peace of the community. 
This legitimate concern, as well as the less admirable desire among many of the ‘ulama who 
wanted to maintain a political quietist position, led to various interpretation that attempted to lessen 
the force of this traditional duty. One such attempt resulted in what’s referred to as the “three 
modes tradition” (Cook 2000: 518). In this interpretation of the duty, the use of force to command 
right and forbid wrong is viewed as solely the ruler’s prerogative. While the use of the pen was 
reserved for the scholars, and only the mind for ordinary people. This was just one among many 
                                                          
215 One of the most famous of such stories is that of the goldsmith of Marw, one Abu Ishaq ibn Maymun. Abu Ishaq 
felt very strongly that he was obliged to confront the leader of an army, Abu Muslim (d. 137/755), if he were to live 
up to the duty to command right and forbid wrong. He sought the counsel of, while also hoping to convince, Abu 
Hanifa (d. 150/767), the founder of the Sunni Hanafi school of fiqh (jurisprudence), to join him in condemning Abu 
Muslim and perhaps lead an armed rebellion. When Abu Hanifa counseled prudence, Abu Ishaq went and 
confronted Abu Muslim on his own and was killed for his troubles. See Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding 
Wrong in Islamic Thought, 3-10.  
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attempts in the history of Islam to try to defang the traditional duty of commanding right. Despite 
these efforts, the mainstream understanding of the duty informed a general social perception and 
practice that saw the individual as having the duty and the right to command right and forbid wrong 
in accordance with one’s ability. Two modern developments, however, have somewhat altered the 
practice of this traditional duty, according to Cook. He points out that the modern state’s sway 
over most aspects of social life, including education, the economy, politics, and intellectual life, 
has meant that much of the recent writings on this traditional duty has been aimed at taking it out 
of the hands of individuals and making it into a state prerogative. Thus a certain political quietism 
has characterized the modern interpretations of this traditional duty, particularly among the 
traditional ‘ulama. This modern tendency, writes Cook, “is both a flagrant diversion from the 
mainstream of traditional Islamic doctrine and an unmistakable assertion of political quietism” 
(2000 525). The principle is, nevertheless, often invoked by armed contemporary Islamic activists 
in their confrontation with the state. Another modern development is an emphasis on organization 
in carrying out this duty, “the core of the old conception was a personal duty to right wrongs 
committed by fellow-believers as and when one encountered them; the core of the new conception 
is a systematic and organized propagation of Islamic values both within and outside the 
community” (Cook 2000:515). This organizational emphasis is reflected is the emergence of 
da‘wa or piety movements. The most famous example of which is Jama‘at al-tabligh,216 a 
transnational Islamic piety movement focusing on correcting the conduct of fellow Muslims. These 
movements don’t usually concern themselves with engaging politics at the state level. Instead, they 
focus on the spiritual renewal of the individual and the cultivation, through devotional disciplines, 
                                                          
216 For more on this movement, see Barbara D. Metcalf “’Remaking Ourselves:’ Islamic Self-Fashioning in a Global 
Movement of Spiritual Renewal.” In Accounting for Fundamentalism, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).  
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of what they consider to be the necessary virtues for a life in accordance with Islamic teachings. 
In this regard, they constitute a continuation of the traditional emphasis on embodiment in Islamic 
education and religious practice. Da‘wa movements are political, despite their not engaging with 
the state, because they help individuals to acquire virtues relevant for politics.217 How did the 
traditional duty of commanding right inform the concepts and practices that culminated in the 
formation of the Shari‘a courts?  
In the history of the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu we see the traditional duty of commanding 
right invoked in people’s explanations of their understanding and reasoning regarding what 
motivated them to undertake the actions that culminated in the formation of the courts. Both in the 
accounts of ordinary people and the discourse of the ‘ulama, the tradition of commanding right is 
summoned to explain the duty, the urge, and the necessity for undertaking actions against rampant 
criminality. In his document, Sheikh Hamud time and again refers to this tradition to explain that 
it was a duty upon everyone to do something to correct all the sinful deeds that were happening in 
their presence. He cites the well-known Qur’anic verse and hadith mentioned earlier to make his 
argument. He also repeatedly cites a well-known prophetic tradition where a society in which no-
one commands right and forbids wrong is compared to a group of people in a boat, who do not 
stop someone in their midst who makes a whole in the boat.218 The point of the analogy is, just as 
the boat will sink and take everyone down with it because no-one in the boat thought to stop the 
ones making the hole, so will society be completely destroyed if no-one stops wrong doers. Here 
is how Sheikh Hamud puts the matter: 
                                                          
217 For works that explore da‘wa or piety movements, their emphasis on embodiment and the cultivation of ethical 
virtues see Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2005); Charles Hirschkind, The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic 
Counterpublics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).   
218 Sheikh Hamud, The Wholesome Society, 14. 
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It’s a duty upon every believer to cleanse society of these crimes. . . . Every 
person is responsible for forbidding what he sees of all the different crimes. It’s 
not enough that one is a good person, while these crimes are destroying all those 
around him. If a fire starts somewhere and it’s not put out immediately, it effects 
everything. Our prophet has ordered us to forbid wrongs with action or with 
words.219 
Sheikh Hamud claims that his writing of this document was itself an act of nasiha or “advice,” 
which is one way the duty to command right and forbid wrong is understood. Sheikh Hamud’s 
appeal to everyone to do something against the rampant criminality seems to contradict his other 
position, which we saw earlier, where he singles the ‘ulama as the group particularly responsible 
for saving society from the corruption of the mujrimin, the mooryan. I suggest that this 
contradiction is a reflection of the tension, mentioned earlier, between the egalitarian ethos of 
Islam and the Shari‘a image of society that divides society into scholars and ordinary people. In 
the egalitarian ideal of the umma, there are no privileged groups and every Muslim has a duty to 
struggle daily towards the realization of a society where life can be lived in accordance with Islam. 
Whereas in the bifurcated Shari‘a image of society, the ‘ulama alone are entitled or burdened with 
the responsibility of guiding society on the path of the Shari‘a.  
Among the ordinary people who were active in the emergence of the Shari‘a courts, there 
was no doubt in their minds that they, and not just the ‘ulama, had a religious duty to command 
right and forbid wrong. These ordinary people explained their socially relevant actions by invoking 
the tradition of commanding right. In the various accounts of the formation of the different Shari‘a 
                                                          
219 Ibid., 21. 
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courts, the religious duty to command right and forbid wrong was underlined as the reason why 
individuals were moved to undertake actions that ultimately culminated in the formation of 
community centers that came to be called Shari‘a courts. We saw the invocation of the traditional 
duty to command right in the accounts of the emergence of the four Shari‘a court noted in chapter 
four. In the first story, the story of the Court of Madina, we saw that it was a group of young men 
who initiated the series of actions that eventually led to the establishment of the court. The ‘ulama, 
including Sheikh Hamud, got involved, only after the group of young men who called themselves 
a civil security force (madani) asked them to do their religious duty and judge those brought before 
them in accordance with the Shari‘a. In the account of this court provided by one of these young 
men, he describes what motivated their actions by saying they couldn’t just sit and do nothing with 
all the reprehensible (munkar) acts occurring all around them. They felt that it was a religious duty 
to protect those that couldn’t protect themselves, “we talked and we asked ourselves, why are we 
here? Aren’t we here to protect ourselves, to help each other and our neighbors? Isn’t this man our 
neighbor? Isn’t he a Muslim? Isn’t it our duty to protect him?” In many of these stories there is a 
sense that their very claim to being Muslims is in serious jeopardy if they stand by and do not live 
up to the obligation to command right and forbid wrong. In the account of the emergence of the 
Court of Karaan, the man who organized the group of young men who took it upon themselves to 
do something about the criminality in their neighborhood, explained their reasoning, “we shouldn’t 
watch this (the crimes in the neighborhood) and go to our mosque every Friday, and not talk about 
or do something about these reprehensible acts.” Similar to the formation of the Court of Madina, 
it was these ordinary men whose actions were decisive in the creation of the court. Many more 
examples could be given of ordinary people whose actions led to the emergence of a court, and 
who explained their actions and reasoning by referencing this traditional Islamic duty.  
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The influence of this traditional duty in the formation of the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu 
manifested itself in a different aspect of the work of the Shari‘a courts. Besides the mediation and 
arbitration of disputes and conflicts, the other major activity which the creation of the courts was 
an expression of was rehabilitation. When addressing the history of the courts most commentators 
remember the courts simply as courts of “Islamic law,” but just as significant in the history of the 
courts was their function as rehabilitation centers. There were some courts, particularly the Court 
of Harar Yaalle, which were known primarily for their work on rehabilitation. I was told that at 
one point the Court of Harar Yaalle held over 300 individuals who were all being rehabilitated. 
The rehabilitation program of the courts was impressive for its simplicity as for its effectiveness. 
The rehabilitation work of the courts began when the person to be rehabilitated was brought to the 
court by a relative. The persons brought to the courts for rehabilitation were usually young men, 
who were using drugs, on the streets, or simply neglecting their duties and not listening to parental 
guidance. The parents or relatives of such a person would bring that person, by force or by 
persuasion, to the court. Most of the courts were established in areas that were previously 
government buildings such as police stations. They, therefore, had accommodations that enabled 
the courts to keep people there for a long time. During their stay in the court the relatives who 
brought the person to the court would be responsible for their food and room. The court also 
collected small fees for its work. In situations where the person was brought to the court against 
their wishes, the court’s small security force would keep watch over the person to make sure they 
didn’t escape. If, in the course of their stay, the person were to harm themselves or someone else 
it would be the responsibility of the relatives. I was told of a case of a young man who was brought 
to a court for rehabilitation. The young man, in his 20s, was brought to the court by his father 
because he was addicted to qat, the mildly stimulant leaf that is popularly chewed throughout 
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Somalia. After a few days of being forcibly kept at the court, the young man went on hunger strike. 
The sheikhs at the court called the father because they didn’t want to be held responsible should 
something happen to him as a result of the hunger strike. The father wrote and signed a letter 
absolving the court of any responsibility. Moreover, he instructed the court to keep the young man 
there despite the hunger strike. Realizing that his hunger strike was winning him no reprieve the 
young man started eating again.  
It wasn’t just young men that were brought to the courts for rehabilitation. I was told of the 
fascinating story of an old man, in his 60s, from the diaspora who was brought to one of the Shari‘a 
courts through deception by his relatives. The man, I was told, lived in a European country for 
most of his life. During his time in the diaspora he had become alcoholic and never managed to 
start or keep a family. This was a scandal in the eyes of his relatives. He had a sister who lived 
somewhere in the Middle East. During one of their calls, this sister told her brother that their family 
houses in Mogadishu were going to be sold. She urged that since he was the eldest brother he 
should go to Mogadishu and oversee the sale of the houses. Enticed, perhaps, by the potential 
money from the sale of the houses, the brother agreed to come back to Mogadishu. Little did he 
know it was all a ruse to get him to come to Mogadishu. The sister had already spoken with 
relatives in Mogadishu, and they agreed to apprehend him upon his arrival and take him to one of 
the courts for rehabilitation. Once he arrived in Mogadishu, the relatives, as agreed upon, grabbed 
the man by force and took him to one of the Shari‘a courts. There, he was deprived of his alcohol 
and subjected to religious education and discipline. The man, it’s said, got so ill that he almost 
died during the first week. Eventually, he fully recovered from alcoholism, agreed to marry a local 
girl, and became a good, i.e. religious, man. When he was released from the rehabilitation center 
he was full of gratitude for his sister and the relatives that “saved” his life. At the time when I 
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heard this story I was informed that the man lived in a small town near Mogadishu and had three 
children. This man’s story is exceptional and demonstrates how popular the rehabilitation work of 
the courts was. Ordinarily, the rehabilitation work of the courts was focused on the young armed 
men on streets of Mogadishu, the so-called mujrimin or mooryan.  
What is significant about the rehabilitation work of the courts is that it’s a manifestation of 
the traditional duty to command right and forbid wrong through an emphasis on embodiment, and 
the need to mold the human sensorium in order for the person to be receptive to the message of 
Islam. Sheikh Hamud in his document discusses the need to have receptive ears even as he rebukes 
the ‘ulama for not doing enough to prevent the criminal behavior of the mujrimin, “I testify that 
many among the ‘ulama haven’t put forth enough effort to put out this blaze that is devastating 
our country, which has caused hundreds of thousands of lives to perish. But when they did put 
forth effort, they didn’t find ears to hear their good advice.”220 In order for the efforts of the ‘ulama 
to produce any results, Sheikh Hamud suggests, it was essential that they were addressed to ears 
that were tuned to the message of Islam. The idea that in order for the message of Islam to be 
effective, the human sensorium, particularly the ear and the heart, have to be attuned to its message 
isn’t limited to scholars. It’s a widely-held socio-cultural notion captured in the everyday usage of 
the term adab or proper behavior.221 The term adab is widely used in Somalia, as it’s in many 
other Muslim societies. It connotes the idea that there is a religiously sanctioned proper behavior 
                                                          
220 Sheikh Hamud, The Wholesome Society, p. 7 
221 Ira Lapidus (1984) writes on this concept “Adab was used throughout the classical era of Islam to imply learning 
and knowledge for the sake of right living. [It meant] in its most general sense: correct knowledge and behavior in 
the total process by which a person is educated, guided, and formed into a good Muslim. In this larger . . . sense, 
adab is part of a system of Muslim ideas, part of interrelated set of concepts that constitutes the basic vocabulary of 
Islamic belief and makes up a Muslim anthropology of man.” See Barbara D. Metcalf, ed., Moral Conduct and 
Authority: The Place of Adab in South Asian Islam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).  Another 
related concept is tarbiya (education, pedagogic, training) which is viewed as an integral part of any Islamic 
education. See Anne S. Roald, Tarbiyya: Education and Politics in Islamic Movements in Jordan and Malaysia 
(Lund: Lunds Universitet, 1994).  
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in every sphere of life, and that it’s only through religious discipline that the proper behavior is 
learnt. A person who lacks the appropriate behavior or misbehaves is said to lack adab. One of the 
major reasons why children are taken to Qur’anic schools (dugsi) is for them to be disciplined, so 
that they might embody the adab necessary to lead the life of a good Muslim. The rehabilitation 
work that the courts performed was an expression of this religious and cultural idea. It was not 
enough to just prevent people from doing wrong. It was viewed that the only way to make the 
wrong doers (zalim) see the wrongness of their actions and correct their conduct was to discipline 
them in the proper behavior of a Muslim subject through authorized procedures. When individuals 
were brought to the courts for rehabilitation they were instructed in the daily rituals (‘ibadat) of 
Islam.222  Foremost among them, the five daily prayers. In between these prayers individuals were 
given basic lessons in Qur’anic exegesis (tafsir), hadith, and stories of the Prophet and his 
companions. The general expectation was that these devotional practices would inculcate in 
individuals the virtues and the ethical and moral judgments necessary to prevent them from 
engaging in the type of offences that were considered detrimental to proper Muslim life. The 
rehabilitation work of the courts was political because it aimed at, if not always achieving, helping 
individuals to acquire virtues necessary for social action. This aspect of the work of the courts was 
also political in a more immediate sense; they helped to remove many of the armed young men 
who constituted the core of Mogadishu’s militias from the streets. This directly impacted the 
manpower available to the city’s faction leaders and warlords. This was one of the reasons why 
the warlords felt so threatened by the rise of the Shari‘a courts.  
Conclusion 
                                                          
222 For a discussion on the role of Islamic rituals in the formation of a Shari‘a-minded subject, see chapter 5, “The 
Political Subject and Moral Technologies of the Self,” in Wael B. Hallaq, The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and 
Modernity’s Moral Predicament (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).  
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The immediate background and context that created the conditions of possibility for the emergence 
of the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu was the appalling conditions of insecurity and violence that 
followed the fall of the Mohamed Siyad Barre regime in 1991. Most academic commentary on the 
courts go no further than to attribute the formation of the Shari‘a courts to the insecurity of the 
environment (Ahmad 2015; Menkhaus 2006; Rotberg 2005; Waal 2004). The fact of insecurity 
alone, however, can’t account for the emergence of a city-wide mass-based reform movement that 
aimed at transforming society. There were, after all, many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 
1990s that were experiencing similar societal crises resulting from economic and political failures 
following the end of the Cold War. In very few cases did such societal upheavals lead to mass-
bases reform or revolutionary social movement. The political scientist William Reno reflects on 
this issue in a number of articles (Reno 2002, 2003). Reno contends that part of the reason why 
the societal crises of 1990s Sub-Saharan Africa did not generate mass-based social movements is 
due to the consequences of pre-conflict regime patronage politics. He explains that the existence 
of networks of control over economic opportunities left behind by the patronage politics of the 
pre-conflict regime and controlled by former regime elites enabled these elites to buy influence 
and coopt the character of anti-regime mobilization, thus undermining the social base and control 
over the rebellion. Led by these former regime elites, Reno concludes, the anti-regime rebellions 
of the 1990s often led to the formation of predatory armed groups and the emergence of war 
economies. Regardless of whether or not one agrees with his answer Reno poses a relevant 
question. The Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu, I contend, were precisely the type of mass-based social 
movement that Reno finds lacking.  
In this chapter, I attempted to go beyond formulations that simply posit insecurity as an 
explanation for the emergence of the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu. I focused on the religio-cultural 
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concepts and practices that informed and motivated the actors whose actions culminated in the 
formation of the community centers that became known as the Shari‘a courts. We found that 
concepts and practices that have been developed in the Islamic tradition and deeply embedded in 
the religious and cultural life and norms of the Somali people laid the foundations for the 
emergence of the Shari‘a courts. The courts built on these older ideas and practices, which have 
been pushed out of the political space during the colonial and postcolonial periods. They remained 
dormant but nevertheless present in the social and religious discourse. Foremost among the 
concepts and practices that were essential to the formation of the courts were the notions of 
“collective duty” (fard kifaya), “the people of resolution and contract” (Ahl al-Hal wa’l-‘Aqd), and 
“commanding right and forbidding wrong” (wa-ya’muruna bi’l-ma‘rufi wa-yanhawna ‘ani ’l-
munkar). These traditional Islamic concepts and their associated practices undergirded the 
compulsion to recognize a wrong and be outraged and moved to correct it and change the social 
environment that made such actions possible.  
 These concepts from the Islamic tradition and the practices that accompanied them were 
not without tensions. As noted above, one such tension is evident in the discrepancy between the 
emphasis on the egalitarian ideal of Islam and the Shari‘a image of society, which divides society 
into two groups: the scholars and the ordinary people, giving the former the task of guiding society 
to the righteous path. Another tension was present in ordinary people’s practice of the duty to 
command right and forbid wrong, and the ruling authorities’ desire to regulate the possible abuse 
of this principle, and, more importantly, the threat, which it’s practiced posed to their authority. 
These tensions are in many ways inherent to the very logic of the practices these traditions 
encourage. But the way these tensions manifested themselves in the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu 
reveal something about the contradictions imminent to their practice in the modern world. Let’s 
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take the traditional duty of commanding right. It’s without doubt that the ideas and practices 
encompassed by this concept were indispensable to the discourses and practices of ordinary people 
that informed the formation of the courts. It’s safe to say that the courts could not have arisen 
absent the social force of this traditional Islamic duty. As the Shari‘a courts unified under the 
Union of Islamic Courts (UICs) and began a process of centralizing authority, the unregulated 
practice of this traditional duty began to pose a problem for the courts.  
The independent and community based Shari‘a courts metamorphed into the UICs and took 
over Mogadishu in mid-2006. All of the sudden the world’s attention was on the UICs and their 
conduct. News reports and Western diplomats depicted them as the African version of the 
Taliban.223 They showed images of the courts’ security forces lashing people and enforcing 
specific dress codes, hair styles, and shutting down cinemas. For much of the international media 
and Western policy makers this behavior only confirmed their worst fears; that a “radical” Islamic 
movement was taking root in the “vacuum” left behind by the disintegration of the postcolonial 
state. For many among the Somali population, both at home and in the diaspora, who were pleased 
to see the people of Mogadishu organize and liberate themselves from the warlords, these turn of 
events were difficult to understand. Many, including myself, wondered, what were the courts’ 
leadership thinking? Why would they concern themselves with such trivial matters as hairstyles 
and dress codes? Couldn’t they see the monumental task they were facing? Why give an already 
suspicious world the reason to undermine them? I put these questions to Sheikh Hassan Daahir 
Aweys, one of the leaders of the UICs, and a man often referred to as the godfather of 
contemporary politico-religious activism in Somalia. The following is our exchange: 
                                                          
223 Jeffrey Gettleman, “Drinking Fanta with Islamist Militants,” New York Times, May 13, 2017.   
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Me: Many people were pleased and hopeful when the Shari‘a courts defeated the warlords and 
took over Mogadishu. But then people saw images of young men whipping people on the streets, 
forcing them to cut their hair, and they thought these people don’t know what they are doing.  
Hassan: Let me tell you a story. I was once in Qoryoley.224 I went there to meet with some elders 
and to explain the Islamic courts to them. We met inside a house. When the meeting finished and 
I came out, I found my bodyguards roughing up the neighborhood kids, cutting off their hair and 
shortening their baggy pants because they thought these things were un-Islamic. I got upset and 
scolded them. But I couldn’t scold them too much. 
Me: Why couldn’t you scold them too much? 
Hassan: It wasn’t easy to stop them even if you wanted to. Every person thinks they have the daliil 
(evidence).225 Have you ever heard of the Somali saying, ‘only he who doesn’t know the nature of 
a lion touches its nose?’ Also, the same fervor that motivated these young people to take on 
insurmountable odds was also making them do these things. It wasn’t an easy thing to solve.226 
This exchange demonstrates that Hassan was perceptive to the problems arising out of the 
unregulated practice of the traditional duty to command right and forbid wrong, as were many 
others. Another interlocutor, someone critical of the Shari‘a courts, put the problem in the 
                                                          
224 A small town to the south of Mogadishu 
225 There is a long-held tradition in Islam that the final arbiter of any argument is the Qur’an and hadith. If one can 
find direct evidence from these sources for one’s position the matter is considered settled. Some scholars contend 
that the spread of a form of religious argumentation based on the search for evidence (istidlal) in the foundational 
texts (Qur’an and hadith), rather than relying on the authority and model of the traditional ‘ulama, is a recent 
phenomenon that has spread as a result of developments in mass literacy and mass media. See chapter six for more 
on the effects of modern techniques of schooling and mass literacy on authority and modes of argumentation in 
Islam.  For the difference between this evidence based argumentation and the kind of religious discourse grounded 
on ‘esoteric’ or secret (sir) conception of knowledge see Salomon (2013). Salomon argues, in contrast to Brenner 
(2001), that the assumed decline of the secret-based epistemology of Sufi Islam and the dominance of evidentiary or 
rationalistic theory of knowledge associated with reformist Islam is overstated. He argues for a “comingling of 
epistemes” (821).   
226 Interview in Mogadishu on March 2015.  
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following, “everyone dislikes some particular behavior. Some dislike smokers, others dislike 
sagging pants, and others loathe people who chew qat. After the Shari‘a courts, everyone who 
disliked some behavior was in a position to do something about it. What the courts did was to give 
power to each of these individuals to outlaw and enforce a punishment for the specific behavior 
they didn’t like.”227 There is a clear articulation by both interlocutors that with the emergence of 
the courts there developed everyday practices of the duty to command right and forbid wrong, and 
that this was a nuisance for many people, but a major problem for the leadership of the courts. 
What is worthy of note in my brief exchange with Hassan is his clear understanding of the problem, 
and his contention that there was nothing that could be done about it. Hassan goes further than 
many of my interlocutors in realizing that one could not easily regulate or limit the practice of the 
tradition without undermining a key feature of what made the courts successful. He is, 
nevertheless, mindful that the unregulated practice of the tradition poses a threat to the coherence 
of the project of the courts. He points out that there was little one could do about it, when the 
people practicing the tradition are armed with what they see as evidence from the foundational 
texts of Islam. This is a clear evidence of the emergence of the tension this tradition creates 
between governing authorities and its practice by everyday people. This tension, as pointed out 
earlier, has been present throughout Islamic history, but with the rise of the modern state this 
tension has become much more exasperated.  
Another influential leader of the UICs comments on this issue in a book228 he wrote after 
the UICs were evicted from Mogadishu by an Ethiopian invasion in 2006. In a section where he 
critiques the UICs for some of its failures, he complains that the abuse of the duty to command 
                                                          
227 Interview in Mogadishu on June 2015.  
228 Dr. Omar Iman abu Bakar, The Trails of the Islamic Courts in Somalia: The Success and Limitations (tajriyat al-
mahakim al-Islamiyya fi Somali). The book is translated from Arabic by the author.  
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right had turned many people against the courts. Revealingly, when he tries to offer suggestions 
as to what should have been done, he had no more than to say “one should not command people 
on what’s right without first doing what is necessary such as the proves and clarifications, which 
would enable one to get people to accept the right thing. One should also soften one’s tongue and 
behavior towards people.”229 These two men, Sheikh Hassan and Oman Iman, were two of the 
men that rose to positions of power after the communal Shari‘a courts transformed into the UICs. 
They were in fact the chairman and the deputy chairman of the Shura Council of the UICs, 
respectively. It’s thus quite revealing that though both men experienced the unregulated practice 
of the tradition to command right as a problem in their time with the courts, neither man has a 
realistic suggestion on how to overcome this problem. The experience of the courts showed the 
profound importance of this traditional Islamic duty in communal mobilization and self-
governance. But as soon as the courts transformed into a political formation with a modicum of 
centralized administration and authority in the form of the UICs, this traditional duty began to pose 
serious problems for the coherence and direction of the project of the UICs.  
I contend that this tension and the inability of the leadership of the Shari‘a courts and the 
UICs to address reveals something about tradition that is rarely discussed by the theories of 
tradition of Alasdair MacIntyre and Talal Asad. Tradition frames a particular approach and 
orientation to the world, but in so doing tradition entraps its practitioners and allows them no 
“acceptable authoritative exterior”230 vantage point from which to judge the very serious tensions 
and contradictions that arise between the principles of a tradition and the constantly shifting 
realities of the world. It’s perhaps the case that when the severity of a tradition’s contradictions 
                                                          
229 Omar Iman, The Trails of the Islamic Courts, 37.  
230 I am thankful to Professor Vincent Crapanzano for drawing my attention to this aspect of tradition.  
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are so transparent and the tradition’s practitioners are unable to find a workable solution for it, the 
continuity of the tradition is in serious jeopardy. Despite the “entrapment of tradition” that they 
were caught in, the experience of the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu gave us a window into a type 
of governance informed by the Islamic tradition but not centered on the model of the modern 
territorial state, as many contemporary Islamic movements are. Before their unification into the 
political formation of the UICs, the courts were independent from each other though somewhat 
interlinked, non-hierarchical with no centralized authority. Consequently, they were much more 
open to pressures and influences by ordinary people. They were accountable to the neighborhood 
and district residents of its milieu. This is what is really unique about the Shari‘a courts. The 
prolonged and complete absence of the state from the scene led people to engage in organic 
experiments of self-governance without such process being influence by the overbearing demands 
and engagement with state institutions. It was an experiment that grounded the governance of 
social affairs, i.e. politics, in historically embedded religio-cultural notions of authority, of justice, 
and responsibility. The non-state centric concepts and practices of the communal Shari‘a courts 
ended with the formation of the UICs. The rise of the UICs I submit was a step in the direction of 
the logic and form of governance of the modern state. The next chapter will explore how the 
metamorphosis of the previously communal Shari‘a courts into the UICs entailed forms of 
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CHAPTER VI 
The rise of “modern”-educated elites and the bureaucratization of Shari‘a practice in 
the formation of the UICs 
When the previously independent communal courts came together in 2006 to create the 
Union of Islamic Courts (UICs), the UICs undertook a process of unifying the previously 
independent neighborhood/lineage courts to create a unified municipal legal system. This entailed 
the centralization and bureaucratization of the practice and authority of the Shari‘a. With the 
adoption of centralized bureaucracy the authority to interpret and speak for the Shari‘a was no 
longer vested in the “traditionally” trained religious scholars, but in the impersonal workings of 
rules, procedural norms, and most importantly documentation. The process of bureaucratization 
was led by a group of men educated in modern Islamic universities outside of Somalia, primarily 
Sudan. These men weren’t involved in the establishment or running of the communal Shari‘a 
courts that preceded the UICs. They rose to positions of power with the formation of the UICs. 
The bureaucratization process which they led displaced the authority of the local and ‘traditionally’ 
educated religious authorities who founded the initial communal Shari‘a courts. The 
bureaucratization of Shari‘a practice shifted authority away from neighborhood sheikhs, placing 
them in the lowest rung of the new governing structure of the UICs.  In this chapter, I analyze the 
bureaucratization process and the change of Shari‘a authority which it entailed, through a focus on 
the educational background and the rise to power of this “modern”231 educated cosmopolitan 
university graduates. I do this through a narrative of the educational biography and role within the 
                                                          
231 I am using the term modern in this chapter to specify post-nineteenth century developments in the institutions 
of learning in Muslim societies.  
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UICs of a single individual whose life story and influence on the courts reveals the educational 
socialization and impact on the Shari‘a courts of this group. 
The chapter thus examines the link between the rise of new politico-religious elites defined 
by their modern education, the bureaucratization process that the UICs undertook, and the shift in 
Shari‘a authority and practice in Mogadishu, Somalia. In examining the link between these three, 
this paper engages with the literature on how some of the major developments of the modern world 
have altered the way the Shari‘a is conceptualized and understood.  It’s now a well-established 
position among scholars that the rise of the modern and modernizing state in the Muslim world 
over the past two centuries has been accompanied by the transformation of Shari‘a from an 
uncodified, judge-centered, and decentralized set of norms and institutions to a codified and state-
centered ‘law’ whose jurisdiction was limited to the sphere of the family (Agrama 2012; Asad 
2003; Hallaq 2001, 2009a, 2013; Hussin 2016; Messick 1993; Pierce 2003; Rosen 1989, 2000; 
Weiss 1992). This transformation of the Shari‘a, beginning at different times in various parts of 
the Muslim world, qualitatively altered the structures of authority and epistemological basis of the 
Shari‘a. Some of the important factors that led to the transformation of the Shari’a included state 
codification, the abolishing of waqfs (inalienable religious endowments), Western style court 
systems, and the introduction of modern schools. The essential aim and achievement of these 
reforms was to centralize, that is bureaucratize, the administration of justice so as to enable the 
emerging nation-states to exert judicial sovereignty. To centralize the administration of justice the 
nation-state had to undermine the heterogeneity of authoritative Shari‘a opinions the was 
occasioned by the individualistic interpretation which has historically characterized the world of 
the Shari‘a. Throughout much of Islamic history the structural and epistemic authority to interpret 
the Shari‘a had lain with individual Shari‘a specialists. As Wael Hallaq explains “it was these men 
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who undertook the task of elaborating on the legal significance of the revealed texts, and it was 
they who finally established a legal epistemology that depended on its entirety upon the premise 
of an individualistic interpretation of the law. This feature was to win for Islamic law, in modern 
scholarship, the epithet ‘jurists’ law’” (2001: 125). 
As the quote above makes clear, the development and interpretation of the Shari‘a 
throughout Islamic history was an individual undertaking based on the epistemic authority of 
Shari‘a specialists. This individual derivation of the Shari‘a was made possible by the 
independence of Shari‘a specialists from formal institutionalization, particularly their distance 
from centers of political power. The Shari‘a specialists’ authority to interpret the Shari‘a was 
acquired through individual-based and life-long endeavor of education and scholarship which was 
ultimately acknowledged by one’s peers. In general, traditional Islamic education began with 
Qur’anic schools where students memorize the Qur’an and might have learn to read and write 
Arabic primarily to aid the process of memorization. After the completion of the Qur’anic school, 
the ambitious and capable young person would then pursue instructions in the various Islamic 
disciplines, such as fiqh (jurisprudence), Qur’anic exegesis (tafsir), the science of hadith, and 
grammar (nahwa) among other disciplines, by joining mosque circles or madrasas (Eickelman 
1984, 2007; Hallaq 2009a; Heffner and Zaman 2007; Makdisi 1981).232 Historically, Madrasa was 
“a kind of seminary or ‘college’ for Islamic sciences” (Hefner and Zaman: 8). Madrasas and 
                                                          
232 In areas outside of the Islamic heartland what is referred to as madrasas are a recent phenomenon. For 
example as Hefner and Zaman (2007, introduction) point out in many parts of Africa and in Indonesia modern 
schools that combine secular and religious subjects in their curricula are known as madrasas. In Somalia madrasas 
are known as the relatively new Islamic institutions often run by reformist oriented clerics and teach only religious 
subjects. For more on madrasas and mosque circles, see George Makdisi, The rise of colleges: institutions of 
learning in Islam and the West ( Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981); Wael Hallaq, Shari‘a: theory, 
practice, transformations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Dale Eickelman, Knowledge and Power in 
Morocco: The Education of a Twentieth-Century Notable(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985); 
idem, “Madrasas in Morocco: Their Vanishing Public Role,” in Hefner and Zaman (2007).   
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mosque circles were quite different from modern institutions of higher learning in very important 
ways. The sources of funding for madrasas and mosque circles were community-based or obtained 
through waqf.233 Such support was crucial for the traditional scholars’ relative autonomy from 
centers of political power. Madrasas and mosque circles were also different from modern 
universities in their methods of instruction. Prior to the nineteenth-century, for example, madrasas 
“operated without the benefit of examinations, formal curricula, or college governance. In fact, 
until well into the modern period, the pursuit of religious knowledge in Muslim societies was an 
individual or, more precisely, networked undertaking, in which students sought master scholars 
for personalized instruction” (Hefner and Zaman 2007: 9). 
Traditional Islamic institutions of learning were therefore crucial to the formation of 
Shari‘a specialists such as muftis, and the individual-based hermeneutic discourse of the Shari‘a. 
Thus a change in the character and means of transmission of Islamic knowledge directly impacted 
Shari‘a authority and practice (Masud, Messick, and Powers 1996: 26-27). The curricular and 
organizational changes in the institutions of learning led to the formations of new subjectivities 
(Brenner 2001; Ware 2014), changes in the religious imagination (Eickelman 1992; Starrett 1998), 
and struggles over authority and legitimacy between different intellectuals (Eickelman and 
Piscatori 1996, 37-79; Soares 2005; Zaman 2002, 2005, 2007) throughout the Islamic world. Most 
important for the purposes of this chapter is how changes in the institutions of learning led to the 
emergence of new religious authorities with different subjectivities and worldviews who 
challenged the authority of the traditional ‘ulama. These new intellectual in the Muslim world, 
                                                          
233 For more on how religious endowments helped to maintain the relative independence of Islamic institutions of 
learning, see chapter 3, Hallaq (2009). Asad (2003) contends that though waqf (plural awqaf) is normally translated 
as religious endowment its purposes went beyond the ‘religious’ since the institutions of waqf helped to fund such 
‘non-religious’ projects as hospitals and schools (2003: 207). 
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frequently referred to as modernists or Islamists (Zaman 2002), and who spearhead contemporary 
Islamic reformist movements, are distinguished from the traditional ‘ulama by their educational 
background, among other things. Rather than the traditional Islamic education they are schooled 
in modern institutions of learning that combine religious education and secular subject. These 
modern institutions of learning are exemplified best by my modern Islamic universities, such as 
the Islamic universities in Saudi Arabia. These universities are often state-funded and embody a 
new vision of the role and responsibility of the ‘ulama. Speaking of these universities Muhammad 
Zaman writes that the vision which informs these institutions is novel and important “for 
conceiving of a new kind of ‘ulama – products not of traditional madrasas but of modern, albeit 
Islamic universities – who alone would be able to challenge and reverse processes of 
Westernization” (Zaman 2007: 256). Part of the vision that informs the establishment of these 
modern Islamic universities, which is inculcated in their graduates, is a critique of the pedagogy 
of the traditional Islamic institutions of learning and the discourse of the traditional ‘ulama. They 
argue that traditional Islamic pedagogy and the discourse of the traditional ‘ulama are to blame for 
the “backwardness” of Muslim societies. It’s therefore necessary, they contend, to reform and 
revitalize the institutions of learning in order to produce intellectual elites capable of leading 
Muslim societies in the modern world. 
Over the past few decades several of these modern Islamic universities have been established 
in sub-Saharan Africa.234 There has been, however, little academic analysis of the impact of these 
modern universities in the transmission of Islamic knowledge and the nature of religious authority 
in Muslim societies in sub-Saharan Africa. This chapter examines the impact on politico-religious 
                                                          
234 See Mbaye Lo and Muhammed Haron, eds., Muslim Institutions of Higher Education in Postcolonial Africa (UK: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 
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leadership and Shari‘a practice in Mogadishu by graduates from a modern Islamic university – the 
International University of Africa in Khartoum, Sudan.235 More specifically, I look at the rise to 
positions of power of graduates from the IUA and their role in the unification of the previously 
independent communal/lineage Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu in the rise of the UICs. These 
graduates led the bureaucratization of Shari‘a practice which took place under the UICs. I conclude 
that though the bureaucratization of Shari‘a practice which these graduates spearheaded displaced 
the authority of the traditional ‘ulama, it didn’t thereby mean that Shari‘a authority was now vested 
in the university educated new elites. Rather, Shari‘a practice and authority was vested in the 
impersonal workings of the bureaucratic system which the graduates were establishing. In 
summary, I examine changes to the way religious knowledge was obtained and transmitted and 
how that change impacted the transformation of the Shari‘a courts into the UICs. The next section 
is a brief description of “traditional”236 Islamic education in Somalia and the changes that 
education system underwent.   
The transformation of “Traditional” Islamic education: The De-centering of the Jama‘a as 
an Islamic institution of learning 
In “traditional” Somali society the literate or educated person was the same as the local religious 
authority, the sheikh or wadaad237 (man of religion). Learning to write and read Arabic as part of 
one’s religious education constituted the chief achievement of the literate person. This education 
                                                          
235 For a discussion of Islamic universities in East Africa, including IUA, see Ahmed Chanfi, “Muslim Universities in 
East Africa: Negotiating Cultural Identity and Political Challenges,” in Muslim Institutions of Higher Education in 
Postcolonial Africa, edited by Mbaye Lo and Muhammed Haron (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 195-210. 
236 What I am labelling here as ‘traditional’ refers to the situation from the eighteenth century onwards when 
religious orders or Sufi turuq (sing. tariqa) were developing in Somalia as dynamic social movements.  
237 In the old days the term wadaad referred to any man of God, but today wadaad is frequently used to refer to a 
man of religion whose religious schooling took place in “traditional” settings and not in “modern” schools. Even 
religious intellectuals trained in modern institutions of learning use the term wadaad to refer to traditionally-
trained religious scholars, as we will see later in the chapter.  
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began with a Qur’anic school (dugsi) and continued with higher stages of learning at mosque 
circles and religious communities (jama‘a). The first stage in this education usually begins at the 
age of 5 or 6 at a Qur’anic school where children, principally male in the past but now includes 
girls, are sent to memorize some or the whole of the Qur’an. To this day, the basic model of the 
Qur’anic school remains the same. They are communally founded and run. The Qur’anic teacher 
is often a member of the community and is compensated for his services by the parents of the 
children in the form of livestock or cash, depending on the context. The students at Qur’anic 
schools use a wooden slate (looh) and ink made from charcoal and resin. With the increasing level 
of urbanization, remuneration now takes the form of cash, and notebooks are replacing the wooden 
slates in some Qur’anic schools. Upon completion of the Qur’anic school, the motivated and 
capable student would seek higher religious instruction at mosque circles or join a jama‘a. Jama‘as 
were found by Sufi masters/sheikhs and were established in agricultural areas or around water 
wells in pastoral nomadic communities.238 In some cases a jama‘a grew large enough to become 
self-supporting and eventually turn into a village or town. In cases where a jama’a grew large 
enough it could challenge the socio-political relations in its vicinity.239 When a jama‘a wasn’t self-
sufficient the students were supported by the center’s host community. Each student would share 
meals with a specific family or rotate between different families. Students studied jurisprudence 
(particularly the Shafi‘i madhab), Quranic interpretation (tafsir), hadith (prophetic traditions), 
grammar (nahwa), among other subjects. A student could enter and leave at any stage and during 
                                                          
238 For more on Jama’as and their role in the spread of Islam in Somalia see chapter two. 
239 For an example of a jama‘a, the Bardheere jama‘a, which grew large enough to challenge militarily the 
economic and political relations in its vicinity, see Lee Cassanelli (1982); Virginia Lulling (2002); Trimingham (1965). 
Also see chapter two  
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the course of a student’s career he may study under many different sheikhs. The system thus 
produced scholars of all levels.  
In terms of traditional religious education and literacy these centers were absolutely central. 
They “produced a considerable Arab-Somali religious literature written mainly in Arabic (but in 
some cases in Somali transcribed in an adoption of Arabic script” (Lewis 1998: 14). The itinerant 
sheikhs or wadaads who provided rudimentary religious instruction in the villages in rural areas 
and among the pastoral nomads obtained their religious education at these centers. These itinerant 
sheikhs provided instruction at Qur’anic schools and sometimes formed followers (hir) that moved 
with them in rural areas and among pastoral nomads. Some graduates from this education system 
with the necessary connections were able to pursue further education in the other Islamic centers 
of learning such as Harar (now in Ethiopia), Yemen, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Yemen and Harar 
were particularly popular destination in the pre-colonial period, while connections to Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia strengthened in the second half of the twentieth-century (Reese 2008).240  
The change in the destination of Somali seekers of religious education is reflective of 
transformations in higher religious learning. As mentioned earlier the Qur’anic school, for the most 
part, remains the same except in the widespread use of cash as payment and the introduction of 
notebooks in place of the wooden slate (looh). What has changed more significantly is the place 
of the jama‘a in higher religious instruction. Jama‘as, as pointed out earlier, were integral 
institutions in higher religious learning in Somalia. They were also the central institution in the 
organization and identity of Sufi orders. With the spread of urbanization mosque circles have taken 
                                                          
240 Scott Reese (2008) notes “prior to the end of the nineteenth century, Somali religious practitioners looked 
almost exclusively to Arabia as the primary source of religious learning. . . . with the start of the twentieth century, 
however, a noticeable change occurred as Somalis – as well as other East Africa Muslims – began to shift their 
intellectual attention northward towards the Mediterranean” (6-7).  
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center stage in higher religious instruction. Jama‘as still exist, even in urban centers, but their 
significance has decreased. Given that jama‘as were the central institutions of Sufi brotherhoods, 
their diminished role in higher religious education is testament to the decrease in Sufi membership 
as an institutional by-product of the quest for religious education. From the turn of the twentieth 
century onwards the increased prominence of religious scholars unconnected to specific Sufi 
orders, and who were in fact very critical of some Sufi practices, led to the marginalization of the 
jama‘a in the acquisition of religious education. Mosques in major urban centers like Mogadishu 
served as a platform for the spread of the ideas and influence of the new ‘ulama. Because of their 
more robust connections to the outside world, these new ‘ulama became the carriers of new 
currents of Islamic thought and debate thus introducing into Somalia the literature and debates of 
the Islamic Awakening (Al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya). In pre-colonial Somalia, journeys to centers of 
Islamic education outside of Somalia were made possible through Sufi networks that connected 
Muslims in the Horn of Africa to those in other parts of the world. It was, therefore, scholars 
identifying with specific Sufi orders that introduced the latest currents of Islamic thought in 
Somalia through their networked connections to Islamic centers of learning outside of Somalia.  
The onset of colonialism multiplied the connections to the outside world, “from scholars seeking 
knowledge and enlightenment to businessmen and laborers looking for economic opportunity, 
imperial infrastructure seems to have laid the groundwork for expanding the horizons of East 
African Muslims” (Reese 2008: 8). The formation of such networks were more responsible for 
transforming traditional Islamic institutions of learning than any large scale educational reforms 
carried out in the colonial or postcolonial periods.   
It was the formations of new connections to the outside world, formed particularly in the 
second half of the twentieth century, which altered the symbiosis between Sufi orders and the 
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acquisition of higher religious education by diminishing the role of the jama‘a  in religious 
education. The modern and state-centered Islamic educational reforms in influential Muslim 
countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia are significant to the story of Islamic education in Somalia, 
in so far as these reforms made Islamic education part of these states’ calculus in cultivating 
relations and influencing debate in other Muslim countries. This partly explains why connections 
to institutions of learning in Egypt and Saudi Arabia became widespread and influential beginning 
in the latter half of the twentieth-century in the process of the emergence of the postcolonial Somali 
state. Education was one of the arenas where competition for influence by foreign countries over 
the newly emerging Somali state was exerted. Former colonial powers such as Britain and Italy 
and newly emerging global powers like the United States and the Soviet Union began to offer 
Somali students opportunities for study through scholarships to universities in the host countries. 
Muslim states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia also began to try to exert influence in Somalia 
through education. Egypt, for example, began to send education missions either through al-
Azhar241 or through the department of education beginning in the 1950s (Abdullahi 2015). Such 
efforts led to the establishment of Arabic language institutions and schools that were funded and 
taught by Egyptian teachers. These efforts increased the opportunities and the number of Somalis 
seeking higher religious instruction in these countries. The opportunities for such study was made 
even more available with the increased labor migration to the oil producing Arab Gulf States 
beginning in the 1970s. The educational networks made possible by these connections allowed 
many Somalis to attend state-backed and newly founded religious institutions embodying the 
vision of the ‘new’ Muslim intellectuals, such as the Islamic universities of Saudi Arabia.  
                                                          
241 The oldest and most famous institution of higher learning in the Sunni Muslim world.   
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Many of the Somalis who spent time in these universities did in fact form a new ‘ulama 
unconnected to the preeminent local institution of higher Islamic learning, the jama‘a, and critical 
of Sufi-oriented religious authorities produced in that institution. These new ‘ulama provided 
religious lessons in mosques and introduced the literature and debates of thinkers associated with 
the new intellectuals, such as the writings of Sayyid Qutb. They influenced many young people in 
urban centers who began to comport themselves in the fashion of contemporary Islamist activists 
and who viewed themselves as part of the wider phenomenon of the Islamic Awakening. These 
influences led to the formation of Islamic associations and movements in the 1980s, the most 
important of which are al-Ittihad al-Islam (Islamic Union) and al-Islah (Reform).242 As the 
“socialist”243 military regime of Barre began to face mounting economic, political, and social 
upheavals beginning in the late 1970s Islamic associations provided a platform and discourse from 
which to critique the state.244 The networks and personal links to institutions in the Arab world 
also made it possible to find employment and escape the regime’s crackdown. In the ensuing chaos 
following the collapse of the state in early 1991 the Islamic associations became more organized. 
Their networks were essential in accessing charities and various other opportunities. One such 
opportunity was education.  
With the total collapse of public education the Islamic educational networks linking 
Somalia with other Islamic countries provided the only opportunity for many young people to 
continue their education and escape the deteriorating violence in Somalia. These networks weren’t 
                                                          
242 For a well-researched account of al-Islah, see Abdullahi (2015).  
243 For an analysis and critique of the socialism of the Barre regime, see Ahmed Samatar (1988).   
244 The most important event in the Islamic opposition to the socialist regime’s policies took place in 1975, when 
the regime promulgated new and controversial family laws. From the perspective of the ‘ulama the regime’s 
intervention in the family, the sphere of the Shari‘a, was an unacceptable intervention in the practice of the 
Shari‘a. The resulting confrontation between the state and the ‘ulama led to the execution of ten religious 
scholars. For more on this even, see Abdullahi (2015). 
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limited to Middle Eastern Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. In fact, in the course 
of the civil war in the 1990s connections to sub-Saharan Africa Muslim countries became as 
important, if not more important. In the rest of the chapter I take a closer look at an Islamic 
education network connecting Somalia and Sudan and the role this network played in the formation 
of the new intellectuals that led the transformation of the previously independent 
neighborhood/lineage Shari‘a courts into a municipal legal system. As mentioned earlier, I do this 
through a case study of one man, Geed, who was a member of the graduates from IUA and who 
led the creation of a unified court system under the UICs.   
An Education Network Connecting Somalia and Sudan 
A. The case history of Geed 
The rest of the chapter is about the formation of the Islamic education network which made it 
possible for Somali students to go to Sudan and obtain postgraduate degrees, the students’ 
socialization and experience in Sudan, and the role these graduates played in the rise of the UICs 
once they returned to Somalia. I do this by focusing on the case history of one man who was a 
member of the graduates. We will call this man Geed.245 The use of case history or life history, 
like other literary genres, shapes “a particular preselected range of data into a meaningful totality” 
(Crapanzano 1980: 8). As such, the case history of Geed which I present here is doubly edited: 
first by Geed in the interview encounter and then by me as I arranged his answers into a meaningful 
totality. I, therefore, have not chosen the case history for reasons of ‘objectivity.’ I also do not 
                                                          
245 Due to the sensitivity around my topic, I struggled with how to stay true to the narrative of my informant while 
avoiding the revelation of my informant’s identity in the retelling of his story. Understandably, many of the people 
I interviewed who were involved with the UICs were quite reluctant about sharing their stories. They feared that 
such revelation would only bring them more scrutiny under the current environment of the ‘war on terror.’ 
Consequently, I had to take extreme care with the way I presented Geed’s narrative such that it would be 
impossible to identify him. I omitted or altered much information for that reason, but the overall narrative is 
faithful to the key theme of the chapter.   
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claim that Geed’s case history is the exact representative of the experiences, views, and role of all 
the other members of the graduates. Rather, I chose the case history because such presentation 
allows me to cover the issues in all their complexities and contradictions ethnographically.  
I was introduced to Geed by a friend who knew us both. Geed, the friend told me, was one of 
the officials of the UICs and, just as importantly, Geed was an ‘academic.’ People in Mogadishu 
use that label to describe someone who has a post-secondary degree from a secular institution or 
someone whose religious training took place in one of the modern Islamic universities. The 
connotation is that such a person is knowledgeable about worldly matters. In telling me that Geed 
was an ‘academic’ my friend meant to suggest that Geed would understand that my research on 
the Shari‘a court movement wasn’t connected to any government intelligence organization and 
that it was just ‘academic.’ The comment was meant to alleviate my fear that Geed, like many 
other people I tried to interview, would find my research topic suspicious and possibly refuse to 
talk to me. That was my friend’s thinking. Appreciative, I welcomed the opportunity and a few 
days later I was taken to meet Geed. We visited Geed, a pleasant man in his 40s, in his office 
located in a building near one of the city’s main thoroughfares. Over the course of my fieldwork 
Geed and I would become good friends. I became his English tutor and he turned out to be one of 
my best sources for information on the UICs. In particular, the process of transforming the 
communal and independent Shari‘a courts into a unified and bureaucratized judiciary after the 
Shari‘a courts took over Mogadishu. Geed wasn’t involved in establishing any of the communal 
Shari‘a courts, but he played a key role in establishing a court system once the UICs were in control 
of the city. It was through him that I found out about the Organization of University Graduates 
(hereafter, I refer to the members of this organization and those that fit their profile as ‘the 
graduates’ or ‘new’ intellectuals).   
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This organization was founded around 2000 by university graduates who returned to 
Mogadishu after postsecondary education from various Muslim countries. The vast majority of the 
members, numbering 150-200, graduated from universities in Sudan. Over 90% came back from 
Sudan, I was told. The graduates had specialized in various fields, including both secular and 
religious subjects. The organization was established because of the need the returning graduates 
felt for a space to socialize, discuss developments in the city, and strategize about how to make a 
difference. One interviewee said, “We just wanted a place to meet and have tea, and we also wanted 
to inform residents of the city, particularly the youth, that they could and should do something 
about the violence and terrible conditions of the city.” In a city divided into racketeering fiefdoms 
by warlords and criminal gangs such a space was hard to come by. The politicization of kinship 
relations and religious polarization also limited the availability of neutral social spaces. The 
establishing of the organization was therefore a clear demonstration of the graduates’ sense of 
unity and the role they felt they could play in society. Geed was a member of this organization. I 
managed to interview some of the members of the organization. My presentation and commentary 
of Geed’s narrative is, therefore, informed by the information gathered from these other interviews. 
Members of the graduates remain close friends today and are very active in different spheres of 
life in Mogadishu, including education, politics, and business. Their influence is, therefore, not 
limited to the role they played in the rise of the UICs.246  The following is a summary of Geed’s 
story and by extension the story of the intellectual formation of the graduates and their role in the 
UICs. 
                                                          
246 One day, I was interviewing an old man who had played a key role in establishing one of the earliest Shari‘a 
courts, but who was at the time of my interview an employee at the Ministry of Awqaf and Religious Affairs. A 
group of men in their 30s and 40s walked by us and he commented how “these Sudanese men” were taking over 
all the jobs at the ministry. Though there is a degree of exaggeration in his comment, it nevertheless, goes to show 
the influence these Sudan educated men continue to have to this day.  
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B. Reformist Movements in Somalia and Educational Opportunities Outside of Somalia 
Geed was born in 1971 in a small town in one of the regions, but he always tells people he was 
born in Mogadishu because “I don’t want to be associated with a specific lineage group, which 
people might do if they know what region my family originally came from.” It’s harder to make 
such an association in a big city like Mogadishu where the population is more mixed. At a very 
young age his family moved to Mogadishu where Geed did all of his early schooling. At the age 
of six, Geed began attending a Qur’anic school and a few years later he was enrolled in a 
government school. Geed never completely memorized the Qur’an nor did he acquire more 
religious education in mosque circles. He left the Qur’anic school when he was thirteen, but 
continued attending public schools until his parents decided in 1986 to enroll him in one of the 
Egyptian funded high schools of Mogadishu. The medium of instruction in these schools was 
Arabic. In those days, Geed said, a lot of parents preferred these schools over government schools 
where Somali was the language of instruction. People were beginning to lose interest in public 
schools because employment in government bureaucracy after graduating from such schools was 
no longer guaranteed. Moreover, there was a general perception that, as with the rest of state 
institutions, there was widespread corruption and indiscipline in these schools. The Egyptian 
funded Arabic language schools were preferred because of the possibility of getting a scholarship 
to pursue further study in the Arab Middle East, or finding employment in the Arab Gulf States. 
These schools were also viewed by many parents as disciplining students in Islamic ethics, “they 
viewed them just like the Qur’anic schools,” in terms of cultivating an Islamic subject, said Geed. 
This was the opposite of the perception many people held of government schools which were 
seeing as teaching immoral and un-Islamic practices.  
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The civil war erupted at the beginning of 1991 when Geed was in the middle of his last 
year of high school. After the collapse of the Somali Republic, the public school system completely 
disintegrated. About a year after the onset of the civil war, few schools were reopened, some with 
funding from Islamic charities. Geed became a teacher at one of these schools. He also joined one 
of the Islamic associations at that time. He joined this Islamic association because a friend of his 
who was already a member advised him to join. Islamic associations/organizations saw increase 
in their number in the early phase of the Somali civil war. Abdullahi (2015) describes how Islah 
Islamic Society247 (commonly known as al-Islah, or reform), the Somali chapter of the 
international association of Muslim Brotherhood groups, saw a large increase in their membership 
after the eruption of the civil war. In the early phase of the civil war, when communal violence 
became widespread in Mogadishu, the organization prioritized the security of its members by 
moving them to relatively safe districts or to their home villages, when the capital became too 
unsafe. The organization also utilized its international connections to provide aid to its members. 
In the words of a prominent leader of al-Islah “we made every effort possible to seek humanitarian 
assistance for our brothers inside Somalia and their families which was our priority. We also 
activated Islah charity to mobilize resources for the people of Somalia” (quoted in Abdullahi 2015: 
325).  
Geed was moved to join an Islamic movement because of these reasons, but also because 
he found, in the space provided by the Islamic association, like-minded people he could engage 
and share information with. With the ethnicization or clanization of the Somali civil war, Islamic 
associations provided one of the few arenas where one could form relations that transcended 
                                                          
247 This movement was launched in 1978 in Sudan. At the time it was called Islah Islamic Society, but changed its 
name in 1989 to Islamic Movement in Somalia. To this day, however, it’s widely known as al-Islah. See Abdullahi 
(2015).  
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lineage members. After joining the organization, Geed got to know the history of the 
organization’s leaders. It was commonly known that the leaders travelled widely and had obtained 
postgraduate degrees, on religious or secular subjects, in foreign countries. Such stories were 
popular and gave the members of the organization the image of being educated and modern. This 
made Geed think of going overseas for further education. He also began to entertain going abroad 
because he met Somalis who left the country in the 80s for the Arab world, and who were coming 
back to Mogadishu as employees of Islamic aid agencies. This made Geed realize that for him to 
get a better paying job, maybe with one of the Islamic charity organizations in Mogadishu, he 
needed more than just a high school education.  Geed was of course not the only young man who 
wanted to pursue further education overseas. Since there were no universities open in Somalia at 
the time the only thing to do was to leave the country. This was, however, not easy to do. Since 
the breakdown of the Somali central state most countries no longer recognized educational 
certificates from Somalia. The disintegration of the state also meant that one couldn’t travel abroad 
with a Somali passport. These factors severely restricted educational opportunities for Somali 
students outside of Somalia. One country, however, opened its doors for Somali students and 
became a popular destination: Sudan. Sudan became a popular destination because it continued to 
accept education certificates from Somalia even after the collapse of state institutions.248 Not only 
that, Sudan also provided scholarships and allowed easy entry into Sudan for Somali students. The 
attraction and accessibility of Sudan for Somali students had to do with political developments 
there.  
                                                          
248 Later on in the mid-90s, when the creation of false documents became widespread, an umbrella organization 
representing Islamic charities working in the education sector, Formal Private Education Network of Somalia 
(FPENS), was established in 1999 to provide the privately owned and run schools with a single certificate. For more 
on the establishment of FPENS and the role of Islamic charities in funding these schools, see Abdullahi (2015); Le 
Sage and Menkhaus (2004); Marchall (2002); Saggiomo (2011). 
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In 1989 a coup brought to power the National Islamic Front (NIF) in Sudan. The NIF 
proclaimed a project that “sought to lay claim to the Islamic identity of the state and to conceive 
of the state as a political form for the development of an Islamic way of life that could meet the 
challenges of modernity” (Salomon 2016: 13). Sudan thus became the first example of an Islamic 
state in the Sunni World where Islamists held the reins of state power. The NIF undertook an 
Islamization project, including the Islamization of knowledge which provided more funding for 
education institutions in an attempt to harmonize modern regimes of knowledge with the ethical 
and moral teachings of Islam (Salomon 2013).249 As a byproduct of the assertion and emphasis on 
Islamic identity by the NIF, Sudan relaxed its visa requirements for citizens of Muslim countries 
and established Islamic institutions and universities to internationalize this project. Africa, and 
particularly Somalia, according to Abdullahi (2015), received special attention in this project. 
Geed and the other men I interviewed weren’t unaware of the connection between the Islamization 
project in Sudan and the opportunities Sudan made accessible to them. But for them the kindness 
that the people of Sudan and government extended to them only enhanced Sudan’s credentials as 
a proper Islamic country. A man who made his way to Sudan by journeying through Ethiopia and 
Eritrea and who was amazed by how well he was received by the guards at the Eritrea-Sudan 
border explained the guards’ behavior, “they were good Muslims and they realized we were a 
Muslim people who were without a government and suffering.” Others explained that as fellow 
                                                          
249 The discourse on the need to Islamize knowledge as a way of meeting the challenges of the modern world is a 
key aspect of contemporary Islamic reform. Sudan in the late 80s and early 90s, as Salomon points out, was unique 
in that such a discourse found a state sponsor, “while intellectuals across the Muslim world had debated the 
merits of such a project for several decades, never had a context arisen in which a state provided the resources for 
the flourishing of such a project not only in educational institutes, but at all levels of governance in which Islamic 
knowledge would be used” (Salomon 2013: 830). For more on the Islamization of knowledge discourse, see Mona 
Abaza (2002); Aziz Talbani (1996).  
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African Muslims they felt culturally closer to the Sudanese people than they did in other countries, 
and, they speculated, perhaps that’s why they were so well received.  
Many of the students who ended up in Sudan did so in one of two ways: they either 
managed to get to Sudan through individual initiative by going through Ethiopia and Eritrea, or as 
part of the Islamic organizations in Somalia and their networks. When offering scholarships to 
Somali students, Sudan did so through reformist Islamic organizations, such as al-Islah and al-
Ittihad250 or through Islamic charities, which were themselves connected directly or indirectly to 
these organizations. Prominent sheikhs who had personal connections to Sudan also received some 
scholarships individually. Overall the students who ended up in Sudan were young men who had 
limited religious education and some proficiency in the Arabic language, which they picked up 
either in the Arabic language high schools, or in the process of their religious education in 
mosques. They were predominantly young and belonged to reformist Islamic organizations. They 
considered themselves part of the Islamic Awakening (al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya, or Baraarugga 
Islaaamka in Somali). According to Geed, the reason the reformist Islamic organizations were 
receiving scholarships and sending their members abroad for further education was because they 
were better organized and had better international connections than the Sufi organizations. He 
estimates that 90% of the generation that went to Sudan in the 90s were of this background. Geed 
was fortunate as he was selected by his organization and ended up going to Sudan on a scholarship. 
Geed thinks he was selected because he was an active member of the organization and because the 
organization’s leadership thought he would succeed academically.  
                                                          
250 Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya, or Islamic Union is a salafi-oriented Islamic organization formed in the early 80s.  
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An important point to underline from the above narrative is in relation to the popularity of 
reformist Islamic organizations in Somalia in recent decades, and what it means to belong to such 
an organization. As we just saw, the primary reason Geed joined the organization had to do with a 
desire to become a part of an association that was united by something other than the politicized 
kinship of the day, the security the organization provided from the civil war, and the opportunities 
that came with being a member of the organization. One of the most important opportunities that 
reformist Islamic organizations in Somalia provided was, and is, the chance to seek further 
education – Islamic or secular – in Muslim countries outside of Somalia. Such education allows 
one to gain employment and social prestige both in Somalia and outside of Somalia. The 
socialization and experience that comes with that education inevitably informs the religious 
practice and discourse of the graduates. Geed no longer considers himself a member of the Islamic 
organization which he joined in 1992, and this is not because he disagrees with them ideologically, 
but because in his capacity as a businessman and an aspiring politician he no longer finds the 
organization all that useful to his current state and ambitions.   
C. Socialization and Formation of a New Identity in Sudan 
In Sudan Geed was one of the few lucky ones for he had a scholarship which paid for his housing 
and tuition. He arrived in Khartoum, Sudan, in 1993 and began the process of gaining admission 
to the International University of Africa – Khartoum. IUA was one of the key institutions of the 
Sudan state’s Islamization project.251 Besides the Somali students, Geed also met many other 
African Muslim students there. IUA was different from other universities in Sudan. It was 
                                                          
251 Salomon (2016) writes that the state’s focus on education was an element in a broader effort to reform the 
individual, “From the establishment of Islamic universities such as Holy Qur’an University or African International 
University, to the funding of small circles for study or prayer, such as the humble Omdurman circle which I visited 
in 2007, from the legal restrictions on dress, gender mixing, and personal comportment, to the da‘wa camps 
established in war zones to train civilians in both Islamic knowledge and military skills, the focus on the individual 
as the locus of Islamic renewal was clear in all in all that the NIF did” 73.  
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previously an Islamic institute which had been turned into a university for the purposes of 
internationalizing the state’s Islamization project with particular focus on Africa. For example, 
unlike other state universities IUA administered its own exams independent of the ministry of 
education’s specific requirements. If one failed its entrance exams the university had an institute 
where one could spend a year or two preparing for the exams. Geed passed the exam which was 
on the Arabic language and other general topics. IUA had five facultie, and the exam one took 
depended on the faculty one was entering. Geed enrolled in the faculty of Shari‘a and law, which 
had two areas of specialization: 1) Shari‘a; 2) Shari‘a and qanun252 (administrative law). Geed’s 
specialization was on Shari‘a and qanun. He explained that the difference between the two areas 
of specialization was that the latter wasn’t just about Shari‘a, but also dealt with state law such as 
criminal or commercial law. In those days the majority of the Somali students at IUA were 
majoring in education because that was the field where one could find employment back in 
Somalia. Indeed, many of the graduates, upon coming back to Somalia, became involved in the 
education sector either by founding their own private schools, becoming teachers, or working for 
the Islamic charities that funded these schools. When I asked Geed why he chose to specialize in 
Shari‘a and qanun, he responded that he knew a government would eventually return to Somalia 
and someone with his specialization would be needed, “I was waiting for a government.” Geed 
didn’t want to talk much about the content of his education in Sudan, but he was enthused, as were 
many others I interviewed, to tell me how great and transformative his experience in Sudan was.  
                                                          
252 In Islamic history qanun is known as the body of administrative laws promulgated by the political sovereign, 
which didn’t draw their authority from the Shari‘a. This is in contrast to the Shari‘a, the body of legal opinions and 
norms established by Muslim jurists based on their understanding of God’s will as expressed in the foundational 
texts (Qur’an and hadith). In Somalia today, secular or state law is referred to as qanun.    
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Among the most important consequences of these students’ experiences in Sudan, which 
my interviewees highlighted, is a shift in their religious views as a result of being exposed to more 
debates and differing religious views, conviction in political activism and political organizing as a 
means of achieving social change, and the consolidation of lasting friendships between the Somali 
students. In terms of how Sudan influenced their religious and world views, Geed explained that 
the level and complexity of Islamic learning and debates in Sudan were significantly higher than 
what they knew in Somalia. This was an eye opening experience. He pointed out that in Somalia 
people follow the Shafi‘i madhhab253 (one of the four Sunni schools of legal tradition in Islamic 
jurisprudence, or fiqh), while in Sudan the Maliki school is predominant. Geed said they were very 
aware of the existence of different schools of thought within fiqh, but encountering that difference 
in practice was very different than learning about it theoretically. As Geed quipped, “I learned that 
another Muslim could have an opposing view to yours on a religious position and you could debate 
and disagree about it without becoming enemies. For a person coming from Somalia where people 
were killing each other this was medicine.” He was amazed at the number of student organizations 
and debates that were taking place at the university campus. He described a scene where student 
groups belonging to different organizations gathered and debated. These debates would get so 
heated that Geed thought a scuffle would break out, but to his amazement the same people whom 
he thought were about to fight would be sitting, laughing, and eating together.  
Geed and the other Somali students’ time in Sudan coincided with the state led Civilization 
Project (al-mashru‘ al-hadari)254 which Geed described as a revolution. He explained that because 
                                                          
253 For more on Madhhabs, see Bearman, Peters, and Vogel, The Islamic School of Law: Evolution, Devolution, and 
Progress (2005).  
254 On the Civilization Project, Salomon (2016) writes, “The initiative that the regime called Civilization Project (al-
mashru‘ al-hadari) took place both in the realm of political and legal institutions, where studies of Sudanese 
Islamization generally place their focus (Layish and Warburg 2002; Sidahmed 1996), and in less-studied areas, such 
as culture and the arts, science, architecture, language, and even in the promotion of certain forms of family and 
A h m e d  I b r a h i m  
 
Page | 243  
 
of this revolution a bus would come to the campus every Friday and take anyone who was 
interested to lectures and debates around the city in government ministries and attended by well-
known international dignitaries and scholars. Another man among this group whom I interviewed 
told me that he met the Doha based Egyptian Muslim scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi,255 one of the 
most recognizable and influential Muslim clerics in the world today. This was an important and 
memorable event for the man who came from a small farming village in southern Somalia. In 
Sudan they also had access to big libraries, which Geed said was a drastic change compared to 
what was available in Somalia. Underlining how miniscule the amount of reading material 
available in Somalia was in comparison to Sudan, one interviewee told me, “it was like coming 
out of darkness into the light.” Exposure to this material and the Islamic public sphere in Sudan 
changed their religious views. Geed said that most of the Somali students in Sudan were salafi in 
orientation, particularly those that went there as members of reformist Islamic organizations. Their 
teachers in Sudan realized this and so would challenge and argue with them. He emphasized the 
debating of ideas had a big influence on him and the other Somali students. It informed them of 
the variety of positions and opinions possible within Islam. For example, he pointed out, if a person 
left Somalia and went to Sudan with a big beard, refraining from listening to music, and not 
shaking women’s hands, he came back from Sudan having trimmed or shaved his beard, no longer 
under the impression that Music was haram (forbidden), and having no problem with shaking a 
woman’s hand. Geed concluded “Sudan made us moderate our views (dhehdhahaad).”  
This idea that Sudan moderated their religious views is one that was expressed by many of 
the men I spoke to. What Geed is describing is an Islamic public sphere where Islamic principles 
                                                          
kinship. Indeed it was these latter arenas of intervention that made the NIF’s project properly one that was 
‘civilizational’ in nature, rather than merely an effort at political or social reform” (64).   
255 For more on this important scholar, see Salvatore (1997); Zaman (2004).  
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and terms frame public debate and discussion. This lively public sphere was made possible by the 
effects on Sudanese society of the Islamization policies of the NIF. This, however, didn’t meant 
that this public sphere was characterized by the absence of meaningful debate because it was 
monopolized by the ruling Islamist elite. The public sphere was Islamic in so far as it was informed 
by “a normative framework that far exceeded the state, one that individuals inhabited regardless 
of their positions on the particular government in question” (Salomon 2016: 5). The only condition 
in participating in this public sphere was that one had to frame one’s argument in the normative 
Islamic framework in order to be heard. The public sphere was thus populated by various actors 
including Islamists, non-Islamists, Sufis, and Salafists. It was this Islamic public sphere populated 
by diverse actors that the Somali students, who left a country in the middle of religious polarization 
based on doctrinal debates between Sufis and Salafis, encountered. It is thus no surprise that they 
left Sudan having softened their hardline doctrinal positions.  
The experience in Sudan was also influential in that it created lasting friendships between 
the Somali students who met there. Though some of these students knew each other because of 
their membership in the same organizations or through the towns and cities they came from, many 
didn’t know each other and sometimes were on opposing sides of competing Islamic organizations. 
Their experience in Sudan, as they describe it, has led them to establish a network of friends and 
colleagues which would be crucial in their activities upon their return to Somalia. Some of the 
Somali students in Sudan, like Geed, had scholarships but many didn’t. This meant that those 
without scholarships shared food and room with those that did. In situations where some of these 
students were receiving occasional stipends from relatives the stipends were shared. The money 
was used to buy and cook food for the group. Since no-one consistently received monthly stipends 
everyone shared what they had when the others were short.  They were thus often better off than 
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the other students at the university, which puzzled the other students since the Somalis were 
coming from a war ravaged country. This collectivity and camaraderie led to the establishment of 
a Somali student organization which represented their collective interest and helped newly arriving 
Somali students navigate the system. 
Back in Somalia, these students might have belonged to different Islamic organizations, 
lineage groups, or came from different regions of the country.  Consequently, a certain amount of 
tension and arguments existed which manifested themselves in competition for leadership roles in 
the Somali student organization. The men I interviewed, however, stressed that these tensions and 
disagreements were worked out in debates within the Somali student organization. So whereas 
back home such differences might have led to more serious confrontations, in Sudan they resolved 
such tensions through debating and grassroots campaigning. This, they contend, was a crucial 
lesson from their experience in Sudan. Overtime, the members of this network, which extended 
into different parts of the Somali inhabited regions in the Horn of Africa and Sudan, began to be 
referred to as bah Sudan.256 The friendships and collegiality formed in Sudan became more 
important upon their return to war-torn Somalia. The network was particularly important in finding 
employment in the Islamic charity funded private schools of Mogadishu. The collective experience 
and socialization which gave the network coherence became the bases for their formation as a 
group whose self-understanding vis-à-vis the rest of the society was that of a vanguard.  They saw 
their experience in Sudan as having made them more ‘moderate’ i.e. more open to varying 
interpretations of Islamic practice. They also viewed their education and time in Sudan as having 
                                                          
256 Bah is a Somali kinship term that is used to distinguish the members of a single family when the father is 
married to more than one woman. So the children from different mothers who share the same father are 
distinguished in reference to their mother’s name. For example, bah Asha are the children of Asha. Given the 
significance of kinship ideology in Somalia it’s telling that these students began to refer to themselves as bah 
Sudan indexing Sudan as their common origin and the source of their loyalty.  
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equipped them with an understanding of the issues facing a modern Muslim society, thus uniquely 
positioning them to play a leadership role in transforming the war-torn society.  
Though there is no doubt their experience and socialization in Sudan made a great impact 
on their identity, discourses, practice, and worldviews, the emphasis on the transformative nature 
of their time in Sudan is part of their self-description as modern and worldly Muslims. Their view 
of Islamic knowledge in Somalia is that it’s very limited and Islamic practice as unnecessarily 
restrictive, both the Sufi and Salafi/Wahhabi257 variety. They often view the conflicts and heated 
debates between Sufis and Salafis as a product of their collective ignorance and intolerance. The 
narrative of Sudan’s dramatic and moderating influence on their lives should be seen as part of 
this group’s critique of Islamic practice in Somalia and their self-perception as more modern. 
Geed’s description of what happened once he returned to Mogadishu brings to the fore this group’s 
understanding of their identity and role in society.  
Geed returned to Mogadishu in 1998. Over the four years of his absence, life in Mogadishu 
had become more precarious. Warlords and criminal gangs had multiplied dividing the city into 
fiefdoms and protection rackets making movement between different parts of the city almost 
impossible. There also emerged a big kidnapping for ransom business which created an even more 
complex mosaic of militias and criminal groups. Upon returning to Mogadishu close friends and 
acquaintances in Sudan found themselves in different parts of the city unable to visit and see each 
other. As a way of challenging these enclosures Geed describes how one day he and a friend from 
Sudan tried to walk though parts of the city. After every couple of blocks they would encounter a 
checkpoint manned by a ragtag militia. Since they had nothing of value on their body the militia 
                                                          
257 I am using these terms in the same way they are used in local discourse. I am, therefore, not using the labels to 
index a particular worldview or propensity to political violence as is commonly assumed by commentators, though 
that might sometimes be the function of the labels in local discourse as well.  
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would let them go, but not before enquiring into who they were and where they were going. Upon 
finding out that the two friends calmly walking through Mogadishu belonged to different lineage 
families whose militias were engaged in a bitter turf war, the militiamen would be dumbfounded 
and warn them not to go any further. Geed and his friend would thank them and continue on their 
way. Whether this story actually happened or not the significance of the story is that it’s meant to 
highlight the new found identity and self-perception of bah Sudan. They saw themselves as above 
the politicized kinship allegiances and local understanding and practices of Islam. They viewed 
politicized kinship and intra-religious polarization as the sources of the conflict in Somalia. 
Because of their new found identity the graduates thought themselves above these squabbles and 
so uniquely positioned to lead society to overcome them.  
D. Bureaucratization of Shari‘a Practice and Transformation of Shari‘a Authority  
Soon after his return in 1998, Geed got a job in the education sector, where many of his friends in 
Sudan were employed. The school he began to teach at was founded by someone who also came 
back from Sudan. This school, like the majority of the schools in Mogadishu after the civil war, 
was established and sometimes run with the assistance of Islamic charities. In helping to fund these 
schools, the Islamic charities would agree to pay for part of the initial expenses of setting up the 
school with the goal that the school would eventually become self-sustaining through the fees 
collected from students (Le Sage and Menkhaus 2004). The schools used Arabic as the language 
of instruction and their curricula were often copies of those from the Arab world. Their choice of 
a curriculum was dictated by the absence of up-to-date Somali language textbooks and the 
availability of textbooks from the home countries of the charities that helped fund these schools. 
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Locally the schools were viewed as ‘Islamic’ schools.258 Except for an Islamic studies subject 
which focused on a different religious topic each week, however, the schools taught regular 
subjects like mathematics, history, science, etc. The reasons for the designation of these schools 
as Islamic seems to derive from their use of Arabic as the language of instruction and connections 
to Islamic charities.  
The schools’ designation as Islamic was significant not so much in terms of the religious 
instructions they provided but because of the perception by Mogadishu residents that these were 
spaces where young people were disciplined to be virtuous Muslims. The schools came to be 
viewed as spaces where one was disciplined in the proper Islamic etiquette and behavior (adab).259 
This perception was significant because it turned the schools into centers where parents took their 
children not only to be educated, but to prevent them from joining militias and gangs. An 
administrator of one of these schools noted, “some parents when called to the school to be told 
about their children’s behavior would tell you: please keep them in school even if they don’t learn 
anything, because if they are suspended they would end up in the street with other armed robbers” 
(quoted in Abdinoor 2007: 166). Another administrator told me that his school was one of the first 
to open in the city after the eruption of the civil war. After opening the school the administration 
of the school held a meeting. They told the parents they didn’t have text books or teachers to 
                                                          
258 In many ways these schools resembled what in Louis Brenner’s (2001) account of Islamic education in Mali was 
referred to as medersas (modernized Muslim schools). Like the medersas in Mali the Islamic charity funded schools 
in Mogadishu are established and taught by graduates from universities in Islamic countries. Like the medersas, 
Arabic is the medium of instruction and religion is taught as a subject among other subjects. Nonetheless, they 
were not called madrasas.   
259 These schools were locally viewed as spaces where students were inculcated in the proper Adab. Ira Lapidus 
(1984) writes on this concept “Adab was used throughout the classical era of Islam to imply learning and 
knowledge for the sake of right living. [It meant] in its most general sense: correct knowledge and behavior in the 
total process by which a person is educated, guided, and formed into a good Muslim. In this larger . . . sense, adab 
is part of a system of Muslim ideas, part of interrelated set of concepts that constitutes the basic vocabulary of 
Islamic belief and makes up a Muslim anthropology of man.” Another related concept is tarbiya (education, 
pedagogic, training) which is viewed as an integral part of any Islamic education. See Anne Roald (1994). 
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instruct their children in anything, and that all the school offered was a space for parents to keep 
their children off the streets and away from becoming victims or perpetrators of the violence that 
was rocking the city.  The parents agreed to send their children to the school and pay the small 
fee.260 As Mogadishu’s situation deteriorated throughout the 1990s, Islamic institutions, 
authorities, and discourses provided the spaces and language for critiquing and addressing the 
violence of the war. It was in this context that the private schools of Mogadishu became popular 
as a space where young people could be sheltered from the effects of the war partly by being 
disciplined in Islamic ethics.    
It’s important to remember that initially many of the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu began 
life as rehabilitation centers where parents or relatives of delinquent youth, and the not-so young, 
were taken to be rehabilitated by religious authorities on the right conduct and responsibility of a 
proper Muslim subject. One of the most important communal Shari‘a courts, the court of Harar 
Yaalle, which operated between 1994 and 2007, was primarily a rehabilitation center. I was told 
that at one point it held over 350 individuals to be rehabilitated. It is, therefore, a widely held and 
Shari‘a-informed assumption of the need to cultivate and embody Islamic virtues in order to live 
the life of an ethical Muslim subject that explains the emergence of the rehabilitation centers i.e. 
the Shari‘a court, and the popularity of the private ‘Islamic’ schools.261 The popularity of these 
schools allowed the foreign-educated university graduates, like Geed, to rise to positions of 
authority within the environment provided by these schools. They leveraged their university 
                                                          
260 Along the same lines, Le Sage and Menkhaus (2004) write, “They consistently state the charity-supported 
schools are the only substantial efforts to keep young men ‘off the technicals’ – the gun-mounted trucks that form 
the cavalry of the Somali civil war – and out of gangs. In addition, the mixed classrooms create horizontal 
interaction and build bonds between members of different clans” 23.  
261 For an insightful discussion of the importance of the cultivation of the human sensorium as a prerequisite to 
embodying the virtues necessary to ethical living in the Islamic tradition, and how this aspect of the tradition is 
being recalibrated in the contemporary moment under reformist Islamic movements, see Charles Hirschkind 
(2006).  
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degrees, their proficiency in Arabic, and their connections to Islamic internationalism to gain 
influence and become prominent figures in these schools. The popularity and proliferation of these 
schools throughout Mogadishu was part of a process where Islamic institutions, authorities, and 
discourses were offering an alternative and a way out of the cycle of violence that the city was 
thrown into in 1991. Since members of bah Sudan were leading figures in these schools they were 
well positioned to play a leading role in the transformation of the Shari‘a courts from locally-
established and community based institutions to a city-wide administrative organization under the 
UICs.  
As mentioned above, upon returning from Sudan Geed found a job at a private school 
founded by another man who also came back from Sudan. For money and for prestige, however, 
Geed wanted to be in a management position. He also thought he could manage a school better 
than most because of his university degree. Establishing your own private school was a big 
undertaking requiring both money and community support, so Geed’s best bet for getting into a 
management position was to find employment in one of the big charity organizations that funded 
orphanages with their own schools. He approached the local office of a large charity based in one 
of the Gulf States. Most of the local staff of the charity were Somali and Geed was told that the 
only position they could offer him was a teaching position. He declined that offer. A few months 
later Geed found out a big delegation from the charity was coming to Mogadishu and rumor had 
it that a reorganization of the orphanages and their management was on their agenda. He was even 
more excited when he heard they wanted to select people with university degrees. He jumped on 
this opportunity by writing a letter to the delegation in Arabic. He gave the letter to a friend of his 
who worked for the charity, so that he could hand it to the delegation once they arrived in 
Mogadishu, bypassing the local Somali staff. After receiving the letter the delegation agreed to 
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meet with him for an interview. Geed was asked many questions in the form of various 
hypothetical scenarios having to do with management issues. The delegation was so pleased with 
his performance that a few days later he got a call from the charity’s office informing him that he 
was assigned as the deputy manager of an orphanage. The Somali staff at the charity’s Mogadishu 
office couldn’t believe he went over their head and were furious, but what could they do.  
A few months into his position as the deputy chairman of the orphanage, the chairman of 
the orphanage was asked to submit a detailed itemization of the previous year’s budget showing 
where and how the money was spent. The chairman had no idea what to do, “he was a turban-
wearing wadaad (a man of religion); he was always at the mosque. He didn’t know anything about 
math or administration, but I knew these things well,” explained Geed. Confronted with this, the 
chairman called on Geed to help him prepare the report. Geed assisted him in preparing the budget, 
but this only made the chairman angrier because he felt his position more threatened than ever. 
Geed claims that he always paid the chairman’s animosity towards him with kindness. He read a 
verse from the Qur’an whose rough translation is ‘if you repay their bad deeds with good deeds 
your enemies will become your friends’ to underline his attitude. A few months passed before 
another delegation from the charity came to Mogadishu to inspect all the orphanage centers. They 
checked many things: the overall condition of the orphanage, the staff, the hygiene of the children 
(hair, nails, etc.), the beds, and many other things. As the head of the orphanage, the chairman took 
the delegation around. Whenever they saw something wrong, like a garbage can knocked over, 
they reprimanded the chairman. The chairman got angry every time he was scolded, “he was just 
an old wadaad who had always been in the mosque and couldn’t tolerate being scolded.” To add 
to the misunderstanding, “the old man’s Arabic wasn’t good. He knew classical Arabic which he 
learned in the mosque in the process of his religious education, but he couldn’t speak well.” After 
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walking around with the delegation for a while the chairman had had enough and left Geed alone 
with the delegation. The head of the delegation, a Sudanese man, was very pleased with Geed. A 
few weeks after the delegation’s visit Geed was informed that he was to be the new head of the 
orphanage.  
What is fascinating about this story is Geed’s deft exploitation of his international 
connections, university degree, and mastery of the Arabic language to outmaneuver the local 
Somali staff in the political economy of the charity-supported schools. He skillfully uses his 
experience in Sudan and his mastery of the Arabic language to go above the local networks that 
controlled access to employment in this sector. Geed never mentioned ideological affinity or 
awareness of more contemporary or reformist Islamic discourses as the reason for his relationship 
with the foreign based leaders of the Islamic charities. Rather, the bases of his relations with them 
and what makes him more valued by the international/Arabic staff of the charity is his mastery of 
the Arabic language, and his capacity for bookkeeping and management. Time and again Geed 
referred to his capacity to establish and administer a system (nizam) as uniquely qualifying him. 
He viewed nizam as central to the practice of Islam. Without order there is only mayhem. His high 
valuation of rational bureaucratic know-how is grounded on the assumption that this is what the 
modern world requires. Such traditional Islamic virtue as patience is recast in Geed’s narrative as 
necessary because it’s an indispensable virtue in functioning within the chain of command of a 
bureaucratic organization. The traditionally-trained chairman of the orphanage, whom he 
disparagingly called a simple wadaad and whom he eventually replaced, is said to be lacking such 
patience because he wasn’t schooled in a modern institution. Geed uses the term wadaad to mean 
a simple man of religion who has only had religious education in traditional settings and therefore 
ill-prepared for running an organization requiring bureaucratic and administrative knowledge. His 
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use of Wadaad encompasses both those who self-describe or are described as Sufi or Salafi. In 
fact, the particular sheikh, the chairman of the orphanage, that is the subject of his above 
commentary is considered a Salafi. Geed’s view of the locally-trained religious scholars and their 
place in society becomes clearer as he describes his role within the UICs. 
After the September 11, 2001 terror attacks in New York and Washington things began to 
deteriorate in Mogadishu. Some of the biggest Islamic charity organizations that were supporting 
the private schools and orphanages came under scrutiny as directly or indirectly supporting 
‘radicalization.’ Some charities curtailed their activities, while others withdrew from the country 
completely. The city’s security also deteriorated. As in 1993, the quest for education gave Geed 
the reason to leave a city that seemed on the verge of another round of intense conflict. By this 
time there was a sizeable Somali community in Egypt and some of the students from Sudan had 
made their way to Egypt. Geed had contacts there and through them he secured a visa to Egypt. 
Once in Egypt Geed enrolled in an institute funded by the Arab League Educational, Cultural and 
Scientific Organization (ALESCO). There, he first did a two-year diploma and then a masters on 
Shari‘a and qanun which he completed in mid-2005. After completing his studies he returned to 
Somalia in early 2006. By this time the situation in Mogadishu had changed dramatically. When 
he left the city in 2001 there were small and independent community centers known as Shari‘a 
courts in some neighborhoods of the city. Around 2003 the Shari‘a courts began to go through a 
transformation. They grew in strength as they gained more community support and began to 
coordinate their activities. The rise to power of courts led to a conflict with Mogadishu’s most 
powerful warlords for control of the city. Taking advantage of the opportunities for funding made 
available by the U.S.-led ‘war on terror’ the warlords rebranded themselves the Alliance for the 
Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) in early 2006.    
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Shortly after the creation of ARPCT, an intense conflict erupted between them and the 
alliance of the Shari‘a courts. The conflict ended with the victory of the Shari‘a courts and their 
allies in July 2006. Soon after taking over the city the Shari‘a courts and their allies created the 
Union of Islamic Courts (UICs). With the city under the control of the UICs everyone began to 
flock to the winning side. Even communities that didn’t have their own Shari‘a court, and 
therefore, didn’t partake in the conflict with the warlords created their own Shari‘a courts so as to 
share in the emerging power dispensation. Many people thought the movement which they came 
to call an uprising (ka‘doon) would lead to an Islamic government, though no-one was quite sure 
what exactly an Islamic government entailed, and those that had some idea were in disagreement. 
One thing everyone agreed upon was that an Islamic government must be governed by the Shari‘a, 
though of course what a Shari‘a-based government looked like wasn’t clear as well. It was one 
thing to call the community centers run by the sheikhs from the local mosques Shari‘a courts, but 
establishing a city-wide Shari‘a-based court system that functioned essentially as the city’s new 
administration was a different story. One group that was well-positioned within the revolution and 
who prided and distinguished themselves on their understanding of Islam and the modern world 
were members of bah Sudan. Members of this group took on a leading role in bringing together 
the leadership of the different Shari‘a courts and coordinating their activities during the conflict 
with the warlords, as well as establishing a unified judiciary once the UICs was in control of the 
city.  
Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, for example, who used to be the chairman of the university 
graduates was now a chairman of an important court, the court of Siissi. He was also a leading 
figure in the Shari‘a court movement’s conflict with the warlords. Many other members of bah 
Sudan were playing different roles within the movement. Even those among them who were not 
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directly involved with the Shari‘a courts were helping the courts in other ways. They would, for 
example, go on local radio stations and encourage everyone to assist the courts with whatever they 
could. This was an Islamic duty and the right thing to do, they argued, because the courts were 
doing the just thing in opposing the warlords and their crimes. On multiple occasions during the 
conflict between the warlords and the Shari‘a courts, members of bah Sudan helped draft Friday 
sermons applauding the work of the Shari‘a courts and encouraging people to support them. Copies 
of the sermons were secretly handed out to all the mosques of the city to be read simultaneously 
during Friday sermons. This was tremendously important in rallying the residents of Mogadishu 
to the cause of the Shari‘a courts against the warlords. Since many of the members of bah Sudan 
were in positions of influence in various spheres of social life, their support was important in the 
courts’ rise to power. This support for the courts was not haphazard but was planned by the 
Organization of Somali University Graduates. They were also the leading figures in the attempt to 
establish a unified judiciary under the UICs, a process that essentially entailed the 
bureaucratization and centralization of Shari‘a practice and authority.  
We now turn to Geed’s involvement in this process to get a better understanding of the 
changes the rise of the UICs brought to the authority and practice of Shari‘a. Geed was intrigued 
by the courts and what they were doing. He was specially fascinated by the efficiency with which 
the courts were mobilizing the population and securing the city. He kept referring to the events of 
that time as a miracle. His friends from Sudan, who were active in the courts, encouraged him to 
get involved but he refused till July 2006, when the unified militia of the Shari‘a courts evicted the 
warlords and took control of the city. In July 2006, as the UICs was attempting to establish an 
integrated court system, Geed was convinced to join the project by an acquaintance, a graduate 
from a university in Egypt, who was in the UICs’ Shura council. The friend knew Geed had a 
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masters in Shari‘a and qanun, and thus judged him perfectly qualified for the task at hand. Because 
of this expertise Geed was assigned to a senior position in the newly created Court of the Union 
(mahkamada midowga) located in the dilapidated buildings of the old Banaadir regional court. 
This court was the creation of the newly formed UICs made up of a Shura Council (Guddiga 
Shurada) and an Executive Council (Guddiga Fulinta). After taking control of the city the UICs 
created the Court of the Union as the principal component in establishing for the city a new and 
centralized governing structure. The Court of the Union was composed of three courts: a) the 
highest court of the new court system; b) an appeals court; c) the Court for Returning Forcefully 
Taken Fixed Assets (Mahkamada Hanti Isu Celinta). Significantly, the UIC officials declared that 
only individuals with degrees in Shari‘a and qanun could be appointed as judges or administrators 
at the new Court of the Union complex. Since Shari’a and qanun wasn’t a subject learned in the 
traditional religious education in Somalia, this requirement meant that only individuals with 
university degree could be appointed to the Court of the Union. Many of the people who met this 
requirement were the young men who had graduated from modern Islamic universities outside the 
country in the Muslim world.  
A seminar262 was held for the sheikhs and judges of the previously community-based 
Shari‘a courts, and only those who passed the exam at the conclusion of the seminar were given a 
judgeship position in the Court of the Union. Those who failed the exam were reorganized and 
assigned to district level courts. The old community-based Shari‘a courts were thus transformed 
into district courts, the lowest level of the new Shari‘a court system. The jurisdiction of the district 
                                                          
262 The material for the seminar came from Qaradawi’s book, Al-siyasa al-shar‘iyya fi daw‘ nusus al-shari‘a wa 
maqasidiha (Governance according to Shari‘a norms in light of the sacred legal texts and their purposes), a work 
that, according to Zaman (2005) “runs to over three hundred pages and offers an extensive discussion of the 
juristic concepts of maslaha (public interest) and, as the work’s title suggests, of siyasa shar‘iyya (governance 
according to shari‘a norms)” 96. The man leading the seminar was a graduate of one of the Saudi Islamic 
universities. 
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level courts was limited to family matters and minor disputes. Effectively, district courts occupied 
the same space and had the same jurisdiction as family courts under the previous military regime. 
In dismantling and reorganizing the original communal Shari‘a courts as district courts, the UIC 
was taking the first steps in bureaucratizing and centralizing Shari’a practice. This also meant the 
usurpation of the Shari’a-based authority of the traditionally trained neighborhood sheikhs who 
found and run the original communal courts. In so doing the UIC was also essentially undermining 
the communal embeddedness of Shari’a authority and practice.    
In his new position as one of the top officials at the Court of the Union Geed was 
responsible for setting up the administration and management of the new court complex. The 
administrative procedures and institutional reforms which he and his colleagues instituted helped 
to streamline and centralize Shari‘a practice, further undermining the authority of the 
neighborhood Shari‘a authorities. Among the administrative procedures he and his colleagues 
instituted at the Court of the Union included, the requirement that each case would be presided 
over by 1-3 judges, depending on the severity of the case. Upon reaching a decision the judges 
were required to run their final decision by Geed so that he would be able to give attention to those 
cases that involved politically sensitive issues. Under the previous communal Shari‘a courts the 
local sheikhs who presided over disputes were often the same figures as the traditional elders of 
the community or worked very closely with them. This meant that considerations of the effects of 
their decisions, political or otherwise, were an integral part of their deliberations and not separate 
from it. This had to be the case since, in the absence of a monopoly over the use of force, their 
decisions were effective only in so far as they were perceived to be just. Under the UICs such 
considerations were removed from the deliberation of the judges and placed in a different office. 
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Geed proudly told me that they were working on giving the judges codified versions of the Shari‘a 
copied from other Islamic countries to systematize the rulings and limit the judges’ latitude.  
He and his colleagues also transformed the position of wakiilu da‘wa. In the community-
based Shari‘a courts, litigants could avail themselves of the services of wakiilu da‘wa to make 
their case for them in court. Such a person didn’t have to have any specific expertise in law or in 
any other subject. Wakiilu da‘wa was widely used in the Shari‘a courts before their unification 
under the UICs. The only requirement was the Wakiilu da‘wa had to be “a good Muslim”, someone 
with an outstanding moral character as judged by the sheikhs and elders at the court. Geed 
transformed the position by requiring that only someone with a university degree in Shari‘a or in 
Shari‘a and qanun could represent another person in court. Moreover, it would be Geed himself 
and his office where the determination of whether a person met the necessary qualifications were 
made. He justified this by stating that the position of wakiily da‘wa had been abused and was 
undermining the course of justice. Litigants, he argued, were employing afminshaars (literally, 
someone who cuts or dissects with his/her tongue i.e. someone who isn’t constrained by the 
difference between a truth and a lie in making a case) to argue their cases in court. By instituting 
this change Geed hoped that knowledge of Shari‘a and qanun as well as the moral and ethical 
virtues cultivated through such knowledge, which he assumed a person trained in Shari’a and 
qanuun possessed, would prevent them from knowingly representing a false claim.  
Another innovation that had a similar impact is the creation of a court of appeals under the 
UICs. Under the UICs a court of appeals was established to allow parties dissatisfied with a court’s 
decision the opportunity to challenge the decision. Geed’s office determined whether a case should 
be forwarded to the appeals court after considering the arguments for and appeal. There was an 
appeals process under the communal Shari‘a courts but it was very different than the appeals 
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process under the UICs. Under the communal Shari‘a courts there were no hierarchy of courts and 
thus there was no specific court of appeals. This, however, didn’t mean that a court’s decision 
couldn’t be contested. Such contestation of a court’s decision happened in two ways.  It was a 
common practice in the communal Shari‘a courts to invite well-known and reputable Shari‘a 
authorities, locally referred to as Mufti (jurisconsult) or Fuqaha (Shari‘a specialists) to sit on as 
cases where argued and be present for judgements rendered. This was done so that the public 
would have confidence that the judgments rendered were in accordance with the Shari‘a. In some 
instances, these Shari‘a authorities would contest the decision reached by the judges. This led to a 
new round of deliberations and debate in the court between the challenging Shari‘a authorities and 
the judges. In such situations, the court’s judgment would be postponed until the challenge had 
been satisfactorily addressed. In some cases the previous decision would be overruled.  
Another way a case was appealed was when one of the litigants was unhappy with the 
decision of the court. The litigant could take her/his case and the judgement of the court to a Mufti 
and ask for an opinion. If the consulted Mufti disagreed with the court’s decision then the case 
would be brought back to the court to be argued once more. This was the process through which a 
case was appealed under the communal Shari‘a courts. This process allowed for more contestation 
of a court’s decision and Shari‘a authorities were crucial to this process. After the establishment 
of an appeals courts and Geed’s office, the appeals process was taken out of the hands of Shari‘a 
authorities outside of those working as judges for the UICs. Interestingly, under the communal 
Shari‘a courts an appeal of a court’s decision hinged upon arguments over the position of the 
Shari‘a. Under the UICs disagreements over the position of the Shari‘a weren’t the basis of 
appeals. Rather, appeals under the UICs were on matters of procedure and evidence.  In other 
words, the Shari‘a understanding of the judges of the UICs were final and could not be contested. 
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This was a major transformation of the openness and contestation that was part and parcel of 
Shari‘a practice under the communal Shari‘a courts. Geed also instituted a small fee (gar furasho) 
before filing a case with the court. He hoped this would discourage people from making false 
accusations and also help to pay for the running of the court. Many of the administrative procedures 
that Geed instituted got him involved in heated debates with traditional ‘ulama who opposed the 
changes on the bases of their incompatibility with the Shari‘a. These arguments and the process of 
their resolution shed light on the conflicts within the newly victories UICs and the position and 
thinking of the group of young men with university education whom Geed is a representative of.  
At the newly established Court of the Union, which was essentially the city’s new 
municipality under the UICs, the most important court was the Court for Returning Forcefully 
Taken Fixed Assets (Maxkamada Hanti Isu Celinta). As Geed pointed out throughout the decade 
and half of civil war “people killed each other and that we could do nothing about, but a lot of 
people fled Mogadishu and all their houses and land were taken over by a new group of people. 
This was the biggest issue we had to resolve. Over 90% of the cases the court dealt with had to do 
with this issue. This is why the Shura Council set up the special court dealing with this issue.” This 
special court was also set up because conflicts over land and houses were very complex and 
politically sensitive. Because of the complexity of the issues this court had to deal with the Shura 
Council decided to create a special committee made up of some of the most renowned and 
respected sheikhs in the area to preside over cases involving complex land disputes. The Council 
thought that because of their reputation and knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) the 
judgments by such well-respected sheikhs would carry more weight and was more likely to be 
accepted by the litigants and their respective communities. Geed, however, was opposed to the 
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assignment of these sheikhs to the special court because he thought they didn’t have the technical 
and administrative know-how to run such a court.  
The Sheikhs, for their part, opposed some of Geed’s administrative innovations, such as 
the imposition of a fee before opening a case with the court. The sheikhs objected to such a 
requirement as un-Islamic i.e. unjust, arguing that the poor who had been wronged shouldn’t be 
made to pay to receive justice. They also feared that once collected such money could become a 
source of corruption. Geed insisted that there was nothing wrong with the practice and that it was 
essential to the functioning of a court system anywhere in the world. He argued it was an 
internationally recognized practice. Geed referred to most of his technical and administrative 
innovations as international (‘alami) so as to suggest that they were beyond reproach since they 
were an internationally recognized standard. He asked the sheikhs, who was going to pay for the 
running of the court? “The ‘ulama didn’t think about that,” he explained. The conflict between the 
sheikhs and Geed reached the Shura Council. The Council agreed with Geed that the fee for 
opening a case with the court should be levied. The Council, however, disregarded with Geed’s 
argument that the Court for Returning Forcefully Taken Fixed Assets shouldn’t be placed under 
the ‘ulama’s care and the special court was placed in the care of the ‘ulama. After the ‘ulama took 
over the running of the special court everything came to a standstill. Said Geed, “the ‘ulama just 
sat there with their hands crossed and everywhere people crowded around them wanting to have 
their cases heard. I came to them and told them for God’s sake what are you doing, why aren’t you 
working? They said, we’re ‘ulama and we are here to decide on the Shari‘a position of disputes, 
we’re not here to write things (paper work). They couldn’t understand that you needed to file a 
case, give the person a number, summon the litigants, schedule a date for the case to be heard, 
create and file documents, and many more things.” After a week it became obvious to the Shura 
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Council that the ‘ulama couldn’t run the court and the court was turned over to Geed and the judges 
he picked. The ‘ulama, however, were retained as advisors to this court and were called upon in 
very difficult cases when their standing in the community was crucial to establishing the legitimacy 
of the UICs court’s rulings.   
Conclusion 
Many of the institutional and procedural changes made under the UIC were led by university 
educated men. These changes included the establishment of a distinct court dealing with family 
matters and the creation of a hierarchical court system. These transformations involved a 
bureaucratization of Shari‘a practice, a process that transferred authority away from traditional 
religious figures (wadaads). Though this process was led by the graduates, authority didn’t thereby 
transfer to them. This is because bureaucracy, “rule by writing desk” (Hull 2012), is by definition 
impersonal. The bureaucratization of Shari‘a practice meant various mundane procedures of 
converting formerly family/communal run courts all over the city into a networked system of 
compatible arbitration centers that could be recognized as a cohesive municipal legal system. 
These procedures—as Geed shows in both his narrative of the orphanage where he deploys 
mastery of paperwork and accounting systems that are legible to international organizations seem 
mundane but are actually crucial in usurping the “traditional” authority of wadaad. These mundane 
procedures—paper work, archiving, paying fees—are significant because they illustrate the very 
processes that transferred authority from one party to a network. The “traditional” ‘ulama lost 
control over the courts not just because they didn’t know how to do paperwork. They still would 
have lost their authority because that is how bureaucratization works. Bureaucratization is not just 
about institution building but converting a “rule of expertise” (in the sense of the ‘ulama whose 
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authority comes from their knowledge of Shari‘a) into a Rule of Records (Hull 2008, 2011), where 
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Epilogue 
The memory of the communal Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu and the Union of Islamic Courts 
(UICs) was a hotly contested issue in Mogadishu when this fieldwork was carried out between 
2014 and 2015. On the one hand there are those who view the experience of the courts as a lost 
opportunity, referring to that time as a “golden time” (wakht al-dahab) and the Shari‘a courts “as 
a gift from God.” And, on the other hand, there are many who see the courts as the harbingers and 
forerunners of terrible times and events yet to come. They blame the courts’ leadership for 
negligence and inexperience, and for not having the foresight to anticipate the kind of reaction 
they would provoke from regional countries and the “international community.” Whether it’s 
positive or negative, the memory of the courts is conditioned not so much by what the courts and 
the UICs actually did during their time, but by the events that followed their rise which resulted in 
the terrible conditions of the present. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the transformation 
of the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu into the UICs was followed by a series of reactions labelled as 
“counter-terrorism” operations, beginning with the American-backed Ethiopian invasion of 
Mogadishu and the UN-led state-building project. These events turned Somalia, particularly 
Mogadishu and southern Somalia, into a front in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). It’s these 
events and the current condition of pervasive insecurity, fear, and suspicion that frame the memory 
of the courts. The following is an example of how the memory of the courts is being re-evaluated 
in light of what has come after the courts. 
I met Agon at one of the many hotels in Mogadishu, which cater primarily to employees 
of the government and international NGOs. As such, these hotels are targeted by the Islamist 
militant group al-Shabaab, which considers anyone associated with the government and its 
international backers an enemy. I was at the hotel with an acquaintance who introduced me to 
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Agon. We sat in the open courtyard of the hotel fenced in by high walls made up of wires, 
sandbags, and concrete. Agon, who is in his 60s, got involved with the Shari‘a courts in 2005 
during the courts’ confrontation with the warlords. His didn’t really join the courts in any formal 
way. He just became one of the many who supported the courts without being actual members of 
the courts. He organized and joined demonstrations whenever the leaders of the courts were 
holding a rally. He told people that the work the courts were doing was good and that everyone 
should support in whatever way they could. He went on local radio stations to sing the praises of 
the courts. When the Shari‘a courts evicted the warlords out of Mogadishu and created the UICs, 
the UICs began spreading to other parts of the country. One of the ways the UICs spread to other 
cities and towns was to send a delegation from the UICs in Mogadishu to the area in question and 
encourage the people there to join the UICs by creating their own Shari‘a court and declaring 
allegiance to the UICs. After the UICs’ take-over of Mogadishu, Agon was among a group of 
elders sent to a town in central Somalia to convince the people there to create a Shari‘a court and 
declare allegiance to the UICs. Agon said his primary reason for supporting the courts was because 
he felt that “the warlords were an obstacle,” and, continued “if the warlords were defeated it would 
lead to a reconciliation among the Somali people and then there would be a government.” I asked 
Agon to reflect on his experience during the rise of the courts and what he thought about the courts 
now: 
When the courts first appeared everyone in Mogadishu was in panic; people were 
overwhelmed because there was so much violence. Everyone in Mogadishu 
thought the same way. When you are among hundreds of ignorant people you 
become like them. The educated and the regular people were all alike in their 
support for the courts. This is because no-one was able to take a neutral view of 
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the courts: who were they? Where were they heading? In those days people 
thought a sheikh was a sheikh; they thought they were all the same. People didn’t 
know the difference between extremist (xag-jir) and moderate (qunyar so‘od). 
People didn’t see that there were many different groups within the courts. They 
were overburdened with insecurity which they were desperate to throw off. When 
the Ethiopian forces came to Mogadishu and al-Shabaab spearheaded the 
resistance, the Shabaab killed many innocent people. I criticized al-Shabaab. 
They threatened me and then attacked my house. I had to flee the country.  
I wish I had a chance to read about the Taliban in Afghanistan before I joined the 
courts. In Afghanistan, after the mujahideen defeated the Soviets they began to 
fight amongst themselves. They fought because of the different religious views 
they held and not just over how to rule. The only thing that united them was their 
opposition to the warlords. There is no question that even if the Ethiopians didn’t 
come the courts would have fought amongst themselves and divided the city into 
different sections just like the warlords. They were only united by their opposition 
to the warlords, which concealed their real differences.  
 Throughout our conversation Agon was eager to highlight his association with and support 
for the Shari‘a courts during the courts’ confrontation with the warlords, but at the same time felt 
the need to justify his support for the courts. He explains that he and everyone else in Mogadishu 
were too overwhelmed by insecurity to correctly judge what the courts were. The layman and the 
educated were alike panic stricken and embraced the courts without thinking about who the courts 
were. Agon also reveals that when the Shari‘a courts first appeared in the 90s the current 
categorization and differentiation of Islamic organizations and movements into “extremists” (xag-
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jir) and “moderates” (qunyar so‘od) was not yet standard in Mogadishu. The Somali terms xag-jir 
and qunyar so‘od did exist as terms prior to the 90s, but only recently are they used to describe 
Islamist groups or personalities. Another interlocutor told me that the usage of these terms was 
first introduced by the media, particularly the Somali language BBC services. He noted that 
initially people were skeptical and thought that it was just away to discredit Muslims, but 
nevertheless the terms were slowly adopted. Clearly, the international context and not just events 
in Somalia condition the memory and experience of the courts.  
Agon illustrates this best when he says that had he known about the history of the Taliban 
in Afghanistan, he would have been much more skeptical about the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu. 
He points out that as soon as the coalition of Islamist units defeated the Soviet Union forces in 
Afghanistan, they started fighting amongst themselves for power. If he knew this history, he 
contends, he would have been able to surmise that the Shari‘a courts were going to end up just like 
the mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan. But he was blind to such considerations because of the 
weight of insecurity, which put him and everyone else in Mogadishu in a state of panic. It’s worth 
noting that Agon didn’t mention specific wrongs that the Shari‘a courts themselves committed. 
When he mentions wrongs committed, it was al-Shabaab, an organization that was very distinct 
from the courts, that was the perpetrator. However, because the experience of the Shari‘a courts 
has been subsumed within and framed by the events that have followed since, including the 
internationalization of the Somali conflict under the GWOT, the uniqueness of the Shari‘a courts 
as expression of autonomous and communal self-governance is often long forgotten. The 
aspirations of a Shari‘a governed future society where justice prevailed, which the Shari‘a courts 
summoned, is now lived and experienced as the nightmare of a present characterized by insecurity, 
fear, uncertainty, and suspicion.  
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During my field work, Mogadishu was the epicenter of a conflict between a weak 
government, which barely controlled the capital city even with the support of the “international 
community,” and a militant Islamist group, al-Shabaab, which stubbornly continuous to wage a 
deadly campaign of attacks despite prophecies by “experts” that its demise is imminent. The 
government is supported and protected by the forces of the African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM), a regional “peacekeeping” mission operated by the African Union with the approval 
of the United Nations. This force, which number over 20,000, are armed, trained, and funded 
primarily by the U.S. and E.U. With the help of AMISOM forces, al-Shabaab has been driven out 
of most urban centers, but it still controls large swathes of rural areas in southern Somalia. From 
their bases in the bushes they stage direct attacks on isolated military outposts, suicide commando 
raids on government and U.N. buildings in urban centers, suicide bombings on restaurants and 
hotels, and assassinations of anyone associated with the government and its international backers. 
As the biggest city in southern Somalia, Mogadishu is the epicenter of this conflict. For the people 
of Mogadishu, this conflict means living with the ever-present reality that a bomb could go off or 
an attack could take place at anytime and anywhere. This has created an environment where fear 
and suspicion have become so ubiquitous that they affect almost every aspect of social life.  
Observers often comment how quickly the rhythm of life returns to its normal routine after 
a major attack in war-ravaged cities like Mogadishu. But what these observers fail to notice is how 
every attack jolts people back to the reality of the danger and insecurity of their lives which they 
desperately try to forget. The quickness with which the daily rhythm of life returns is partly a 
reflection of the fact that life must continue, but it also indexes a desperate desire for things to be 
normal. But despite such desire, every attack infuses social life with fear and suspicion. This fear 
and suspicion spread in specific ways. One way fear and suspicion is expressed and spread is 
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through constant and running commentary on every major attack and suicide bombing that takes 
place. When major attacks occur they don’t just end there. For days they continue to constitute the 
major theme of conversation and commentary in gatherings small and large. Since both the 
government and al-Shabaab are engaged in misinformation, neither of them can be relied for the 
“truth” regarding an attack. People, therefore, try to gather as much information as possible from 
as many sources as they can to gain an adequate understanding of the attack. This is necessary 
because it’s through an analysis of such attacks that people make their own calculations as to who 
has the upper hand in this constantly seesawing conflict, and to know the sort of security 
precautions they should take to avoid becoming a casualty in this war.  
In conversations about such attacks, often carried in hushed tones in small groups, people 
want to know more about the casualties, the target of the attack, why it was targeted, who was 
behind the attack, how it was carried out, what the security forces of the government did or didn’t 
do, and what they could have done. Within a few hours after such an attack, there are usually 
pictures circulating online posted by the government, al-Shabaab, the news media, or regular 
people. These pictures provide hints regarding the sophistication of the attack, the casualties, and 
identities of the perpetrators. People go online, listen to local radio stations, call friends or family 
members who might have better information, or gather in small groups in their houses or business 
establishments. One of the first things that people begin to discuss are the names of the victims of 
such attacks. Upon finding out the names of victims everyone begins to talk about those among 
the victims whom they personally knew or met, even if only once. They talk about the kind of 
person the victim was and when they saw her/him last, and if they had any future plans to interact 
with that person. What such conversations about the victims do is to bring the attack much closer. 
One feels especially touched by the attack not only because one is devastated and mourns for the 
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victims, but one also feels touched by the attack in a more direct way. This happened to me once. 
I was scheduled to meet and interview a man when I heard that he was one of the victims of a 
suicide bombing in a hotel. I didn’t know the man and never spoke to him. Nevertheless, for days 
after the attack, the precarity of life in Mogadishu and the fact that I might, at any moment, fall 
victim to such attacks was so acutely present that I found it difficult to leave my place of residence.  
Another way in which fear spreads after such attacks is the constant remarks about one’s 
connections to or physical proximity to the location of the attack. Such talk underlines how close 
one was to becoming a victim. People often talk about how close they were to the location of the 
attack when the attack happened. They also talk about how close they could have been. For 
instance, one might remark that s/he was at the site of the attack a few hours or days before the 
attack. Or might mention that s/he was in the process of going to the site. All this is to underline 
that had the attack happened a few hours or days before or after anyone of the people conversing 
could have been victims of the attack. Through such conversations attacks reverberate through 
society spreading fear and suspicion. It’s almost as if everyone dies just a little after every major 
attack.  
In their small gatherings people also talk about the tactics the attackers used to break 
through the defenses of the government. Such conversations revolve around the clever schemes 
the Shabaab use to outmaneuver the government and gain access to their target locations, and the 
laziness and reactionary nature of the government’s response. After major attacks there are in-
depth conversations regarding the tactics used by the attackers. A constant theme is how the 
Shabaab always have an inside help. This adds to the sense that al-Shabaab is very much present 
in every sector of society, including the government itself. There are plenty of stories that portray 
in an almost humorous fashion the omnipresence of al-Shabaab. One such story is about a man 
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who worked for the government inside Villa Somalia, official residential palace and principle 
workplace of the President of Somalia, and therefore one of the most heavily guarded compounds 
in Mogadishu. One day while out and about in the city the man was captured, blindfolded, and 
taken to a house by a group of men. The men, whose faces were all covered, told him that they 
were al-Shabaab and they knew he worked for the government. A fact which rendered him an 
apostate and an enemy in their eyes. They informed him, however, that they were willing to spare 
his life if he agreed to give half his monthly salary to al-Shabaab. Relieved to know that they were 
willing to spare his life, he gladly took the offer and was let go. After giving it some thought, the 
man decided to renege on the deal thinking that he was safe. At the end of the month when he went 
to collect his salary, he was given only half of his monthly salary by the government official 
handing out salaries. When he enquired where the rest of his money went, the man who was giving 
out the salary asked him, didn’t you promise to “donate” half your salary? Astounded, the man 
simply walked away, left his job, and fled the country. This is just one of many stories that speak 
to al-Shabaab’s ubiquitous presence. Every time there is a successful attack by them it occasions 
yet another round of commentary and conversations around their omnipresence, further spreading 
fear and suspicion throughout the city.  
The constant bombings and assassinations and the pervasive fear and suspicion that 
characterize everyday life in Mogadishu has resulted in the emergence of well-known tactics and 
strategies for survival. One of the most important pieces of advice that people share with you is to 
never look like you are new to the city. Both the government and al-Shabaab are very wary of 
anyone who appears, either by their dress or physical appearance or mannerism, new to the city. 
The government is suspicious of unfamiliar faces because it’s said that al-Shabaab uses young men 
from other parts of the country or even from outside the country to carryout attacks in Mogadishu. 
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Similarly, the Shabaab are also very distrustful of the sudden appearance of a stranger in the city. 
They suspect that such a person might be a spy for the government or foreign entities. Both 
antagonists in the conflict are therefore on the lookout for people who are unfamiliar. To avoid 
becoming a victim to either of them, people in Mogadishu try their best not to do anything that 
would make them stand out. For example, a new comer is advised not to look up or around when 
you are walking in the streets or dress in ways that make you standout.   
Another strategy for staying alive in this war-ravaged city is to never answer a call from 
an unknown number. Al-Shabaab carries out assassinations on a daily basis targeting anyone with 
connections to the government or the various NGOs and UN offices that work with the 
government. The assassins frequently do not know the person they are killing or the reason why 
the person is being killed. One of the ways these assassinations are carried out is a group of two 
or three Shabaab members are told to go to a particular location and they are given a number to 
call at a designated time. The number they are told to call is the cell phone of the target person. 
Only when they make the call and the target person answers the call do they know the person they 
are to assissinate. Once the call is answered and the target is identified, they proceed to carry out 
the murder. As a result, Mogadishu residents say you should never answer a call from an unknown 
caller. This is specially the case when you are outside your house. As is usual there are stories 
shared to bring this lesson home. Whether the story actually happened is beside the point. There 
is a story about two friends: one from the diaspora and the other a local. The local man worked 
with a Western NGO, which made him, as far as al-Shabaab was concerned, an enemy. One day 
the two friends were sitting in a restaurant when all the sudden the local man’s cell phone rang. 
Realizing that he didn’t know the caller, the local man simply ignored the call. A few minutes later 
the phone rang again, and again he looked away from the vibrating phone. Confused, the diaspora 
A h m e d  I b r a h i m  
 
Page | 273  
 
man enquired why his friend was ignoring the call. The friend told him to just let it go. The phone 
rang again for a third time, and again the local man declined to answer it. Agitated by it all, the 
diaspora man picked up the phone and answered the call. Soon as he answered, the caller hanged 
up. A few minutes later someone walked up to the man who answer the phone, shot him multiple 
times, and walked away. 
Another strategy for survival in the midst of this conflict is to try to do your utmost to not 
only remain neutral in the conflict but to appear entirely unconcerned and uncurious about the 
conflict at all. But this is much more difficult than it appears because the very language that is used 
to describe events or groups is itself part of the conflict. Consequently, one can easily get 
implicated in the conflict, regardless of whether one is impartial or otherwise. The situation is 
made more difficult when both the government and al-Shabaab demand that their derogatory labels 
of each other be used by everyone else. For instance, the government’s label for al-Shabaab is 
khawarijuun or “heretics,” while al-Shabaab calls the government and anyone associated with it 
murtidiin or “apostates.” During my fieldwork in Mogadishu, the government put out a decree that 
from then on al-Shabaab were to be called UGUS, an acronym from the Somali name Ururka 
Gumaadka Ummada Soomaaliyeed (The Organization that Massacres the Somali People). The 
government ordered the media to stop using the name al-Shabaab, and instead to call the group 
UGUS. Not surprisingly, al-Shabaab declared that anyone calling it UGUS would be considered 
an enemy. One man’s advice to me in response to the government’s decree was not only that I 
should I not use the label UGUS to refer to al-Shabaab, but I should do all I could to forget the 
acronym lest my tongue gets used to it and I utter it unintentionally. For their part, al-Shabaab 
demand that they be referred to as mujahideen (those engaged in jihad).  
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To avoid this dilemma, people in Mogadishu try to avoid engaging any conversation that 
might involve the conflict, except with close friends and family, and preferably in the safety of 
their homes. This strategy is necessary because it’s widely assumed that both the government and 
al-Shabaab have spies and sympathizers everywhere. The basic assumption is that you should 
always assume the person next to you could be anyone. Another way to avoid being caught up in 
this predicament is by using labels that are outside the language war of the government and al-
Shabaab. One such name, popular especially among young people, is Arsenal for al-Shabaab. 
Arsenal is an English Premiere League soccer team. The team is known for the youthfulness of its 
players, which might explain why it’s used in place of al-Shabaab. Such names are attractive 
because they aren’t associated with either of the conflicting parties and are value neutral, making 
them safe to use.  
 Such is the life people lead in one of the frontline cities in the GWOT. The harrowing 
conditions of their life has led many people to invest their hopes in the rise of a strong state that 
could win the war against al-Shabaab and ensure their security. Despite the attempts to guard 
against the expression of this sentiment for fear of al-Shabaab, you see this hope expressed in the 
silent delight and satisfaction when the government announces, as it often does, that a potential 
suicide bomber had been apprehended. You also see this wish expressed in the nostalgia narratives 
of the now-gone postcolonial Somali state of the 1970s and 80s. The long-time military dictator 
Mohamed Siyad Barre is now remembered as a hero and a capable leader unlike the squabbling 
petty politicians of today. You see this hope on display in the collective excitement and 
celebrations of the people every time a new president is selected by parliament. The selection of 
new leaders provides a brief moment of relief from the disappointment of the last administration, 
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and a reason for hope despite all evidence to the contrary. But what will this hoped-for state look 
like? 
 The signs are all pointing to the formation of a neo-liberal security state if, and that is a big 
if, the current state-building project of the “international community” succeeds. There are two 
objectives the achievement of which are assumed would entail a successful state-building project: 
a strong military force which can defeat al-Shabaab and hold the territory to prevent the re-
emergence of militant Islamists; the creation of state institutions capable of generating revenue 
from the land and the people to sustain the state. To achieve the first goal, a strong military, there 
are a number of countries, including the U.S., E.U., and Turkey, that are each training and funding 
different components of the military and security forces. The forces are armed and paid, when they 
are paid, by the respective foreign countries that train them. In some cases the chain of command 
of each of these forces goes directly to the foreign country in question.  
To achieve the second goal, revenue generation, the Somali government has turned to 
selling or leasing national resources to multinational corporations. The government in Mogadishu 
is incapable of generating revenue from the levying of taxes on everyday transactions because of 
insecurity. So its best hope for generating revenue is from selling national resources like oil, fishing 
rights, and land, or leasing sea and air ports. For example, the major air and sea ports in Mogadishu 
are operated by Turkish companies. The company shares part of the revenue with the central 
government. Predictably, the selling and leasing of these resources often leads to the economic 
displacement of the local population. This happened during my fieldwork in 2015, when the 
seaport of Mogadishu was turned over to a Turkish company and thousands of porters were let go. 
Despite the complaints and protests of the porters, the leasing of the port went ahead. It thus 
appears that a successful state-building project in Somalia will establish security-oriented 
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neoliberal state, whose security forces are largely unaccountable and whose economic policies 
result in the economic disenfranchisement of large segments of the population.  
Despite the problems mentioned above, people in Mogadishu are today yearning for a 
powerful security state as an antidote to the insecurity and fear of the present. Never mind that 
such a state will in the long run pose its own forms of subjugation. It’s sought as a remedy for 
today’s suffering because it’s the only game in town. There was a brief moment, however, when 
history conspired to offer a different political future based on a form of governance and 
organization that was distinctly different from the neoliberal security state whose roots are being 
planted today. I tried to argue in this dissertation that the Shari‘a courts of Mogadishu, which 
existed from 1992 to 2006, represented that brief historical moment when a different political 
future was imagined and experimented with. The transformation of the courts into the Union of 
Islamic Courts (UICs) in 2006 was an interesting political phenomenon, but we will never know 
what kind of political formation the UICs would have become since it was upended within six 
months of coming into existence. The fact that the novelty of the Shari‘a courts is completely 
forgotten today speaks to the dominance of the nation-state form as the organizing principle of 
global politics today. 
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